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The gift of
UNTVERSITY OF CHICAGO
HARVARD COLLEGELlBRARY35?U
THE DECENNIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
THE DECENNIAL PUBLICATI0N9
KITID *V A COMIHTTEK APPOIlfTKD BV THB SE» ATE
ni-muLi-r» JAOjcita b
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THBSE VOLUMES ARE DEDICATED
TO THE MEN AND WOMEN OP OUR TIME AND COUNTRY WHO BY WISE AND GENEROÜ8 GIVING HA VE ENCOURAGED THE 8EARCH AFTEB TBUTH IN ALL DEPABTMENTS OF KNOWLEDOB
4M
HISTORY OF THE GREENBACKS
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*- ..
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A HISTORY OF THE x GREENBACKS // é+r
WITH SPECIAL BEPERENCE TO THE EOONOMIC OONSEQÜENCES OF THEIR ISSUE: 1862-66
t
D
WESLEY CLAIR MITCHELL
OF THE DKPABTMENT OF POtJTICAL KCONOMT
THE DECENNIAL PÜBLICATION8 8ECOND SERIES VOLÜME IX
CHICAGO THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
1903
TO J. W. M. AND L. M. M.
PREFACE
Apologies must be made both for the bulkiness and for the fragmentary character of the following monograph. Theee defects are due to the same canse: an attempt to utilize all the well-authenticated statistical material bearing apon the subjects treatecL The amonnt of labor entailed by this attempt was so large that I have been nnable to carry the discnssion beyond the first fonr years in the history of the greenbacks. Even within this brief period two impor- tan t topics are passed over. Nothing is said of the effects of the greenbacks upon foreign traHe, and nb comparisons are made between American and foreign experiences with paper money,. The former topic is omitted from lack of time to get the refractory statistical data relating to it into significan t shape ; indeed, my dealings with the figures incline me to donbt whether any other than a speculative treatment is feasible. As for the latter topic, I soon discovered that foreign comparisons presented too large a snbject to be dealt with as a side issue in such a monograph as the present Moreover, the conseqnences of the abandonment of the specie standard in which I have been most interested are such as can be traced only when one has much fuller information regarding pnces, wages, and the like than are available to the student of foreign experimenta with inconvertible paper currencies.
All of the statistical data employed in the course of the discnssion are presented at length in the Appendix in such form that they can be readily verified, or employed in new combinations. The tables have passed through the hands of two computers. While I can hardly hope that no errors
zi
xii Pbeface
of transcription, computation, or printing remain uncor- rected, I should be surprised to find any of sufficient consequence to affect the validity of the conclusions drawn.
Four of the chapters have appeared at various dates as articles in the Journal of Political Economy, and one has been reprinted in Sound Currency and the Report of the Indianapolis Monetary Commission. Three of these articles have been entirely rewritten, and the fourth has been care- fully revised.
Professor J. Laurence Laughlin and Dr. Herbert J. Davenport, of the Univereity of Chicago, and Professor T. S. Adams, of the University of Wisconsin, have read differ- ent parts of the book and made valuable suggestions and criticisms. Misa Mande L. Radford, of University College, Chicago, has looked over all the chapters and done what she could to amend crudities of expression. My thanks are also dne to the late Professor Charles F. Dunbar, and to Colonel Carroll D. Wright, for answers to troublesome inquines by
letter.
W. C. M. UiravKBSiTY of California.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART I. HISTORY OP THE LEGAL-TENDER ACTS
Chapteb I. The Suspensión of Specie Payments 3
i. State of the Finances, March, 1861. ii. Chase's Administraron of the Treasury, March to June,
1861. ni. Financial Legislatura of the Extra Session of Congress. iv. The $150,000,000 Bank Loan.
Chapteb II. The First Legal-Tender Act .... 44 1. The Legal-Tender Bills. 11. Debate in Congress. ni. Attitude of Secretary Chase, iv. Passage of the Act
Chapteb III. The Second Legal-Tender Act 82
1. Government Finances, January to June, 1862. 11. The Second Legal-Tender Act. ni. The Postage Currency Act.
Chapteb IV. The Third Legal-Tender Act - 100
1. The Finances from July to December, 1862. 11. The Joint Resolution of January 17, 1863. ni. The Third Legal-Tender Act
Chapteb V. How Further Issuesof Greenbacks Were Avoided
in 1864 and 1865 119
1. The Congressional Pledge to Issue no More U. S. Notes.
11. Financial Difficulties of 1864.
ni. Secretary McCulloch and the Alley Resolution.
iv. Recapitularon.
PART II. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE LEGAL- TENDER ACTS
Chapteb I. Preliminary Sketch 135
Chapteb II. The Circulating Médium .... 141
1. Gold and Silver Coin. 11. Bank Notes. 111. Oíd Demand Notes.
• • •
Xlll
xiv Table of Contents
iv. " Shinplasters" and Fractional Currency.
v. Minor Coins.
vi. Treasury Notes.
vil Recapitulation.
Chapteb III. The Specie Valué of the Paper Currency - 182 1. The Markets for Goíd. "*""" "
11. Factors Which Affected the Gold Price of the Currency. ni. The Course of Depreciation, January, 1862, to December, 1865.
Chapteb IV. Pnces 239
1. Falkner's Table of Relativo Prices. 11. A New Table of Relativo Prices by Quarters. ni. Relativo Prices Paid by the Federal Government for
Supplies. rv. Relativo Prices of Various Necessities at Retail. v. General Causes of Price Fluctuations Other than the
Currency. vi. The Currency as a Cause of the Price Fluctuations.
Chapteb V. Wages 280
1. Falkner's Table of Relativo Wages. 11. Scope of the Data Concerning Wages in Table XII of
the Aldrich Report. ni. New Tablea of Relativo Money Wages Based upon the
Data in Table XII of the Aldrich Report iv. Relativo Money Wages in the Coal, Iron, Glass, and
Pottery Industries, v. Relativo Salaries of School-Teachors. vi. Relativo Wages of Farm Laborera, vil. Tablea of Relativo Money Wages Based upon the Mate- rial in VoL XX of the Tenth Census. viii. Pay of Government Employeos. ix. Increase in Living Expenses. x. Relativo Real Wages. xi. Conclusión.
Chapteb VI. jtent 352
1. Urban Renta. 11. Farm Renta.
Chapteb VII. Interest and Loan Capital - 860
1. The Problem of Lenders and Borrowere of Capital. 11. Purchasing Power of the Principal of Loans. ni. The Rato of Interest
Table of Contents XV
ChaptebVIII. Profite 380
l Profite as a Share in the Distributíon of the Product. il Profite in Different Industries. iil Statistical Evidence Regarding Profite.
CbaPTEB IX. The Prodliction and Qnngnmptinn nf Wfíftlth - 392 —j L Production. il Consumptíon.
ChaptebX. JTheGreenbacks and the Cost of the Civü War 403 l The Problem and the Method of Solution. n. The Greenbacks and Expenditures. iil The Greenbacks and Receipts. iv. The Greenbacks and the Public Debt. '/■ -
-^j
v. Conclusión. ->
/
Li
STATISTICAL APPENDICES
Appendix A. Gold Valué of the Paper Currency, 1862-65 - 423 Table 1. Monthly Highest, Average, and Lowest Gold
Price of $100 of Paper Money in the New
York Market. Table 2. Daily Highest and Lowest Valué in Gold of $100
in Currency.
Appendix 8. Relative Pnces of Commodities - 429
Table 1. Relative Prices of Farm Products. Table 2. Relative Prices of Various Commodities at
Wholesale. Table 3. Relative Prices paid by Federal Government
for Supplies. Table 4. Relative Prices of Various Commodities at
Retail. Table 5. Comparison of the Relative Prices of Twenty-
three Commodities at Wholesale and at Retail.
Appendix C. Relative Wages 470
Table 1. Wage-Series from Table XII of the Aldrich
Report. Table 2. Wage-Series from Vol. XX of the Tenth Census. Table 3. Relative Salaries of School-Teachers.
Ixdex 569
xvi Table op Contents
Chabts —
Chabt I. Graphic Illustration of the Effect upon the
New York Banks of the $150,000,000 Loan - 31
Chabt II. Fluctuations in the Gold Valué of $100 in
American Paper Money from January, 1862, to December, 1865 211
Chabt III. Relativo Prices at Wholesale and the Valué
of Gold Coin in Currency ... - 277
PART I
HISTORY OF THE LEGAL TENDER ACTS
CHAPTER I THE SUSPENSIÓN OP SPECIE PAYMENTS
I. State of the Finances, March, 1861:
Appointment of Secretary Chase — Financial Difficulties Inheríted from the Buchanan Administration — Morrill Tariff Act.
II. Chote* i Administration of the Treasury, March to June, 1861: Improvement in the Credit of the Government — Chase's Attempts to Borrow.
III. Financial Legislation of the Extra Session of Congress: Chase's Program — Loan and Tax Laws — Inadequacy of Taxes Levied.
IV. The $150 ¿XX) ¿XX) Bank Loan:
Why Chase Applied to the Banks — Plan of the Bank Loan— Chase's Refusal to Draw on Banks and his Issue of Treasury Notes — Effect of the Loan on Condition of the Banks— Second $50,000,000 Loan — Third $50,000,000 Loan — Effect of Finance Report and Trent Affair — Depletion of Bank Reserves and Suspensión of Specie Payments.
I. STATE OF THE FINANCES, MABCH, 1861
On the day after his inaugnration President Lincoln sent to the Senate the nomination of Salmón P. Chase, of Ohio, as secretary of the treasury. Political considerations were of chief weight in determining this appointment. Mr. Lincoln perceived that the support of the various elements of which the young Republican party was compounded would t* necessary to secare the success of his administration. So Seward, the recognized leader of the radical wing of the party, was made secretary of state; and Chase, the most prominent representative of the conservativo wing composed ot anti-slavery Demócrata, became secretary of the treasury.1
In addition to political availability, Mr. Lincoln thought Chase possessed peculiar personal qualifications for the
1 Cf. Nioolat and Hay, Abraham Lincoln, A Hhtory (New York, 1890), Vol. III. puJM.
3
i HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS
position. True, his thirty years* connection with the Cin- cinnati bar, and the term in the Senate and two terms as governor of Ohio, that constituted his experience of public affairs, had brought him little familiarity with fiscal ques- tions. But they had shown that he had a clear intellect, administrative ability, and untiring industry. And, above all, they had given him a ñame for strict integrity that would be of especial weight in gaining the public confidence indispensable to success in the management of the then dis- credited treasury. Though Mr. Chase brought with him little knowledge of financial administration, his mind was deeply impressed with certain financial theories. From his former Democratic affiliations he had imbibed the "hard- money " principies of Jackson and Benton and their dislike for paper currencies. Personal observation of the unsound methods of banking then prevalent in the western states had strengthened these convictions and inspired in him an indiscriminating distrust of the issues of all banks whatso- ever. The early suspensión of specie payments and issue of an irredeemable currency of legal tender paper in the Civil War occurred, then, under the administration of a secretary of the treasury who cherished a strong predilection for metallic money.1
It was with great reluctance that Mr. Chase resigned his seat in the Senate to undertake the arduous task of manag- ing the treasury in the face of th reate ning war.s The diffi-
1 Three considerable biojrraphies of Chaire haré been published, ooe by Robeet B. W arden*. An Accxmnt of the Privóte Life and Public Service» of Salmón Portland Chote. Cincinnati, 1874; í>to, pp. xxiii -r 83$ (raluable chiefiy for copióos extracta from Mr. Chase's prívate papers) ; the secood by J. W. Schtckers. Life and PuMic Service* of S. P. Chase^ Xew York, lí*74 ; 8to, pp. xv -+■ 669; the third by Professo* A. R Hart, Saimón Portland Chase ("American Statesroen" Series \ Boston and Xew York, 18»; 8\u pp. xi — ¥&, See abo HüOH McOclloch. Xen and iíeomno» of Half a (Yntum ,X« w York, 1888\ chap, xtí, and W. M. Etart*, EuU>gf on Chase* appcnded to íh hk kkks'í Life*
- Cf. Chase** letter to the frorernor of Ohio. ScUvoker*, ojv ctí.. p. 307, and letter of F. A. Conklinir to E. G. Spauldinj?, Octobor 17, IS7\ in SrAri-Dlxo, History of the Legal Tender Paper Money Issued durtng the Grent Kcbcihon, 2d ed. i Baílalo, 1875), Appendix. p. bi.
Suspensión op Specie Payments 5
culties of his position were increased by the disorganized condition in which the federal finances had been left by the preceding administration. When Mr. Buchanan was inaug- urated his secretary of the treasury, Howell Cobb, of Georgia, found himself embarrassed by a redundant revenue, to reduce which Congress had just passed the tariff act of March, 1857, lowering the duties npon imports. Unfortu- nately the financial crisis of 1857 and the commencement of the Mormon troubles followed hard upon the date when the new tariff took effect ; the one, in conjunction with the new tariff, decreased the treasury receipts from customs by a quarter, the other increased the expenses of the War Depart- ment So, instead of a surplus the fiscal year 1858 pre- aented a déficit in the revenue.1
To meet the shortage Congress authorized the issue of $20,000,000 of one-year treasury notes.2 As the déficit recurred the next year, a fifteen-year loan of $20,000,000 was made;1 and in March, 1859, when the one-year treasury notes began to fall due, it was necessary to extend their term to July, 1860/ Even by that time the financial situa- tion had not improved sufficiently to enable the government to pay the notes out of revenue, and another loan of $21,000,000 had to be authorized to procure the necessary funds.*
Early in September, 1860, Secretary Cobb invited bids for $10,000,000 of this loan, a sum sufficient to meet the notes coming due before January, 1861. When the bids were opened, October 22, it was found that the whole sum had been taken at par or at a small premium. Payment of the subscriptions was to be made thirty days later. But in
i Repori of the Secretary of the Treasury, Docembor, 1H58, pp. 3, 4.
* Act of Decembcr 23, 1857, 11 Statute* at Large, p. 257.
> Act of June 14, 1858, ibid., p. 365. * Act of March 3, 1859, ibid.% p. 430.
* Act of Jone 22, 1860, 12 Statute* at Large, p. 79.
6 HlSTOBY OP THE GBEENBACKS
November Mr. Lincoln's election was followed by threats of secession from the southern presa. A suelden business revulsión resulted, for everyone was anxious to prepare his affairs for the coming storm.1 The subscribers to the loan were timid and embarrassed. To encourage them, Cobb ofFered an additional thirty days for making payments to all who would deposit one-half of their bids on the appointed day. Though most of the bidders accepted the offer, some preferred to forfeit the 1 per cent, deposita sent in with the bids rather than to take the bonds. From the $10,000,000 offered the treasury realized only $7,022,000.*
Convinced by this ill-success that an attempt to negotiate the remaining $11,000,000 of the loan would fail, Cobb requested Congress to substituto treasury notes for the bonds and to pledge the publie lands unconditionally for their redemption. Further, he asked authority for a new loan of $10,000,000 to supply the déficit in the revenues due to the contraction of business.* Six days after sending this report to Congress Cobb resigned, giving as his reason that Georgia required his services.' Going home, he entered the campaign to persuade his state to secede, and a little later became vice-president of the Confederacy.
President Buchanan appointed as Cobb's successor Philip F. Thomas, of Maryland. Despite the change in secretaries, Congress acted on the second of Cobb's recommendations by authorizing the issue of $10,000,000 of one-year treasury notes at par to those bidders who would accept the lowest rates of interest.5 The day after the act was approved,
i Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, Decombor, 1860, p. 7 ; cf. W. G. Sumneb, A Hitiory of American Currency (New York, 1875), p. 189.
2 Report of the Secretary [of the Treasury, Decombor, 1860, pp. 8, 9, and 480-83; Senate Exccutive Document No. 2, p. 11, 37 th Cong., lst Sess.
3 Rej>ort of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1860, p. 9.
« E. McPRERBON, Political History of the JRtMIn^ 4th ed. (Washington, 1882), p. 2S.
'-> Act of December 17, 1860, 12 Statutes at Large, p. 121.
Suspensión op Specie Payments
Thomas invitad proposals for one-half of this loan. The responso showed how low the national credit had snnk; $1,831,000 was offered at 12 per cent, or lesa; $465,000 more at ratee between 15 and 36 per cent. All offers at 12 per cent, or under were accepted.1
To explain why the government was compelled to pay such high ratea of interest is not difficult. Public confi- dence in the Buchanan administration was shaken; particu- larly, confidence in the management of the Treasnry Depart- ment which for fonr years had been contracting debts to meet annually recnrring déficits. The check to business following the election in November had intensified the nneasinees. One secretary of the treasnry had resignad to aid the secession movement; his successor was distrusted as a southern sympathizer. Sonth Carolina had already adopted the ordinance of secession; other states were on the eve of following her example. At Washington there was disorganization and indecisión. Under such circumstances it was natural that there should be hesitation in New York about lending to the government.
Bnt the needs of the government were imperativo. The fnll amount of the five millions offered was required to meet the treasnry notes and interest on the debt dne Jannary 1. Foreseeing the failure of the public snb- scription, Mr. Cisco, the head of the subtreasury at New York, indnced the New York banks to take at 12 per cent, interest whatever part of the $5,000,000 might not be bid for. Their offer was accepted by Secretary Thomas.2 After the banks had paid a part of the money into the treasnry they became convinced that Thomas intended uto transfer the money into the confedérate región where it would be captured." Accordingly, they withheld payment of the
i B. R. Mitcellaneou» Document No. 20, p. 3, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 /WdM loe. cit.
HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS
next instalment and sent representatives to confer with Mr. Buchanan.1 The result was that Thomas resigned, ostensi- bly because he could not agree with the presiden t "in the measures .... adopted in reference to the .... condition of things in South Carolina." 2 He was succeeded January 11 by General John A. Dix — a man who commanded the full confídence of the North — and the balance of the loan was paicL
Dix found the treasury empty, $350,000 of unpaid war- rants accumulated, and a déficit in the revenue which was expected to reach nearly $27,000,000 by the end of June.* To meet immediate requirements he offered the remaining half of the $10,000,000 treasury-note loan authorized the preceding December. An improvement in the credit of the government was indicated by the fact that whereas 12 per cent, interest had been paid for the first $5,000,000, the second was borrowed at an average rate of lOf per cent.4
But the sum thus realizad did not last long and further borrowing became necessary. Judging from Cobb's failure that it would be impossible to negotiate the balance of the $21,000,000 loan of June 22, 1860, under the terms of the law which forbade the sale of stock below par, Dix applied to Congress to authorize a new bond issue. He even suggested calling on the states to return the $28,000,000 of surplus revenue deposited with them in 1836.* Congress, however, would only pass a $25,000,000 loan act.e Dix then urged
1 Correspondence between Mr. Oeorge S. Coe, one of the bankers concerned, and E. O. Spaalding, in H. Kino, Tumingon the Light (Philadelphia, 1895), pp. 186-9.
*Letter of resignation, G. T. Curtís, Life of Jame» Buchanan (New York, 1883), Yol. II, p. 404.
* Cf. Dix's lettcr to the chairarían of the Committee c»n Ways and Meaos, H. R. Miscellaneou» Document No. 20, 36th Cong., 2d Sosa.
« Cf. J. J. Knox, United States Aofe», 2d cd. (London, 18%), p. 76.
* H. R. MUcellaneou* Document No. »), p. 6, 36th Cong., 2d Sess.
* Act of February 8, 1861, 12 Statute* at Large% p. 129. Tho bonds were to bear 6 per cent, interest and " to be reimbnrsod within a period not beyond twenty years and not leas than ten years."— Sec. 2.
Suspensión op Speoie Payments 9
that the states be permitted to add the pledge of their faith to that of the federal govemment for the repayment of the loan; but the House refused to consider a bilí for this par- póse.1 Nevertheless, when bids for $8,000,000 of the new loan were invited in February, the whole sum was sabscribed ontenns that made the average rate of interest 6.63 per cent, indicating a forther improvement in the national credit*
Such small loans, however, could afford but temporary
reliei The real cüfficulty was the insuíficient revenue. Tostop
the necessity of borrowing by increasing the treasury receipts
was the nominal parpóse of the last important law passed
during the Buchanan administration. Bills to raise duties
on imports had been presented at every session of Congress
rince 1858; but all had failed of adoption, until, shortly
before the presidential election of 1860, the Morrill tariff
act passed the House. It was not taken up by the Senate until
the following session, and even then its progress for a time
was blockecL But finally, after many of the southern sena-
tors had left Washington, it was passed and became a law
two days before the cióse of Mr. Buchanan's term.3
As a revenue measure the new schedule was foredoomed to f ailure. The heaviest duties were levied on articles largely produced in the United States ; sugar and molasses were lightly taxed, while coffee, tea, and wool worth less than 18 cents per ponnd, were entirely free. Revenue was thus sacrificed to protection. During the quarter, January-March, the customs receipts were $9,800,000; in the succeeding three
» Conffrenional Olobe, 36th Coog., 2d Sess., pp. 871, 872.
3 Bids were received for $14,460,250 at the ratos ranging f rom 75 to 96.10. Of these bids 18,008,000 were accepted, all below 90.15 being rofused.— Senate Executive Docu- wnent So. 2, pp. 19-90, 37th Cong., lst Sess. The average rate was 90.478.— Ba y ley, Saturnal Loans of the United Statet, p. 151.
•Act of March 2, 1861, 12 Statutes at Large, p. 178. Cf. F. W. Taüssio. Tariff of the United State», 2d ed. (New York, 1893), p. 158. Sec. 1 of the act author- a loan of $10,000,000.
10 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAOKS
months, when the new tarifF was in eftect, they were $5,500,- 000 — a decrease of over 40 per cent1 Tima, instead of ímproving the position of the treasury, the new tarifF served only to increase the fínancial embarrassineot.*
II. CHASE's ADM1NISTRATION OF THE TBEASUBT, HABCH TO JUNE, 1861
It was at a time, then, when the reveuue of the govern- ment was ineafficient to pny Íts expenses even on a peace footing, and when distrust and freqnent borrowing had mnch impaired Íts credit, that Mr. Chase, with small ezperience of fínancial operations, nodertook to raisethe means forwaging a most expensive war. From Apríl to Jane the ordinary receipts of the treasury were $5,800,000, its expenditurea $23,500,000.' To fill the déficit there was bnt one reconrse — borrowing. Disadvantageons as were the tetros on which the recent loans had been pande, it was to a new loan that Mr. Chase was forced to resort.
On the whole, he was in a more favorable position for borrowing than Cobb, Thomas, or Díx had been. Trae, the political Bitnation had become more grave. Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texaa had fol- lowed South Carolina's example in seceding from the Union, and when the new administration was installed at Washing- ton it eaw itself confronted by a rival government in Mont- gomery. But to offset this, Bachanan, who had become thoroughly discredited in the North, had given place to
i Reporl of the Secretar? of ilie Trearury, Deeembsr, 1861, p. 30.
lOn the ooDdilioD of the finalices nt the eommencement of the CítíI W«r. cf. B. J. WlLin, American Finante» and Retourca (London, lüU) ¡ Voh Hocí, Die- Fituuuen uvl die Finanigachichte iler l'ertinigten Btaattn (8tutt««n, 1887], pp, 437-40: H. & Fíelo, Manarte* of Manguen and of .Sume Women (L*adon, 1874), pp. -J50-52; John Shehjhn, Reeollectioni cf Forty lean in the ¡¡otate. Señóte «d Cabinet (Chicago, líflj). VoL 1. pi>. 2SM¡ Ksoi. ap. eií-, pp. 704S; J. O. Blaihb, Tírenla Yeart cf amaren (Somich, C»tin.. 1W4), VoL I. pp. 396-401; A. 8. BOUM, Financial Hittnry of Ule United State* from ¡mi to ISSi (Now York. 1888), pp. 4-fl.
> Report of !he Secrctari/ of the Treatury, December, 1861, pp. 30-JÜ.
SU8PEN8ION OF SPECIB PAYMENT8 11
Lincoln, in whom the people reposed greater conñdence. In raising his fírst loan Mr. Chase had the beneñt of this feel- ing. Moreover, the credit of the government was improved by a temporary Lacrease of revenue. The Morrill tariff act, approved March 2, was to go into operation April 1. Import- ers took advantage of the intervening thirty days to pass their goods through the custom-houses as rapidly as possible in order to escape payment of the higher duties imposed by the new schedule, thus increasing the receipts from customs for the months of February and March.1
Under the existing laws the secretary had authority to borrow some $41,000,000. (1) Of the $21,000,000 loan of June 22, 1860, Cobb had negotiated $7,022,000, leaving a balance of $13,978,000 which could be issued in 6 per cent, twenty-year bonds — a resonrce available under the law, however, only when the bonds could be sold at par. (2) The two $5,000,000 treasury-note loans raised by Secretaries Thomas and Dix had exhausted the authority to borrow under the act of December 17, 1860 ; but (3) Dix had issued only $8,006,000 of the $25,000,000 of 6 per cent, stock provided for by the act of February 8, 1861. The disposal of the remainder of this stock — $16,994,000 — was not hampered by the customary provisión forbidding sales below par. (4) Finally, the opening sections of the Morrill tariff act author- ized a loan of $10,000,000 upon 6 per cent, ten-twenty-year bonds at par, or upon 6 per cent, treasury notes ; but the pro- ceeds of this loan could not be applied to the service of the current fiscal year which would end June 30, 1861. However, this act made the authority to borrow, existing under other laws, more available, by permitting the president " to substitute treasury notes of equal amount for the whole or any part of any of the loans for which he is now by law authorized to
i Cf. American Annual Cyclop&dia, 1861, p. 296, and Hunt's Merchante* Maga- zinc VoL XLIV, p. 666.
/
12 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS
contract and issue bonds." The treasury notes so issued were to bear interest at 0 per cent., be receivable for govern- ment dues, convertible at par into 6 per cent, bonds, and could be made redeemable at any time within two years ; but, like the bonds, they could not be issned to creditore or sold for coin at less than par.1
Mr. Chase began by advertising, on March 22, $8,000,000 of the 6 per cent, stock which, under the act of February 8, could be sold to the highest bidder.2 Ten days were allowed for making proposals. When the bids were opened, April 2, it was found that the loan had been subscribed three times over at rates ranging from 85 to par.* This indicated an encoura- ging improvement in the credit of the government, for the offers for an equal amount of the same stocks made to General Dix less than two months before varied from 75 to96.10 and amounted to $14,460,250, as compared with $27,182,000. But Mr. Chase thought the treasury notes, which he had authority to issue in lieu of the bonds, could be sold at better pricea* Consequently he accepted only the bids at 94 and above, amounting to $3,099,000, and on April 6 invited bids for the balance — $4,901,000 — in treasury notes.5 Unfortu- nately, the departure of the expedition to relieve Fort Sumter became known in the meantime. The news created much uneasiness, and when the bids were opened April 11, but one-fifth of the sum had been taken. Financiera who were interested in the success of the loan procured a delay, however,
i Act of March 2, 1881, Soo. 4, 12 Matute* at Laroe, p. 173. On Chase's authority to borrow, soo his roport of Jal y 4, 1861, Señóte Executive Document No. 2, p. 11, 37th Cong., lst Sess.
ZSenate Executive Document No. 2, p. SI, 87th Cong., lst Sess.
iSchedulo of bids, Í6i'd., pp. 32-49.
*Since tho treasury notes boro 6 per cent, intorost and were receivable for all government dúos, largo i m portera derived a proflt from investing in thom the monoy held in r<»adino.ss for tho payment of customs duties. Cf. American Annual Óyelo- perdía, 1861. p. 297.
sSenate Executive Document No. 2, pp. 11 and 50, 37 th Cong., lst Sess.
Suspensión op Speoie Payments 13
and by dint of their efforts subscriptions were secured for $5,340,000, of wfiicfh sum $2,500,000 were taken by a single New York bank.1
The means thus provided were soon exhausted by the large government disbarsements, and it became necessary to borro w again. On May 11 the balance of the 6 per cent, stock of the February loan — $8,994,000 — was advertised for sale.2 Bids carne in very slowly, and a failure of the subscription seemed probable. Such an event would have seriously affected the pnce of all government securities. In self-defense, the Chamberof Commerce of New York and the banks of New York and Boston carne to the aid of the treasury. A card was issued signed among others by J. J. Astor, August Belmont, James Gallatin, A. T. Stewart, Moees Taylor, and George 8. Coe, calling attention to the government loans and inviting "all capitalists and moneyed institutions to avail themselves of these opportuni- ties for investment."3 To give the committees appointed by the chamber and the banks more time to secure subscrip- tions, Mr. Chase postponed the opening of the bids four days, and also offered to consider bids for treasury notes at par in place of bonds, should that form of security be pre- ferred by any subscriber.4 Finally, bids ranging from 60 to 93 were obtained for $7,441,000 of the stock, and bids at par for $1,684,000 of the treasury notes. All the latter bids were accepted, and of the former all those at 85 or above — an amount of $7,310,000.5 From this loan of $8,994,000 the treasury realized the sum of $7,922,553.45.'
i /6tdM p. 51. Of course only $4,901,000 of the bids — the amount advertised — were accepted. The treasury realized $7,814,809.80 from $8,000,000 of securities sold. — /frttf., p. 11. See American Annual CyclopcRdia, 1861, p. 296, on the difficulty experienced in negotiating the treasury notes.
* Señóte Execuiive Document No. 2, p. 52, 37th Cong., lst Sess.
* American Annual Cyclopcedta, 1861, p. 297; cf. " Federal Finances Examined" i anón.), Hunfi Merchante' Magazine, Vol. XLVII, p. 504; and ¡hid.% Vol. XLIV, p. 791.
* Señale Executivc Documcnt No. 2, p. 53, 37th Cong., lst Sess. » Ibid., pp. 58 and 60. « Jbid.% p. 11.
14 HlSTOBY OF THE GBEENBAOK8
Requiring still more money, the secretary asked for pro- posals for the balance of the 6 per cent, twenty-year loan of June 22, 1860, amounting to $ 13,978,00o.1 As 6 per cent government bonds could then be bought in the market at 84, the off er of this stock which the act forbade to be sold below par was a mere formality; but, by advertising the bonds, Mr. Chase complied with the terms of the law, and was ena- bled to issue treasnry notes for the full sum.' Three bids, aggregating $12,000, were received ; but they had been made under misapprehension and were withdrawn." On account of this loan, however, Mr. Chase issued, by the end of June, $2,584,550 in treasury notes at par.4
Finally, just before Congress met, the treasury was again in need. Five million dollars were required to carry it along until new means of securing funds could be devised. As the two-year treasury notes were selling at a discount of 2 to 2£ per cent., they were not directly available. But the banks agreed to advance the amount required for sixty days and take 6 per cent, treasury notes as collateral security.6
Two points in this review of the operations of the secre- tajr of the treasury from March to July are of signiñcanoe:
l\ When hostilities opened the federal government was recei ving lesa than a quarter of its revenue from taxation ; for the remaining three-quarters it was depending upon hand- to-mouth borrowing.6 From March 7, 1861, when Mr. Chase was installed, to July 1, there had been an addition of $14,- 412,529.40 to the public debt.7
i Scnate Executive Document No. I, S7th Cong., lst Seas., p. 11.
2 Cf. Applcton'$ Annual Cyclopcedia, 1861, p. 297.
*8enate Executive Document No. I, p. 11, S7th Cong., lst Sess.
« Of this sum $1,710,650 was sold for ooin, and $873,900 was paid to crédito».— JWd., pp. 60-62.
& Cf. American Annual Cyclopctdia, 1861, p. 297; and HunV* MerchanU* Magor cine. Yol. XLVII, p. &05.
6 From April to Jone, 1861, the reoeipts from enstoms, sales of public land, and miscelianeous sotirces, were $5300,000, from loans $17,600,000.— Report of the Secretary of the Trea»uryy Deoember, 1861, p. 90.
^ Señóte Executive Document No. *, p. 18, S7th Cong., lst.
N
Suspensión of Spegie Payments 15
2. Mr. Chase had of his own accord inaugurated the policy of issuing interest-bearing treasury notes running one or two years, in preference to long-time bonds, whenever they wonld fetch a higher price, disregarding the fact that such a conree exposed the treasury to the danger of being called apon to redeem its notes while hard pressed for funda to meet current demanda.1
IIL FINANOIAL LEGISLATION OF THE EXTBA 8ESSION OF
OONGBESS
Such was the sitnation when Congress convened in extra session Jnly 4. Emphasizing the need of extraordinary measures, President Lincoln's message recommended that "at least 400,000 men and $400,000,000" be placed "at the control of the government."2 The financial program of the admínistration was outlined in a report snbmitted by Secretary Chase.*
It was estimated that the government would require $320,- 000,000 to meet the expenditures of the coming twelve months. Of this sum the secretary thought that " not less than $80,000,000 should be provided by taxation, and that $240,- 000,000 shonld be sought through loans." The $80,000,- 000 wonld defray the expenses of a peace footing, estimated at $66,000,000, the interest on the pnblic debt, $9,000,000, and provide an annual sinking fund of $5,000,000. By revising the Morrill tariflf, Chase thought the customs conld be made to yield a revenue of $57,000,000. An additional $3,000,000 from sales of public lands would leave $20,000,- 000 of the $80,000,000 to be raised by direct tax or by inter- nal duties as Congress might decide.
To secnre $240,000,000 by borrowing new loans to the
i Mr. James Gallatin, president of the Gallatin Bank of New York, advised strongly against this policy. See his Ttoo Lettcn to the Hon. S. P. Cha$c, etc., New York, 1861.
> Lincoln» Complete Work§, ed. Nicolat and Hat, Vol. II, p. 60.
* Señale Executive Document No. 2, S7th Coog., lst Sess.
16 HlSTOBY OP THE GbEENBACKS
f ull amount would be necessary ; f or the $21,393,450 which the secretary still had authority to borrow under existing laws ! was available only when creditors were willing to accept payment in 0 per cent, treasury notes at par, which, Mr. Chase admitted, was " not to be expected." He sug- gested (1) a national loan of $100,000,000 in 7.3 per cent, treasury notes, running three years ; (2) a loan of like amount in 7 per cent., thirty-year bonds; (3) the issue of not over $50,000,000 of 3.65 per cent, one-year treasury notes to meet any need unprovided for by the proceeds of taxation and the other loans. But, said Mr. Chase, "the greatest care will .... be requisito to prevent the degradation of such issues into an irredeemable paper currency, than which no more certainly fatal expedient for impoverishing the masses and discrediting the government of any country can well be devised." *
If Secretary Chase erred in thus proposing at the outset to rely upon borrowing to secure three-quarters of the means for waging the war because he doubted the readiness of the people to submit to heavy taxation, Congress was neither wiser ñor bolder than he. With his report were submitted drafts of bilis embodying its suggestions.* Af ter one hour's debate, entirely taken up by Mr. Vallandigham in an attack upon the policy of the president, the House passed the $250,000,000 loan bilí by a vote of 150 to 5/ In the Senate a few verbal amendments were made;8 these were quickly concurred in by the House,6 and eight days after its intro- duction the bilí was approved by the president.7
i The issne of $2,584,550 treasury notes under the act of June 22, 1860 (p. 12, abo ve), had redaced the balance of that loan remaining to be borrowed to $11,393,450. Besides this there was the $10,000,000 loan authoriced by the act of March2, 1861. — Senate Ejcecutive Documcnl No. 2, p. 12, 37th Cong., lst Sess.
2 Jbid., p. 14. 3 lbid.% pp. 65 ff. and 71 ff.
« Congressional Globe* 37 th Cong., lst Sess., p. 61.
5 Jbid., pp. 109 and 127. • Ibid., p. 147.
7 12 Statutcs at Large, p. 259. Act of Jnly 17, 1861.
Suspensión op Specie Payments 17
So hurriedly, indeed, was the work done that a supple- mentary act had immediately to be passed.1 Together, these two laws anthorized the secretary to borrow $250,000,000,* for which he could issue in such proportions as he might deem advisable, (1) 7 per cent, twenty-year bonds at par; (2) 6 per cent twenty-year bonds " at any rate not less than the equivalent of par for the bonds bearing 7 per centum interest;" (3) 7.3 per cent three-year treasury notes, fundable in 6 per. cent twenty-year bonds; or (4) treasury notes, either bearing interest at 3.65 per cent and payable in one year, or bearing no interest and payable on demand. These demand notes were to be receivable for all public dues and of denominations as low as $5 ; but their issues were not to exceed $50,000,000. Finally, 6 per cent, treasury notes, "payable at any time not exceefding twelve months from date," might be issued to the amount of $20,000,000. To hcilitate the negotiation of the loan, it was provided that any part, not above $100,000,000, might be borrowed abroad, and the principal and interest made payable in Europe; and that the secretary might "deposit any of the moneys obtained on any of the loans . . . . in such solvent specie-paying banks as he may select."
Legislative indorsement was also promptly given to Sec- retary Chase's suggestion of increased taxation. August 5 arevenue act was approved which (1) raised the tariflf by
1 Tbid., p. 813. Act of August 5, 1861.
'The amount of securities, however, that might be issued under these acts was oot dsfinitoly limited ; for Sec. 1 of the act of August 5 provided that holders of tí» taree-year 7.30 notes might exchange them for 6 per cent, twenty-year bonds. -12 Statute» ai Largc, p. 313. The total issues under the acts were as follows :
6 per cent, bonds $189,321,350
Demand treasury notes, no interest - 00,030,000
7.30 treasury notes 139,999,750
$389,351,100
B. A. Batlet, National Loans of the United States, p. 78. Of the 6 per cent, bonds oalj ££,000,000 was sold for raoney; tho remainder, $139,321,350, was issued in óchame for 7.30 notes.— Ibid., p. 153.
i
18 HlSTOBY OP THE GREENBACKS
imposing duties on tea, coffee, sugar, and molasses — important revenue articles admitted free or at low ratos by the Morrill act;1 (2) apportioned between the states a direct tax of $20,000,000, of which, however, there was small hope of collecting the quotas of the disloyal states, amount- ing to $5,000,000 ; (3) levied a tax of 3 per cent, apon the v excess of incomes above $800.2 While certain featares of this scheme of taxation encountered opposition, members of Congress evinced a striking readiness to waive objections and vote for any bilí that the administration and the leaders of the houses held to be a "war necessity." *
The striking feature of the plan of finance thus recom- mended at the commencement of the war by the secretary of the treasury, and adopted by Congress, was the reliance upon borrowing to meet all the extraordinary military and naval expenditures. The taxes imposed were expected to yield revenue sufficient only to defray the ordinary expenses of government, to pay interest on the public debt, and to provide a small sinking f und. Nothing shows more forcibly the inadequacy of this policy than the quickness with which Nthe necessity for increased taxation made itself apparent. The heavy expenses of the months following the adjourn- ment of the extra session begot a general conviction that a ñrmer foundation for the financial operations of the govern- ment was indispensable. When Congress reassembled in December it was met by a strong popular demand for a vig- orous tax policy. " The country presente," said the Boston Advertiser, "the spectacle of a people praying to be taxed." * An examination of the newspapers of the time shows how
i<y. "Comparativo Rates of Duty, 1842-61," Hunt't Merchante' Magasine, Vol. XLV, pp. 506, 507.
2 12 Statute» at Largt, p. 292.
• As e xa m pies of this dispositioo see the remarles of Senators McDoogall, of California, and Wilkinson, of Minoesota. — Congre*»ional Globo, 37th Cong., lst p. 999*
* Febrnary 4, 1862.
Suspensión of Specie Payments 19
literally this was true.1 Urged forward by public opinión, the same Congress that had in August deemed $80,000,000 a sufficient revenue to raise by taxation, resolved in January with but six dissenting votes in both branches, to levy taxes thatwould " secare an annual revenue of notless than $150,- 000,000." 2 Mr. Chase, also, took a fírmer stand, advocating in his report of December, 1861, an increase of the customs duties on tea, coffee, and sugar, and direct taxation aggre- gating $50,000,000.' With increasing experience his appre- ciation of the "great importance" of raising the "largest possible amount" of revenue by taxation became keener. "It is hardly too much," he declared to Congress in 1863,* "perhaps hardly enough, to say that every dollar raised [by taxation] for extraordinary expenditures or reduction of debt is worth two in the increased valué of national securities." 4 In the same report he explained his failure to recommend teavy taxation to the extra session of Congress in July, 1S61, by pleading the impossibility of foreseeing at that time the magnitude and length of the war.6
IV. THE $150,000,000 BANK LOAN
While these bilis were pending in Congress and before the resources provided by them could be availed of , it was necessary to provide funds for the immediate wants of the
1 Cf. New York Times, June 20 and July 23, 1861, and January 13, 1862 ; New York fler«W, December 31, 1861, and January 7, 8, and 9, 1862; New York Tribune, June 26, 1^1. and February 3, 1862; New York Commercial Advertiser, January 3, 11, and Feb- """7 26, 1862; Springfleld (Mass.) Rcpublican, January 7, 15, and 21, 1862; Boston totly Advertiser, January 11, 13, and 24, 1862; Boston Journal, January 8, 1862 ; Boston **« January 28, 1862 ; Philadelphia Press, January 18 and February 5, 1862 ; Xattonal I*klUg?nccr (Washington), January 11, 1862. Cf. the letters urging heavy taxation "seired by the Ways and Means Committee, Spaülding, op. cit., pp. 23, 24; Speech, ^•^bCosklino, Congressional Olobe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 633; " Memorial of !^X«w York Chamber of Commerce," Scnatc Misccllancous Document No. 95, 37th r<*«-2d Sess., and Edwaro Evkeett in Atlantic Monthly, March, 1862, Vol. IX, pp.
1 Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 344, 349, 376.
1 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1861, pp. 13 and 13.
Klbid„ 1863, p. 12. 6 Ibid., p. 10. Cf. chap. ii, p. 72, below.
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I
20 HlSTOBY OF THE GREENBACK8
treasury. Mr. Chase accomplished this by issuing "for payment to public creditors or for advances of cash," $14,- 000,000 in two-year 6 per cent, treasury notes, and $13,- 000,000 in 6 per cent, notes running bnt 60 days.1
This, however, was bnt a temporary makeshift and the more serióos task remained of providing for the regular and continuous expenses of the war. For this purpose the secretary at once set about negotiating a large loan under the ampte powers conferred upon him by the extra session of Congress. Borro wing abroad was out of the question; for European capitalista were unwilling to lend.1 Reliance upon a popular loan seemed hazardous, not only because of the ill success of recent ventures, but also because the market for bonds was stocked with the securities of several states which were negotiating war loans.* Circumstancee seemed, then, to indícate the banks as the most available source from which to obtain means.
Fortunately the conree of events had been such as to render the banks, at least in the northern Atlantic states, unusually strong. In the previous November the sudden panic following Mr. Lincoln's election had causad the banks to curtail discounts. A severe pressure for money followed and a suspensión of specie payments was averted in New York only by the combination of bank reserves and the
i Report of the Secretary of the Treatury, December, 1861, p. 8. These issues were made in accordance with the acts of June 22, 1860 (12 Statute* at Large, p. 79), and March 2, 1861 (i6td., p. 178).
s " It is ntterly out of the qnestion, in oor jndgment," said the London Economitt of August 24. 1861, " that the Americans can obtain, either at home or in Euro pe, any- thing like the extravagant sums they are asking for. Europe won't lend them; America cannot."— Eamomist, 1861, pp. 927, 928. Cf. Blaine, TxcerUy Yeart of Cañ- are*, Yol. I, pp. 409, 410.
* New York and Pennsylrania had anthorizod loans of $3,000,000 each ; Connecti- cut, Now Jersey, Indiana and Ohio loans of $2,000,000; Massachusetts, Maine, Illinois, and New York city had oach offerod loans of $1,000,000, Iowa of $800,000, Michigan of $500,000, and Rhodo Island of $100,000.— Banken' Magazine (New York), Vol. XVI, " Notes on the Money Market," and Appleton's American Annual Cyclopctdia for 1861, pp. 297. 307, 308.
Suspensión op Speoie Payments 21
issne of clearing-house certifícates.1 But most of the paper held by the banks was good ; liquidation proceeded favorably and the threatened danger passed. The acate pressure was followed by general stagnation. In the unsettled state of the country there was a general disposition to avoid new ondertakings and to keep oíd ones on a most conservative basis. The result was that the banks could make no new f loans.1
Dnring the winter difficulty was experienced in making collections in the sonthern states. In the spring many fírms resorted to intentional failnres to rid themselves of northern obligations,' and in May a law was enacted directing that sach debts shonld be paid, not to the creditors, but into the Confedérate treasury.4 The cessation of remittances from the Sonth cansed in May and June a seríes of failures affecting especially large jobbing houses.5 But, owing to the very conservative nature of the business that had been done in the preceding half year, the crash did not become
iBankers* Magazinc (New York), Vol. XV, p. 500; HunVs Merchante' Magazinc, M XLTV, pp. 75-92, 198, and 327 ; Sümneb, History of American Currency, New York, MR5, p. 189; Dunbajk, Chapters on the Theory and History of Banking, New York, 1*1, pp. 68-73. The Boston banks rejected the use of clearing-house certifícates, but lUowed 50 per cent, of balances at the clearing house to be paid in a bank's own notes,— Dünbab, op. cit., p. 79; cf. "Report of the Massachusetts Bank Commis- íioncrs," Rxecutive Document No. 25, pp. 48-50, 37th Cong., 3d Sess.
1 " InactÍTity, or inoreasing stagnation, " wrote Mr. James Oallatin to Chase in Xtith, " is the characteristic of our business a ffairs."— Tiro Letters to the Honorable & P. Chase CSevr York, 1861), p. 5; cf. HunVs Merchante' Magazinc, Vol. XLTV, PP.TÍ7A.
lHunts Merchante' Magazinc, Vol. XLVI, p. 316; American Annual Cyclopasdia, UQ, p. SIS.
4See test of the act in American Annual Cyclopcedia, 1861, p. 310; J. C. Schwab, **t Confedérate States of America (New York, 1901), p. 113.
*fftt*i'« Merchante' Magazinc, Vol. XLV, p. 105. The indebtedness of the South to the Korth was estimated on the basis of R. O. Dun A Company's annual circular *" 1*51 at $300,000,000— Ibid., Vol. XLVI, p. 317. The losses of northern creditors **n nsually reckoned at $200,000,000. Cf. " Report of the Massachusetts Bank Conmissioners," October, 1861; Executive Document No. 25, p. 50, 37th Cong., W 8ess.; New York Tribune, September 18, 1861; Presidenta Message, December 1 IStt, in A. Lincoln, Complete Works, ed. Nicolat and Hat, VoL II, p, 99. Schwab considera this estímate exaggerated, op. dt., p. 111.
*££ HlSTOBY OF THE GrEENBACKS
gouoral. It had the effect, however, of making the times xvt inore dull ; the transactions of the New York clearing Iu>um*> declined from $129,000,000 in the second week of Maivh, to $ÍS0, 000,000 in the corresponding week of August.1 Tho bunkn were uot seriously weakened by the failures,* bnt fouud it atill more difficult to lend their capital. From iXvvmbor, lSt>0, to August, 1861, bank loans in New York diiuiuiahed $23,000,000; in Boston the fall from January to July waa $2,000,000 and in Philadelphia $3,000,000."
Thin dwrease of loans was accompanied by a slight diH'lino iu oirculation, a more decided increase in deposite, »uul a uiarkod gain in the amount of specie held. Small i^KJaU dúo partly to the Morrill tariff, but chiefiy to the slo|uv**k>n of trade — and heavy exports of grain — the ivnult of good crops at home and poor crops abroad — vHaubiui>d to turu the balance of payment toward the United HUUmí.4 Uuriug the spring and summer months sterling nvchangc nold from two to three points below par in New Yiuk.% Not only was the usual drain of specie to Europe bU4>j*iHl, but the current was kept fiowing in this direction, m» thut, though the receipts from California declined and t'iuuüdiH'ttble amounts were sent into the interior, specie accu- iuuIuUhI iu the vaults of the New York banks to an unprece-
' *ki ulilo uí cloaring* in H. R. Executive Document No. 25, p. 107, 37th Cong.,
fct ?H-...i.
• l Un kt*:»»ttchuáottrt oommissioners stated in October that the losses of the kk< i«>i« Utuk* by tho ropudiation of southern debts would not exceed in amount the uuttit uivd ptoiitd on h&nd.—Kxteutive Document No. 25, p. 50, 37th Cong., Sd Sess.
■ íX'.ii labio, |i. Jt>, below.
* ^» luttfu was the exportation of breadstuffs during the summer and antnmn of t-MU il*.u n moro thau offset the effect of the blockade in decreasing shipments of • > <i t < .»» TUu movouieut in aomewhat concealed by the usual statements of commeroe i t t i< ■ fiullug Juuo S); but appears clearly in the official table of imports and
>. i<>. i . «•( im ivhumliM) at tho port of New York by months. From January to April
ui.i»ii <íii<hU«1 uxporU, but from May to December the re was an excess of exports,
. •> ».i,m^ t<> Üvu luilliou dolía re in June, two in July, two in August, four in
». i i i.ii». i . n vi' iu October, six in Xovember, and six in December. — See tables in
filé.* . \/i - . k.int*' Huvuzíne* Yol. XLVI, pp. 277-81.
tui-.kn* Wu4/ai<»u; vNew York), Yol. XVI, p, 798.
SU8PEN8ION OF SPEOIB PAYMENT8 28
dented degree. August 17 the ratio of the specie held by the aseociated banks of New York to their deposite and circalation was 50 per cent. ; for Boston it was 27, and for Philadelphia 39 per cent.1 Thus the banks were unusually etrong; bnt they were making little profít because the stag- nation of trade gave them few opportanities of lending to basine88 men.
Consequently, when Mr. Chase appealed to them to assist the government, the banks were both able and willing to render efficient aid. A conference of representativos of the New York, Boston, and Philadelphia banks,8 held August 10-17 in New York, at the secretary's invitation, drew up in consultation with him a uplan for assisting the United States government."1 Fifty million dollars was to be advanced to the treasury by the aseociated banks of the three cities. In return they were to receive at par a like amount of treasury notes running three years and bearing interest at 7.30 per cent. Further, the banks were given the option of taking a second $50,000,000 of the notes on the same terms October 15, and a third $50,000,000 December 15.* Mr. Chase considered the plan highly advantageous to the government. In the face of war he was borrowing money at ua rate of interest only 1.3 per cent, higher than the ordinary rate of 6 per cent." Besides he received $50,000,000 immediately to meet the pressing
1 See table, p. 30, below.
*"It was greatly desired," said one of the most prominent of the New York bankers, " to inclnde also the banks of the West, bnt it was found impracticable to secare the co-operation of the state banks of Ohio and Indiana ; and the state banks of Missouri, the only other organization under a compacted system, were sorrounded by eombatants."— Letter of George S. Coe to E. O. Spanlding, October 8, 1875, Spacldiwq, op. cit, Appendix, p. 90.
* Report of the Secretary of the Trecuury^ December, 1861, pp. 8, 9. A detailed aeooont of the conference is given by A. S. Bolles in LippincotVt Monthly Magcuine, Yol XXXVIII, pp. 200-206; reprinted in Bankers' Magazinc, Yol. XLI, pp. 365-7.
* For teztof this agreement see Bankert' Magazine (New York), Yol. XVI, pp. 162,161
4
/
•
24 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAOKS
demanda apon the treasury.1 To the banks the plan offerert profitable employment for their idle capital31 y
The banks which thus undertook to lend the government $150,000,000 in four months' time had an aggregate capital of but $120,000,000. Althongh unusually strong in specie at the time the agreement was made, their combined coin reserves amounted only to $63,200,000.* This sum would hardly more than pay the first instalment of the loan. To prevent its being exhaosted at the very beginning, it was necessary that the banks should be able to replace very rapidly the specie which they paid to the government They counted on doing this in two ways: First, they would sell the securities received £ rom the goverment to the public for cash. It was part of the agreement that the treasury should help in this by opening public subscriptions to the loan in all parts of the country. Second, the specie given to the government would be speedily paid out again in dis- bursements for the immense purchases of war supplies. The coin would thus be restored to the channels of trade, and naturally flow again into the banks.
If the banks could collect specie in these two ways as rapidly as they paid it out to the government, they could continué to supply the treasury with f uncís indeñnitely. But the moment even a brief delay occurred in the return of specie to the banks trouble would come. The reserves would be depleted by the drafts of the treasury, and suspen- sión would be inevitable. Such a delay would happen if anything occurred to make the public slow in buying the
i Chase's letter to Trowbridge, Wardkn, op. cit., pp. 886-8.
3At flrst the banks deoided to divide the $50,000,000 among themselres in proportion to their res pee ti re ca pitáis. This would haré giren the flfty-four New York banks $29,500,000, the forty-six Boston banks $15,500,000, and the nineteen Philadelphia banks $5,000,000. But the Boston banks flnally deoided that they could not take more than $10,000,000; so that the New York institntions had to make up their subscriptions to $35,000,000.— Hunf* Merchante' MaQaxine, Vol. X.LV. p. 831.
• See table, p. 30, below.
Suspensión of Spegie Patments 25
7.30 treasary notes from the banks, or to interrapt the government's payments of specie out of the subtreasary, or to prevent men from depositing again in the banks the coin received from the government. The situation, both of the banks and of the treasary, was thus very precarious. The plan might work well in fair weather, but in the fírst storm it was likely to collapse. Mr. Chase, however, seems to have been nnconscious that danger lorked in the scheme.
At the very outset the banks encountered an onforeseen obetacle. The independent snbtreasnry system required all does to the United States to be paid into the treasary in coin.1 This woald compel the banks to send the specie lent the government to the subtreasuries, there to lie in the vaalts antil paid out in disborsements to pnblic creditors. But provisión had been made by Congress with the special intent of removing this difficalty.2 The law of Aogost 5 had relaxed the rigor of the subtreasary system so f ar as to permit the secretary " to deposit any of the moneys obtained on any of the loans . . . . in sach solvent, specie-paying banks as he may select," and allowed " moneys so deposited" to#tbe withdrawn from sach deposit for deposit with the regalar authorized depositarios, or for the payment of public daes."* Under this law the banks expected that the loan to the government woald be managed in the same manner as a loan to a prívate person ; they would credit the United States with a deposit of $50,000,000 upon their books, against which the secretary of the treasary coald draw as he had occasion. But Mr. Chase's instinctive distrust of bank issues permitted no modification of the subtreasary system.
» Acta of July 4, 1840, seos. 19 and 20, 5 Statutet at Large^ p. 385; and of Augost 6, 1SJ6, seca. 18, 19 and 20,98UUuU» at Large, p. 59.
>8ee the letter of Mr. E. O. Spaulding, who drafted the section in qoestion, op. dL% Appendix, p. 51; and remarles of W. P. Fessenden, ohairman of the tenate •»»*~^ eommittee, Conortmional Olobc, S7th Cong., lst SessM p. 990.
*8ec 6, 12 8tatuU$ at Large, p. SIS.
26 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS
He declined to make payments in bank checks on the ground that, though the eastern institutions were ready to pay such checks in coin, their western correspondents on whom they might draw would possibly ask creditors of the government to accept bank notes in satisfaction. He therefore insisted that the loan be paid in specie into the vaults of the sub- treasury. Much against their will, the banks complied.1
Ñor was this the only point in which the banks fonnd the policy of the treasury an obstacle to the success of the loans. Beside borrowing from the banks to secare fands, Mr. Chase took advantage of his discretionary power to issue non-interest-bearing treasury notes.' Though payable on demand in gold at the subtreasuries, and receivable for taxes and customs dues, these notes were accepted with reluctance. To facilítate their circulation, the secretary and other treasury officials signed a paper agreeing to take them in payment of their salaries, and General Scott issued a circular setting forth the superior convenience of paper money to soldiers desiring to send home a portion of their pay.* But the banks feared the government paper money would drive their own issues from circulation, and declined to receive the demand notes except on "special deposit" Should they receive the notes as current funds, bankers said, they would
i Secretary Chase 's reasons for refasing to draw direetly on the banks are airen Ib a letter to Mr. Trowbrid«e,(WARDKX, Ufe of Chase, p. 987). The side of the banks is represen ted in G. S. Coe's letter to Spaolding (Histoiy o/ the Legal Tender Paper Money, 2d ed., Appendix. pp. 91.92) ; J. E. Williams's letter to Chase of October 4, 1961 (i'otd., pp. 97-9), and his War Loan» of the Auociated Bank» to the Oovemtment im J9M, (New York, 1876) ; James Gallatin. The Nationai Finance** Cúrreme*, Bank- ing, etc. (New York, 1864). Most wríters ha ve concorred in the opinión that Mr. Chase's refosal was an error. Cf. Our Nationai Finante** Whai Shaü be Donmt (anón.] (Boston. 1862); Spauldixo. op. cif., Introduction to 2d ed., pp. 1-4, and Appendix, pp. 51-3; F. A. Coxkling, i oíd., Appendix. p. 85; J. S. GlBBOira, The Public Debtof the United State» (New York. 1867). pp. 135, 136; H. V. Poo*, Money cmrf it» Law*. 2d e«i. < New York. 1877). pp. 562-4; Ho*ace Wbttb, Money and Banh> ta# (Boston. 1896). pp. 150-51
«Acta of Jnly 17, 1861. sec. 1, 12 Statute» at Large, p. 259. and of Augost 5» 1861, ana. 3 (téid., p. 313).
•Text in American Annuai Cyclopctdia, 1861, p. 299.
Suspensión op Specie Payments 27
be under obligation to redeem them in coin on demand, and this would increase the barden which their reserves had to carry, and so endanger the maintenance of specie payments. Furthermore, the existence of a large amount of obligations, which the treasury might be called apon to redeem in coin at any moment of panic, was a standing menace to the sol- vency of the government, and in so far injared its credit, and made more difficult the rapid sale of the secarities held by the banks to the pablic, on which the saccess of the loans depended. But it was in vain that the banks appealed to Mr. Chase to cease his issues. He replied: " If yon can lend me all the coin required, or show me where I can borrow it elsewhere at f air rates, I will withdraw every note already issaed, and pledge myself never to issae another; bat if yoa cannot, yon most let me stick to United States notes." ' Unable to induce the secretary to alter this reso- lution, the banks again reluctantly yielded.2
But though the position of the banks was weakened by Mr. Chase's refusal to allow the proceeds of the loan to remain on deposit until paid out to the creditors of the government, and by his issue of paper money, all went well for a time. Mr. Chase appointed agents in over two hundred
i Letter to Trowbridge, W arden, op. cit., p. 388.
*The banks were the more annoyed at Mr. Chase's refusal to malee payments in checks drawn apon them and at his issue of treasury notes, because when the irrangement regarding the loan was made they had understood him to agree to caoform his action in these respeets to their wishes. See J. E. Williams 's letter of Oetober 4, 1861, to Chase and George S. Coe's letter of October 8, 1865, to Spaulding in Spacldino, op. ctf., Appendix, pp. 97-9 and 92 respectively. Mr. Chase, however, wid in his report of December, 1861, that ** it was .... understood that the secre- tar? of the treasury should issue a limited amount of United States notes, payable <a demand" (p. 9).
On the inconrenience caused the banks by the issue of the demand notes, see "Objectioos to Government Demand Notes, by a New York Bank Officcr," Banken' XaQatinc (New York), Vol. XVI, pp. 353-7; George Marsland, "The Banks and the Qfwnbacks," Bankert" Magcuine (New York), Vol. XXXI, pp. 173-81 ; Bolles, Finan- «oitfótory of the United States, 1861-85, pp. 34 and 37; H. V. Poor. Money antl iU k»w, 2d ed. (New York, 1877), pp. 564 ff. ; J. K. Upton. Money in Politics, 2d ed. (Bos- ton, 1HB), pp. 72 ft\; R. M. Breckenridoe, "The Demand Notes of 1861," in Sound Cartucy, (New York, October, 1898), Vol. V, pp. 336, 337.
28 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS
towns to receive subscriptions for 7.30 treastiry notes,1 and issued an urgent address, appealing to the people to assist in making the "national loan" successfuL2 His efforts were warmly seconded by the newspaper press, which explained the advantages of the loan to investors, and represented sub- scription as an act of patriotism. On their side the New York banks strengthened themselves by putting their coin into a common fund, and reviving the organization entered into to check the panic of the preceding November. The "loan committee," then appointed under the chairmanship of Moses Taylor, was entrnsted with the snperintendence of the execution of the contract with the government. It was part of the arrangement that the stock of specie shonld not be allowed to fall below one-fourth of the net liabilities, exclusive of circnlation and the credit given the treasnry. In case any bank failed to maintain this proportion of reserve, the loan committee was directed to charge interest on the déficit, and to pay the interest received to the institntions holding the highest percentage of specie.*
The associated banks agreed to divide the subscriptions to the loan between themselves in proportion to their respect- ive capitals. Each bank was to pay 10 per cent, of its sub- scription into the subtreasury at once, and to place the bal- ance to the credit of the government upon its books.4 Against these credits Mr. Chase was to draw only as fast as
» See list in Boaftera' Jfatfaxine. (New York), Vol. XVI. pp. 306-10. Asida from treasury offlciaLs there veré 148 agents.— B. JR. Exmtire Docmmení No. •¥, p. 2, SHhConc., IstSess,
*Text Í5 to be foand in Bamkert* MagaMine^ YoL XVI, pp. 90-2. The notos were a&Vred at per. and were to draw interest from Aogust 19, bot on fc*^'*»g the boods sabscribers were required to paj interest from that date to daj of sabscripiion, so that the interest reeeiTed by the purchaser befan with the date of his parchase.
* Cy. note 1. p. 32. below. The best anthority for the hanking operatioos ts the "Beport of the New York Loan Committee." Jone 1*. lüfcl publisbed in the lf<V"¿i*r, VoL XVII. and in H. R. Erocntire Docuwemt So, J&. Xllh Coa#% 3d pp. \Z>*L
« See text of ajrreement of banks with foreranteot. and proeeedints of the in* of banker» in refereoce to iu— ¿fcmfesr»' Jf«t«ui»e. VoL XVL pp» ttl-IQL
Suspensión of Specie Payments 29
he needed funds for disbursement. It was anticipated that his drafts would be about 10 per cent, of the loan a week.1 Consequently, the effect of the transaction may be traced in the weekly bank returns of the three cities. In New York the first instalment of the loan, $3,500,000, was paid into the subtreasury August 19, 1861.a Comparing the reporta of August 17 and August 24, one fínds a decrease of $2,600,- 000 in the specie holdings of the banks, and a like increase in the coin held by the subtreasury.' At the same time the balance of the government loan was added to the line of dis- counts, increasing the loans reportad by $29,000,000. Finally, the sum placed upon the books of the banks to the credit of the government to be drawn against produced a nominal increase of $26,500,000 in the deposita.4 Similar changes are seen on comparing the situation of the Boston and Philadelphia banks on August 17 and 31. In Boston payments to the subtreasury diminished reserves less than $300,000, while discounts and deposits were increased $3,600,000 and $4,200,000, respectively, in consequence of the government loans. The Philadelphia banks lost $600,- 000 in specie during the two weeks, and increased their dis- counts $4,600,000 and their deposits $3,700,000.
But the situation immediately began to change. The banks paid over the loan in instalments of about $5,000,000 at intervals of six days.s Each payment thus made into ttye Bubtreasuries decreased the sum credited to the government tó a deposit. Loans also declined, for as fast as the 7.30
1 American Annual Cyclopctdia, 1861, p. 64. Cf. Chase 's letter of October 2, M^i to Lar» Anderson, in Schuckers, Life of Chcue, pp. 430, 431.
'"Reportof the New York Loan Committee," Bankers' Magazine, Vol. XVII, *1».
'For this and the similar subsequent comparisons see the table showin& the «•dition of the banks of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, p. 3ü, and the accom- Wañogchart.
4 Cf. " Report of the Bank Commissioners of Massachusetts, October, 1861," B R Executive Document No. 25, p. 56, 37th Con*?., 3d Sess.
1 Letter of G. S. Coc, in Spauldinq, op. cit., Appendix, p. 92.
HlSTOBY OP THE GliEENBACKS
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32 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS
notes were sold to the public through the treasury agencies the proceeds were remitted to the banks and deducted by them from the loan to the govemment. From August 31 to September 28 the decline of bank loans was $15,000,000 in New York, $2,000,000 in Boston, and $2,000,000 in Philadelphia. The corresponding decline in deposite amounted to $23,800,000, $2,400,000, and $2,700,000 re- spectively.
The point of crucial importance for the success of the bank loan, however, was the change in the stocks of specie held. The payments into the subtreasuries drained the bank reserves of about $5,000,000 a week. This loss was offset in part by the re-deposit in the banks of money paid out by the govemment to army contractors and other creditors, and in part by sums received from the treasury on account of sales of 7.30 notes to the public through the sub- scription agencies — though it was not until September 3 that the banks received any reimbursement from this latter source.1 For the first five weeks the withdrawal of specie from the banks so far exceeded receipts as to cause a rapid reduction of reserves. From August 17 to September 21 the New York banks lost $13,000,000 of specie. Whither the money had gone is shown by the contemporaneous gain of $11,000,000 in the coin held by the New York subtreas- mm. During the same time the Philadelphia banks lost ^,000,000, or over 30 per cent, of their specie. In Boston the reserves increased slightly for the first three weeks and the subsequent loss was less serious than in the other cities, a trifle less than 20 per cent. In New York the loan com- mittee found that the loss of coin reduced the reserves of some of the associated banks below the stipulated propor- tion of 25 per cent, to net deposite, making necessary a
i ** Report of the New York Loan Committee," H. R. Executive DocumaU No. 25, S7th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 128.
SU8PEN8ION OP SPECIE PAYMENT8 88
reapportionment of the specie for the first time on Sep- tember 2.1
After September 21, however, the tide turned. " The disbursements of the government for the war were so rapid," said Mr. Coe, a New York bank presidenta "and the consequent internal trade movement was so intense, that the coin paid out upon each instalment of the loan carne back to the banks throngh the community in about one week."2 Such fresh deposita, together with the reimbursements received throngh the treasnrer from the public snbscriptions to the loan, carne to exceed the payments of specie into the subtreasury, and the reserves consequently rose again. By the middle of Octo- ber the New York banks held $5,500,000 more specie than on September 21. Meanwhile government disbur^sements had reduced the specie holdings of the subtreasury by $6,000,000. In about the same period the reserves of Boston banks gained $1,500,000 and those of the Phila- delphia banks $1,700,000.
Encouraged by the gain in specie, the banks agreed to take a second $50,000,000 of the 7.30 three-year treasury notes October 1, fifteen days earlier than the time agreed npon in August, although they had not yet completed their
|The apportionment was at first managed by charging interest upon the defl- ciency of reserve ; but on September 21 this account was olosed, and 4i thereafter tbe specie apportionment was made by reqniring the banks to exchange loan certifl- cates for specie whenerer their specie was less than 25 per cent, of their net deposits, «clasiv© of the amonnt to the credit of the government." From September 21 to fooember 30 a daily apportionment of specie was made in this fashion. The com- ■úttoe issaed loan certifica tes drawing 7 per cent, interest to banks whose resé tres had Míen below the limit, for 90 per cent, of the amonnt of 7.90 notes, or assistant treas- Btr'g receipts for payments on the loan, deposite*! with them. An issne of $10,000,000 °' tuca certificates had been authorized by the banks April 24, 1861. This was "*"*s©d to $15,000.000 December 18, to $20.000,000 December 28, and to $25,000,000 Jiaoary 20, 1862. The total issues were $22,585,000, and the largest amonnt ontstand- ^•u 121,960,000 from February 3 to February 7, 1862. The interest amounted to *^>4&£. Certificates were issued to thirty-nine of the fifty associated banks, t*irty-oa« of which paid more interest than they received. All the certificates were r*1*aed by April 28, 1862.-/6id., pp. 126-33.
]Letter of October 8, 1875, in Spaüldino, op. cik, Appendix, p. 93.
84 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS
payments upon the firet loan.1 There was but one ominóos sign — the popular subscription under the management of the treasury department had not been an unqualified success. In the hopo of stimulating the laggíng subscriptions, the Boston banks had issued a card September 11, saying:
The banks are meeting their engagements and furnishing the $50,000,000 with no practical inoonvenience to themselves or the morcan tilo community; and if no more money was required no
difficulty would be experienoed But who is tofurnish the
next $50,(kk)%tHH>f Are the banks expected to do so? If they are, the men of mentía, large and sniall, must take and pay for the first $50,000,000 during the presen t month or early in October — other- wiae it cannot be aecomplished.'
But, despite suoh appeals and the efforts of the secre- tary and the presa, subscriptions became so slow, after about $45,000.000 of the first loan had been sold to the public, that the treasury agencies were cloeed and the banks under- took to dispose of the second $50,000,000 themselves withont the aid of the govenunent.*
Changa in the accounts of the banks, similar to those resulting from the first loan, folio wed the taking of the sec- ond. On comparing the reports for September 28 and Octo- ber 12, one sees an increase of loans amounting to $30,000,- 000 in New York, $3,300,000 in Boston, and $3,600,000 in Philadelphia. At the same time, the credit given the gov- ernment upon the books of the banks created a corresponding increase of deposita amounting to $32,600,000, $5,500,-
» Cf. Bankert* Mnoaxine (New York), Yol. XVI, p. 397, and " Boport of the New York Loan Committee," ioid.. Yol. XVII, p. 140.
* ¿tontera' Maocuint (New York), Yol. XVI, pp. 386, «7.
*Chas*'i*letter to Trowbrídfre, Wardbn, op. ci*., p. 387. The banks continuad, however, to receÍTe drafts from the treasury on aooonnt of the salas made to the public by the treasury agencies on their aooonnt. The final cash reimborsemant was tiot rocfiyed in New York until January 13, 1861.— Kxccutire Document No. Ja, p. 12$, S7th loug., 3d Sess. Of the $45.000.000 sold, $24,700,000 were disposed of by prívate attvuts and the balance by department officials. It was by his success in obtainina* •ubacriptions for over $5,000.000 of 7.30b that Jay Cooke attracted Mr. Chase't Uuu.— Sw H. H. Kxtcutirt Document No. **, S8th Coa*., lst Seas.
8ü8Pension of Specie Payments 35
000, and $4,600,000 respectively. But, instead of falling o£F as in August, the reserves of the banks increased, main- taining a high level throughout October, November, and the first half of December. Of conree, as snccessive $5,000,- 000 instalments were paid into the subtreasuries by the banks, their deposita declined again after October 12, as they had after Angust 31, and the loans were reduced by con- tinoed receipte from the proceeds of the popular suLrip- tion. By November 16 (the last report made before the taking of the third loan) the fall of deposita in New York was $18,000,000, and of loans $19,000,000. The corre- sponding figures for Philadelphia were $1,300,000 and $2,700,000; and for Boston (October 12 to November 9) $1,100,000 and $2,300,000.
All this time, while supplying the federal treasnry with ' specie on so large a scale, the banks had also to furnish the usual accommodations to the mercantile community. But they were able to serve both the government and the public with comparativo ease. For, as the Massachusetts bank commissioners reported in October, 1861, " the prostration of business robbed them of their usual customers, and the operations of the government, which have given rise to a new activity exerted in the public service, have caused the making of very little business paper, such as banks are in the habit of discounting. Public contractors are usüally paid in cash at intervals shorter than the average length of bank accommodations, and they have little occasion to bor- row money."1
The last instalment of the first $50,000,000 was paid into the subtreasuries by the banks October 24, and payment on the second loan was begun five days later.2 The operation
1 ELrecutive Document No. 23, 37 th Cong., Sd Sess., p. 56.
* " Report of the New York Loan Committee," Bankcrs* Magazine (New York), Yol. XVII, pp. 139, 140.
36 HlSTOBY OF THE GfiEENBACKS
proceeded smoothly, the decline of the reserves being insig- nificante and the banks determined to take a third $50,000,- 000 of govemment securities November 16, a month before the date set in the agreement of August. But, because of the difficulty experienced in disposing of the three-year 7.30 treasury notes to the public, they declined to accept more of these securities, and received instead twenty-yeari 6 per cent, bonds at a rate equi valen t to par for 7 per cent.,1 \ in the expectation that such bonds could be sold at a profit in Europe.3 At the same time, the banks were given the option of taking on January 1, 1862, a foorth loan of . $50,000,000 upon the same terms as the fírst and second.* In pursuance of this arrangement, the government was given credit upon the books of the banks for $45,795,478.48 — the proceeds of the $50,000,000 bonds at the given rate4 — which increased once more the sum of loans and deposita* For several weeks af ter the third loan was taken every- thing went well. The banks continued to pay regular instal- ments on the second loan into the subtreasuries of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, and did not make the firet payment on the third until December 10.6 Meanwhile the specie reserves increased slightly in each of the three cities, so that by December 7 New York banks held as much coin as at any time since August, and the Boston and Philadelphia
i This rate is 89.322463831- Executive Document No. 35, p. 129, 87th Cong., 9d This arrangement was made under authority of sec. 7 of the act of August 5, 1881, 12 8tatute* at Large, p. SIS.
2 See the letter f rom a New York bank president published in the New York Tribuna December 25, 1861, p. 7.
s Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1881, p. 10.
« Ibid., loe. cit. Cf. Executive Document No. 25, p. 129, S7th Cong., 9d Seas.
& For New York the gain from November 16 to November 30 was $23,500,000 in loans and $25,100,000 in deposita. For Philadelphia the corresponding figures are $2,400,000 and $3,400,000. The Boston banks gained $3,600,000 in loans from the second to the fourth week in November and $3,500,000 in deposita.
« " Report of the New York Loan Committee," BanJcen' Magaxine, Yol. XVII, p.140.
Suspensión op Speoie Payments 37
banks were actually stronger in specie than at the time when the firet government loan was made.
About this time, however, two untoward events occurred. The first was the publication, December 10, of the annual report of the secretary of the treasury. In his report to the extra session of Congress in the preceding July, Mr. Chase had estimated that receipts from customs dues and Bales of public land would yield during the current fiscal year (July 1, 1861, to June 30, 1862), a revemie of $60,- 000,000, while the expenditures of the government would probably reach $318, 519,582. ] Enormous as this budget seemed, the succeeding months proved its inadequacy. The December report showed that the estímate of expenses should be increased $214,000,000, while the estímate of revenue from customs and land sales should be reduced $25,000, 000.a But more than this, it had been generally felt that the plan of borrowing from banks could be only a temporary makeshift to serve until a permanent policy was matured. It was hoped that the report of December would present a definite plan of finance based upon adequate taxation. But Mr. Chase pro- posed taxes yielding only $50,000,000,' and put his main reliance upon a scheme for reorganizing the banks of the country in such a way as to compel them to buy a large amount of government bonds.* The disappointment caused by the report was keen.5
The second event was the Trent affair. November 8, 1861, Captain Wilkes, of the American warship San Jacinto, removed two commissioners of the Confedérate States —
i Senate Executive Document No. 2, pp. 5 and 8, 87th Cong., lst Sess.
* Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1861, pp. 11, 12.
* Ibid.y p. 15.
« Ibid,% pp. 17-20.
* Cf. " Federal Finalices Examined" (anón.) HunVs Merchante' Magaxine, Vol. XLVII, December, 1862, p. 507 ; Appleton '« Annual Cyclopcedia, 1861, p. 66; BLAINB, Tweniy Yeart of Congress, (Norwicb, Conn., 1884), Vol. I, p. 407.
38 HlSTORY OF THE GBEENBACK8
Mentira. Masón and Slidell — by forcé from the Britifl] utoamer Trent, plying between Havana and Southampton In the United States lively satisfaction was felt in this cap turo, and Wilkes was dined by clubs and thanked by Con ^roHH. But when the news reached England, November 27 there was great indignation over what was felt to be a wan ton innult to the British flag ; and the government dispatche< a quoen's messenger to Washington to demand the snrren der of the prisoners and an apology. If this demand wen iiot ooniplied with in seven days the English ambassador wat iiwtruoted uto repair immediately to London." This was i plain threat of war. Intelligence of the action taken by th< KiigUah cabinet was received in New York on December 16 A* the report had gone out that the Confederates would no bu r^leased it seemed highly probable that the federal gov enmient would be involved in a second war.1
The receipt of the news on the 16th caused a panic in th< New York markets. On the stock exchange governmentsecu ritiea fell 2-2| per cent Shares of all kinds participated ii the decline,1 and sterling exchange rose two points.' WaL utreet was filled with rumors of an agreement among the banki to suajiend s¡)ecie payments, and men with balances in bankf llegan to turn them into special deposita4 Next day a meet ing of the associated banks was called to consider the sitúa- tina. A motion was made to suspend specie payments al once, but the proposal failed of adoption. Instead, in the ho|ie of quelling the panic, the banks unanimously adopted i aeries of vigoróos resolutions, declaring that there wat "uothing in the position of the loans to the government te
' ('/. J. F. Rhodbh, Hiñtory of the United State*, Vol. III (New York, 1886), pp
USU4&
¿Bunker*' M agutine (New York), Vol. XVI, pp. 558 and 481; and stock qaota
IWjuh, ibtd., \i. S59.
•» /6<d., Vul. XVI, p. 738.
« ¡but., Vol. XVI, pp. 491 and 558.
Suspensión of Specie Payments 39
canse uneasiness," and that they saw u no reason, justifica- tion, or necessity for a suspensión of specie payments." '
But these resolutions availed little. While the banks continued to pay specie into the subtreasnry at the usual rete, the money paid out by the goverment to contractors and others, owing to the alarmed state of the public mind and the fear of a suspensión, did not flow back as bef ore into their reserves.2 This cut off the chief source from which the reserves had been recruited. Mean while the banks of Boston and the West began to draw heavily upon their balances in New York, so that the deposits fell off $17,000,000 in three weeks." To meet thisdouble drain — coming from the sub- treasury and the interior banks — the New York institn- tions had no available resource. Over $50,000,000 of their resources seem to ha ve been locked up in government secun- des,4 which could not be sold to obtain specie ; for the fall in the price of stocks made it impossible to dispose of 7.30 treasury notes at home except at a heavy sacrifíce,5 and the danger of war with England cut off all hope of negotiating the 6 per cent bonds in Europe.6 The result of the situa- tion was a rapid depletion of the reserves. The week that Mr. Chase's report on the fínances was published the New York banks lost $2,900,000 of specie. The next report — made after the receipt of warlike news from England —
i See copy of the resolutions in HunV» Merchante? Magaxine, Vol. XX» VI, p. 101. Cf. the oomment in the New York Tribuna, December 23, p. 8, and December 30, p. 8; New York Herald, December 19, p. 6; and New York Time*, December 30, p. 4.
3 Cf. letter from a New York bank president in New York Tribuna, December 25, 1861, p, 7.
* Cf. New York Tribune of December 23, p. 8, and of December 30, p. 8. The table, p. 30, above, shows that the Boston banks increased their specie, while those of New York were losing rapidly.
*Cf. Banken' Magaxine (New York), Vol. XVI, p. 560.
* Most of the 7.30 notes sold by public subacription had been taken by " small ioTestors, and they were airead y again offering them in the market to an eztent which reduoed the price to 96 for those that were indorsed and 96 for clean notes."— Awtcrican Annual Cyclopcedia, 1861, p. 299.
* Letter from bank president in New York Tribune, December 25, 1861, p. 7.
40 HlBTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS
exhibited a further loss of $2,600,000. During the next seven days the rate of depletion was even more rapid, and the loss for the week amounted to $7,400,000.
Under such a drain the complete exhanstion of the reserves was evidently a question of only a short time. Saturday, December 28, the banks held another meeting to decide what measures should be taken. After a "rather stormy" session of six or seven hours, the resolution to sus- pend specie payments upon the following Monday, Decem- ber 30, was carried by a vote of 25 of the institntions represen ted to 15.1
i Cf. " Remarks made by Mr. James Galla tin at the Meeting of Bank Offioers, .... December 28, 1861," Banker*' Magaxine (New York), Vol. XVI, pp. 05-31 ; H. W. Domett, HUtory of the Bank of New York, 2d ed. (New York, 1884), p. 97, and aooonnts of the meeting in the New York daily papera of December», 1861.
It is to be noted that suspensión was rather a measnre of preoaation to preTe&t fnrther depletion of the reserves than one of neoessity ; for on the day when suspen- sión was decided npon the New York banks held $4,600,000 more specie than they had ai the commenoement of the year. Their attitade was expressed in Mr. Qallatin's remarks : " The goTernment mnst snspend specie payments or we must, and it is only a question of a few more days* time as to who suspenda flrst and who shall hold the specie now in our Taults. If we hold it, the people and the goTernment will be alike beneflted. If goTernment takes it, the whole will be expended and hoarded by a few people. "— fianJbers* Maaazine (New York), Vol. XVI, p. 627.
At the time of suspensión the account of the banks with the goTernment stood as follows (ibid., p. 560)
|
Sub«crib«lto |
R*c«iv*d back |
DuatoOor- |
||
|
Loto |
Paldln |
trom Oov*rnm«at |
•rBBMl |
|
|
Banks of New York - |
- $102,066395 |
$81,066335 |
$27,125,000 |
$21,000,000 |
|
Banks of Boston ... |
29,159,005 |
23,159,096 |
7,750,000 |
6,000,000 |
|
Banks of Philadelphia - |
14,579,548 |
11,579,548 |
3,875,000 |
3,000,000 |
$145,796,478 $115,796,478 $38,750,000 $30,000,000
The goTernment made its last cash payment to the banks January 13, 1862, and the banks paid the last instalment of money due apon the second loan January 15, and on the third loan February 4. January 24 the banks still owed the goTernment $9,375,000. (Cf. " Report New York Loan Committee," Bankert' Magamne, Vol. XVII, pp. 139, 140, and comment on the money market, ibid., Vol. XVI, pp. 560 and 655.)
There was a rexatious delay in the delirery to the banks of the secarities they had purchased. The 7.30 treasury notes for the portion of the flrst loan which was not sold to the publio ($5,625,000) were not reoeired by the banks tul January 24, 1862. The notes for the second loan were delirered in four instalments between January 22 and February 5; and the 6 per cent, bonds for the third loan in nine instalments between January 27 and March5.— " Report of the New York Loan Com- mittee," loe. cit.
*' As fortunately as unexpectedly," reported the New York Loan Committee June 12, 1862, in regard to the operation, " it has reeolted profltably for the assooi- ates, and has probably enabled them to employ their means to nearly as much
Suspensión of Specie Payments 41
"The suspensión of thebanks [of New York] was received in oommercial and monetary circles without surprise." ! The banks of Philadelphia, which had lost nearly $2,000,000 of specie in a fortnight, followed suit; and so did those of Boston, although the latter had managed to increase their reserves $1,600,000 between December 7 and 21, and had then lost but $1,100,000 by the 28th, thus suspending with $2,300,000 more specie than on August 17, when the con- tract for the first government loan was taken. With the exception of the banks of Ohio, Indiana, and Kentucky, and a few scattered institutions, the suspensión of specie payments immediately became general3
The suspensión of the national treasury followed of neces- sity hard upon that of the banks. As Mr. Chase said, after the banks had ceased paying in specie, it was "certain that the government could no longer obtain coin on loans in any adequate amounts." * Consequently the treasury was obliged to cease redeeming in coin the demand treasury notes in circulation.4
The responsibility for the suspensión of the banks and
advantage as would haré beendone but for the political disturbances of the country. Most of the government securities which have been sold by the associates have been sold by themselves at different times, and it is not possible for your committee to state the amount of interest for the capital invested which has been received thereon ; but the associates still hold a large amount of them, the market valué of which is much higher than the price at which they were taken."— Loe. cit., p. 148.
Moreover, the banks drew interest at 7.3 per cent, upon the en ti re $50,000,000 of the first loan from August 19, upon the second from October 1, and upon the third from November 16. As they paid up these loans at the rate of about $5,000,000 per week, not completing the payments on the first loan tul October 24, 1861, on the seeood tul Jannary 15, 1862, and on the third till February 4, 1862, they were for a considerable time paid interest on funds that had not left their possession. On that portion of the first loan sold to the publie, the banks received interest from August M, 1861, to the dates of sale, amounting altogether to $621,290.—" Report of the New York Loan Committee," Banker*' Magazine, pp. 139-42, and Report of the Secretar? of the Treasury, 1861, p. 9.
i New York Tribune, December 31, 1861, p. 3.
* Qf. Part II, chap. ii, sec. ii, below.
* Letter to Trowbridge, W arden, Life of Chase, p. 388.
*On the subsequent history of these treasury notes seo Part II, chap. ii, sec. iü. and rhap. iii, sec. ii, below.
42 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS
government has frequently been placed upon Mr. Chase for his issue of demand treasury notes and his refusal to draw directly upon the banks in making pay menta1 Examination of the condition of the banks, as shown in their weekly reports, however, hardly bears out this opinión. Doubtless the position of the banks would have been stronger had the secretary conformed his policy to their wishes. But, inas- much as no serious trouble had been experienced np to the second week of December, despite Mr. Chase's refusal to do as the banks desired, it seems unreasonable to attribute the sudden loss of specie in the last three weeks of December, which caused suspensión, to the policy pursued by him throughout— especially when the result is so adequately accounted for by the depression due to the unfavorable treasury report and to the fear of a war with England. These events made clear the weakness inherent in the plan of the bank loan. Suspensión was inevitable whenever any- thing occurred to check the re-deposit in the banks of money paid out by the treasury, or to prevent the banks from replenishing their reserves by selling the securities received from the government. . A severe blow to the national credit would inevitably produce such effects. It so happened that the publication of the disappointing treasury report and the Trent affair were the fírst occurrences of this nature momen- tous enough to arouse general uneasiness. Had there been no threat of war with England, and had the condition of the federal fínances revealed in the report of December been lesa gloomy, the banks would probably have been able to carry out their program of taking a fourth $50,000,000 of treasury notes on January 1. Suspensión would then have been postj)oned, but, in all probability, not prevented. To assume that the banks could have continued indefinitely to carry their double burden — supplying both government and
> For examples soe the citations in note 1, p. 26, and note 2, p. 27, aboTe.
i
Suspensión of Specie Payments 43
poblic with loans — is to assume that no serious reverse would have bef alien the national credit; for, as has been twice said, a disturbarte© of publie confídence would have led to the withdrawal of deposits and the hoarding of specie; the government securities held by the banks would have
beoome unsalable and suspensión would have followed.
As it was, the specie standard was abandoned within six months after the Civil War had fairly begun. The country was left at the beginning of the new year, 1862, with a mixed circulation of paper money which neither the issuing banks ñor the federal treasury were prepared to redeem in coin. How Congress met the situation thus created forms the subject of the following chapter.1
i General aecounts of the $150,000,000 bank loan and the suspensión of specie pay- ments are to be found in Report of the Secretary of the Treasury , December, 1861, pp. 8-10; letter of Chase to Trowbridíce, in W arden, Life of Chase, pp. 886-8; Schuckebs, Lifeof Chote, pp. 225-31; "Report of the Loan Committee of the New York Banks," Executive Document No. 25, 37th Con*?., 3d Sess., pp. 125-42, and Bank- er»' Magaxine (New York), Vol. XVII, pp. 136-49 (details of the management of the loan by the New York banks) ; Gborge S. Coe, letter of October 8, 1875, to E. Q. Spanlding, in latter's History of the LegaUTender Paper Money, 2d ed. (Buffalo, 1875). Appendiz, pp. 89-96; republished nnder title, "Financial History of the War," in Bankers" Magazine, Vol. XXX, pp. 536-44 (written from point of view of the banks, as is the nezt also) ; J. £. Williams, The War Loans of the Associated Banks to the Government in 1861 (New York, 1876) ; American Annuat Cyclopvcdia, 1861, article "Finances of the United States," and pp. 61-6 (impartial); "Federal Finances Examined " (anón) ; HunVs Merchante' Magazine, Vol. XLVII, pp. 506 ff. (criticism of II r. Chase) ; Yon Hock, Die Finanzen uml die Finanzgeschichte der Vereinigtcn Staaten (Stnttffart, 1867), pp. 442-6 (deficient in information) ; W. A. Berkey, The üoney Question, 4th ed., Grand Rapids (Mich.), 1878, pp. 154-8 (versión of the "ffreenback" party); Bolles, Financial History of the United States, 1860-85, pp. 3M2 (looeely written) ; W. Q. Sumner, History of Banking in the United States, (New York, 1896) [Vol. I of History of Banking in all Nations], pp. 458-61.
CHAPTER II THE FIRST LEGAL-TENDER ACT
I. The Legal-Tender Bills :
Spaulding's Legal -Tender Bill — Discussion in Committee — The Bankers' Convention — Revisión of Spaulding's Bill.
II. Debate in Congress:
Constitutional Argument — Argument from Experíence — Eco- nomic, Moral, and Fiscal Objections — Argument from Necessity — Alternativos Proposed — A Temporary Measure.
III. Attitude ofSecretary Chase:
Chase 's Reluctant Assent to Legal-Tender Clause — Later Denial of Necessity for It — Opinions of Financial Critics.
IV. Passage of the Act:
Three Substitutos for Legal-Tender Bill — Vote in House — Senate Amendments — Votes in Senate — Conference Committee — Pro- visions of Law — Attitude of the Business Public and of the Press.
I. THE LEOAL-TENDEB BILLS
On the very day that thq Ne%r York " banks suspended specie payments, a proposal was made in Congress that the United States resort to the issue of an irredeemable paper currency of legal-tender notes. This bilí, so promptly pre- sented, originated in the following manner:
In his report of December 9 Mr. Chase had estimated the probable déficit for the coming six months at $214,000,000. To secure this sum he proposed an increase of only $50,000,000 in tazation and for the remainder reliance upon loans. With the purpose of making it easier to borrow he suggested a national reorganization of the state banking system requiring all banks to purchase United States stocks to hold as security for their circulating notes1 — a proposal
i Report of the Secretary of the Trecuury, December, 1861, pp. 11-20; Note» Erplanatory of Mr. Chcue'* Plan of Xational Fi nance (Washington, 1861). p. 15.
44
The Fibst Legal-Tendeb Act 45
oat of which the national banking system developed some two years later.
According to the usual course of business this report was read in the House of Representativos and referred to the Committee of Ways and Means. The large amount of work which devolved upon this committee had made neces- sary a división of labor among its members. The chairman, Mr. Thaddeus Stevens, of Pennsylvania, whose radical anti- slavery opinions, imperious temper, and vigorous use of invective had made him the Republican leader of the House, devoted himself to pushing the appropriation bilis. To the remaining eight members fell the task of preparing new measurea They organized in two subcommittees, one of which, presided over by the leading tariff advócate of the day, Justin S. Morrill, of Vermont, undertook to frame a program of war taxation, leaving the other subcommittee to consider the loan bilis.1
It was to this second subcommittee that Mr. Chase's national currency scheme was submitted. The chairman was Elbridge 6. Spaulding, a Buffalo banker who had been state treasurer of New York and had served two terms in Congress. His colleagues were a retired Boston merchant, Samuel Hooper, who had entered politics as a Republican after accumulating a fortune in business, and Erastus Corning, an Albany millionaire possessing executive ability but no talent for speech-making. These three gentlemen immediately adopted the secretary's plan and began to draft a bilí for a national currency secured by a pledge of govern- ment bonds. But on Saturday, December 28, they learned that the New York banks had decided to suspend specie payments on the following Monday. Suspensión would of course drive gold from circulation and leave the country
> E. G. Spaüldino, History of the LegaUTender Paper Money Istued During the Grtat Rebellion (Buffalo, 1860), pp. 7, 8.
46 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS
with no other currency than the $33,000,000 demand notes issued by the treasury, the notes of the suspended state banks, and small change of silver and minor coins. Even when redeemable in specie the bank notes, issued by some 1,600 different institutions according to no general plan and varying widely in valué, made a very unsatisfactory currency. Moreover, bank notes could not legally be accepted and paid out by the federal treasury under the provisions of the subtreasury law. Mr. Chase's plan for reorganizing the banking system would perhaps furnish a sounder circulation, but the banking bilí contained sixty sections and was certain to encounter opposition from the friends of state banks that would delay its enactment sev- eral months. "So long a delay," thought Mr. Spaulding, "would be fatal to the unión cause." Accordingly, he "changad the legal tender section, intended originally to accompany the bank bilí, into a sepárate bilí, .... and on his own motion introduced it into the House by nnanimous consent on the 30th of December." !
After being twice read in the House of Representatives, this bilí was referred back to the Committee of Ways and Means. Upon its wisdom the members of the committee were equally divided. Of the subcommittee, Spaulding and Hooper favored the bilí, while Corning opposed it Thaddeus Stevens at first objected to the legal-tender clause as unconstitutional ; but he soon overcame his scruples and decided to vote for the bilí. Morrill, of Vermont, and Horton, of Ohio, joined Corning in opposition. Maynard, of Tennessee, and Stratton, of New York, took no part in the discussion; but the former was inclined to support the proposal, while Stratton was undecided. There was thus a deadlock in the committee — four members favored and four
i Spaulding. op. cit., p. 14. This was H. R. bilí No. 182. It authorized the issne of $50,000,000 of legal-tender treasury notes. For text see Spaulding, pp. 14, 15.
The Fibst Legal-Tender Aot 47
opposed the bilí. The ninth member, John S. Phelps, of Missouri, was not in Washington at the time. Bnt finally the wavering member, Stratton, consented to vote for the bilí in order that it might go before Congress for considera- tion.1 Thus, after a narro w escape from defeat in the com- mittee, the legal-tender bilí was formally reported to the House by Mr. Spaulding, Jannary 7, 1862.a
Mr. Spaulding's reasons for urging a legal-tender bilí upon Congress at this juncture were given in a letter to a gentleman who ventured to suggest that heavy taxation was preferable to the issue of irredeemable paper as a method of secoring revenue. Spaulding wrote:
The treasury-note bilí . . . . is a measure of necessity and not one
of chotee We will be out of means to pay the daily expenses
in about thirty days, and the committee do not see any other way I rítf to get along till we can get the tax bilis ready, except to issue tem- w
porarily Treasury notes We must have at least $100,000,000
during the next three months, or the Government must stop , payment.
And the letter closed with an intimation that unless the gentleman could snggest some other plan for raising the said $100,000,000 it would best become him not to criticise the bilí.'
By the publication of copies of the legal-tender bilí in various newspapers, the country was quickly informad of the radical step which Congress was considering. When the bankers of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia who had been supplying the government with funda heard of the proposal, a number of the most prominent went to Washing- ton to persuade Secretary Chase that the situation could be
i Spauldiko, Hi$tory, p. 16.
J This second bilí (H. R. bilí No. 187) differed from the flrst in increasing the i»oe> of legal-tender notes from $50,000,000 to $100,000,000 and in making the demand note* aathorixed in July, 1861, also a legal tender. For tezt see ibid., pp. 16, 17.
* Letter of E. O. Spaulding to Isaac Sherman, January 8, 1862, Spaulding, Historp, pp. 17, 18.
48 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS
met with a remedy less heroic than the issue of an irredeem- able paper currency. January 11, 1862, these gentlemen had an informal conference with Mr. Chase, the members of the House Committee of Ways and Means, and of the Senate finance committee.1
As spokesman for the banks, Mr. James Gallatin, presi- dent of the Gallatin Bank of New York, pointed out the evil consequences that would follow the emission of legal-tender paper money, and submitted an alternative plan for relieving the necessities of the treasury. The main featnres of his proposal were: first, heavy taxation; second, the sale of long-time bonds at their market valué. Adeqnate taxation, he argued, would give the long-needed assnrance that the treasury had ampie revenue to pay interest on loans. Bonds could then be sold on better terms, especially after the futile attempt to fix a minimum valué for them by legislation forbidding sales below par should have been abandoned.3
Simple and efficient as this plan seems, it did not meet with the approval of the secretary or the congressional committees. Mr. Spaulding, who replied to Gallatin, stated the grounds of their dissent as follows:
Mr. Spaulding objected to any and every form of " shinning " by government through Wall or State streets to begin with; objected to the knocking down of government stocks to 75 or 60 cents on the
>Spaüldino, op. cu., pp. 18-20.— The bankers who took part in thisconferenoe seem to haré had no official position as delega tes of the association of banks. Howerer, they were men of stich prominence that mach weight was attached to the opinions they expressed on financial topics. According to Spaulding, Coe, Vermilye, Martin, and Gallatin carne f rom New York ; Harén, Walley, and Bates f rom Boston ; and Rogers, Mercer, and Patterson from Philadelphia (ibid.% p. 19). But that the riews of these gentlemen were not shared by all their associates appears from the letters received about this time by Mr. Spaulding from other bankers (tbid., p. 23-5). See also the New York Herald financial column dated January 13, 1862.
2 The re were four other points in Mr. Gallatin's plan: (1) cessation of issue of demand notes beyond the $50,000,000 already authorized ; (2) tho issue of $100,000,000 of two-year treasury notes receivable for government ducs ezcept customs; (3) sus- pensión of the subtreasury act so as to allow banks to become government deposi- tories; (4) authorixation of temporary loans secured by pledges of government stock.— /6id., p. 20.
The Fibst Legal-Tendeb Act 49
dollar, the inevitable result oí throwing a new and large loan on tbe market, without limitation as to price; claimed for treasury notes as much virtue oí par valué as the notes oí banks which ha ve suspended specie pa yments, but which yet circuíate in the trade oí the North; and fínished with firmly refusing to assent to any scheme which should permit a speculation by brokers, bankers, and others in government securities, and particularly any scheme which should double the public debt oí the country, and double the expenses oí the war by damaging the credit oí the government to the extent oí sending it to " shin " through the shaving shops oí New York, Boston, and Philadelphia.1
This reply of Mr. Spaulding to Mr. Gallatin is interesting because it shows plainly the curious inconsistency in the position taken by the promoters of the legal-tender bilí from beginning to end of the discussion. They professed to advócate the issue of paper money upon the ground of sheer necessity. By this means alone, said Mr. Spaulding, in the letter quoted above, could the immediate wants of the treasury be met. To substantiate this argument it was of course necessary to 6how that no other feasible method of obtaining funds existed. When, then, bankers declared that there was an alternative, that the government could secure means by adopting a policy of vigorous taxation and selling its bonds at their market valué, the only logical answer for the friends of the legal-tender bilí was to show that the bankers were mistaken. But such was not the answer that Mr. Spaulding made. He replied instead that selling bonds below par was more objectionable than issuing paper money. And in this view the committee of Congress apparently concurred. Thus, when the delegates of the banks called attention to the possibility of borrowing, the argument for the legal- tender bilí was shifted from the ground of necessity to that of expediency. The choice lay not between irredeemable paper money and federal bankruptcy, but between irredeem-
1 Spacldino, p. 21.
60 HlSTOBY OF THE GBEBNBACKS
able paper money and borrowing at high ratee of interest. The financia! leadera of the government delíberately pre- ferred the former conree. Whether their choíce was wise or not, even from the strictly financia! point of view; whether the íncrease of debt, which Mr. Spaalding saw would result from selling bonds below par, waa avoided by the issne of paper money; whether " the knocking down of government stocks to 75 or 60 cents on the dollar" was prevented, are questions that muat be left for the chapter on the effect of paper iasuea apon the cost of the war.1
As has been said, Mr. Spanlding's reply convinced the congressional committees that the legai-tender bilí was a better method of relievingthe embarraesment of the treasury than the bankers' proposal to sell bonds at their market valué. Subsequently, however, the delégales of the banks succeeded in formulating a plan which received the indorae- ment of the secretary of the treasury. New loans of $250,- 000,000 or $300,000,000 and the enactment of the nationai banking bilí advocated in Mr. Chase's report were its chief points. The issue of demand notes in excess of the $50,- 000,000 already authorized, and the making those already isBued a legal tender, was to be avoided as nnnecessary.' But tilia plan siso was rejected by the committees of Con- grega as inadequate to the crisis. Plainly, it would be of emall avail to authorize bonds at par when capitalista would bny them only at a discount, and to sales below par the commit- tees would not agree. Consequently, the attempt of the repre- sentativo bankers of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia to gíve the government the benefit of their advice carne to nougbt. The plana suggested by them are of interest, how- ever, because they show that in the opinión of experienced
■ Part II, ch»p. i. below. qr. Mehiy Anua, Hüttnical Smaf (New York,
un i, di». aw-w u ud es, h b«iow.
• SrAULDisa, pp. 21, 22.
The Fibst Legal-Tendeb Aot 51
men the legal-tender act was not the only escape from the difficolties into which the treasury had drifted.
After the convention of bankers had broken up, Mr. Spaulding added another section to the legal-tender bilí, recast it in pursuance of suggestions from Secretary Chase,1 and introdnced it again into the House of Representativos, where it was made the special order for January 28, 1862. As it carne before Congress the measnre provided for the issue of $100,000,000 of United States notes to be " a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and prívate," and exchangeable for 6 per cent, twenty-year bonds of which the secretary was anthorized to issue $500,000,000.9 Upon the appointed day the House resolved itself into a committee of the whole upon the átate of the Union, and Mr. Spaulding made an elabórate introductory speech, ezplaining and rec- ommending the bilí.1 But opposition to the making of treasury notes a legal tender developed at once, and it was not until after four weeks of earnest discussion that the fate of the bilí was decided. What motives actuated Congress in its final decisión can best be learned by study of the debate.
II. DEBATE IN OONGBESS4
Logically, the first point in the case of the promoters of the treasury-note bilí was the proof that Congress had power under the constitution to make paper money a legal tender in the payment of debts. Foreseeing that this power
» Spaüldixo, pp. 26, 27.
>H. B. bilí No. 240, ibid., p. 27; full test in Congrenional atabe, 37thCong.,2d Sess., p. 522.
* Congrettional Qlobe. loe. cit.% pp. 523-6; Spaulding, pp. 28-42.
* In the following section I haré attempted to gire an analysis of the whole dis- cussion in both houses of Congress, rather than to show the attitode of prominent indiridnals. Acconnts of the debate from the latter point of riew are numeróos. Sw, e, g.: Spaulding, pp. 28-152; J. O. Blainb, Twenty Year» of Congrcu (Ñor- wieh, Conn., 1884), Yol. I, chap. xiz; J. J. Knox, United State» Note», 2d ed. (LoDdon, 1885), pp. 119-37; A. S. Bolles, Financial History of the United State», BfJ-lttS (New York, 1886), Book I, chap. iv; J. F. Rhodbs, Hutory of the United
52 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAOKS
would be challenged, Mr. Spaulding read un nnofficial opinión of the attorney -general, Edward Bates, which vas interpreted, not quite fairly, to mean that Congress conld make treasury notes a legal tender sínce it was not forbidden to do so by the constitntion.1 To thia it was answered that nnder the tenth amendment Congresa poasesaed no powers except those explicitly or implicitly granted it, and therefore that no anthority for making paper money a legal tender could be inferred from the silence of the constitation on the point.' So conclusivo was this reply that the Bupporters of the bilí found it necesaary to eeek other groond for their con- tention by dedncing the ríght to make paper bilis legal tender from aome of the powers expressly delegated to Con- gress. Appeal was made to the claose anthorizíng Congresa "to make all lawB necessary and proper for carrying into execution " the powers specifically granted it. Mr. Spauld- ing coupled this clause with the anthorization to levy war. "This bilí," he argued, "ie a necesaary means of carrying into execution the powers granted in the constitution ' to raise and support armies ' and ' to provide and mainiain a navy."" Thaddeus Stevens added the necessary clincher by saying: " Whetber euch necessity exista is solely for the decisión of Congrees."* Two attempts were made to over-
Stnta.from mo (New Tork. IB»), Yol. III, pp. Ml-V; J. K. Dpton, Jfoney in Poli- lia. Id ed. ( Rostan, 1HS6), pp. 75-89; J. L. LaüQHIJN, Rtport of tKe Afondar» Com- mimion (Chicago. 1896), pp. 4OH-10¡ F. A. WaI.RU. Uoneg (Nsw Tork, 1891), pp. 3S9-7S; F. A. Waj.kkb and Hish Adahb, "The Legal-Tender Aot." Nortn American Sañew, Aprll, 1HV0 ; "The Qreenbacks in Congrega," Sour.d Cumne*. Yol. III, No. *. JinuuT. 1888.
1 Cmarmianal Olofte, Í7th Cong-, Id Seas., Part I, p. 52S; Spíuldinq, pd.1S.18. Bates 's real maaalnf soems to be that Congresa is no more prohibí ted trom inskiag billa of credit a legal tender thau it ia from iasoing tbem, and the latter right no
> ¡bid. Bw remarks of Messrs. Pendletoa, p. HOi Cowau, p. 791 ; ShefBeld, p. 8«; Tilomas, p. «al ; CoUamer, p. 7SS; Pearce, p. sai; Crisuelo, Appeodií, p. IX; Hajani. p. 785; Conidia*-, p. 61">: Wr¡«ht. p. «62.
1 Ibid.. p. 521. Similar argumenta were made by Heasra. Blake, p. SBo; Howe, Appendií, p. H; Sterens, p. fiut.
*Ibid.
The First Legal-Tendeb Act 53
throw this position. Such an argument, said Mr. Crisfield, amounts to a claim of unlimited authority; for, if one granted it, by asserting that the act was necessary " to insure poblic safety," Oongress could enact any law, no matter how injudicious, provided it were not expressly forbidden by the constitution.1 Mr. Pendleton took different gronncL Granted, he argued, that Congress could make treasury notes a legal tender if this were necessary to pay the army, it still remained to prove that this necessity existed. He himself was nnable to see the necessity in the pending case. There- fore, to him the bilí was nnconstitutional.3
A second form of the " necessary means" argument was made by Mr. Bingham, of Ohio. Congress, he said, has power to regúlate commerce, and the determination of what shall be lawful tender in discharge of debts is a necessary incident of this regulation.8 But it was answered, first, that it was a mere subterfuge to pretend that regulation of com- merce was the object of the bilí;4 second, that the power of Congress over commerce extended only to " commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes," while a legal-tender act affected only transac- tions between individuáis;6 and third, that the substitution of a paper for a metallic standard, so far from "regulating and promoting" commerce, tended rather to "disturb and destroy" it.6
Senators Howard and Sherman elaborated a third varia- tion of the argument. Making treasury notes a legal tender they held was one of the necessary and proper means for borrowing money.7 Senator Collamer anticipated this con- tention, and replied that where power was granted to do a
i Conffremional Olote, S7th Cong., 2d Sess., Appendix, p. 48. J Ibid., p. 550.
1 Ibid., p, 637 ; cf. remarles of Mr. Kellogg, p. 679.
* Mr. Crisfield, Appendiz, p. 49. & Mr. Collamer, p. 769.
•Mr. Crisfield, Appendix, p. 49. ' Mr. Sherman, p. 790; Mr. Howard, p. 796.
54 HlSTORY OP THE GRBENBAOKS
certain thing in a certain way it waa not permissible to seek kiferential authority to accomplish the same end in a differ- ent manner. Now Congress was empowered to ruine money first, by ievying taxes, second, by negotiatíng loans. The iasue of Iegal-tender notes, being neíther a tax ñor a loan, carne under neither of these exprese grants ; and not coming under the expresa grants, no authority could be ínferred for it as a meaos of raising money.1
The last argnment for the conBtitationality of the bilí — the one that found no adeqnate answer — was Charles Sum- ner's. He called attentioo to the fact that Congress had long been conceded the right to issne treasnry notes. Beview- ing the financia! history of the American coloníes, he showed that ten of the thírteen had at different times issaed paper money, nsnally making it a legal tender. In America, he argued, " the legal tender was a coustant., though not insepa- rable incident of the bilí of credit." The conclusión was that the unqueationed power of issoing treasnry notes carried with it the right to make the notes a legal tender."
Biit, af ter spending mnch time and ingenmty in debating the constitntional qnestions raÍBed by the Iegal-tender clause, the members of Congress apparently concluded that they had mnltiplied words to little parpóse. While a few declared that constitntional scruples would prevent them from voting for the bilí,1 the more general feeling was that it would be unreasonable to decide a question of sach importance upon a
1 Cenermiionui Glooe, 37th Cong., 2d 3r.nr., p. TO?.
' Ihid., pp. T97, 798. An amusingly fantastlc argnment for the eooatitutionalily of the bilí was mude by Senator McDoogall uf California, who attempted to deduce the right to issua Iegal-tender treasnry notes from the power lo coin money. by Hbowing that the wnrd "coin" «as etymoloRically equivnlrnt to tbe word " stamp," and tbercfnre that tnn right of coinage musí include the right to atamp paper notes. Uafortunately for the argnment, the canon of interpreta ti na whicb insista that words aro usoel In tbe cnnslitntioD in atrict acoordan» with thcir etynmlosical significante did not commend Itself to the lawyera of the Senate.— lbid„ Appendtx, p. 80. forhis argument; with which compare the remarkaof Hr.Thomas. p. Sal.
»E. g., Sena to» Col lamer, ¿oúf., pp. ¡67. 770; Powell, p, 804; Saulsbnry, p. SU.
The Fibst Legal-Tendeb Agt 55
doubtful technicality which could be settled only by the coarte. If the measare was expedient there need be little hesitation at such a crisis in constrning liberally the powers of Congress.1 The fate of the bilí was affected, then, much lees by the inconclusive constitutional argnment than by the debate apon the merits of the issae of legal-tender notes as a financial policy.
Considering the bilí thas apon its merits, the opposition called attention prominently to the lessons of experience. Could it be shown that the resort to an inconvertible paper corrency had always been attended in the past with evil resalte, a strong presamption woald be created against the wisdom of a repetition of the experiment. Consequently rhetoric was employed to pictnre in vivid colore the unhappy conseqaences that had followed the issae of paper money by France daring the Revolution,2 by England in the Napol- eonic wars,* by Austria,4 and Turkey,5 by Rhodelsland* in colonial days, by the Continental Congress in the War of Inde- pendence,7 and fínally by the Confedérate States, then fairly launched apon the paper-money policy.8
To break the forcé of these historical parallels, which told so heavily against the bilí, its supporters sought to show that causes, which under different conditions had led to deprecia- ron, would not be operativo in the case of the United States in 1862. Thus, it was said, the continental notes of the American Revolution depreciated because of the poverty of the country , which ofFered no security for their redemption ; the vastly greater wealth of the nation in 1862 would prevent a repetition of the experience.9 The depreciation of the issues
1 Remarles of Fessenden, Congre&ionalGlobe^Xlth. Cong., 2d Sess., p. 767 ; Wilson, p. 788; Allcy, p. 659; Sherman, p. 791; Pike, p. 658; Campbell, p. 686.
* Mr. Cowan, tótd., p. 792; cf. Sumner, p. 798; Pike, p. 657. *Mr. Morrill, p. 631 ; cf. Spaulding, p. 526; Stevens, p. 689.
♦ Mr. Morrill, p. 631. & Mr. Simmons, p. 794. «Mr. Sheffield, p. 164. 7 Mr. Collamer, pp. 767-8; Sumner, p. 798; cf. Kellogg, p. 680; Pike, p. 656.
• Mr. Horton, p. 665. » Mr. Kellogg, p. 680.
30 HlSTORT OF THE GBEENBACKS
oí Louis XIV was explained on the gronnd that France was theu exhausted by heavy taxation to maintain a proflígate eourt.1 The case» of the French Revolution and the Con- fedérate ¡States were acconnted for by the fact that these governments were revolotionary.2 Some gentlemen even deuied that depreciated correncies had proved evils. "It wuuld be far froin a blnnder," said Senator Howe, " to say that the 4 golden age ' of England was doring that long period wheu the only eurrency she knew was one of irredeemable paper;"* and Mr. Kellogg declared the paper issnes of the Revolution had increased confidence, clothed the army, and rev i ved eoinmerce.4 Another supporter of the bilí tried to evade the hiatorical argoment by maintaining that the trae le«*ou of experienoe was that of modérate issues.* But no oue *eeina to ha ve taken these ingenióos pleas very seriously, for it waa eaay to show that one of the striking lessons of experimenta with paper money is that such moderation, whieh the iaauer at first intends to observe, has almost mvui iably been soon forgotten/
If the argutnent f rom experience was strongly against the bilí, the cognate eeonomic argoment was hardly less so. The opptmeuta of paper issues assomed the ofFensive, declaring eiuphutioaUy that the proposed legal-tender notes were cer- tum tu deprecíate in valoe. Mr. Lovejoy said:
U xa uoi in the power of this Congress . . . . to accomplish an liupua&ibiüty in umking something out of nothing. The piece of ^k^í uní atatnp as uve do liare is not five dollars, and it never will íh\ uuK^i» it U convertible into a five dollar gold piece ; and to pro- tvw* thut it U, U siuiply a delusion and a fallacy.7
» Vii Uonso, .Vppeadix, p. 55, Congremional Gfoóe, 37th Coog., 2d Sess.
* \JU l^olUktfg, p. 680; Howe, Appendiz, p. 55.
• Vt.i..'.u*Uv p. 55; cf. Spaulding, p. 526.
» /<>m¿. ^ uM. *Mr. Pike. p. 657.
Vi - ''* Ticuna!*» p. 682; Cowan, p. 793; Morrill, pp, 631, 886; Pomeroy, p. 884;
• i> ii
The Fibst Legal-Tendeb Act 57
Various shif ts were tríed to meet this attack. Mr. Kellogg boldly asserted that the legal tender quality of the notes would preven t fluctuation of their valué ;' but more f aith was put in the reply that the total wealth of the country was security for the notes, and this security being ampie the valué of the paper would not decline.3 The rejoinder to this was first, that the security for the notes was not the total wealth of the people, but only such part of it as the govern- ment could obtain by taxation ; and second, that though the security for ultímate redemption might be ampie, the notes would nevertheless deprecíate in valué if the holders were unable to secure immediate payment*
A different argument to show the improbability of depreciation was based by Thaddeus Stevens upon the quan- tity theory of money as expounded by McCulloch. " The valué of legal tender notes," said he, " depends on the amount issued compared with the business of the country. If a less quantity were issued than the usual and needed cir- culation, they would be more valuable than gold."4 The opponents of the bilí replied, not by attacking the quantity theory, but by insisting that all experience showed that, after one issue of paper money had been made, other issues were sore to follow, until the currency became redundant and depreciated. "The experience of mankind," said Mr. Thomas, " shows the danger of entering upon this path ; that boundaries are fixed only to be overrun ; promises made only to be broken." * " The same necessity," added Mr. Pomeroy, " which now requires the amount of inconvertible paper now authorized, will require sixty days henee a similar issue, and then another, each one requiring a larger nominal amount to
' Ccmffreuional Globe, 87th Congress, 2d Sess., p. 681 ; cf. the answer of Sen ato r ColUmer, p. 767.
' Messrs. Spaulding, p. 524; Howe, Appendix, p. 55; Kellogg, pp. 680, 681.
> Cf. Mr. Morrill, p. 630, Thomas, p. 682.
* Jfruf ., p. 668. » Ibid.t p. 682.
58 HlSTOBY OF THE GBEENBACKB
represen! the same intrinsic valué."' To such assertions, backed by the weight of histórica] evidence, the snpporters of tbe bilí conld respond only tbat the case of the United States would be aa exoeption; the American government would not yield, as other governments had done, to the temptation to make further ¡senes.1
Some of the more astnte fríends of the bilí admitted the probability of a redundant cnrrency, and relied, not on limi- tation of ¡sanes, bnt on a funding scheme to prevent depre- ciation. Section one of the bilí provided that holders of legal -te nder notes conld at any time exchange them at par for 6 per cent, twenty-year bonds.' Under this arrange- ment, it was supposed, the valué of the notes conld never be lees than that of the bonde, and, as bonds conld by law not be Bold for less than par, it followed that the notes conld not greatly deprecíate.* Unfortunately for the argument, eren while Congress was debating the bilí, bonds were selling in New York at ninety cents npon the dollar in notes of the suspended banks.* Henee the forcé of Mr. Morrill's remark ; " By making onr notes a legal tender we make them better for a moment than we can make our bonds, and men migbt be willing to exchange bonds for the notes ; but notes for bonds never."*
Having proved to their satisfaction that the legal-tender notes would deprecíate, the opponents of the bilí pnrened their advantage by dwelling upon the evil conseqaences that would result. Coin would disappear from circulation, said they, prices would rise suddenly, fixed incomes would decline,
|
1 Conffrtnional Glabc ported tho bilí when BIDei Cullsmer, p. 770; Lotejciy, |
S7tta Coag.. ided lo pro p.B9l; Hoi |
2d Se |
ss., p. 881. Dr pajment |
Mr |
. Pomeror. howeret, «np- intereiit in ooiu. Cf. mito .793; lli.rrill, p. 931. |
|||||||
|
iqr. |
the nmirb |
<.(il |
OS3T |
s.PiLe. |
p. 657 |
;H< |
«per. p |
.en |
; Steveí |
is, y. 688. |
||
|
Spa, |
>See |
I. D. 126. |
II, » |
i"., |
p- 522, |
■ □d |
Mr. |
SteTeD |
., |
eip!.n. |
■**-.*>•»■ |
QJ. |
|
■Mr. |
Hoopor, ib, |
d.,p. |
817. |
IMr |
Peí |
adlelon. |
MI. |
•/fntt>, p. 830. |
The Fibst Legal-Tendeb Aot 59
creditors be defraudad, and the widows and orphans would suffer.1 Senator Collamer showed how depositors in savings banks wonld lose by depreciation,2 and Senator Fessenden how labor would be injured by a rise of pnces exceeding the rise of wages.* Finally, Mr. Crisfield represented forcibly the instability of a paper standard of valué and the conse- quent danger to business.4
To all of this the promoters of the bilí found it hard to reply. On the other hand they sought support in the contention that the country needed more money,5 and that the government should regúlate the paper currency fur- nished by the banks.6 Of course the rejoinder was, first, that, granted the existence of the doubtful need of more money, the issue of a depreciated paper currency was a very bad method of supplying it ; and, second, that if the bank- note currency required regulation the proper means was a reorganization of the banking system, not a legal-tender act.
Not content with showing the economic evils of a depre- ciated paper currency, the opponents of the bilí denounced it roundly as immoral. To pay contractors and soldiers in depreciated money, they declared, was dishonorable. uThe bilí says to the world," asserted Mr. Horton, "that we are bankrupt, and we are not only weak, but we are not honest." 7 The injustice, however, extended not only to creditors of the government, but to all persons who would be compelled to accept in payment money of less valué than that which they had contracted to receive.8 And by thus encouraging the
i Cf. the remarles of Messrs. Pendleton, Congressional Globe* 2<7th Cong., 2d 8ess., p. 531; Morrill, p. 630; Horton, p. 664; Sheffield, p. 641; Fessenden, p. 765.
* Ibid., p. 770. Cf. the reply of Senator McDougall, Appendix, p. 60.
* rbid., p. 766. * Ibid., Appendix, p. 50.
*Cf. the remarles of Messrs. Alley, p. 659; Hooper, p. 617; Kellogg, p. 681. •Senator Doolittle, Appcndiz p. 57.
' íbi d., p. 664 ; cf. also Sumner, p. 798; Fessenden, p. 765; Crisfield, A ppendix, pp. 49. 50; Pearce, p. 804.
* Cf. Messrs. Pendleton, p. 549; Thomas, p. 682. See Sherman's attempted reply, p. 790.
60 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS
debtor to defraud bis creditor, urged Senator Fessenden, the bilí would lower the moral standards oí the people.1 To these charges, also, the promoters of the bilí had little to say.
Upon the fiscal aspect of the bilí the case of the opposition was hardly less clear. First, they declared, the resort to an irredeemable paper currency was a practical confession of bankruptcy, and would therefore injure the credit of the government, and make less favorable the conditions on which it could borrow. "We .... go out to the country," said Fessenden, " with the declaration that we are unable to pay or borrow at the present time, and such a confession is not likely to increase onr credit." ' Second, it was pointed ont that the depreciation of the currency would cause the prices of everything which the government had to buy to rise, and thus would vastly increase the cost of the war. As Senator Cowan put it, the government umight as well lose 25 per cent, on the sale of her [sac] bonds, as to be obliged, in avoiding it, to pay 25 per cent, more for everything she buys." *
This discussion of the economic, moral, and fiscal conse- quences of issuing a legal-tender paper currency produced in Congress the feeling that under ordinary circumstances such a proposal would be indefensibie. The vigor with which the opposition had presented the case against the bilí made a deep impression. On the other hand, the reasoning by which the supporters of the bilí had sought to establish the constitutional power of Congress to make treasury notes a legal tender was felt to be inconclusive. The forcé of the telling argument from experíence had not been broken; the probability of depreciation had not been disproved; no ade- quate reply had been found to the indictment of the bilí on
i Congreuional Glohc, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 765; cf. Messrs. Conkling, p. 635; Hortou, p. 664.
ilbid., p. 765. Cf. Messrs. Vallandingham, Appendix, p. 44; Sheffield, p. 641; Collamor, p. 769; Horton, p. 664; Crisfield, Appendix, p. 49; Willey, p. 796; Sumner, p. 798; Thomas, p. 682.
s/6irf., p. 793; cf. the remarks of Sheffield, p. 641, and Morrill, p. 630.
The First Legal-Tendeb Aot 61
moral grounds; and, finally, it had not been denied that resort to paper issues would injure the credit of the govern- ment and increase the cost of the war. So generally was the objectionable character of the measure realized that Senator Fessenden could say :
All the opinions that I have heard expressed agree in this: that only with extreme reluctance, only with fear and trembling as to the consequences, can we have recourse to a measure like this of mafcing our paper a legal tender in payment of debts.1
And yet an argament was found that overéame the "extreme reluctance" of a majority of the members and induced them to vote f or the bilL This argument was the plea of absoluto necessity. As has been seen, it was to necessity that Mr. Spaulding had appealed in justifícation of his fírst draft of the legal-tender bilí.2 In opening the debate in Congress he repeated the argument with emphasis. " The bilí before us," said he, "is a war measure, a measure of necessity and not of choice, presented . . . . to meet the most pressing demands upon the Treasury." * The cry of necessity was taken up by the other supporters of the bilí, who relied upon it to meet all the objections urged by the opposition.4 How efFective a plea it was is shown by the influence it had upon those who appreciated the ills of a paper currency. " Beneficent as this measure is, as one of relief," said Mr. Alley, "nothing could induce me to give it sanction but uncontrollable necessity."5 "Ishall .... sup- port the bilí," said Mr. Doolittle, "as a measure of war neces- sity, with more misgivings <as to its effect at home and abroad, than of any other measure for which I have given my vote in this body."®
i Oongre$nonal Globe, 37th Cong., 2d SessM p. 763.
3 Mr. Spaulding's letter qooted, p. 44, abo ve.
» Conffrenional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 523.
1 Cf. the remarles of Messrs. Campbell, p. 686; Walton, p. 692; Edwards, p. 684; Sterens, p. 687; and of Senators Sherman, p. 789; Howe, Appendiz, p. 55; McDougall, Appendiz, p. 58.
*Ibid., p. 659. *Ibid., Appendiz. p. 58.
62 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAOKS
That the assertion of necessity might carry the added forcé of official sanction, Secretary Chase was induced to send a note to the chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means to be read to the House. He wrote:
I ha ve felt, ñor do I wish to oonoeal that I now feel, a great aver- sión to making anything but ooin a legal tender in payment oí debts. It has been my anxious wish to avoid the necessity of such legislation. It is, however, at pi at imponible, in oonsequenoe of the large expenditures entailed by the war, and the suspensión of the banks, to procure sufficient coin for disbursements, and it has therefore become indispensably necessary that we should resort to the issue of United States notes.1
This letter made the bilí an "administration measnre," and so was an important factor in its snccess. Desire to support the government at all costa led members to whom an irre- deemable currency was very repugnan t to vote for the bilí when the secretary of the treasnry declared it to be nec- essary. " I have .... had great doubt as to the propriety of voting for this bilí . . . ." said Mr. Hickman, "but, being assured .... that the Treasnry, and perhaps the Admin- istration, regard this as a governmental necessity, I am dis- posed to waive the qnestion of propriety or expediency, and to vote for it as a necessity." '
i Oonarm$ional Olobe, 87tb Cong., 2d Sess., p, 618. Cf. Mr. Cbase's letter to Spaulding, in tbe latter's History, p. 59; and McCüLi/OCH, Afea and Meaturt» ofHalf a Century (New York, 1880), pp. 170, 171.
* Ocmpresfionoi Qlobe, 87 tb Cong., 2d Sess., p, 690. Cf. Somner's oonolnsion: "Surely we mnst all be against paper money — we mnst aU insist upon maintaining tbe integrity of tbe QoTernment — and we mnst aU set our faces against any proposi- tion like tbe present, exoept as a temporaiy expedient, rendered imperatire by the exigency of tbe bonr. If I vote for this proposition it will be only beeanse I am unwilling to retase to tbe Government, especially charged witb tbis responsibility, tbat confidenoe wbicb is hardly less important to tbe pnblic interests tban tbe money itself. Others may doubt if the exigency is sufflciently imperatire, bat tbe secretary of tbe treasnry, wbose dnty it is to nnderstand tbe oeeasion, does not
donbt. In bis opinión tbe war requires tbis sacrifloe Yonr soldiers in tbe
fleld mnst be paid and fed. Here the re can be no failnre or postponement. A rem- edy wbicb at anotber moment yon would reject is now proposed. Wbatever may be tbe national resouroes, tbey are not now witbin reacb, exoept by snmmary prooaas. Relactantly, painfully, I consent tbat tbe prooess sboold issne" (pp. 799, 800). abo McDougall, Appendix, p. 58.
The Fibst Legal-Tendeb Aot 63
In replying to the plea of necessity, the opposition can- didly admitted it would be better to issae a forced currency than to stop payment, provided there were no alternative. "If the necessity exista," said Senator Fessenden, "I have no hesitation upon the subject and shall have none. If there is nothing left for os to do bnt that, and that will effect the object, I am perfectly willing to do that." l But that such was the case was emphatically denied. " It has been aseerted .... with the utmost apparent sincerity," said Mr. Horton, "that this is a measure not of choice, but of necessity. Bnt Mr. Chairman, that assertion is only reiterated, not proved. Where is the proof that this is a matter of neces- sity? There may be proofs abundant, bnt they have not been produced." *
Not only did the opposition deny the necessity, bnt they were ready also with suggestions of other means of securing the needed fnnds. One suggestion was adequate war taxa- tion. "Not a dollar of tax has been raised," said Mr. Thomas, uand yet we are talking of national bankrnptcy, and lannching upon a paper currency. I may be very dull, bnt I cannot see the necessity, or the wisdom, of such a conree."* It was by this time generally acknowledged that the omission to impose heavy taxes at the extra session of Jaly, 1861, was a serious blnnder which Congress shonld repair as soon as possible.4 But the supporters of the bilí argued* that the pending sitnation could not be met by taxa- tion, for the needs of the treasury were too pressing to wait until new taxes could be assessed and collected.
l ComoremioneU Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 764.
'/otd., p. 063; c/. pp. 664, 665.
l/Wd., p.682; cf» the remarles of Roscoe Conkling, p. 633; Wright, p. 663; Collamer, PPw 770, 771 ; Bayard, p. 796.
* A joint resolution to raise $150,000,000 per annom by taxation had been adopted by t vote of 134 to 5 in the Hoose, January 15, and 39 to 1 in the Senate on the 17th. -Ibid^ pp. 349, 376.
s E. g., see remarles of Mr. W aitón, ibid., p. 692.
64 HlSTOBT OP THE GsKENBAOKS
Tu tbia the rejoinder wasmade: If it will take too long to wait for tbe proceeds of taxeo, let the government supply ita immediate wants by eelling bonds at tbeir market valué, and in tbe meantime frame a permanent eystem of taxation tbat will yield an adequate revenue.' Thia plan waa tbe same tbat tbe delegation of bankera had urged apon tbe secretary and the committees of Congreas,1 and it encountered tbe same opposition. Senator Howe waa nnwilling, as Mr. Spaulding had been, tbat government bonds eliould be sold below par. "The experience of half a centnry," said he, "has demon- atrated that the ose of money is not worth more than six per cent; that sam tbe Government oaght to pay."* Senator Fessenden replied : " Money in tbe market is alwaya worth what it will eell for. It is an articio of merchandise like anything else, and the Government has no reason to suppoae, nnless it can offer mnch better aecurity, that it ahonld get money at a better rate than anybody elae." *
But there were other men who, while apparently ready to admit that government noed not always ineiat on receiving quite par for its bonda, etill believed that under existing cir- cumatances the discount demanded by lendera would be rninoualy high. "I maintain," asid Thaddeos Stevens, " that the highest suma you could sell yonr bonds at would be 75 per cent payable in currency, itself at a discount. That would produce a losa which no nation .... could stand a year." *
Of conree it was not poBaible without offering a loan to determine preciaely at what ratea the government could sell its bonds; but the opponenta of the bilí believed that Mr.
i8*o tho speachoa of llr. LoTeJoj, p. (ttl ; and Seoiiton Cowan, p. VSJ. aad Bajard. p. TOS.
>Sh p. it, abuie.
iO—gwtoiulOto6c, 87th Copg., M Sw., Appendlx. p. W.
' IbúL, p. TU.
■ ¡béd., p. «SU i ef. ths remuki of Mean. Edwuda, p. SSS, ud Pilte, p. «*.
The First Legal-Tendeb Agt 65
Stevens and Mr. Spaulding exaggerated when they predicted that the price realizad would range between 50 and 80.1 Shoald a plan of fínance based upon taxation heavy enough to inspire confidence in the management of the treasuiy be adopted, they were convinced that the government could secare loans without serious sacrifica2 And further, their fiscal argument showed that an increase in the cost of the war would not be avoided by the rival plan of issuing an incon- vertible paper currency.*
Still a third alternative was proposed by the oppoeition — the issue of treasury notes without the legal-tender quality. This suggestion was embodied in the three rival plana intro- duced into the House as substitutes for the bilL4 The dis- cuseion of their merits naturally elicited debate upon the efficacy of the legal-tender clause. The supporters of the bilí were ready enough with assertions of the importance of the clause to the success of the measure;5 but they found it difficult to explain precisely what its valué was. One said, "By making these notes a legal tender we prevent the money sharks from robbing our soldiers of their hard earn- ings."* Another argued that unless the United States notes were made a legal tender, the banks would seek to depre- cíate them in order to retain the field of circulation for their own issues.1 A third declared, 44If wemake the government issues a legal tender, the demand for specie will be so limited that they will maintain their valué."8 Finally, Senator Sherman argued that the banks would not receive the gov- ernment notes unless compelled to do so by the legal-tender clause, and that if not received by the banks as curren t funda
i Cf. Mr. Spaulding, Congreasional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 524. 3 Cf. the remarles of Roscoe Conkling, p. 034, and of Senator Cowan, p. 793. » P. 60, above. « P. 75, below.
* E. g.% Mr. Pike, Conorcuioncd Globty 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 657. •Mr. Blake, p. 686; cf. tbe similar remarles of Messrs. Edwards, p. 683, and Sfaellabarger. p. 680; Campbell, p. 687 ; and of Senator Henry Wilson, p. 788. 7 Mr. Kellogg. P- 681. * Mr. Campbell, p. 687.
HlSTOBY OF THE GkeENBACKS
the notes wonld become hopelesaly depreciated.1 In responso Senator Fessenden pointed to the clanse authorizing the sub- treasnries to receive the notes on depoeit at 5 per cent, interest. This clause woald make discrimination againet the notes impracticable, he argued; £or sbonld the banks refuse to receive notes as deposito they would lose bnsiness, becaose the holders would prefer to depoeit with the snbtreasaries, which woald pay 5 per cent, interest instead of with banks.'
If these attempts to pro ve the ntility of the legal -tender clanse seem rather weak, so do the críticisms arged by the opposition. The advocates of the rival bilis propoeing to issne treasury notes withont the legal-tender qnality might have been expected to dwell npon the fact that their plana left the standard of valne nndistorbed, and so avoided a deprecia tion that wonld nnsettle bnsiness, lower real wages, defraud creditors, and increase the cost of sil snppUes gov- ernment had to bny. Instead, they attempted only to show that the legal-tender clanse wonld impair faith in the paper currency. "The faír inference is in the tnínd of every man, however stnpid," said Senator Cowan, "that yon yoorselvee fírst donbted the validity of it, and that, therefore, yon attempted to give it this qnality of paying debts perforce, to compénsate it for the lack of eseential valué.1"
From this review it is clear that the poeition of those who orged the argoment of necessity for the legal-tender bilí in Congress betrayed the lack of consistency noticed in Mr. Spaulding's reply to the bank delegatea.' When the oppo- sition snggested that the wants of the treasory conld be met either by borrowing or by issning treasnry notes not a legal tender, it was incumbent on those who mantained the poei- tion that the bilí was "a measure not of choice but of necea-
The Pib8t Legal-Tendeb Aot 67
sity" to deny the possibility of securing funda by these methods. But such a denial was not attempted. Instead they tried to show that the issue of an irredeemable paper cnrrency was a better method of securing means than bor- rowing at a discount or issuing treasury notes not a legal tender. It is curious to note the nalveté with which the most strenuous promoters of the legal-tender bilí asserted in one breath that it was a measure of sheer necessity, and in the next breath admitted the existence of alternativas. Mr. Spaulding himself said after emphasizing the necessity: u We have this alternative, either to go into the jnarket and aell our bonds for what they will command, or to pass this bilL" * And Thaddeus Stevens, who began by asserting the necessity, shifted, before concluding, to this position: "Here, then, in a few words lies your choice. Throw bonds at 6 or 7 per cent, on the market, . . . . or issue United States notes." 2 Obvious as is the contradiction, the opposition f ailed to cali attention prominently to it. By thus allowing the logic of the argument from necessity to pass unchallenged, they left room for the impression to arise that the paper issues of the Civil War can hardly be made the subject of serióos criticism, because "necessity knows no law."
But while Mr. Spaulding and his fellows were strenuous in protesting the necessity of the legal-tender act as a measure of immediate relief, they were caref ul to state that it was intended to be temporary, and not to inaugúrate a regular paper-money policy. "When peace is secured," said Mr. Spaulding, "I will be among the first to advócate a speedy return to specie payments."3 Fessenden dwelt on the point at length. He said :
1 Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 524.
libido p. 689; cf. the remarles of Mr. Blako, p. 686, and the divergent viows as to tbe nature of the allegad necessity expressed by Mr. Hooper, p. 617, and by Senator Sherman, p. 791.
» Ibid., p. 526. This promise was well kept. Seo the profaces of Spaüldinq's
ffÚtOTf.
68 HlSTOBY OF THE GBEENBA0K8
The .... secretar? of the treasury .... has declared that in his judgment [the bilí] is, and ought to be, but a temporary measure, not to be resorted to as a policy, but simply on this single occasion, because the country is driven to the necessity of resorting to it. I have not heard anybody express a contrary opinión, or, at least, any man who has spoken on the subject in Congress. The chairman of the committee of Ways and Means, in advocating the measure, declared that it was not contemplated, and he did not believe it would be necessary, to issue more trian the $150,000,000 of treasury notes made a legal tender provided by this bilí. All the gentlemen who have spoken on the subject, and all pretty much who have wrítten on the subject, except some wild speculators in currency,have declared that as a policy, it would be ruinous to any people ; and it has been defended, as I have stated, simply and solely upon the ground that it is to be a single measure, standing by itself, and not to be repeated.1
Similar and hardly less emphatic statements were made by other members of Congress.9 If any one posseesed such ideas of the beneficence of an irredeemable paper cnrrency as afterward animated members of the Greenback party, he kept them to himself .
III. ATTITUDE OF SBCRETABY CHASE
In discussions of the financial policy pursued by the federal government the impression soon gained cnrrency that the legal-tender acts were unavoidable necessities. This impression was deepened by the fact that when the unhappy consequences of the laws began to make themselves felt, members and friends of the administration took the ground that, however deplorable in its effects, such legislation had been inevitable from the beginning of the war.* After peace
i Conertmional Glofce, 37th Con*., 2d Sess., p. 7*4.
a Cy. remarks of II orrill, ibúL* p. 631 ; Pomeroy. p. 884.
* Cf. Lincoln*» messaje to Conjrresss December 1. 1862, ampíete Work; ©d. Nicolat axd Hat. Yol. II. p. 3M; letters of Seward and Stanton in Sfacldino'* History. introdoction to 3d ed.. pp. 27. ¡a\ A nnmber of lectora of tuce tenor from other meu of prominence are giren in Spauidintf's Introduction and Appeodieas.
The Fibst Legal-Tendeb Act 69
was restored this became the common doctrine of the Repub- lican party. It is a very notable fact, however, that Secretary Chase — the one man most conversant with the financial sitnation of the government in the winter of 1861- 62 — carne afterward to the conclusión that the passage of the legal-tender bilí was a blunder, His attitnde toward the measnre is worthy of careful attention.
Apparently the sudden suspensión of specie payments bewildered Mr. Chase for a time. It seemed to make neces- sary a recasting of his financial program,1 and for the moment he was at a loss what to do. The only man in oficial circles who had a definite plan in mind was Spauld- ing, and while others hesitated, he pushed f orward the simple tbough crude expedient of issuing legal-tender notes most vigorously. All Chase's traditions and all his official utter- ances committed him to opposition. But not knowing pre- cisely how to avoid the measure, he promoted the meet- ing between the bankers from New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, and the financial committees of House and Senate, in the hope that some feasible plan for raising funds without resort to legal-tender notes might be agreed upon.2 His hopes were destroyed by the unwillingness of the Congressmen to consent to the sale of bonds at their market price — an unwillingness shared in some measure by most of the opponents of the legal-tender bilí in Congress.8 After this disappointment the secretary of the treasury appears to have surrendered the lead to the Committee of Ways and Means. He could formúlate no plan which commanded the
i Cf. Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1862, p. 7.
'•* Sce sec. i of the present chapter.
* All of the substitutos for the legal-tender bilí proposed in the House provided that the bonds to be issued should not be sold below par. See p. 75 below. The re veré few men who sympathised with Senator Cowan's rigorous declaration that he preferred a " shave of forty per cent." upon bonds to an inconvertible paper cur- nacj.—Cóngremional Globo, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 793.
70 HlSTOBT OF THE GBKKNBACKfl
confidence of others, and so acquiesced unwillingly in wbat the energetic Mr. Spaulding.proposed. '
When Spaaldiog sent him the legal-tender bilí for revi- sión, Chase returned it with a letter, dated Jannary 22, expressing his exceeding regret that it was fonnd neceseary to resort to a legal-tender act, but expressing also his hearty deaire " to co-operate with the committee [of Ways and Means]."1 This letter was regarded by a majority of the committee as "non-committal on the legal-tender clanse." So they Bonght and " after considerable delay " obtained a more explícit approval of the bilí as a measnre of necessity, part of which was read to CongTess.'
Chase's feeling at this time is best indicated by the frank letter which he sent to Spaulding Febrnary 3:
Mr. Sewaxd said to me on yesterday that you obeerved to him that my hesita t ion in coming up to the legal-tender propo- sition embarrassed you, and I am very aorry to observe it, fbr my anxious wish is to support you in all respecta.
It is true that I carne with reluctance to the conclusión that the legal-tender clause is a necessity, but I carne to it decidedly, and I support it earnestly. I do not hesitate when I have made up my mind, however much regret I may feel over the necessity of the conclusión to which I come.'
It is clear from theee letters that Spanlding and not Chase was the real financial leader in the critica) montos of January and Febrnary, 1862.' Spaulding'e position was recognized by a colleague in the House, who referred to him as "the able and distinguished Representativo who has
' It ihoold be notad that Cbase w«d«ily r«ei»ing latiera Irom business mes •hose tiews he was bound u> consider. oruing him lo agree lo the treno ry-noto bilí. But a small minoritr of his cnrresiimdeit* w«m to han atoad oat acaimt the leeal- taader e lause. -Cf. H*IT.S. /'. Chote, pp. ¡30,231.
The Fibst Legal-Tender Aot 71
oríginated this measure and carríed it triumphantly over the Administra tion and through Congress."1
But while harried by the unaccustomed perplexities of his position, Chase yielded to Spaulding and gave an official sanction to the bilí, it did not commend itself to his calmer judgment His later views are stated at length in a dissent- ing opinión which he rendered, as Chief Justice, upon the "Legal Tender Cases," in December, 1870. Of his own conree as secretary of the treasury, he said:
He thought it indispensably neoessary that the authority to iasoe these notes should be granted by Congress. The passage of the bilí was delayed, if not jeoparded, by the difference of opinión which prevailed on the question of making them a legal tender. It was under these circumstances that he expressed the opinión, when called upon by the Committee on Ways and Means, that it was
nece88ary Examination and reflection under more propitious
circumstances ha ve satisfied him that this opinión was erroneous,
and he does not. hesitate to declare it Was the making of
the notes a legal tender neoessary to the carrying on the war? In other words, was it necessary to the execution of the power to borrow money? . . . . If the notes would circuíate as well without as with this quality it is idle to urge the plea of such necessity. But the circulation of the notes was amply provided for by making them receivable for all national taxes, all dues to the government, and all loans. This was the provisión relied upon for the purpose by the secretary when the bilí was first prepared, and his reflec-
tions since have convinced him that it was sufficient In their
legitímate use the notes are hurt, not helped, by being made a legal tender. The legal -tender quality is only valuable for purposes of dishonesty. Every honest purpose is answered as well and better without it.
We have no hesitation, therefore, in declaring our conviction that the making of these notes a legal tender, was not a necessary or proper means to the carrying on war or to the exercise of any expresa power of the government.2
> Mr. Pomeroy. —ConQreMional Olote, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p.884. »12 Wallace, 576-9.
72 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEBSBACKS
Competent critica bave usually been inclined to accept Chase's Iater in preference to his earlier opinión. They havo held that the treasury crisis which rendered the argu- ment of necessity plausible need not have occurred had Congreas adopted a more vigoróos policy of tazation at its extra session in July and Angttst, 1861. Tax lawe then enacted might not bave added greatly to the revenne before the cióse of the year, but they woald have strengthened the credit of the government and so enabled it to borrow more freely and on better terms.
But though this failure to tax adeqnately was unfortn- nate, it was not unnatural. The secretary of the treasury, with whom the initiative rested, was inexperienced and was devoting a large part of his attention to milítary matters.1 Moroover, the Union leaders feared that the t«mper of the North was not firm enough to submit cheerfully to the onerous burden of a heavy federal income tax or high internal duties. Sach taxation had been nnknown for more than a generation; the Repnblican party was young, composed of hete rogé nona elementa not yet completely fnsed, and led by men not snstained by conscionsness of nnhesitating popular support. Realizing their dependence npon pnhlic opinión for succesB, it íb not Btrange that Mr. Lincoln's administra- tion hesitated to take steps líkely from all precedent to pro ve un popular.*
Perhaps even more important in explaining the failure to tax heavily at the outset of the war was the con&dent expectation of its early end. Even in Fehruary, 1862, Justin Morrill, one of the ftrmest opponents of the legal- tender clause, could say in rhetorical strain:
The ice that now chokee up the Miasissippi is not more sure to melt and disappear with the approachiug vernal season, than are
>Cf. Bami.S. P. C»a*r. pp. m-i*.
'Cf.U.B. FIU.D. ¡irmoria V *o«» In o~í <¡f Somt Wamn. 1S74. pp. tü. !»1
The Fibst Legal-Tender Aot 73
the rebellious armies upon its banks when our western army shall break from its moorings,and, rushing with the curren t to the Gulf,
baptize as it goes in blood the people to a fresher allegiance
We can cióse this war by the 30th day oí July nezt as well as in thirty years.1
Had snch optimistic expectations been realized, Chase' s plan of raising by taxation means sufficient only for ordinary eipenditures, interest, and a sinking fund need have caused no serióos disorder in the fínances.2
But, granting that a mistake was made in not levying heavier taxes at the extra session of Congress, the question still remains: Was the issne of legal-tender treasury notes necessary to relieve the treasury from the embarrassments existing in January and February, 1862? Certainly there was no snch pressing necessity as Spaulding, for example, asserted in the fírst panic. His letter of January 8, quoted above, declares that the government " will be out of means to pay the daily expenses in about thirty days." * But it was forty-eight days before the legal-tender act was passed, and over thirty-four days more before the first notes were issuecL None of the legal-tender notes were paid out until April,4 three months af ter the treasury had suspended specie payments. Whatever were the immediate needs of the treasury, then, they were supplied from other sources.5 Had these three months been utilized energetically in passing a
1 Conffretmonal Globe, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 630. Cf. the similar remarles of FbflMndeiL, ibid., p. 765, Chandler, p. 774, and Simmons, p. 794. The most impressire endenoe of oonfldenoe in an early peaoe, however, is the issne of General Order No. 8 by the «djntant general, April 8, 1862, stopping the enlistment of f resh troops.— 8ee Rhodbs, Hutary of the United State», Yol. III, p. 636.
* Cf. Chase's disoossion of the question in his report of Deoember, 1863, pp. 10-12.
*SPAUiiDnro, p. 17; cf. his opening speech in the Hoase, Congremional Globe, nth Cong., 2d Sess., p. 524.
«The New York Times o! April 7, 1662, reports that" the first instalmeat of United States notes .... was received at the subtreasury in this city Saturday norning (April 5)." Cf. R. A. Baylet, National Loan» of the üniied State» (Wash- ington, 1881), p. 157.
58ee ohap. iii, sec. i, p. 88, below.
74 HlSTOBY OF THE (¿BEENBAOKS
few simple sactions of an interna! revenuejax act, impoeiiig doties on whiskey, beer, and tobáceo, and in organizing machinery íor the sale of bonds, there seems to be slight reafion for believing that tho government wonld haye failed to obtain sufficient fonda, particularly when aooonnt is buten of tbe improvement of credit caosed by the military suc- oesses of the winter and apring.1
After all, discoasion of the "necessity" of tbe legal - tender act is rather beside the point. Fot no one, not even Stevens and Spanlding, denied the possibility of borrow- ing, provided the government waa ready to Bell its bonds at their market príce. The real qaeation is, waa the making of United States notes a legal tender preferable to selling bonds at a disconnt? Upon thís qnestion the following chapters will throw some light by showing what were the oonseqaences of the course pursued, both for the people and for the govemment.1
IT. PASBAGE OF THE ACT
The debate apon the tegal-tender act, a logical analysis of which has been presented in a preceding Bection, began in the Hoose of Kepresentatives Janoary 28, 1862. Mr. Stevens and Mr. Spaulding poshed the measore vigor-
■ Cf. Part II. chap. iti, soc. iii, bolow.
i On the queetion of Dscotsitf sea Simón NawooaB, Critica! KxaTninotion of Our Financia! I'oiicy (New York, 1S65L cbap. tü: J. K. üpton, Monew in Politice, 2d ed. (Boston, U»|, p. IOS; W. Q. Sdmkkb, Hiitirry of American Cnrrencr (New York, lB75),pp. 197-208; 8. T. Hfeas, The ¡stytii-Tatdtr AcU (New York. 1B75|, obap. tii ; F. W. TAtinaia, p. 5S7 oí The United Blata of America, ed. N. 8. Shaler, VoL TI (New York, IBM); C. Y. Doké. Dic Pa,picr-icahmnueti'irthecnaft der Union, Berlin, 1877; C TON HOC*. ¡He Finante* und die FinatagachicUe der Vcrvinigtem Staaten (Stntt- gart, 1*17). pp. 171, 472; Chables A. Uanh, Paper liona) Oe Root of Evil (New York, 1872), pp. 1*7,1*8; Nicolat aid Hat, A. Lincoln: A Hietort (New York, 1M0). Vol. VI, chap. ii; Geoeoe I). Iíutlee. The Cumncy Quation, New York, 186*; J. F. Bhodes, Hittory of lite United Siita. Vol. III, pp. 556, 557; HnOH IIcCclloch, Menand Meanrem of Hatf o. Ventury (New York. Use), p. 175; Habt, 3. P. CVuc IB», pp. 218-51; HíseiC. Adamh. /'«Alie Dente (New Yorlt. 1587), pp. 1SS-5S: Hikii Adam», 'Tho Legal Teodor Act, "Bittoricai Eetave, New York, 18W; and eepeeiallj Don C. IUbeett, " Tbe Sopposed Necessitj of the Legal Tender Papar," Qworfrfc, Journal of Economice, Vol. XVI, pp. 523-51.
The Fibst Legal-Tendeb Aot 75
ously. Three bilis were proposed as substitutos by the opposition. One, introduced by Mr. Vallandingham, pro- vided (1) for the issue of $150,000,000 of treasury notes, receivable for government dnes, bearing no interest, exchangeable for bonds, but not a legal tender; (2) for the sale of $200,000,000 of 6 per cent., twenty-year bonds — at rates not less than par.1 A second, offered by Roscoe Conkling, proposed (1) to sell $500,000,000 of 6 per cent, twenty-year bonds at rates not less than the equivalent of par for 7 per cent, stocks; (2) to allow the secretary of the treasury at his discretion to issue $200,000,000 of one-year treasury notes, either bearing no interest or interest at 2¿ per cent., and not legal tender, in place of an equivalent amount of bonds.2 Finally, Mr. Horton's and Mr. Morrill's substituto, favored by one-half of the Committee of Ways and Means, authorized (1) the issue of $100,000,000 treasury notes, bearing interest at 3.65 per cent., receivable for gov- ernment dues except duties on imports, exchangeable at par for all bonds issued, and not a legal tender; (2) the sale of $200,000,000 of 7.3 per cent., ten-year bonds, and of $300,000,000 of 6 per cent., twenty-four-year bonds at pnces not less than par; (3) the payment of interest on the bonds in coin.3
Nine days after the debate began a vote was taken on the subetitution of the third of these measures for the legal- tender bilí. It resulted 55 yeas to 95 nays.4 Then the vote was taken on the legal-tender bilí itself, and it was passed by 93 to 59 — a majority of 34. 5 An analysis of the vote upon the legal-tender clause shows that it was not a strict party división. Of the 95 votes for the legal-tender
1 ConffreMstonal Globe, 37 th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 614.
3/bút. p. 615. *Ibid., p. 693; Spaüldino, pp. 92-4.
*CongrcMional Olote, 37tb Cong., 2d Soss., p. 695; Spaüldino, p. 94. %Omgrtmional Globc, loe. cit.; Spaüldino, pp. 95, 96.
76 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAOKS
clause 8 were cast by Demócrata and 3 by "oíd Une Whiga." With the 25 Demócrata who voted againat the clauae were 7 " oíd line Whiga " and 23 Republicana. Ñor ia a marked aectional división of the vote apparent. Of the membera from New England Statea 16 voted for and 11 againat the legal-tender clauae; of the delegationa from the Middle Statea the correaponding votea were 36 and 18; of the Southern Statea 7 and 10 ; of the Central Statea 27 and 13 ; and of the Western Statea 9 and 3. The moat noticeable f eature of the vote waa the number and atanding of the regular aupportera of the adminiatration who on thia occaaion aided with the opposition. Among them were Roacoe Conkling, Juatin S. Morrill, Valentine B. Horton, Edward H. Hollina, Benjamín F. Thomaa, and Owen Lovejoy.
Aa the bilí went to the Senate, it provided for the iaaue of $150,000,000 of United Statea legal-tender notea; but of thia aum $50,000,000 were intended to take the place of the like aum of "oíd demand notea" authorized at the extra aeaaion of Congreaa in July, 1861.1 A very import- ant amendment waa made by the Senate finance committee. In order to " raiae and aupport the credit of the government obligationa," they propoaed to pay the intereat on the public debt in coin. The committee had conaidered the adviaa- bility of making cuatoma dutiea payable in apecie to obtain the coin neceaaary for intereat; but they finally pre- ferred to set aside the proceeda of salea of public landa, confíacationa of rebel property and import dutiea aa a fund to be uaed for the purpoae. To provide for the poasible caae when thia fund would be inaufficient, the aecretary of the treaaury waa authorized to aell bonda at their market price to get coin.2
i For the t*xt of the bilí as it passed the House seo Spaulding, pp. 96-é.
> S<»e Sonator Fresenden's speech explaining the House bilí and the oommittee's amendmeots, Congrtstional Globc, 3?th Con»., 2d deas., p. 768.
^
The Fibst Legal-Tendeb Aot 77
In this modifíed form the bilí passed the Senate by a vote as devoid of partisan or of sectional character as had been the vote in the House. A motion to strike out the legal-tender clause failed by a majority of 5 — 17 yeas to 22 naya1 Of the yeas nine were Republicana — Senators Anthony of Rhode Island, Collamer and Foot of Vermont, Fessenden of Maine, King of New York, Cowan of Pennsyl- vania, Foster of Connecticut, and Willey of Virginia. On the other hand, three Democrats — Senators McDongall of California, Rice of Minnesota, and Wilson of Missouri — voted for the clause. But when it was seen that the bilí would pasa, legal-tender clause and all, the final vote was 30 for and 7 against it.a Of the seven, three were Republi- cana, three Democrats, and one an "oíd Une Whig."
The House refused to concur in the Senate amendment for the payment of interest on the public debt in coin. Mr. Spaulding declared that such an arrangement would créate intolerable discrimination between different classes of govern- ment creditors. To pay the army in depreciated paper money and the money lender in coin was unjust to the sol- dier risking his Ufe on the field of battle.8 " It makes," said Mr. Stevens, " two classes of money — one for the banks and brokers, and another for the people." 4 Further, argued Mr. Hooper, the refusal to use United States notes for interest would be an admission in advance of a difference in valué between paper and coin, the effect of which would be to discredit the government's issues.5 Mr. Pomeroy replied first, that so far f rom exaggerating the depreciation of paper cnrrency, the amendment would diminish it ; for coin inter- est would tend to increase the valué of bonds and so indi- rectlv of the notes which were to be exchangeable for bonds
i Ibid., p. 800. 2 76¿dM p. 804.
1 Ibid., pp. 881-3. « Ibid., p. 900.
'fttd., p.899.
78 HlSTORY OF THE GbEENBAGKS
at par ; and second, that only by paying interest in coin could the government borrow on favorable terms.1
To termínate the disagreement conference committees were appointed — for the Senate, Fessenden, Sherman, and Carlisle f for the House, Stevens, Horton, and Sedgwick * — and a compromise was agreed upon. Interest was to be paid in coin, but the method of obtaining the coin was changed. Instead of pledging receipts f rom customs, sales of public lands and confiscations, with an ultímate resort to selling bonds at the market price, it was decided to make import duties payable in specie.4 Both Senate and House con- curred in this change,5 and the bilí received the approval of President Lincoln, February 25, 1862.6
In its final form the act authorized the issue of $150,000,- 000 of United States notes in denominations not less than five dollars. Fifty millions of this sum was in place of the "oíd demand notes," which were to be withdrawn as rapidly as practicable. The notes were declared to be " lawful money and a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and pri-
i Congremional Olcbe, 87tb Cong., 2d SessM p. 884; cf. similar argumenta of Messrs. Morrill, p. 886, and C. B. Calrert, p. 886.
> Jbid., p. 809. » ZWd., p. 900.
♦ Text of report, ibid., p. 988. */otd., pp. 929 and 999 rospectiTely.
• 12 Statute* at Laroe, p. 345. In the rersion of the flnancial history of the war later cnrrent with the greenback party, this iimitation of the legal-tender quality of United States notes, by using ooin for interest on the pnblie debt and for eustoms daes, was represented as a serióos blunder, mar ring theotherwise perfeetly symmetri- eal paper-money system. E.g., see G. F. Wilsow, A PracticcU Contideration o/ the Ourrency of the United State*, 1874, p. 5; Plint Fbebman, Corre$pondence on National F i nance, 1875; H. C. Baibd, Money and It* 8ub*titute*, 1876, p. 14; Pbto Coopeb, Political and Financial Opinión», 1877, p. 9. Indeed, the charge was often more serióos. It was said that the " conspiracy " of bank delegates who risited Washington in Janoary, 1862, " corruptly or not " osed their infloence to induce the secretary of the treasury and the Senate to ** motílate " the House bilí by inserting the "exception clause " limiting the foll legal -tender powerof the United States notes. See, e. g„ J. O. Dbbw, Our Money M%u», 1874; W. A. Bkrkby, The Money Question, 1876, pp. 176-9; Nevah, The " Legal-Tender " AcU, [date T], pp. 8-7; Jeme Habpeb, Thirty Ycart' Conflict, 1881, p. 13; Henry S. Fitch, Speech in the State Oonvention of the National Ourrency Party of California, 1877, pp. 0-21 ; Mrs. S. K. V. Emebt, Seven Financial Conapiracie*, 1887, chap. ii. Thaddeus Sterens in a moas u re counbmaoced soch yiews. See his speech of Jone 23, 1864, Qlobe, 38th Con*., lst Sess., pp. 3212 ff.
The Fibst Legal-Tendeb Aot 79
vate, within the United States, except duties on importa and interest on the public debt," which were expressly made payable in coin. Further, the notes were exchangeable at any time in sums of fifty dollars or múltiples of fífty for 6 per cent, five-twenty bonds, $500,000,000 of which were authorized by the second section. Sec. 4 provided that holders of the notes might deposit them with any designated depository of the United States, and receive 5 per cent, interés! But snch deposita conld not be made for leas than thirty days and ten days' notice was required for withdrawal. The sum of these temporary deposits was limited to $25,000,- 000. By sec. 5 the coin received from duties on imports was set apart as a special fund to be applied, first, to the payment in specie of interest on the public debt ; second, to the pur- chase of 1 per cent of the entire debt yearly to be set aside ' as a sinking fund ; third, to the general expenses of the government, if any residue remained.
The attitude of the general public toward the legal-tender act was divided between doubt and hesitation on the part of a few who appreciated clearly the evils of an irredeemable paper currency, and cheerful acceptance on the part of those who felt that scruples, justifíable under ordinary circum- stances should not be allowed to interfere with decisive action in the face of such a crisis. Organized opposition to the bilí by the business community ceased with the failure of the bankers' convention. The opinions expressed by practical financiera showed marked diversity — a f act that was not without influence upon the fate of the bilí in Con- grega. Senator Sumner said of the advice given by business men : " Some tell us that the legal tender will be most bene- ficent ; others insist that it will be dishonorable and perni- cíoub. Which shall we follow?"1 On the other hand,
1 Ocmffrtuional Olobe, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 798; cf, remarks of Senator PeMeoden, ibid., p. 706.
80 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAOKS
Senator Henry Wilson received a letter signed by several Massachusetts firma of high standing, saying they did "not know a merchant in the city of Boston engaged in active business" who was not in favor of the legal- tender clanse.1 Of greater weight was the resolution adoptad by the New Tork Chamber of Commerce that "the present fínancial condition of the government and of the country reqnires the immediate passage of the [legal-tender] bilí."2 Mr. Stevens and Mr. Spaulding said that similar encouragement was received by the promoters of the bilí from the boards of trade in Boston, Philadelphia, Buffalo, Cincinnati, Louis- ville, St. Louis, Chicago, and Milwaukee.* " I have never known any measure," said Mr. Spaulding, " receive a more hearty approval from the people."4
Newspapers showed similar differences of opinión. When the proposal was made to issne legal-tender treasury notes, the New York Tribune said, " We ponder and hesitate." * Mr. Greeley believed that "heavy taxing, light stealing, and hard fightiug," woald remove the alleged necessity for the bilí,* and advocated " a stirring appeal to the people for a Patriotic Loan of Two or Three Hundred Millions."7 But by the middle of February he concluded that, "there has been so much delay and hesitation and vacillation, that it is possible that no other means of giving immediate relief to the Treasury now remains." 8 He finally acquiesced with an ill grace in the enactment of the bilí, and supported very vigorously the amendments of the Senate making interest payable in coin.9 More decided opposition to the legal-
l/6td., p. 789; cf. Senator Simmons, p. 794.
2 ProceedinQM of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York for the Year Ending December 31, 1862, p. 12.
* Congremional O tobe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 900 and 882. * Ibid., p. 882.
6 New York Tribuna Janaary 13, 1882. «76idM Janaary 22, 1882.
7 Ibid., February 1, 1862. • Ibid., February 10, 186&
• Ibid., February 18, 1862; cf. the issaes of February 19 and 28.
The Fibst Legal-Tendeb Aot 81
tender clause was made by the New York World1 and
Journal of Commerce* the Springfíeld (Mass.) Republicana
and the Boston Daily Advertiser.1 On the other hand the
New York Herald espoused the cause of the bilí. With
heavy taxation and the provisión for exchanging notes for
bonds, it thought the greatest depreciation could "not
exceed 10 per cent, and that not before a lapse of two
years" — especially not after the interest had been made
payable in coin.5 Somewhat similar was the attitude of the
New York Times, which thought the legal-tender clause was
necessary to protect the notes from bank competition and
ho6tility;6 of the Philadelphia Press, which regarded the
issue of irredeemable paper as an unavoidable evil which it
was "not manly to bemoan;"7 of the New York Commercial
Advertiser, which acquiesced " in the measure, as the best
on the whole that could be done under the existing circum-
stances;"8 of the National Intelligencer of Washington,
which thought the measure would be of great assistance to
the government provided the notes were fundable in bonds
bearing interest [in coin ;9 of the Boston Post, which advo-
cated "a national issue of paper, legal-tender, as the best
thing to be done under the circumstances;"10 and of the
Boston Journal, which declared that people who feared the
bilí would be a step toward an irredeemable currency were
"too timid for the times."11
1 E. g., see the issues of January 6 and 10.
- Eztract from the New York Journal of Commerce, reprinted in the Baltimore $**, Jannary 16, 1862.
'See the issnes of January 7, 8, 15, 18, 21, 29, and of Febraary 5, 8, and 18, 1862.
* See the issnes of Jannary 24, 28, and 31, and of Febraary 5, 6, 11, 13, 17, and 22, 1862.
' See the issnes of Jannary 11, 20, 21, 23, 30, 31, and of Febraary 5, 10, 13, and 15, 1862.
♦See the issues of January 13, 16, 18, 22, 23, 27, 29, and of Febraary 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, «di*. 1862.
: See the issues of Jannary 18, Febraary 8, 14, and 21, 1862.
'See the issues of Febraary 7 and January 29, 1862.
•See the issues of Jannary 11, 25, and of Febraary 1 and 10, 1862.
16 See the issues of January 14, 21, 28, and of Febraary 1, 1862. I: See the issues of January 8 and of Febraary 3 and 7, 1862.
CHAPTER m
THE SBOOXD LBGAJ^TEXDER ACT
L Govermment Fimmces Jammarg to Jwmz,
Déficit in the Berennes — Exktimg Anthority to Dotwwi — 8eeond Issue of OkL Demand Notes— Temporarj Loaa— OrtificatoB oí Indebtodneas— BeoeiptB, Januarrto March — Refief AÍForded by Issues of Greenbacks — SmaU Amoontof "QamiaiuMB*' — ReoetptB Aprü lo June — Pbsitioc of Treasury, June 30, lfltt
IL T*e Sramd Legal Tender Aci:
Chases Reqoest ffor Seoood Iasae of Greenbacks— Chandler's Attempt to Forestan its Coosidentioo — Debato in Hooae and Senato — Proriskxis of the Act
HL The PoUage-Cmrremcjf Act:
Embárraseme* t of Treasnrj from Disappearance of 8maH Chango
L GOTEBKaTKST FIXAXCES JAXUAKT TO XUKB, 1881
" Withik sixty dars," Jostín Morrill had prophesied in discussing the first legal-tender act, ** we musí haré at least twice the amoant of notes which is propoeed nov.11 l His prophecy was fulfilled, bat not until dooble the time eet had elapeed.
During this interval betumeen the first and seoood legal- tender acta, Secretarr Chase perfbrce depended mainly upon loans. At the time of suspensión "expendituree had already reached an average of nearly a million and a quar- ter of dolíais each secular dav; while the revenne from all sources haxdly exceeded one-tenth of that snm." * In the
» Ocmommomü Glote. 37U» Con*.* Sd Sess^ p» MI, QT. tfeo dallar pcaüctioa» elted in not* 1. p* 56. abor*.
t RffxtH o/ tke SocrHarf <¡f Ote TWttwn-f, Dnwhw, Ha?, p. 7. The adrooatet of the l**al-t«Dd*r bilí in their anxiety to pro** tho aeeaañtr of tho attiun mtm to ha** eizaior^rmt^ üm» expeojvts of «oTrnunecii. Janmary aSpaahttag OBi tao imoont at "moi* th*n tt.aKMXXT p*rdajiCV*vrw«»<N»af GJo»e,Sfta Oo«cn»i8aB*np.aft),a»d. by Ffbroarj 6 St*T«ns ddcUivd daüy «xpeaditans had rtaohod "aboat |3jO*V)00~ litod., iv «7 V Bat an Jane 7 Cfcrnse still pot tho su at9M*M*X «Üa tht i
The Segond Legal-Tendeb Agt 83
quarter January to March the ordinary income of the govern- ment from customs, sales of public lands, and miscellaneous sources was hardly $15,000,000. Though in the next quarter the income from these sources increased $4,000,000 and was supplemented by the first receipts from the direct tax imposed the summer preceding, the total carne to but $21, 000,00o.1 This made total receipts for the six months of $36,000,000 from ordinary sources, while expenditures were probably between $325,000,000 and $350,000,000.* Of conrse the difference between these sums had to be borrowed.
When the banks and the treasury ceased paying in specie Chase foond that his authority to borrow was confined practically to the loan acts passed at the summer session of Congrega. These acts, it will be remembered, permitted the secretary to borrow $250,000,000 and to issue a variety of bonds and treasury notes as security.* Under this authority Mr. Chase had already arranged with the asso- ciated banks for three loans amounting to $150,000,000. $30,000,000 of the bank subscriptions, however, had not yet been paid into the treasury.4 This balance formed his first immediate resource. His second was found in the fact that of the $50,000,000 of demand notes authorized, but $33,- 500,000 had been issued.5 This left a sum of $16,500,000 which he could pay out at once. Finally, after the funda
sion, however, that this amoant woald probably be exoeeded in the near future H. R. Miscellaneous Document No, 81, p. 2, S7th Cong., 2d Sess.). In fact, the daily expenses did not reach quite two millions a day even for the fiscal year of 1362-3. ICy. Rcport of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1863, p. 29.)
1 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury \ December, 1882, p. 37.
* Expenditures — unlike receipts — are not giren by quartera in the reporta of fa secretary of the treasury, except for the three months, July to September. The tbore Acures are the result of a rough estímate made after considering the expendí» tont from July to September, 1861, the total for the fiscal year 1862, and the ratio oí ¡aerease from 1862 to 1863.
1See chap. i, p. 17, a boro. * Ibid., p. 40, note.
1 Reporto/ the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1862, p. 9.
84 HlSTOBY OF THE GeEENBACKS
obtained from the $150,000,000 bank loan and tibe $50,000,- 000 of demand notes had been exhausted, tbere Btill remained $50,000,000 of the $250,000,000 which the secre- tary had been authorized to borrow. Bat this $50,000,000 was not for tbe moment available. For, thoagh it could be barrowed on eitber 7,30 three-year notes at par, or on 6 per cent bonds at 89.3 + , the equivalent of par for 7 per cent, stocks, the sises already issued were selling in the market at 89 and the seven-thirties at 98. '
Under these circumstancea Mr. Chase contínned to draw npon the banks from week to week until their laet mstslment apon the $150,000,000 loan was paid on February 4.2 At the same time he issned demand notes freely, and also persnaded a few government creditors mnch in need of fnnds to accept 7.30 notes at par in satisfaction of their claims.' Bat these resources were not adeqnate for tbe needa of the treasury, and on Febmary 7, tbe day after the legal-tender bilí had passed the Hoose of Representa. tives, Chase was obliged to roqnest anthority to issue another $10,000,000 of the demand notes to tide over tbe time until the Senate could act upon the pending measnre.4 The ahort bilí whicb he sent with his letter was passed at once by the Senate without debate or even reference to committee, and on the following Monday it was acted apon by the Honse with similar disputen."
Ten millions, however, was a small snm compared with the needB of the treasnry, and Chase found it necessary to resort to varióos new devices to obtain additional means.
I Seo the table of prices of Kciorann-nt stocks In the Ameiican Annual f>clo- padia, M8S. p. 474.
IChap. i. p. 40, note, aboTe.
■Thaddeoa Sterena saldlnthe Hoose on Febmary 6 that sucb -■-ihadthenreachedabontr""""" :-""11-'- ""
lis lettor to Feasenden, ibid., p. T06.
Í/6ÚÍ..P.736; 12 fítalttta ai Large, p. SJK.
The Second Legal-Tendeb Act 85
One plan that ultimately had marked success was suggested by Mr. John J. Cisco, the chief of the New York sub- treasury.1 February 8 he published a notice stating that he had been " authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury to receive on depoeit United States notes as a temporary loan" at 5 per cent, interest, with the condition that sums depositad conld be withdrawn at any time after ten days' notice.1 About $2,000,000 were deposited in this fashion within a fortnight; but Secretary Chase seems to have entertained some doubts of his authority to make such an arrangement, and accordingly he requested the Senate finance committee to insert an amendment in the legal- tender bilí then in their hands granting him power to accept such deposita to an amount not exceeding $25,000,- 000.1 Senator Sherman and others demurred on the ground that if men could draw 5 per cent, interest on notes deposited but temporarily with the subtreasuries they would be slow to lock up their capital by fnnding notes in 6 per cent bonds.4 But after Fessenden and Chandler had explained that the secretary believed that the plan would induce banks to accept the notes more freely and that whatever sums were deposited would constitute a loan to the government at 5 per cent., the measure was finally paased by a vote of 21 to 18.5 No objection was raised to the plan in the House, and with some minor changos the amendment was incorporated into the legal-tender act as
Q£W» A.
i Schückxbs, Life cf Chase, p. 269.
iSee flnancial oolamns of the New York papera and the Animal American CyclopatdiOy 1862, p, 454, for text of the notice. The object of this plan was at flrst rather to secare a readier aooeptance of the oíd demand notes by the banks than to raúe a loan at 5 per oent. Cf. Part II, chap. ii, sec. iii, below.
» Congremional Globe, S7th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 772.
*See the discussion of the amendment, ¿Wd., pp. 772, 773, 802, 803.
*/&¿d., p.803.
• 12 Statuta at Large, p. 346.
Histobt op the Gbeenbaokb
The opportonity afforded by this measnre of obtaining 5 per cent, iuterest on cnrrent funde proved very attractive to the baiika. March 7 a meeting of the New York Clearing Huust» Aseociation voted to employ auch certificates of depoait iu payment of balancee at the clearing house, and their agenta arranged with Mr. Cisco to issne for the par* poue eertificatea payable to the order of any bank in the MHOüiatioa.1 As the New York banka wished to take ont $80,000,000 of theae certificates, Mr. Chase saw that the $25,000,000 limit impoaed by the act of February 25 would not allow him sufficiení margiu for similar issues in other oitiea, Conaequently he asked the finance committee of the tteuate to add an amendment raising the limit to $50,000,000 to the bilí that had just been aent up by the House providing for the purchase of coin for interest on the pnblic debt. This requeat waa acceded to, though not without forther objec- tioii- froni Senator Sherman, and the new limit was provided fui by aeo. 3 of the act which was approved March 17.' By the i'iid uf the month the treaaary had reeeived over t^0,00(),000 on account of the "temporary loan," as ít was ealled, and had redeemed leas than $1,500,000.*
Auother ehift for obtaining meanB was the issne of " nertitioatt» of indebtedness." Doring the winter a floatíng debí had bwai gradnally accnmulating, varioosly eetímated
I Duitn1 Mu#cui«, Ve.]. XVI, pp. 806-11.
t Vi .i/.iiiííw u< Largc, p. 3¡0\ CongTtmional Olobc, STth Cong., Id Se»., py. 1158, US» i. lili.
' tí.w l.i, .VufimuJ Loaaio/ tAe Piu'fett Sloíe», p. 138. Tho Uble oompiled br Pro- Icun U. ('. Hurmtt ín.m s™au>r Chandler i spereh of Jon* 17. isas, and pablúhed iu Uta Vu.ftt.l* Jiminat 0/ Eeontmict, Vol. XVI, p. SM, dota not ww with Bajlrj'i ÉjfUI ua. Vi'^irdiuj Ui ILayLey4* Cable tho nmouDt of the temporary loan ontatandinf «JunLll n.(. |IMie,«M.U¡ aecording to Barro» the amount on Aprll 1 iu (12*71.- l»l l'hnuitlut'. figure», on which Barre» relies, «re iocoinbteiit — tho totals do nol ugi-u * iLh tuo Hivural Ítem». Perhap* the niwn Ib that he include» In the totali lliu iluptnlu rooeiveit under Cisco's notice of Fpbruary H, bofore oongreasional ituUnitÍMtnUt liad bvou iiinin (o the ternporary loan. Moreorer, II tala flifure.s an fui U" »ud "' l-e da» they wuuld include the notes depositad Aprll 1, but the» lUiyiuiLi i'iiuM uut h.ivn bwi u largesum, forthenet increaaeUiat week wa*, aoeord- lu« u. uuirutl, uul> I i*4,«tl.
The Sboond Lbgal-Tendeb Aot 87
at from >80,000,000 to $180,000,000.* Mr. Chase did not have sufficient ready money to pay even those creditors whoee claims had been auditecL As a measure of relief he requeeted authority to issue to creditors who might desire to receive them, certifícates of indebtedness bearing 6 per cent, interest and payable in one year or earlier at the option of the government2 This request was granted by the prompt passage of the act of March 1.a March 17 authority was granted to issue such certifícates in payment of disbursing officers' checks as well as in payment of andited accounts.4 Army contractors and similar creditors foond great relief in these provisions, for the delay in obtaining payment for supplies had interfered with their operations seriously, the more so because banks showed a disinclination to lend on their claims even after the claims had been approved by the treasury. Under the new system contractors could at any time obtain 6 per cent, obligations of government which could be sold in the market at a slight discount, or used as first-class collateral in securing loans from a bank.5
By these various shifts Mr. Chase obtained means suffc cient to tide the treasury over the trying quarter between suspensión of specie payments and the time when the resources provided by the legal-tender act became available. The following brief recapitulation may give a clearer idea of the situation. Against expenses of perhaps $112,500,000 to $137,500,000 the ordinary receipts were:
i January 16 the flnancial oolumn of the New York Herald grave $80,000,000 as the entren t estímate. January 28, Spaulding put the floating debt at $100,000,000 (Con- gtrnumal Olote* 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 523) ; February 6 Stevens declared it to be $180,000,000 (ibid., p. 687).
* Congrettional O tobe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 945, 954, 955.
*Í28UOuUaatLartK,t>. 352.
*/6id., p. 370.
1 Cf. AnnucU American Cyclopctdia, 1862, p. 456.
88 HlSTOBY OF THE GBEENBACK8
Fromcustoms $14,618,558.44
From sales of public lands 27,019.74
From miscellaneous souroes (estimated) - - 232,946.91
$14,878,526.09
Meanwhile the issues of government securities were:
Oregon war debt $ 297,000.00
6 per cent, twenty-year bonds .... 20374,753.43
7.30 three-year notes 11,170,698.24
Oíd demand notes 25,900,000.00
Temporary loan (less withdrawals) - - - 18,876,404.43
Certificates of indebtedness - - - -' - 6,629.000.00
1 $81,247,756.10
The operations of the next three months, April to Jone, require less notice because no new measures were adopted. There was an increase of about one-half in ordinary receipts, but it was still necessary to borrow about nine- tenths of the funde required. In borrowing Secretary Chase made use of all the resources employed the quarter before except the issue of 6 per cent, twenty-year bonds. On the other hand he was able to employ also the means provided by the legal-tender act. He did this chiefly by paying out the new legal-tender notes which differed from the uold demand notes " in not being receivable for duties. Of these new notes — which were almost immediately chri8tened the "greenbacks" — $99,500,000 were issued by the end of June.
The other grand resource provided by the legal-tender act proved for the time being a vain reliance. An issue of
i For the revenues of the quarter see Report of the Secretar? of the Treanury* Decem be r, 1862, p. 57. The receipts from miscellaneous souroes are taken as a quarter of the amonnt for the whole year. The issues of securities are oompiled from Batlet, National Loan» of the United State». The Oregon war issues were authorized by the act of March 2, 1861 (12 Statute» at Large, p. 198), for the paytnent of expenses incurred by Oregon and Washington during the Indian troubles of 1855 and 1856. All of the 6 per cent, bonds and about $2,500,000 of the seren-thirties were issued to the associated banks for the loans negotiated before suspensión.
The Second Legal-Tendeb Act 89
$500,000,000 of 6 per cent, bonds had been authorized — called " five-twenties" from the fact that they were redeem- able after five and payable after twenty years — and it had been provided that the legal-tender notes might be exchanged for these bonds at the desire of the holders.1 Much had been hoped from this "funding provisión" by the supporters of the bilí. Thaddeus Stevens expressed their theory most concisely:
My distinguished colleague from Vermont [referring to Justin Morrill] fears that enormous issues [of legal-tender notes] would follow to supply the expenses of the war. I do not think any more would be needed than the $150,000,000. The notes bear no interest.
No one would seek them for investment This money would
soon lodge in large quantities with the capitalists and banks
Where could they invest it? In United States loans at 6 per cent., redeemable in gold in twenty years, the best and most valuable permanent investment that could be desired. The Government would thus again possess such notes in exchange for bonds, and again re-issue them. I have no doubt that the $500,000,000 of bonds authorized would be absorbed in less time than would be oeeded by Government; and thus $150,000,000 would do the work of $500,000,000 of bonds. When further loans are wanted you oeed only authorize the sale of more bonds; the same $150,000,000 of notes will be ready to take them.3
Experience proved that such expectations as Mr. Stevens indulged were far too sanguine. While the government was in the midst of an enormously expensive war of which the end could not be f oreseen, its credit was not high enough to make men desire its 6 per cent, coin interest bonds on the conditions permitted by the first legal-tender act. Conse- quen tly conversions of greenbacks into bonds were slow — less than $14,000,000 of the five-twenties were disposed of in the first three months after they were ready for issue.8
i Sec 2, 12 8tatute» at Large, p. 345.
2 Congretmonal Globe, S7th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 688. Cf. the remarles of Spaulding, ibid., p. 526; Sherman, p. 791 ; and Pomeroy, p. 8S4.
s Batlet, National Loan» of the United States, p. 156.
90 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAOKH
Iustead of its being necessary, as Mr. Stevens forecast in February, ío isece more bonds to take ap the lcgal-tender notes constantly offered for convorsion, it. became necessary to issue more greenbacks to compénsate for the small demand for bonds.1
The treasnry operations for the qnarter April to .Tune may best be presented in a aummary like the one given above for Jannary to March.
BKCEIPTS FROM OBOINARlf SOOBOES
From customs $18,930,170.16
From salee of pablic lands 49,568.54
From miscellaneous sources (estimated) 232,946.91
From direct tax 1,795^331.73
«21,006.007^4
I8BUES OF QOVEBNMKNT 8ECCBITIXS
Oregon war debt S 198,850.00
6 per cent, twenty-year bonds ....
7.B0 three-year notes 13,997,936.64
Oíd demand notes 30,000.00
Temporar; loan (leas withdrawale) - - 39,049,712.14
Certificates of indebtedness 44,252,979.73
197,529,478.61 Legal -tender notes (greenbacks) - 98,620,000.00
Fivetwenties of 1862 13,8-15,500.00
1 $209,994,978.51
The free iseue of greenbacks put the treasnry by the end of the quarter in a very much better position than it liad beeu in at the beginning. The floating debt that had aoca- mnlated during the preceding three months was all cleared away and cnrrent expenses were paid promptly. On Jnly 1, said Mr. Chase in his December report:
■ For the mbMqmuiI hisiury of thn "eonranloo" «eharoe, neeeh»p. It, pp. 1(M. WJ. V». lia. 1H, bolow.
I For nuthoriiie« we abara, p. 8$, nota.
The Second Legal-Tendeb Aot 91
Not a single requisition from any department upon the treasury remained unanswered. Every audited and settled claim on the government, and every quartermaster's check for supplies f ur- nished, which had reached the treasury, had been met. And there remained in the treasury a balance oí $13,043,546.81.'
II. THE SECOND LEGAL-TENDEB AGT
While it is true, as has just been shown, that the treas- ury worked into comfortable condítion during the quarter April to June, 1862, and possessed abundant funde to meet all current demande, Mr. Chase foresaw that this pleasant situation could not continué long without further grants from Congress. The credit was due in large measure to the rapid issues of greenbacks, and when the whole amount of these notes authorized by the act of February, 1865, had been put into circulation stringency would recur. This matter he called to the attention of Congress by a letter written June 7 to Thaddeus Stevens, chairman of the Com- mittee of Ways and Means.2
According to the terms of the fírst legal-tender act, he reminded Congress, $150,000,000 of United States notes might be issued, but $60,000,000 of this sum must be used to replace the oíd demand notes authorized by the acts of July 17, 1861, and February 12, 1862. The new issues, therefore, were confined to $90,000,000. This limit, he said, had already been reached, and accordingly further issues could be made only as equal sums of the oíd notes were retired. Moreover, no more temporary deposits could be received, because the amount on hand had reached $50,000,- 000 — the full sum authorized by Congress — despite a reduction in the rate óf interest from 5 to 4 per cent. Thus the only available resources were receipts from customs, and
l Report of the Secrctary of the Trecuury, December, 1862, p. 10.
2//. R. Miicellaneous Document No. 81, S7th Cong., 2d Sess. The dato of the letter as giren by this document is April 7, but this is an error of the press. See the remarks of Mr. Stevens, Conffrtuional Qlobe, JTíth Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2768.
92 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEBNBAGKS
sales of five-twenty bonds for greenbacks, or "conversions." But these resources were far from adequate to meet the expenditures.
No safe reliance [said Mr. Chase] can be placed on conversions so far as experience has afforded any grounds of estímate, for more than $150,000 daily; and the daily average revenue from customs, duríng the past month, has been about $290,000.
The aggregate daily receipts from both these sources, therefore, cannot be estimated at more than $380,000, and may very possibly fall short of that sum; while the average daily expendí ture cannot be estimated at less than $1,000,000, and will, probably, unless very considerable retrenchments are made, exceed that sum.
To meet the déficit the secretary proposed two measures: first, the "removal of the restriction upon temporary deposits ;" second, the issue of another $150,000,000 of legal- tender notes. The first measure would enable him to take f ull advantage of the disposition of business men to lend their means to the government temporarily at a low rate of interest Mr. Chase thought that not less than $30,000,000 would be added at 4 per cent, to the $50,000,000 of deposits already received. To provide for the prompt redemption of such of these deposits as were withdrawn, he proposed that a reserve of 33¿ per cent, be provided out of the new issues of greenbacks.
Another suggestion, indicative of the state into which the circulating médium of the country had already fallen, was that $25,000,000 of the new United States notes should be of denominations less than five dollars.
Payments to public creditors, and especially to soldiers [Mr. Chase said in explanation], now require large amounts of coin to satisfy fractional demanda less than five dollars. Great inconveni- ences in payment of the troops are thus occasioned. With every effort on the part of the treasury to provide the necessary amount of coin, it is found impracticable always to satisfy the demand. When the amount required is furnished, the temptation to disburs- ing officers to exchangeit for any small bank notes that the soldiers
The Segond Legal-Tendeb Act 93
or the public creditors will take, is too great to be always resisted. And even when the coin reaches the creditors it is seldom held, but pasees, in general, immediatelyintothe hands of sutlers and others, and disappears at once from circulation.1
With this letter Mr. Chase sent a bilí embodying his recommendations. "The condition of the treasury," he said, in conclusión, " renders prompt action highly desirable."
This commnnication was laid befo re the Honse June 11. The request for a second issue of legal-tender notes imme- diately alarmed the opponents of paper money. With the hopo of preventing its consideration, Senator Chandler, of Michigan, introduced a resolntion: uThat the amonnt of legal tender treasury notes already authorized by law, shall never be increased." * Speaking in support of this resoln- tion he said that the effect which the passage of a second legal-tender bilí would have was shown by the fact that the mere publication of Secretary Chase' s request, " without any action of Congress on the subject, has created such a panic, and has so convinced the money center of the world that we are to be flooded with this paper, that gold has risen in price from 2f to 7 per cent premium." If full use were made of other resources, he continued, the disastrous consequences of fresh paper money emissions could be avoided. By pay- ing 5 per cent, interest an indefínitely large sum could be obtained on temporary deposit and the lagging conversions of greenbacks into bonds could be stimulated by an appeal to the patriotism of the people.8
Senator Fessenden, chairman of the finalice committee, replied in a modérate vein. Reliance upon temporary deposite, he pointed out, would be very hazardous, because if any severe shocks occurred to the credit of the govern- ment, large sums might be withdrawn within a few days,
i Cf. Part II, chap. ii, sec. ir, below.
i Comffremional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2746. > IbitL, pp. 2774, 2775.
94 HlSTOBY OF THE GsEENBACKS
and Mr. Chase be left without fonda. He regretted tbat tbe secretary had fonnd it neceaaary to reqneat the isaue of more notes, and he waa not convinced that soch a conree would be wíse. But until the aecretary's reasona veré fully known he tbonght it would be wrong to resolve not to grant bis reqneat. Therefore, he moved that the resolation be referred to his committee for conaideratíon. This was done, and nothing more was heard of the matter by the Senate.' Meanwhile Mr. Chase'a bilí was introdnced into the House.1 As before, Mr. Spauldíng fatbered the measnre. The tone of the debate was quite different f rom that apon the first legal-tender act. The advócate» of paper money Bpoke in a leas apologetic tone, boldly asflnming the offenaive. The first experiment, they he Id, had demon- atrated the wisdom of their policy . Mr. Spaulding declared that the act of February 25 had " worked well," and had "exceeded the most Bangnine expectations of ita warmest advocatea."' Some members who had voted against the firat bilí were won over by soch claims to vote for the Becond. Senator Simmons, for instance, said the firat issue " has given great practical relief to the coontry, and inas- mnch as it has done so, I ... . give my consent to author- ize a further iasue.'1* Other members agreed to the bilí because of the hopeleaanese of opposition. Owen Lovejoy, who had spoken vigorooaly against the bilí in February, explained that he stíll thought the policy pernicious but that he would not "pereist in any factious opposition to what is a foregone conclusión."* On the other hand, there were members who had voted for the first bilí aa a measure of
1 Conffmtionat Olobt, STth Cong., 2d Sosa., pp. £171, SI7S.
) Ibid., p. toa. The bilí os reportad írom the Committee of Wnjs ud Htiu differed from the bilí submitted bj Cha» In not authoriiiog the issoe of notas le» than fl »e dolía re. Soe the teit, p. 2786.
• Aid., p. TM. Cf. od the other oíde Mr. Sheffisld. p. 2*8*.
*Ibid., p.am. • /Mrf., p. 2B8S.
The Segond Leoal-Tendeb Aot 95
temporary necessity, but who opposed the second on the ground that it inaugnrated a regalar policy of depending on inconvertible paper.1 Thus the character both of the Bupport and of the opposition shifted somewhat.
In the debate one point especially received relatively more attention than in February. Mr. Hooper based his argament for the bilí on the country's need of a cnrrency of uniform valué. It was a qnestion, said he, between bank notes and government notes, and he preferred the latter.2 "If anybody," said Mr. Lovejoy, "is to have the advantage of a depreciated cnrrency — the advantage, in other words, of not paying interest on what they [sic] owe — I say let the government have that advantage ; and let the bankers share with the rest of us."' In order to secnre this advantage to the government, Senator Sherman proposed an amendment to the bilí impoeing a tax upon bank notes.4
Bnt it was again the argament of necessity that did duty as the chief reason for the bilí. In opening the debate Mr. Spanlding reiterated it explicitly. **The ground apon which the secretary of the treasary, and upon which the Committee of Ways and Means, rest this issue of notes," he said, 4t is the necessity of the case." * By the opposition the alleged necessity was once again emphatically denied. Mr. Pomeroy made an elabórate attempt to show that Secretary Chase had underestimated the probable receipts of the gov- ernment, and that the daily déficit instead of being $620,- 000 was only $166,166.* Mr. Pike, who had voted for the
' Cf. the remarles of Mr. Pike, ibid., p. 2798, and Senator Davis, p. 3078. l Ibid., p. 2882. * Ibid., p. 2885.
* Ibid. y pp. 3071, 3072. This proposition was opposed by Senators Collamer, p. *7B; Simmons, pp. 3076, 3077 ; and Davis, p. 3078.
*Ibid., p. 2708. Cf. remarles of Messrs. Baily, ibid., Appendix, p. 296; and Edwards, ibid., p. 2888.
* Mr. Pomeroy estimated " oonversions " at $275,000 instead of $150,000 daily, and farther added $333,000 per day as the expected receipts f rom the inte mal rerenue act then just enacted.— Ibid., p. 2797. As a matter of fact this act yielded abent H08.000 instead of $333,000 daily in the fiscal year, 1863.— Rcport of the Secretary o/ the Trea&ury, 1863, p. 28.
96 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS
first bilí on the ground of necessity, refused to vote for the pending measure, which could be advocated only upon "the mere ground of convenience." ' And Mr. Morrill declared that after the recent victories of the federal armies and the passage of the tax bilí there was not only no neces- sity, but no excuse, for the issue of more paper.1
Ñor were these gentlemen who denied the necessity at a loes for an alternativa "The true policy," said Mr. Morrill, "is to put upon the market the small amount which will be required . . . . in the bonds of the Government, at what- ever they would bring."8 Mr. Sheffield concluded his speech by saying : "I am persuaded that it would be fax better for the people of the country to sell bonds at a large discount than to f urther disturb the relation between price and valué by a further issue of these notes." 4 Mr. Horton put these suggestions into formal shape by presenting, as a substituto for the bilí, a measure authorizing the secretary of the treasury to borro w $100,000,000 on 6 per cent., twenty-five year bonds.5
As in the first debate, the supporters of the bilí implicitly gave away the argument of necessity in the answer made to the proposal of borrowing. Instead of showing that it was impracticable to sell bonds, they responded that, as a method of securing revenue, it was better to issue inconvertible paper money than to borrow below par. "When money can be obtained at par on six per cent, bonds," said Mr. Spaulding, "I would prefer to have that done to the issuing a very large amount of legal tender notes."6 Mr. Edwards fol- io wed suit, " I would gladly give my consent," said he, " to . . . . the sale of bonds . . . . if I were assured those bonds could be sold at par." 7
i Congrestional Olobe, S7th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2798.
2 Ibid., p. 2885. See also Mr. Baker, ibid., p. 2881.
« Ibid., p. 2885. * Ibid., p. 2888. * Ibid., p. 2794. • Ibid., p. 2767.
1 1bid., p. 2888. Cf. on the other sido Mr. Pomeroy, ibid., p. 2796.
The Seoond Legal-Tendeb Act 97
The legal-tender debate in June and July was by no means so exhaustivo as had been the debate in January and February. Apparently members felt it would be a fmitless waste oí time to diseñas again the questions debated at snch length five months before. An attempt was made, however, to learn whether this was the last issne that would be asked for. Mr. Stevens, the chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means, to whom the qnestion was put, replied frankly that he did not know where the issues would stop.1 To offset this damaging admission the supporters of the bilí praised the paper curreney,2 and asserted that there was no reason why a new issue should increase depreciation.8
The measure carne to a vote in the House June 24. It paseed by 76 yeas to 47 nays. Of those who voted in the affirmative five had opposed the legal-tender clause in the first act. On the contrary, of the nays, seven had sup- ported the legal-tender clause in February. The large majority of members, however, voted upon the second act as they had upon the first. The yeas included four Demócrata and the nays fifteen Republicana, so that the división was not a party vote.4
In the Senate the vote was 22 to 13. Four senators voted for the bilí who had opposed the legal-tender clause of the first act, and three senators — John Sherman among them — who had supported the first act opposed the second. Twenty-one Republicana voted in the affirmative and nine in the negative. Of the four democratic votes one was in favor of the bilí. As in the case of the first act the vote was devoid of sectional and of party character.6
i /WdM p. 2886.
i Mr. Spaulding, e. 0., said the act of February 25, 1862, " had giren the country a arrand national curreney, in which the people ha ve had en ti re eonfldence."— lbid.y p.
m.
* Mr. Hooper said he had " no apprehension of any depreciation of the curreney bein* prodaced by the passage of the bilí."— Ibid., p. 2883.
♦ Ibid.. p. 2908. * Ibid., p. 9079.
HlSTORÍ OF THE GBEENBACK8
President Lincoln approved the second legal-tender at Jnly 11, 1862. The law anthorized the issue of $150. 000,000 United States notes. In addition the limit upo the amoont of temporary deposita that might be receivo was raised from $50,000,000 to $100,000,000. In oider t provide for the prompt payment of these deposite th secretary was directed to retain as a reserve fund not les than $50,000,000 of the newly authorized notes.'
III. THE POSTASE CÜKBKNCT AOT
It has been seen that Secretary Chase's letter requestin. aathority for a second issue of greenbacks referred to th diflículty experienced by disbursing ofGcers ín makin. change for suma of leas than $5. To relieve this difficnlt it was provided in the act of Jnly 11 that $35,000,000 c the new issues should be of lower denominationB than $í but it wbjs also provided that no note should " be issued fe the fractíonal part of a dollar."2
Hardly had this act been approved by President Lincol when Mr. Chase found it necessary to request authority t use paper money, not only in pay menta of one and two do) lara, but also in payments of 50, 25, and even 10 centi Jnly 14 he wrote a letter to Thaddeua Stevens, saying:
The depreciation of the curreney, resulting, in great meaaun from the unrestricted issues of non-specie-paying banks an unauthorized associatíons and persona, causes the rapid disappea: anee from circuJation of small coins. To supply the want of tlic* coins, tokens and checks for suma leas than one dollar are bein iseued by hotel», business houses, and dealers generally; and tfa raost serioiin inconveniences and evils are apprehended unlet these issues can be checked and the small coins of the Qoveramei kept in circulation, or a substituto provided.'
1 12 SlattUa iií Large, p. ¡Si. " /Wd„ toe. eit.
The Sboond Legal-Tendeb Aot 99
Chase proposed two methods of meeting this situation. One was to diminish the weight of the subsidiary coins to 8Qch a point that as bullion they would be worth less than their face valué as money ; the other was to authorize the ose of postage and other stamps in payments of fractional parta of a doilar. For the convenience of the Committee of Ways and Means the secretary submitted two bilis embody- ing these suggestions. The second expedient seemed preferable to the committee, and accordingly the bilí providing for the use of stamps as currency was introduced by Mr, Hooper July 17 and passed at once by a vote of 62 to 40, with no debate aside from an objection raised on constitutional gronnds against the clause forbidding the isBue of small notes by state banks.1 The Senate passed the bilí the same day without debate or división,2 and President Lincoln signed it before night.
The act directed the secretary of the treasnry "to furnish to the Assistant Treasurers, and such designated depositaríes of the United States as may be by him selected, in such sama as he may deem expedient, the postage and other stamps of the United States, to be exchanged by them, on application, for United States notes."
Such stamps were not made a legal tender between indi- viduáis, but their currency was assured by providing that they should be receivable in payment of all dues to the United States less than $5, and that they should be redeemed in greenbacks on demand by the treasury officials. The second section forbade any u prívate Corporation, bank- ing association, firm, or individual" to put in circulation notes or tokens of any character for sums less than a doilar. "
i Oonertaaional Globe, S7th Cong., 2d Seas., pp. 3406, 3406.
* Ibtd., p. 3402.
> 12 Stotvte* at Largc, p. 592. On the authorization of fractional currency to Uke the place of postage currency, seo Part I, chap. iv, p. 118, below. On the ciroula- ÜoQ of both these forma of small chango seo Part II, chap. ii, sec. iv.
CHAPTER IV
THE THIRD LEGAL-TENDER ACT
I. The Finalices frota July to Deoember, 1862:
Keceipta and Expenses July to September — lacrease oí Déficit in October and November — Propottala of the Finalice Report; No Further Iasues of Greenbacks, But Reliance Upon Loaos. II. The Joint Beaolution of Jcmvary 17, 1863:
Aneara in Pay of Army — Congreesional Inquines and Chase'a Rejoinders — Reeolution for Additional Issuesof Greenbacks. IIL The Third LegaUTender Aet:
PtovíbÍods of Waj-s and Meaos Bill— Chsracter of Debate Repeal of Funding Proviuious — Substitutos Propasad — Senato Amendments — Provisiona of the Act.
I. THE FINANCES FBOM JUNE TO DECEMBEB, 1862 On Jal; 1, 1862, the beginning of the new fiscal year, the treasory was in easy circamstaaces, as has been shown. All andited claims had been met, and there was a balance of $13,000,000 on hand.1 But in the next quarter the treasory began to ron behind again. The futile ending of McOlellan's campaign in the Península, from which so mnch had been hoped, showed that the end of the war vas not at hand, and on July 1 Presiden t Lincoln issned a cali for 300,000 additional troops." Enlarging the army of conree promiBed an increase of demanda on the treasory. During the qaarter July to September, however, the war- rants drawn against the treasurer for other purposes than payment of the public debt were slightly lees than the quarterly average for the fiscal year 1862 had been — viz., $111,000,000 as compared with $119,000,000.' Bot at the
' Pp. 90, VI, jiboie.
1 Compide H-orte, ed. Nicolai akdDat.VoI. II, pp. 19t, 19S.
a of nipendi turas in the Rtport of t*e Secrxlary af tkt
The Thibd Legal-Tendeb Act 101
same time some $45,500,000 more had to be used in redeem- ing oíd demand notes, greenbacks, certiñcates of indebted- oess and certiñcates of deposita.1
To help in meeting these total expenditures of $156,- 500,000 there was a slight increase in the receipts f rom taxa- tion and miscellaneous sonrces. This revenue rose from abont $21,000,000 in the preceding quarter, to $24,000,- 000.2 For the rest Mr. Chase had to borrow. As conver- sions of greenbacks into five-twenty bonds amounted to but $2,500,000, he relied mainly on issnes of greenbacks and various short-time obligations.s Altogether he succeeded in obtaining $114,500,000 from loans, but the necessity of pay- ing $45,500,000 of the principal of the debt reduced the net increase of means from loans to $69,000,000. This sum, with the receipts from ordinary sonrces, gave the secretary $93,000,000 to meet warrants of $111,000,000.* The dif- ference between these snms swallowed up the balance of $13,000,000 on hand July 1 and left an accumulation of unpaid warrants amounting to $5,000,000.
Unpromising as the situation of the treasury was at the end of September, it became worse dnring October and November. The increase of the army began to be felt by the treasury. The expenditures during these two months other than those for payment of debt were almost as great as the total for the three months preceding — viz., $109,000,000 as compared with $111,000,000.5 Mr. Chase was not able to raise money fast enough to meet these expenses, and though he borrowed $85,500,000,* the accumulation of unpaid requisitions at the end of November reached $48,000,000/
l Ibid., p. 43.
3 Ibid., pp. 37, 43.
* $¿¿00,000 of seren-thirty notes, $72,500,000 of greenbacks, $12,000,000 of certifica tes of indebtedness and $23,000,000 of certiñcates of deposit were issued.—Ibid., p. 43.
4 Exclusive of payments of the principal of the debt.
* Ibid ., p. 1<X • Ibid., p. 3. ^ Ibid., p. 10.
102 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAOKS
When the secretary prepared his annual report to Con- grees early in December, he estimated that the expendituree for the remainder of the fiscal year wonld be $485,000,000. The addition of the $48,000,000 of accumulated floating debt made the total to be provided $533,000,000. Against thii lum Mr. Ohase expected to receive $125,000,000 from taxea of all kinds and miscellaneous sonrces. This left $408,000,000 to be raised from loans. Under existing laws the neoretary expected to secure $27,000,000 from issues of grwnbacks, $36,000,000 from postage currency, $13,000,000 froui certificates of indebtedness, and $20,000,000 from t^ni(>orary deposita. These sums, with an estimated sale of ttvo-twtmty bonds amonnting to $35,000,000, made a total of $131,000,000; which, subtracted from the $408,000,000 to tx* borrowed, left loans of $277,000,000 to be provided for by iww logislation.1
lu diHousaiug how this sum should be procored Secretary (Iba*** took emphatic ground against any considerable iiiortmne in the emission of greenbacks:
» kepwt <V the Secretary of the Trecmiry, December, 1882, pp. 3-5, 11, 12. The tttfuroM ¡u the report vive estimated receipts and expenditares for the whole fUual year, whlle the figures above are confined to the months December, 1862, Mi July, llttVa. In obtaining the latter figures from the former it is necessary to tm»t out the cápennos actual ly paíd from Joly to November. This can be done with wirlaluty for the months July to September because a full statement is givtm of the receipts and expenditnres of that quarter. But for October and MtiVMiulittr the utatemcnts show only receipts from loans ($88,000,000), and expendi- Ituit» for iihJecU other than payment of the principal of the debt ($109,000,- U4M I i U, therefore, necessary to estímate the receipts from ordinary sonrces and iUu aitidiiiit pald ou the principal of the debt. Snch an estímate is not difficult to ii(ukt>, bucauM» the figures actually gWen show that the latter sum exoeeded the |< a mor by $2U,U00,Ui0. The difference between the stated expenditnres and receipts l« $2ft,uU,UUJ. Hut It U ttl.Ho stated that the acoumulation of unpaid requisitions rose (mil) $íi,uUMM> al the end of September to $48,000,000 at the end of November. Since lU«, ituaaury ihiu fell behind $43,000,000 on all expenditures and only $23,000,000 on ¡ ut» A ii«|wutlUurea It must have been because expenditures not stated exceeded iumUííIu uol «tutod by $20,000,000. With thisguidc and that afforded by the figures fui lu<> i|imrUir July to September, I nave estimated the receipts from customs, etc., • tui lutf (V.Utl*»r uud NoTember at $18.000,000 and the payments on the principal of the .It.UiUlHiMMMUO. The figures for the araounts to be borrowed given in the text, l«<.,*< v«u, uunut with those in the secretary's report and are not affected by any lo.iMiu.try oí ilut»e guenses, for, if the estimated receipts from taxation are too ui'tlUUrj uruooinpousated for by correspondingly deficient cstimates of expendí- %ut u ou luu priueipal of the debt.
The Thibd Legal-Tendeb Act 103
The easiest mode [oí obtaining the $277,000,000] doubtless would be an issue oí the required amount in United States notes; but such an issue, especially in the absenoe oí proper iBstrictions on corporate circulation, would, in the judgment oí the Secretary, be as in jurious as it would be easy. The addition oí so vast a volume to the existing circulation would convert a currency, of which the benefíts ha ve thus far greatly outweighed the incon- veniences, into a positive calamity. Its consequences would be inflation of pnces, increase of expenditures, augmentation of debt, and ultimately, disastrous defeat of the very purposes sought to beattained by it.1
While the secretary thus opposed further issues of greenbacks, he had no suggestions to make of increased taxation. Instead, he proposed to secure the additional $277,000,000 solely by borrowing. In order to facilítate the negotiation of loans as well as to provide a better currency, he urged again upon Congress the plan proposed in his report of the year before for reorganizing the banking system. Banks that desired to issue circulating notes were to be required to purchase United States bonds to be held as security. This plan, he thought, would make a market for not less than $250,000,000 of bonds "within a very few years." * Moreover, the steady sale of bonds to banks would strengthen the credit of the government and enable it to borro w from others on better terms.8
If reliance were to be placed upon loans, the question as to what form of security had best be offered became important. Mr. Chase opposed any increase beyond five years in the length of time that bonds should run before they became redeem- able, and any increase in the rate of interest beyond 6 per cent. As an alternativo he preferred the issue of 7.30 three- year notes, "convertible into five-twenty sixes at or before maturíty, and of smaller notes bearing an interest of 3.65 per cent." 4
i Ibid., p. 12. 2 Jbid., p.18.
* Ibid., pp. 18, 24, 26. * Ibid.% p. 25.
104 HlSTOBY OF THE GBEENBACKS
No prudent legislator [said he] at a time when the gold in the world Í8 increasing by a hundred millions a year, and interest must necessarily and soon decline, will consent to impose on the labor and business oí the people a fíxed interest of 6 per cent, on a great debt, f or twenty years, unless the necessity is far more urgen t than is now believed to exist.1
Accordingly, he recommended no change in the law providing for the issue of bonds beyond the necessary increase in amount and the repeal of two clanses which in his view limited the sale of the five-twenties already author- ized.2 These clauses, however, or rather Mr. Chase's inter- pretation of them, require some attention.
The first legal-tender act of February 25, 1862, as will be remembered, had authorized the issue of $500,000,000 6 per cent, five-twenty bonds, which the secretary was permitted to sell "at the market valué thereof." The law also provided that holders of greenbacks might exchange them in sums of $50 or múltiples of $50 for these bonds at par." Under this authorization the secretary had been able to dispose of but relatively few of the five-twenty bonds. Up to the first of December "conversions" amounted to less than $24,000,000/ Mr. Chase now declared that these small sales were due to the clauses restricting sales to the "market valué" of the bonds and permitting "conversions" of greenbacks into five-twenties at par.
Considerable amounts [he explained] are seldom taken, except with a view to resales at a profit, and resales at any profit are impossible under the law. Negotiations below market valué are not allowed, and if not allowed the taker of the bonds can expect no advance, unless a market valué considerably below par shall become established. The act makes advance above par impossible, by authorizing conversión of United States notes into bonds at that rate.6
1 Report of the Secretary of the Treatury, December, 1862, p. 25.
2 Ibid., p, 26. 3 12 Statutes at Large, pp. 345, 846.
* Report of the Secretary of the Treatury, December, 1862, p. 12. * Ibid., p. 52.
The Thibd Legal-Tendeb Aot 105
What this peculiar explanation meant Congress did not nnderetand, and, as will soon appear, the secretary was asked tointerpret it
II. THE JOINT BE80LUTION OF JANÜABY 17, 1863
This report was laid before the House of Represen- tatives December 5 and referred to the Committee of Ways and Means, which at once set about drafting finance bilis along the general linea indicated by the secretary.1 Bnt this was a task that necessaríly reqnired some time. It was not nntil the 8th of Jannary that Mr. Stevens was able to report the loan bilí and the bilí for reorganizing the banks of issue.*
Meanwhile the treasury continued to ron behind as it had done in October and November, and the accumulation of requisitions which conld not be paid for lack of funds became larger. This state of affairs attracted mnch atten- tion in Congress becanse the pay of the army fell into arrears. Members began to receive letters from constituents who were serving in the field, complaining that their families at home were suffering from lack of the money which the government owed but did not pay them.* Such complaints found a ready responso. December 11 the House adopted a resolntion asking the secretary of war to report " what regiments remain unpaid and how long have the soldiers of such regiments remained without pay." 4 As Mr. Stanton did not reply promptly, * the House adopted another resolution December 15, directed to the secretary of the treasury:
i Conffreatioruil Olobe, 87th Cong., Sd Sess., p. 15.
2 Ibid., pp. 235-7. It was the Sena te banking bilí introduced by Sherman Jannary 26, ** a littlo different from the bilí introduced in the House of Representa- tires " (p. 505), that was finally passed. Cf. Spaüldino, op. cit., p. 186.
* Soe, e. ff., the remarles of Mr. Gurley, Congretrional Globe, S7th CongM Sd Sess., P.S44.
* Ibid.. pp. 75, 76. & No answer had been received np to Jannary 12.— JWd., p. 2S8.
106 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS
Wbereas grievous delays happen in the payment oí money due soldiere: Therefore, in order to ascertain if any and what legisla- tion may be necessary to remedy such delays,
Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury be requeeted to furnish to this House the reasons why requisitions of paymastere in the Army are not promptly fílled.1
Mr. Chase answered that the unpaid army requisitions then in the treasury amounted to $28,700,000. Payments of requisitions designated by the war and navy departments as most urgent were being made at the rate of about $1,000,000 daily from the proceeds of customs, internal revenue taxes, conversions, temporary deposit loans, and new issues of greenbacks. These resources, he concluded were insufficient, but he could not obtain more funds until Congress should adopt the measures recommended in his report.2
The House replied to this communication the day before adjourning for the holidays by passing a joint resolution declaring that in the opinión of Congress " immediate steps ought to be taken by the Treasury Department to pay the sums due the soldiers .... and that to this end a prefer- ence be given to this class of Government creditors over every other."3 After the recesa Henry Wilson, of the Committee on Military Affairs, reported this resolution to the Senate with an amendment which authorized the issue of an additional $50,000,000 of greenbacks to enable the secretary to carry out its directions. Senator Fessenden, however, pointed out that before such a measure was adopted Mr. Chase ought to be cónsul ted, and for this pur]K>se he requested and the Senate consented that the matter be referred to the Committee on Finance.4
i Conortnional Qlobe, 37th Conff., Sd Sess., p. 93.
a H. K. Kxteutive Document No Jf, 37thCong., 3d Sea.,Dated Deoember 18, IMS. * Adopted Deoember 22, \d81.—Conerttmcmal Globe, 37 th Con«., 9d Sen., p. 1«7. For tho tozt see p. 199. « Ibid.. pp. 199, 200.
The Thibd Legal-Tendeb Act 107
When the resolution was sent to Chase he declared that
the means províded by it would be insufficient. The exist-
ing resonrces of $1,000,000 a day did not cover current
expenditures, and the addition of $50,000,000 of greenbacks
wonld not snffice for the arreara in the pay of the army and
navy, which probably approached $60,000,000. Therefore,
as a substituto for the joint resolution, he sent in a bilí
providing for the sale at the best ratea obtainable of $100,-
000,000 of 6 per cent, ten-year bonds, the isaue of $50,000,-
000 of United States notes, and of a like sum of two-year
i per cent treasury notes.1 On recommendation of the
Committee on Finance the Senate postponed indeñnitely the
resolution adopted by the House and passed in its place the
bilí prepared by Chase.2
While the joint resolution waa pending in the Senate, the House followed up its inquiry into the non-payment of the soldiers by requiring Secretary Chase to explain why he had not availed himself of the authority conferred upon him by the act of February 25, 1862, to sell $500,000,000 of 6 per cent five-twenty bonds.1 In replying, Chase laid the blame for the failure to use this authority, as he had done in his annual report, upon the clause specifying that the bonds ehould be sold at "the market valué thereof." "The market valué," he said, "can only be ascertained by the daily quo- tations of sales in New York." But he could not sell large amounts of securities at these market quotations, for heavy purchasers as a rule bought to 6ell again, and resales at a profit were impossible unless bonds could be bought from the government at prices less than those ruling in the market.4
The question whether Chase or Congress was respon-
i The text of his letter is published ibid., p. 270.
libia., p. 270; January 12.
•J Resolution adopted Janaary S.—Ibid.^ p. 237.
* H. R. Executive Document No. 29, 37th Cong., 3d Soss.
108 HlSTORY OF the Gbebnbagks
aible for tbe emptiness of the treasury thng turned npon the meaning of the phrase "market valué" of bonds. Chase, who construid it to mean the quotations of the New York stock market, was no donbt right in saying that salea of largo amounts at these quotations were imposBÍble. His critica in Congress, however, regarded his interpretation as a legal quibble which ought not to stand in the way of supplying the pressing needs of soldiers. "Everybody knows," said Mr. Otarle v, im palien ti y, that the market valué of bonds "ifl the pnce they will bring when placed npon the market; .... no far fetched construction of this sort ahoold prevent their sale." '
Thongh the majoríty of congressmen probably shared Mr. Gurley's feeling that in his fear of exoeeding the powers conferred npon him the Becretary had been over-nice, the needs of the honr were too nrgent to permit of fnrther fen- cing. The great Ways and Means bilí which had been reported from the committee while this dispute abont the pay of soldiers was goíng on, contained a section which authorized the issue of $300,000,000 additional greenbacks " ¡f required by the exigencies of the public service, for the payment of the army and navy and otber creditors of the Gove^nment.", Debate upon it began Jannary 12 with an elabórate speech by Mr. Spanlding.* The same day the joint resolntion giving soldiers preference over all other government crédito rs which the House had passed December 22 was rejected by the Senate in favor of Chase's substituto.* Jnst before adjournment, still on this same day, the latter bilí was referred to the Committee of Ways and Means in the House.* Though this committee felt that stops shonld be taken at once for the relief of tbe soldiers, they did not approve of Secretary Chase's proposals. The Ways and
l Oont/rt—ional Gtobe, 37th Con»., :
The Thibd Lbgal-Tendeb Aot 109
Means bilí which they had framed would grant abundant power to borrow money, but they knew that it could not be passed much before the end of the session. Consequently they determinad to put the simplest of the proposals of the Ways and Means bilí into a sepárate measure and ask for immediate action. With this view, on the 14th of Jannary, Thaddeos Stevens introduced a " Joint Resolution to provide for the immediate payment of the Army and Navy of the United States." It was very brief, merely authorizing the issue of $50,000,000 additional greenbacks to be included in the issue provided for by the pending bilí. On Lovejoy's motion the amoont was doubled. Then without any discus- aion the resolution was passed.1 The next day the Senate acted apon it with similar expedition,2 and President Lincoln signed it on the 17th.s In notif ying the House of his approval of the measure the president expressed his "sincere regret that it has been found necessary to authorize so large an ad- ditional issue of United States notes," and urged prompt enactment of Chase' s plan for a national banking system.'
A third issue of greenbacks was thus determined upon with much lesa discussion than had been bestowed upon the ñrst and second issues. The opening for it was made by Secretary Chase's peculiar interpretation of the loan sections of the fírst legal-tender act. Had he taken the "market valué" of bonds to mean what Congress seems to have intended — the price which they would bring when sold on the market — it is probable that he could have negotiated a much larger amount of the five-twenties in the summer and autumn of 1862. Then the pay of the army would not have fallen into arreare and the occasion for the joint resolution of January 17 would not have presented itself.
i Oongrmional Qlobe, S7th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 314.
i/Wd.,p.323. *í28UMhUe$aLLarffc, p.822.
« Ckmffrttñanal Globc, S7th Con*., 3d Sess., pp. 302, 888.
i
110 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAOKS
III. THE THIBD LEGAL-TENDEB ACT
The greenbacks authorized by the joint resolution, how- ever, formed but a third of the issues proposed by the Ways and Means bilí reported by the committee. Thís bilí author- ized the secretary of the treasury to borrow $900,000,000, intended partly to supply the wants of the current fiscal year and partly of the year that wonld begin Jnly 1, 1863. To secare this sum the secretary might sell "upon the best terms he can obtain, not lesa than par," twenty-year bonds, bearing interés t at 6 per cent., in coin. He might also issue $300,000,000 of three-year treasury notes bearing coin interest at 5.47¿ per cent.; i. e., a cent and a half per day on $100. Further, " if required by the exigencies of the public service," he might issue $300,000,000 of green- backs. To prevent the avenues of circulation from being closed against government paper money by enlarged issues of bank notes, a tax of 2 per cent, per annum was pro- posed on the circulation of banks beyond certain limita, which varied from 25 per cent, of the capital in the case of institutions with a capital of over $2,000,000 to 90 per cent, of the capital of banks with capitals of $100,000 or less.1
Rather curiously, the discussion of this sweeping measure centered not in the question how best to borrow the $900,000,000 needed, ñor in the policy of issuing more legal- tender notes, but in the proposed tax on bank notes. Con- gressmen acquiesced with little dispute in the recommenda- tions concerning the loans ;a but they discussed at much length and with much warmth the alleged attack upon the banks. Of strenuous opposition to the increase of the irredeemable currency there was none. It was clearly enough seen that
i The text of the bilí is gWen Conffrwional Gtoóe, 37 th Cong., 3d Sess., pp. 283, 284.
2S©e, e. g.„ the speeches of Messrs. Spaulding, ibid., p. 287; Morrill, p. 296; Shef- fleld, p. 367; Hooper, p. 384; Riddle, p. 383; Lorejoy, p. 345; Gurley. p. 342; Walker, p. 339.
The Thibd Legal-Tendeb Aot 111
the bilí would cause further depreciation,1 injure the govern- ment's credit,2 increase the cost of the war, work injury to recipiente of fixed wages — particularly soldiers — to savings bank depoeitors and all creditors, and that it would still further excite the "spirit of speculation."* But this recital of the ill effects which would follow the bilí apparently had little influence. Even Amasa Walker — then serving his short terna in the House — who saw these evils most clearly, could lightly waive them aside. "One thing is certain," said he, " we are in such an emergency at the present time that it is not worth while f or us to be very particular."4 He frankly admitted that he could see no alternativo.5 Simi- larly Justin S. Morrill, who had opposed the first and second legal-tender acts, felt constrained to vote for the bilí because he knew of no better way of securing funds. "The patient has got accustomed to opiates," said he, "and the dose can- not now be withheld without peril."6 Mr. Horton took the same stand. He had opposed the whole paper-money sys- tem, but now that the country was "launched . . . . on this current of paper money," there seemed to him to be no turning back.7 While even these staunch opponents of irredeemable currency admitted the necessity of the bilí, Mr. Spaulding and his associates proclaimed it as they had done u\ the case of the first and second issues. "I have an aversión," said Mr. Spaulding, "to any considerable further issue of legal tender notes, and can only consent to it as an imperativo necessity. I think too large an issue will tend to Ínflate prices; but I do not see how it can be avoided."8 In the recognition of the ill effects of an irredeemable paper currency and the assertion of necessity the discussion
i Senator Sherman, ibid., p. 841.
3 Amasa Walker, ibid., p. 339.
• See remarks of Messrs. Walker, loe. cit.; Ward, ibid., p. 337; and Pike, p. 347.
4 Ibid., p. 392. * Ibid., p. 339. • Ibid., p. 294. t Cangreuional Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 387. »/fr»d., p. 289.
112 HlSTORY OF THE GrEENBACKS
of the third legal-tender act was bot a repetitíon of the two formei debatea. One new topic, however — wbether or no the currency waa "inflated" — attracted mnch attention. The apologista of the legal-tender ayetem were anxious to minimizo the avile inciden t to it, and especially to show that the government notes were not rednndant and had not depreciated. Mr. Chase had set the example by attributing the premium on gold to the anxiety of timid investors, for- eign and native, to sell American securíties even at heavy sacrifico for coin which conld be exported or hoarded. Speculatora, he said, had made the moat of this situation to effect a great rise of gold. That the high premium waa "not due wholly, or even in greatest part, to the increase of the currency," he Bonght to show by estimatea of the mone- tary circnlation befare and after suspensión. According to his figures the circnlation of the loyal states had increased between November 1, 1861, and November 1, 1862, bnt from $355,000,000 to $377,000,000. Nearly or quite all of tbia modérate gain of $22,000,000 he thonght waa reqtüred by the greater activity of business and the greater govemment transactions. That this was the case seemed to bim snf- ficiently well attested by the fact that the pricea of varióos Btaple producís euch as wheat, mesa pork, cora, hay, beef, etc., had risen Httle if at all. Moreover, he showed that the.fluctn- ations in the premium had not coincided with changos in the volume of the circnlation. Finally, he argued, "if there be a considerable real depreciation of the circnlation — which is by no means admitted — " it is due not to redundancy of greenbacks, but to the needlesa increase in the note and depoeit currency of banks.'
Mr. Cbase's arguments reappeared during the debate in a number of variations. One gentleman declared that a
' Rcport of Me Sccretary qf tile Trtatwy. Deoember, 1882, pp. 12-15. QT. Pait O, ehmj». ii, iii and ir. below, on the eircnlatina médium, Uta premium on «oíd and Uie Drices of oommodities.
The Thibd Legal-Tendeb Agt 113
bushel of wheat sold f or a gold dollar in Europe and a paper dollar in America, and that as the wheat had everywhere the same intrinsic valué there could be in reality no such difference between the valué of paper money and coin as the premium on gold indicated.1 Another member pro- pounded the doctrine that the rate of interest is an inf allible test of the adequacy of the money supply. Since the rate of interest in the money market was high he refused to believe that the currency was unduly expanded.2 Mr. Edwards declared that "a more fallacious idea was never put forth" than that "the difference between gold and the currency issued by the Government is the measure of depreciation." In his opinión the difference was due to the fact that gold was and greenbacks were not receivable at the customs houses. Gold had become "an article of merchandise." The supply of it was not equal to the demand, and in the scramble it had become "a monopoly in the hands of a few who hoard it because they know they can get a good price for it from the customer who is obliged tobuyit."'
To refute such proofs that the currency was not redun- dant, Amasa Walker declared, on the authority of Calhoun, that the amount of currency required by the community was just one dollar for every twenty-five dollars of property. He estimated the property of the loyal states at $12,500,000,000. The proper amount of currency was therefore one-twenty- fifth of this sum, or $500,000,000. But there was in circu- lation some $850,000,000 of currency. That is, by his estímate, there was a redundancy of $350,000,000/
i Mr. Shellabarger, Congreuional Globc, 87th Cong., Sd Sess., p. 407.
J Mr. Watts, <Wd., p. 891. * IWd., p. 409.
* Ibid.i p. 899. Mr. Walker incloded bank deposits In his estímate of the volóme of the currency. Calhonn's statement of the theory is not quite so bold and dogma- tic as Mr. Walker representad it. See Work* of John C. Calhoun (New York, 1858), Vol. n, p. 847.
114 ÜI8TORT Or TBI GbBHBICES
Replying lo Walker, Mr. Riddle raised no objection to the metliod of bis argnment, but declared that an important •lement had been omitted in the calcnlation — the govern- nent reqnired macb more cnrrency in time of wax than in time of peace. "So far from there being a rednndancy of the currency," he conclnded, " I believe tbere is a defici- ency.'" The commonest rejoinder to the statement of mlundancy, bowever, waa the aaaertion tbat pnces of com- nottltlea had not rísen materially.*
But the matter waa carríed farther. Not aatisfied with tlanylng the depreciation of tbe paper currency, some mem< tiera AMorted that fortber inflation waa neceasary to facili- ta!» borrowíng. This argnment, too, eeema to have been dvrivMl from a paaaage in Mr. Chase's report:
Tliti iforamment can reeort to borrowing only when tbe issue |{i( V iilt**! Htatoa notes] has beoome aufficiently large to warrant a Jiwl «lueotation that Joans of the notes can be had from thoae wltn lii'til or rain obtaiD them at ratee not lesa advantageous than IIiimx of ooio loana before BuapensioQ.'
Tilla languago can hardly mean anything elee than that tbe yovuriimtmt ahould continué to isaue its notes untü their valué llHil Ihhhi so depreeaod that holdera would be ready to M(i|iMii|[t> $100 of currency for an annual goI<i payment of $11, (Joiitrretamtm at leaat took thia view. Mr. Horton ltw>Uro<l ñ further isaue of currency neceaaary "in order to fyml a large aniount of debt."* Similarly Mr. Hooper ItlilMHHnl wllliig bonda below par and preferred to adhere to ltit> |Hillt<y of prevloua legislation, which, according to him, had tamil " lo laaiio hyal-tonder notes in sufficient amount .... fcittiMtt .... Itonda and keep them at par."* Mr. Spanlding
I llIjinHinll ata**, ftth Cuna., U Sm*., p. KJ.
iiy t»w, mullí «f Mw™. Hooiw, n ns, Watts, p.an.BiddU,p.an, ud taliMt h«Km n-uu m«ir. v- «".
I M|wrt «f M*a*mhww VUm rrwMHf, rjMMBbn, UCt. p. 14.
t m^r^wwt ai»*» mh Out-, m 6—., p. un. •ím&.p.iu
The Third Legal-Tendeb Act 115
urged the same argument The treasury found difficolty, said he, in borrowing corrency to pay for the necessary loans; conseqnently inore corrency shoold be issoecL1 Finally, Mr. Watts declared that he woold issne legal-tender notes, "un til the rate of interest shoold come down to such a reasonable notch that the government conld afford to go with some prospect of oltimately paying the amoont of its indebtediiess and interest." *
Such talk marks the extreme length to which the idea that government shoold not sell bonds below par was carriecL When the treasury was onable to get fonda by selling bonds at par there were three possible coorses: (1) to make the secoxities offered more attractive to investors by raising the rate of interest or lengthening the time for which they woold ron ; (2) to make no change in the terms of the bonds bot to accept the market price for them ; (3) to decrease the valué of the corrency to a point where $100 in greenbacks was worth less in the minds of the poblic than the promise of a gold income of $6 for a term of years and final repayment in coin. The third course necessarily involved all the disor- ders caused by a depreciation of the money that served the commonity in its economic relations as a standard of valué. Bot the demand for fresh issues to facilitate borrowing was virtoally a recommendation of this third course.
One amendment to the bilí, destined in later years to be the sobject of much criticism was made during the discus- sion in committee of the whole. Despite Secretary Chase's urgent recommendation, the "conversión" clause. permitting holders of greenbacks to exchange them at par for tí per cent, bonds was retained in the bilí as reported by the Com- mittee of Ways and Means.* Near the end of the debate, however, Mr. Horton moved to strike out this clause. "It simply leaves the option in the hands of the secretary of the
i Tbid., p. 287. 2 IbicLy p. 391. 3 Sec. 8, /6idM p. 284.
116 HlSTOBY OP THE (JBBENBACES
treasury," he said io explaining the proposed amendment, " instead of the holders of the cnrrency." ' Very little atten- tion was paid to the cbange. Shellabarger and Steveus showed a diBpoBition to qaestion its wiBdom, bnt it was accepted in committee of the wbole without a división,' and when Shellabarger called for the yeas and naya apon it in the Houae they were not ordered.'
Three substitutos were proposed for the bilí broaght in by the Committee of Waya and Means. Thaddeua Stevens proposed one, of which the characteriatic features were the issue of $300,000,000 in United States notes, payment of interest on bonda in " lawf ul money " instead of in coin, and repeal of the legislation authorizing the acceptance of depoait loans.' When this aubetitnte waa rejected by a vote of 39 to 66,* Mr. Stevens impertnrbably proposed a second.* Aa the Honse waa diapoeed to insiet apon payment of interés! in ooin — a measnre which seemed to Mr. Stevens to deatroy "the aimplicity andharmony" of the paper-moneyayatem1 — he accepted this principie and proposed that any part of 9900,000,000 might be borrowed on treasury notes bearing 3.65 per cent interest in ooin, a legal tender to the same eztent as greenbacks and redeemable at the pleaanre of the govemment,' This proposition waa defeated by a yea and nay vote of 37 to 91.* The third substitnte, introdaced by Mr. Hooper, reprodaced with a f ew modifica tions of wording a bilí Bubmitted by Secretary Chase at their reqnest to the Committee of Waya and Means, but not accepted by them." As Chase observed in bis letter to the committee, "the pro- visión io respect to loans is very general." " In order to Becnre $900,000,000 the bilí anthorized the secretary of the treasury to issue 6 per cent, honda mnning twenty years or
■ anviaÚMl Otobe, S7th Con#., U Sesn. . p. «M. ■ Ibid., loe. cil.
>lb¡d„vV2. •ForteitiasíMd., p-ZM. Ubid., y. m.
Ubid.. p. 480. i /b.rf., p. lli, ■FartastnaiMd., p. SJD.
• Ibid., p. 521. >°See Hooper'i sipUimtiujis. ibid.. p, W, 1" Ibid., loe. eil.
The Thibd Legal-Tendeb Act 117
lesa, or 6 per cent, treasury notes running not more than three years, or United States notes, without specif ying any limit to the amount of these various secnrities to *be issued beyond the provisión that the aggregate of bonds, treasury notes, and United States notes should not exceed $900,000,- 000. ! This bilí met a fate similar to Stevens's by an equally emphatic majority — 32 to 67.2 After these substitutos had been rejected the bilí of the committee was passed without a división and sent to the Senate.'
In the Senate the finance committee proposed several amendments, of which the most important was the reduction of the issue of greenbacks from $300,000,000 to $150,000,- 000. * Why the House Committee of Ways and Means had set the issue at $300,000,000 is not clear. Mr. Hooper, after a conference with Chase, told the House that the secre- tary seemed not to consider so large an issue necessary.* Yet the amonnt was not reduced, ñor was there any discussion of the subject However, no objection was raised to the Sen- ate's amendment reducing the issue by one-half. Appar- ently, the House was proceeding on Amasa Walker's maxim that in such an emergency it was "not worth while . . . . to be very particular."6 Had it not been for the action of Senator Fessenden's committee the amount of greenbacks authorized during the war would have been $600,000,000 instead of $450,000,000.
The debate in the Senate was bríef , and even more largely devoted to the clause taxing bank notes than had been the case in the House. The final vote was yeas 32, nays 4.7 March 3, 1863, the bilí received President Lincoln's approval.
This law authorized the secretary of the treasury to bor-
1 For the text see ibid., p. 484.
2 Ibid.y p. 487. 3 ibid.% p. 522. * Ibid.% p. 927. * Ibid., p. 366. • Ibid., p. 902. i Ibid., p. 945.
118 HlBTOBY OP THE (¡SEESBACKS
row on the credit of the United States $900,000,000. He i'uuld sell 6 per cent coin-interest, ten-forty bonds on such te ruis as he might "deem moet advisable." Of thís enm $400,000,000 might be in three-year treasnry notee bearing not mor» th.au tí per cent, interest payable in "lawfulmoney." Tliese notes were to be s legal tender for their face valne, exoluding interest, of denomina tions not lesa than ten dollara and oould be sold " on the best terma that can be obtaíned," or |«id to creditors willing to accept them at par. Further, tlie woretary web empowered "if reqnired by the exigencies uf the publio service, for the payment of the army and navy, kiul other creditors of the government, to issue .... the «UlU of $160,000,000 of United States notee, inclnding the Hiuouut uf such notes [$100,000,000] heretofore anthorized by til» julnt resolation approved Jannary 17, 1863." The iiUtunes in the first and second legal-tender acta restrict- kiitf " the negotiation of bonds to market valne" «ere r*H*mlwl; and holders of United States notes who desired to "MUivert" them into five-twenty bonds «ere reqnired to |t««K>4it their notes for this pnrpose on or before July 1, 1863, ufU'i' whli'h date the ríght to exchange abould "cease and dtiltirutliie." Finally, to take the place of the nnsatisfactory lawtul ourrency, the secretary was anthorized to issue notes for fvHutional parte of a dollar to an amonnt not exceeding $riO,(HHI,(>00, and a tax of 5 per cent each half-year was íui|hhhk1 on fractional notes issued by any bank, Corporation ur individual.'
' 11 HUttttl— oí Lorp*. p. T»
\
CHAPTER V
HOW FURTHER ISSUES OF GREENBACKS WERE AVOIDED
IN 1864 AND 1865
I. The Congres8Íonal Pledge to Issue no More U. S. Notes:
Avoidance of Greenback Issues in Latter Part of War — Due Chiefly to Increase of Taxation — Success of 5-20 Loan in 1863 — Finance Report of 1863 — Greenbacks in First Session of Thirty- eighth Congress.
II. The Financial Difflculties of 1864:
Chase's Difflculties f rom January to June — Change of Secretaries — Financial Straits During the Summer — Fessenden's Report in December — Improvement in the Situation.
III. Secretary McCulloch and the Alley Resolution :
7-30 Loan of 1865— Finance Report— The Alley Resolution.
IV. Recapitulation :
Government Receipts of 1861-66 — Decreasing Relativo Importarle© of Loans — Financial Role of the Greenbacks.
I. THE CONGBESSIONAL PLEDGE TO ISSUE NO MORE
U. S. NOTES
Sinoe no further issues of greenbacks were authorized after March 3, 1863, it may seem that discussion of the war legislation regarding them should end with the last chapter. But in passing upon the paper-money policy it is quite as necessary to understand how the issue of more greenbacks was avoided in the latter half of the war as it is to discover why such issues were made in 1862 and 1863. For thfc purpose a brief review of the treasury policy in 1864 and 1865 must be added.
Of course, the demands made upon the treasury in these later years were much heavier than they had been during the first half of the war. The expenditures other than pay- ments of principal of the debt rose from $470,000,000 in 1862 and $719,000,000 in 1863 to $865,000,000 in 1864 and
119
120 HlSTOBY OF THE GBEENBACK8
$1,297,000,000 in 1865.1 If recourse to United States notes was avoided in the second half oí the struggle despite these enormously increased disbursements, the chief reason must be found in the more efficient revenue system. The slowness of the secretary to recommend and of Congress to enact heavy taxes in the earlier stages of the war has been commented apon.' There was no great hesitation in raising the cnstoms dnes on imported articles, but the resulta from the fiscal point of view were not of great moment, becanse Congress seemed more inclined to strengthen the protective than the revenue features of the tariff. The direct tax imposed by the summer session in 1861 was of slight avail. In no year during the war did the receipts from this source reach $2,000,000. Internal taxes were not levied until July 1, 1862, when a very elabórate system was created, according to which almost everything that seemed to Congress susceptible of yielding a revenue was subjected to a duty.8 This system was amended and extended by the acts of June 30, 1864, and March 3, 1865.4 At first the resulta of this system did not meet expectations. Chase estimated for the first year of its operation that the receipts would be $85,500,000, and they proved to be but $37,500,000 — leas than half the anticipated sum.s But as the tax officials became more familiar with their duties and the imperfections shown by experience to exist in the first legislation were remedied, receipts increased very rapidly. In 1864 they were $110,000,000, in 1865 $209,- 000,000, and in 1866 $309,000,000.
Such large receipts from taxation not only provided an increasing proportion of the sums needed to meet expendí- tures, but also improved the credit of the government as a
* For these and similar figures giren below seo the table of receipts and expendí- tures for pa*t years pnblished in cvery Report of the Secretary of the Treasury,
) Cf. Part I, chap. i, p. 18, and chap. ii, p. 72, aboTe.
« 12 Statutet at Large* p. 432. * 13 Statutet at Large, pp. 223, 400.
* Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, Deceno ber, 1863, p. 3.
HOW FUBTHEB ISSUES WEBB AVOIDED 121
borrower. At the same time more efficient methods of negotiating loans were devised. The happiest of Mr. Chase's fínancial expedienta was the arrangement into which he entered with Jay Cooke in October, 1862, for selling the five-twenties authorized by the first legal-tender act. The system of agencies which Mr. Cooke organizad was so suc- cessful in obtaining subscriptions that the fiscal year, 1863, which had opened badly, ended most fortunately, despite the untoward military events of May and June, when Grant seemed to the public to be making little advance against Vicksburg, and Lee and Bragg were invading the North. The aecumulation of unpaid requisitions that was already a canse of solicitude when Chase sent bis report to Congress in December, 1862, had monnted by the cióse of the session to $72,000,000. But when the third legal-tender act, with its ampie provisión for loans and repeal of the funding clanse, had become a law, the lagging sale of bonds became 8o rapid that "within two months after the adjournment of Congress the whole mass of suspended requisitions had been satisfied, all current demands promptly met, and full provi- sión made for the pay of the army and navy." At the end of the fiscal year there was a balance of over $5,000,000 in the treasury.1
Encouraged by Cooke' s continued success, Mr. Chase in his report of 1863 took ground against further issues of greenbacks. " The limit prescribed by law to the issue of United States notes," said he, "has been reached, and the Secretary thinks it clearly inexpedient to increase the amount." 2 Instead, he recommended such modifications of the internal revenue system as should increase the receipts to $150,000,000.' If this recommendation should be fol- lowed he entertained u little doubt of being able to obtain
i Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1863, p. 2. On the arrange- ment with Jay Cooke see H. R. Executive Document A'o.6»,37th Cong., lst Sess.
> Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1863, p. 17. 3 Ibid., p. Id
122 HlSTOKT OF TU GlUSBACKS
whatever fnnds wiH be needed. tkroagh loms, at reasonabte
ratee of interés*, for bpods or Uiimi notes/"1
Appareaúr Congress tungmiied m the secreiary's belief
that further issaes of United States Botes *uold be detri-
mentaL Jhastin S. Morrill «cnns lo nave expreased the
general feeling:
Tb loree the Trhbt fc> mwe kgal leader notes in any way bevond Uie prosea* toáis — taoagh the «ages oí labor, thoogb the pay oí s&t&ried Mea aad oí the sokürr, sbonld be incieased — woukl repulí in dlr<appointtneat aad dkasscr. .... Lee as ha ve t&xe* ; leí us haré Iotas ; marfaiag, ai aD erante, which will reduce the amoant oí legal tendees aow ontatinrting.1
Not only did the thirtr-etghth Ooogicas decline to
incoase the issaes of United States notes, bol it inserted
in the %4 act lo provide ways and means for tbe snpport of
the Governinent," approved Jone 30, 1861, the following
proviso:
. , , , ñor shall tbe total amoant oí United States notes, tssoed or to be iasued, e*er exosed fonr hundred nrilKraw of dolíais, and sueh additional sum, not exceeding fiftr milKntw of dolíais, as may be teuiporarily requiíed for tbe redemplion oí temporary loan [*&].'
This ünportant clanse, pledging that no more United States notes would be issued, attracted siight attention. But one feature of the debate is of interest- Thaddeus Stevens,con- aistent to the last, made " one more effort to save the national oredit," as he put it, by proposing to pay the interest on the new loans in paper money instead of in coin.4 Again he faüed.
II. FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES OF 1861
The pledge thos given by the fírst session of the thirty- eighth Congress was kept despite the ñnancial embarrass- uients of the summer of 1864, and the enormous expen-
> Repori of tke Sccrttarg of the Trcamury, December, IMS, p, IS. i l\>*tfm*tomat Globc. %th Con*.. 1*4 Besa., p, 1716.
> S*c. í, 13 Statuie» at Larpe, p, 219.
« CQi^frmtiontil Otobe, 38th Con*, Ut Sen^ pp. 3212 ff.
HOW FüBTHEB ISSUES WEBE AVOIDED 123
ditnres of 1865. Dtiring the year ending June 30, 1864, the expenditures ezceeded Mr. Chase's anticipations by $116,- 000,000.' Though there was a similar ezcess of the actual over the estimated receipts from taxation and miscellaneous sources of $104,000,000,2 it was still necessary to borrow immense sums. Over $320,000,000 of the five-twenties were sold by Mr. Cooke and the treasury agencies, but the sub- scription books closed January 21. In arranging for a new loan Mr. Chase made three changes. He offered bonds that would run twice the time of the five-twenties, but he reduced the rate of interest from 6 to 5 per cent., and instead of employing Jay Cooke again as general agent he tried to sell the bonds through national banks and other agencies under supervisión of the treasury department.8 In consequence of these changes and the slow progresa of the northern armies inthe winterand spring of 1864 the "ten-forty loan," as it was called, was as marked a failure as the five-twenty loan had been a success. By the end of the fiscal year only $73,- 000,000 had been sold.4
This failure left a déficit which Mr. Chase could find no better way of filling than by issuing more legal-tender notes. The new issues, however, were of a type different from the greenbacks in that they ran for definite terms and bore interest which it was hoped would lead holders to retain them as an investment instead of putting them into circula- tion as money. During the half year January to June, 1864, issues of such interest-bearing legal-tender notes in
1 Compare Reporta of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1803, p. 5, aud 18M, p. 6.
2 J6id., 1864, loe. cit.
* See Chase 's letter to Fessenden, Schttckers, op. cit., p. 416. In explaining this chango of plan Chase wrote : " I ha ve not forgotten the calumnies for which my employment of a general agent was made the occasion, and I confess it was princi- pan y with a view of avoiding these calumnies that I abandoned the general ageney system."
* Batley, op. cit., p. 164.
124 HlSTOBT OF THE GBEENBACKS
excess of redemptions were made to the amount of $163,- 000,00o.1 Despite all Chase' s efforts to obtain funds, how- ever, demande upon the treasury piled up more rapidly than they could be mei Thongh on the lst of July there was a nominal balance of $19,000,000 on hand, there were also unpaid requisitions that on the 5th amounted to $72,000,000.'
At this uneasy junctare a change of secretaríes occurred. In May, John J. Cisco, the experienced chief of the New York snbtreasury, had sent in bis resignation to take effect June 30. Chase and Senator Morgan, of New Tork, carne into conflict over the appointment of bis successor. Thongh the cause of disagreement was finally removed by Cisco' s consenting to remain in office, Chase could not resist the temptation to impress upon the president the necessity of deferring to the wishes of his secretary of the treasury by sending him a note of resignation. Three or four times before when Mr. Chase had tried 'similar tactics to carry a point, Mr. Lincoln had begged him to reconsider the step. Consequently, Chase was disagreeably surprised when, on June 30, he received a note f rom the president accepting his resignation.8 After the vacant position had been refused by Governor David Tod, of Ohio, W. P. Fessenden, of Maine, chairman of the Senate finance committee, reluctantly con- sented to assume its responsibilities.
The new secretary found himself in a very difficult posi- tion. Beside the $72,000,000 of unpaid requisitions, there were outstanding $162,000,000 of certifícates of indebted- ness. Receipts f rom customs were hardly more than enough to pay interest on the debt, and from internal revenue duties
1 There were three varieties of these issues : the one-year and the twc-year notes of 1863, and the compound interest notes. Seo Baylky, op. ctt., pp. 161-3; Beport of the Secretary of the Treasury % December, 1864, p. 3. On their circulation as money see Part II, chap. ii, sec. vi, below.
iReport of the Secretary ofthe Treasury, December, 1864, p. 19.
> See the letters published in W arden, op, cit.^ p. 614; cf. Schuckkbs, op. cit~, chap. xlv, and pp. 5(6-10; Habt, op. cit., pp. 315-18.
HOW FüBTHEB IS8UES WEBE AVOIDED 125
not more than $750,000 a day was expected. Meanwhile the daily expenses were estimated at not less than 12,250,00o.1 Ñor was the prospect bright for secnring funda by borrow- ing. Three days before Fessenden carne into office a loan on seventeen year 6 per cent, bonds offered by Chase at 104 or above was withdrawn from lack of takers.2 A promis- íng attempt to secnre $50,000,000 from the banks of New Tork, Boston, and Philadelphia, was blocked by the sub- treasury law which was held to prevent the secretary from drawing npon any but national banks.8 Fessenden then decided upon a popular subscription for seven-thirty notes authorized by the act of June 80, 1864. Although he incurred considerable expense in advertising this loan the sums realized were not large.4 The unpaid requisitions now amounted to more than $130,000,000, and the secretary " resolved to use all the means at his command to pay so much, at least, as was due to . . . . soldiers, who were suf- fering from the long delay in satisfying their just claims." For this purpose he was compelled, much against his will, to issue over $80,000,000 of legal-tender compound-interest notes. He also used over $20,000,000 of seven-thirties in paying the army, and raised $33,000,000 more on the sev- enteen-year bonds which Mr. Chase had been unable to selL* But all these shifts did not bring in sufficient means, and the quarter ending with September showed a déficit of $130,000,000.6
Still, when Secretary Fessenden prepared his report to Congress he did not recommend an increase in the issues of greenbacks. To push the circulation of government notes
i Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1864, pp. 19, 20.
2 Seo Chase' s letter to Fessenden, Schuckers, op. cit., p. 415; cf. Hunt's Mer- chanW MagazinCy Vol. LI, pp. 42 and 129.
* Report of the Secretary of the Treasuryy December, 1864, p. 20 ; Hunt's Merchante' Magazine, Vol. LI, pp. 129, 130.
* Revort cited in preceding note, p. 20. & Ibid., p. 21. * Ibid., p. SSL
126 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS
"far, if at all, beyond its presen t limitj" he said, "could only be justified by absoluto necessity." * The operations of the treasury during bis brief incumbency had satisfied him " not only of the ability of the people to furnish, at a short notice, such sums as may be required, but [also] of the entire confidence felt in the national securities." * What sort of loans should be offered he lef t f or Congress to decide, but he felt that as an aid in negotiations the secre- tary should be granted a discretionary power to increase the currency.* For the rest, he recommended that the internal revenue duties be increased and extended to a point where they would yield $300,000,000 a year.4
Even before this report was sent to Congress the financial situation seems to have improved. This improvement was doubtless due in large measure to the successes of the Union armies that began to hold out an increasingly definí te promise of peace. Under such circumstances borrowing became easier. During the quarter October to December Fessenden secured $20,000,000 from compound interest notes, $36,000,000 from ten-forties, $54,000,000 from seven-thirties, and $77,- 000,000 from five-twenties. In the next three months he raised $56,000,000 on ten-forties <VnA #18S,0OQ,ÍK)O on seven-thirties. Meanwhile the redemptions of greenbacks were slightly, and of certificates of indebtedness largely, in excess of issues, and while considerable amounts of compound interest notes were paid out they were more than offset by redemptions of one and two-year notes of 1863.*
rV ! •" • ' *• **- ' \
III. SECBETABT McCULLOCH 'ÁNDASE ALLEY BESOLUTIOfc
When President Lincoln entered upon his second term Fessenden was allowed to lay down his uncongenial burden. His successor, Hugh McCulloch, was strongly recommended
i Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1864, p. 17.
2 lbid.% p. 21. a lbid.% p. 22.
* Jfciíi., p. 14. 6 Cf. Baylkt, op. cit., pp. 157-63.
HOW FüBTHEB ISSÜE8 WEBE AVOIDED 127
by his snccess as president of the Bank of the State of Indiana and his services as the first comptroller of the treasury in organizing the national banking system.
Thongh the war was obviously nearing its end, the task of the new secretary was by no means easy. The armies could not well be disbanded until the government was provided with funds snfficient to meet all arreare of pay, including bonnties and cost of transportaron. To secnre means, Mr. McCulloch arranged for a popular subscríption for seven- thirty notes, and employed Jay Cooke as general agent. As before, Cooke was eminently snccessful. By the end of July $530,000,000 of seven-thirties had been sold, and McCulloch had, in his own words, u the unexpected satis- faction of being able, with the receipts from customs and internal revenue and a small inerease of the temporary loan, to meet all the requisitions upon the treasury." *
The war over, McCulloch set himself to reducing the government fínances to more manageable shape. In his annual report for 1865 he estimated that at the cióse of the current fiscal year the national debt would amount to about $3,000,000,000. 2 To reduce this sum, the secretary proposed that $200,000,000 be spent each year in payment of interest and principal.8 Such payments, he showed, would extinguish the debt, if funded at 5£ per cent., in thirty- two years.4 But he laid chief stress upon the desirability of reducing the volume of currency as a preliminary to resum- ing specie payments at an early date.
The present legal-tender acts [he said] were war measures, and while the repeal of those provisions which made the United States notes lawful money is not now recommended, the Secretary is of the opinión that they ought not to remain in forcé one day longer than shall be necessary to enable the people to prepare for a retum to the constitutional currency.5
i Report of the Secretary ofthe Trecuury, December, 1865, pp. 36, 37.
2/6»d., p. 22. 3/&¿d., p.25. */6id., p. 28. &J6»dMp.4.
128 HlSTOBT OF THE GBBENBACKS
He therefore recomineaded tbat he be empowered to Bell honda "for the purpose of re ti ring not only compoond interest notes, bat [also] the United States notes.11 '
That Congreas shared the secretar}-'» deaire to resume specíe pay menta apeedily seeined to be sufficiently shown by tbe prompt action of the Honse of Representativos apon a resolntion introduced by John B. Alley, of Massachusetta. It ran as follows:
Resolved, That this House cordial! y concura in the viewa of the Secretar? of the Treasury in relation to the neceasity of a contrac- tion of the currency with a view to aa early a reaumption of apecie paymenta aa the husmea» interests of the country will pennit; and we hereby plodgo co-operative action to thia end as speedily aa practicable.
Thia resolntion was adopted without debate on December 18, by a vote of 144 to 6.* The story of bow the fnlfilment of tbe promise of resnmption was delayed for tbirteen years does not belong to the war history of the greenbacks.
IT. KECAPITULATION
Tbe role played by tbe greenbacks aa a financia! resonroe at different stageB of the Civil War can best be sbown by a tabular recapitulation of the receipta of the treasury from different sources dnring the fiscal years 1861-66.
Tbe "net ordinary receipta" ahown in thia table are taken from the reporta of tbe secretary of the treasury. They include, besides import duties and interna] -revenue taxee, proceeds of sales of pnblic landa and all miscellaneous ítems. The notable fact conceming tbem is the rapid increase from year to year — an increase for whicb tbe internal-revenue Bystem deserves the lion's share of credit. From a tenth in 18(12, the proportion of ordinary to total receipta rose
> Rtport oí /*« .Smríurv of IKt TreuHuy, Domrahoi , 1M5, p. 14.
»Th¡rty-twu mamburm d Id not Tota.— Ctmgrmnonal uíobr.Tfüi'a Comí., lit Btm-,
p.n.
HOW FuBTHEB ISBÜES WEBE AVOIDED
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130 HlSTOBY OF THB GbEENBACKS
to a quarter in 1864, and it would have been considerably instead of slightly larger in 1865 had not customs duties fallen off so largely in consequence of the tariff act of June 30, 1864, which discouraged legal importations and stimu- lated smuggling.1
By <( net receipts from loans" is meant the receipts minus sums employed in paying principal of the pnblic debt. These receipts are divided into three classes, according to the kind of security npon which money was borrowed. Each class is charged with all redemptions of secnrities falling within it and credited with all new issues, including premiums realized on sales.2 When the redemptions exceed the issues the fact is indicated by placing a minus sign before the figuree.
Two matters of interest are brought out by the exhibit The first is the correlative of the point already noticed; as the revenue system became more efficient, a smaller pro- portion of the means necessary to carry on the war had to be borrowed. From nine-tenths in 1862 the proportion fell to three-quarters in 1864 and 1865. The second matter concerns the method of borrowing. At first reliance was placed rather on issues of circulating currency than on sales of bonds ; but with increasing experience the secretaries used bondfl and interest-bearing treasury notes more and green- backs less. To make this clearer a supplementary table is added giving the proportions of the net receipts from loans obtained from the three classes of securities.
From this table it appears that the greenbacks were not an important financial resource after June, 1863. In the fiscal year, 1862, more than a fifth, and in 1863 nearly half of the
i Cf. Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1864, pp. 13, 26.
i Issues and redemptions of the principal of the debt are compiled from Batlet, op. cit. Premiums are as «i ven by De Knight, History of the Currency of the Country and of the Loan» of the United State», Treasury Department Document So. JM?, pp. 121, 122.
HOW FüBTHBB ISSÜES WEBS AVOIDBD
131
TABLE m
PBOPOBTION OF THE NET RBCRIPT8 FROM LOAN8 DEBIYBD FROM BONDfl, BHOBT- TIME DfTSBBST-BBABINQ OBHOATION8, AND FROM NON-INTERRST BBAB- DíO OBLIOATION8 FOR THB FISCAL YBAB8 1861-66
|
1861 |
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
1865 |
1866 |
|
|
Net receipts f rom loans |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
100% |
|
Bonds |
101.3 -1.3 |
13.8 49.6 36.6 [22.8] |
28.9 28.6 42.5 l«.5] |
67.1 26.7 6.2 [«.3] |
89.8 60.4 .8 [-2] |
119.9 |
|
Short-time interest-bear- ing obliga tions |
7.2 |
|||||
|
Non-interest-bearing obli- gations |
-27.1 |
|||||
|
[United States notes] |
[-28.6] |
loans were representad by issues of United States notes, but in 1864 the proportion f ell to a sixteenth, and thereaf ter the redemptions were greater than the issues, This statement, however, does not by any means show the real financial effect of the greenback policy. More important than the nominal amount of the issues was the influence of the paper money upon the price of supplies bought by the government. But this is a large subject that must be reserved for a f ature chapter.1
i See Part II, chap. z, below.
130 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEK'
to a qnarter in 1864, and it would hay instead of slightly larger in 1865 hu> fallen off so largely in consequence of * 30, 1864, which discouraged legal iiu lated smnggling.1
By "net receipts from loans" is m- suma employed in paying principa These receipts are divided into thr< the kind of secnrity npon which mor class is charged with all redempti- within it and credited with all premiums realized on sales.2 Whc; the issues the fact is indicated !■ before tho figures.
Two matters of interest are \> The first is the correlative of ti as the revenue system became m- portion of the means necessary i be borro wed. From nine-tentl¡ fcll to three-quarters in 1864 an< - concerns the method of borrow placed rather on issues of circu of bonds; but with increasing •■ bonds and interest-bearing ti- backs less. To make this clt added giving the proportions obtained from the three clasp*
From this table it appears r important financial resourtv ■■ year, 1862, more than a fif ti.
> Cf. Rcport cf tke Secretar^ cf <Ai
> litstae* and redemption* «f the ¡tr > . op. of. Pn*mium<* arv ns cítch liy ! l\mnt>y iiml u/ the Loans o/ the Cn¡U Jftá». pp. 13. 1SL
PART II
EOONOMIO CONSEQUENCES OF THE LeGAL-TeNDEB AOTS
OHAPTEK I
PRELIMINARY SKETCH
The preceding chapters have shown that the policy of issuing irredeemable paper money was adopted because of the ñnancial embarrassments of the federal government. But the policy thus adopted for purely fiscal reasons had serióos , consequences of quite other than a fiscal nature. It caused a grave disturbance of established economic relations and affected for good or ill the economic circumstances of almost every person in the country. The parpóse of the present part is to trace out these consequences in as clear a fashion as the available materials permit. Of necessity the analysis must be intricate and tedious, because to be faith- ful it must deal with a bewildering complexity of conditions and must attempt to distinguish between the effects of a mul- tiplicity of economic causes. Perhaps the best way to give a degree of coherence to the details will be to preface the analysis with a sketch of the general nature of the economic disturbances that characterized the period.
In the first place, then, suspensión of specie payments threw the monetary circulation of the loyal states into dis- order by causing the withdrawal of gold and silver coin f rom common use as money. The inconveniences that attended this withdrawal and the various substitutos that were employed to take the place of specie as media of exchange form the subject of the next chapter.
But, though the inconveniences caused by these changes in the médium of exchange were not slight, they were less serious than were the results produced by the change in the standard of valué. For about nine years before suspensión
135
136 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS
the money unit of the United States in which all pnces were reckoned and debts discharged, had been, in fact, if not in legal theory, the gold dollar.1 The legal-tender acts subetituted the greenback for the gold dollar as this unit. Now the gold dollar had contained 23.2 grains of pare metal, but the greenback dollar that took its place was at no time during the war worth so much as this. A year after the passage of the fírst legal-tender act a greenback dollar would purchase but 14.5 grains of gold. Though from this point its valué advanced until in August, 1863, it was worth 18.4 grains, the rally was followed by a serious relapae that culminated in July, 1864, when the paper dollar was worth but 9.0 grains. Another advance carried the valué to 17.1 grains in May, 1865, and another relapsa reduced it to 15.9 grains at the end of the year. The course
1 and causes of these fluctuations in the gold valué of the
l . atandard money are dealt with in chap. iii.
It wftH this depreciation of the money unit that gave ríse to the moflt complicated and interesting economic develop- ments of the war period. Of course, in exchanging com- raodltles for money men were unwilling to give as much for A dollar worth 9 grains of gold as they had given for the dol- lar worth 23.2 grains. What is tantamount to giving less goodt» for the dollar, they demanded more dollars for the goüdü. The decline in the specie valué of the greenbacks, therefore, produced an extraordinary rise of prices, which is inveatigated in chap. iv.
From the very organization of a modera industrial aooiety, such a ríse of prices must produce far-reaching dis- turbauces. The complex procesa of producing and distribut- iug wealth is carried on by a succession of money payments. huaiiu'Bfl-men buy materials for money prices, léase land for uumoy rents, borrow capital expressed in money for the pay-
» ( 7. Lauohlin, History of BimetaUUm in the United State» (4th edM 1807), p. 81
Pbeliminaby Sketch 137
ment of money interest, hire labor for money wages, sell their producís for money, and in money reckon their profíts. At bottom, of course, this highly developed system of money payments is only a mechanism for distributing among the members of society the economic satisfactions which are the real goal of effort. But under the present régime the eco- nomic satisfactions which any individual can obtain — what may be called his "real income" — depend proximately on - the pnrchasing power of his money income. The rise of pnces that resulted from depreciation decreased, of course, the pnrchasing power of a given money income. As a result the economic satisfactions received by all those whose money incomes did not rise as quickly and in as great degree as pnces, were diminished.
But the matter could not rest there. Men did not long remain content with the same money return, when the economic satisfactions it enabled them to command had declined so considerably. As prices rose, then, all classes in the community which contributed of their property or their services to the process of production insistently demanded a larger sum of money for their co-operation. The economic situation apparently favored their success. For depreciation of the currency of itself did not decrease the amount of commodities produced and services offered — the source from which the real income of all classes in the community is drawn — ñor did it affect directly the relative supply of and demand for the various f actors of production ; it altered only the división of these commodities and services among the various classes that shared in them. Those persons whose money incomes had not advanced parí passu with prices received a less proportion than before, and those whose money incomes had increased more rapidly than prices commanded a larger proportion. But it was the former distribution of wealth that was the outcome of the
138 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS
exisüng economic conditions. The change in the distribu- tion, caused by depreciation of the standard of valúes, was from the standpoínt of the situation before suspensión an artificial disturbance. Under the operation of free competí- tion, a readjustment of the nominal amounts of money pay- ments— the mechanism by which real income is distributed — was therefore to be expected, in the direction of restoring the relative distribution of wealth between different classee prevailing before the disturbance had occurred.
A further consequence of depreciation, therefore, was to start a readjustment of money incomes, whether derived from renta, interest, or wages. But this procesa of readjusting the whole system of money payments so as to restore real incomes was certain to encounter seríous obstacles.
1. At any given time business men are bound to a con- siderable extent by legal contracta calling for the payment or receipt of specified sums for specified gooda or services. They are under engagement to pay set amounts fox rent and interest ; they owe others and others owe them accounts pajable in legal money ; they ha ve agreed to buy materiak at fixed pnces, or to supply others with their own producís; they have borrowed and lent money; when due the loaos are to be paid in the standard currency ; they have contraded whh others to give or receive their services at certam aalarks, etc. Whether the purchasing power of dolíais rises or falls, such contracta are fulfilled by the payasea! of the specified number of dollars. Until the tennination of the contracta there is no alteration in the nominal aaaoont of the money to be paid. In this way the scale of asooey payments existing before depreciation is legaüy petrüed and enforced for a while in the new situation where the sane aun of monev means less economic satisfactiongw
2. Bapid readjustment is further hindered by the Cact that the nominal amoont of many money payaseáis is a co*- ventiooal sum, not subject as a rale lo bargmining hgtamgm
Pbbliminaby Sketch 139
the parties. The f ee of the bootblack, the barber, the notary , the physician; the price of a newspaper, a cigar, a ríde in the street-car, in some places the monthly wage of a farm hand — these and many other payments are not easily changed in amount.
3. Even where legal contracta are not in the way, and the pnces paid are mostly the subject of bargaining, the change in the amount of payments produces friction. The complex system of money payments, by which the distribution of wealth is effected, is an organic whole, and a change in one part encounters serious opposition unless all the other parta are similarly altered. A change in the scale of money pay- ments that affects all simultaneously and in the same propor- tion would proceed smoothly and work hardship to no one. But changes do not occur in this manner. They always start somewhere, and extend spasmodically over the rest of the field. Persons whose products or services do not at once rise in price, oppose, so far as they can, changes which increase their money expenditures. Laborera may demand an increase of wages because the price of f ood has risen. But the employer cannot accede to the request, without injuring himself, until the price of his products has advanced. If he sell to other dealers, they object strenuously to paying higher prices unless sure the increase can be shifted onto others. And consumere exceedingly dislike paying more for their goods especially if their own money incomes have not risen. So at every step the advance in the scale of money payments is impeded.
4. The readjustment in the scale of money payments, then, that is necessitated by an alteration in the standard money works itself out in a period of economic stress and strain. During the Civil War the tenseness of the situation was increased by the constantly varying degrees of deprecia- tion. There was not a single shift from a higher to a lower level; the standard of valué was fluctuating all the time.
140
HlSTOBY OF THE GbEEKBACKS
Bef ore a readjustment of money payments to a scale that, at the existing valué of a dollar, would restore real incomee approximately to what they had been could be worked out, the valué of the dollar had changed again and a new adjust- ment on a new basis began.1 The príce level was constantly changing, and each new change unsettled real incomes afresh and precipitated a new struggle for a readjustment of money pay menta. While the war continued no adjustment could be even tolerably stable, for the next week's war news might raiae or lower the valué of the government's notes which aerved as the community's money several per cent., and so produce new confusión.
A atudy of the economic consequences of the issue of legal- tefidor paper currency as a measure of uwar necessity" Ijwouhhi, then, primarily an examination of the intrícate fffwt* of the changes in the purchasing power of the standard aionoy u¡x)n the distribution of what Marshall calis the "national dividend." The most important problem is to dis- flowr how the real incomes of laborera, landlords, capitalista, and active business managers were affected. Beyond this prohltim lies the question what effect these changes in real Irtoofii» had upon the consumption and production of wealth. HucU in brief are the subjects discussed in chapa, v-ix.
• The rapldlty and Tiolenee of these fluctaations may beet be seen from the MI"*!'** tabular itatement of the peroentage of altematinc deprnciaUon and *f#f#f**l*tl«rfi In the ipecie ralae of the greenbacfc dollar :
Montb
Oold Valué
of $lin
Paper
Money
Riae(+),
or Fallí-)
Per Cent, of Appreeiatioo or Depre- ciaron in OoW Vahee o/ the Cnr-
H 00 .9»
«3
.7»
*7
tt;
«84
|
-0 034 |
|
|
! + |
0it> |
|
«5 |
|
|
+ |
1*5 |
|
— |
a*L \ |
|
+ |
a» |
|
— |
«3 , |
FaU of 14» Ris* of 1 * _ Fall of 9t~*3p*r Rü» of 2? <l pe*
á FaU of 34 32 prr Ru» of «a 44 per
1 FaU of t 1»m*
a S
U1B 2
uinM in « inU inM in I
ttns ith*
ith* itfcs
CHAPTEK II
THE CIRCULATING MÉDIUM
I. Oold and Silver Coin: Money in Use Befo re Suspensión — Disappearance of Oold After Suspensión in East — Continued Use in California.
II. Bank Notes:
Exceptions to Rule of Suspensión— Obstacles to Free Circulation of Bank Notes — Redemption in Greenbacks — Increase of Note Issues.
III. Oíd Demand Notes:
Attitude of Banks — Demand Notes at a Discount — Temporal? Loan Scheme — Effect of Legal-Tender Act.
IV. "Shinplasters" and Fractionál Currency:
Disappearance of Silver Coin — Issues of "Shinplasters" — Poetage Currency — Fractionál Currency.
V. Minar Coins :
The Premium on Nickel Cents — Its Cause — New Bronze Cents — Other Minor Coins.
VI. Trtasury Notes:
Greenbacks — One and Two Year Notes of 1863 — Compound Interest Notes — Use of Certifícates of Indebtedness and Seven- thirties as Currency.
VIL Recapitulation :
Chaotic Condition of Circulating Médium — Uncertainty Regard- ing Volume.
I. GOLD AND SILVEB COIN
Befobe the banks and the treasury suspended specie pay- ments, December 30, 1861,1 the monetary circulation of the United States consisted of (1) gold coin, (2) subsidiary sil- ver coins for fractionál parts of a dollar, (3) one-cent pieces of acopper and nickel alloy, (4) treasury notes of the gov- ernment payable on demand, and (5) circulating notes issued
1 See Part I, chap. i, pp. 40, 41.
141
142 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS
by banks chartered under state laws.1 The specie in circu- latíon was estimated by the director of the mint in October, 1861, at from $275,000,000 to $300,000,000, of which he thought not more than $20,000,000 was at the South ;* the demand notes outstanding were $33,500,000,* and the bank notes reported as issued by the 1,289 institntions in the loyal states amounted to about $129,000,000/
Suspensión threw this whole system into disorder. Gold coin, the only full legal-tender money in use, was withdrawn from general circnlation as soon as the banks and the treasnry ceased paying it out, and the conntry was lef t dependent npon a currency of paper money which the issners were not pre- pared to redeem in specie.
It is not quite accurate to say that gold coin ceased to circuíate. The banks continued to hold large amounts of specie in their reserves,6 while the government paid interest on a large portion of its debt in gold and required the use of gold by importers in payment at the customs houses. More than this, there was a section of the conntry where the greenbacks did not succeed in displacing coin even in com- mon business transactions.
In 1862 there were but very few banks in states west of Kansas and Nebraska.6 Indeed, in California, the wealthiest and most populous of the far western states, the existence of banks of issue was expressly prohibited by the state
i Silvcr dolían hmd not been in oommon use for many years, because they were worth more as ballion than as money. See the table showina; the acerase rala© of an American silrer dollar each year from 1834 to 1882 in H. R. Livdebman'b Mamen and Legal Tender in the United 8tate* (New York, 1879), p. 161, and compare Lauqbxin, HUtory of BimetaUism in the United State», chapa, ít, t.
> Finante Reporta 1861, p. 62. * lbid.% 1862, p. 9.
« Compiled from the " Synopsis of the Betnrns of the Banks in the Diffenot 8tates," pablished in the Finance Report for 1862, pp. 189 ff.
ft Aocording to the "Annual Reports on the Condition of the Banks,** the amount of specie held by institntions in the loyal states increased from 176,400,000 at the befrinning of 1862 to $81,500,000 at the beffinnin* of 1863.— H. R. Execntive Documcnt No, 2ó% 37th Con«M 3d Sess., p. 209; and No. 90, S8th Cong., lst Seas., p. 211.
* See the bank reports cited in preoedinsj notes.
The Circulating Médium 143
constitution.1 "Suspensión" was, therefore, a much less momentous occurrence for these communities than for those of the East, where business centered around highly developed banking systems. West of the Rocky Mountains men con- tínned to buy and sell for coin, giving little thought to the fact that bank notes in circtdation elsewhere were no longer redeemed in specie.
But when Congress, by the act of February 25, 1862, provided for the issue of $150,000,000 of United States notes and made them a legal tender between individuáis, the currency troubles of the rest of the country were brought home even to Californians. Under this law it was techni- cally possible for a person who had bought goods from a San Francisco jobbing merchant to compel his creditor to accept in payment greenbacks worth considerably less than the expected gold. Elsewhere this situation had been prepared for by the use of notes of suspended banks for three months before the first United States notes were issued, and men adjusted their business transactions to suit the currency. But on the Pacific coast people had been accustomed to a circulation of specie only and were very loath to surrender it Business men consequently cast around for some means by which they could maintain the circulation of gold and prevent debtors from forcing them to accept greenbacks. One means to this end was the formation among the mer- chants of San Francisco in November of an agreement "not to receive or pay out legal-tender notes at any but the mar- ket valué, gold being adhered to as the standard." Firms that refused to enter into this agreement, or to abide by it, were to be listed in a black book and required in f uture deal- ings to pay cash gold for goods which they purchased.
Loyal observance of such a voluntary agreement, how- ever, was difficult to maintain, and vigorous efforts were
» Article IV, secs. 34, 35. There were, however, a few deposit banks. 8ee J. J. Ksox, A Htitory of Banking in the United State* (New York, 1900), pp. 643-5.
•
144 HI8TORY OP THE Greenbacks
accordingly made to secare such action f rom the state legis- latura as would secare the same end by legal means. After several other proposals had been rejected, a "specific con- tract act" was finally passed and approved April 27,1863. It provided in sabstance that contracta for the payment of specific kinds of money should be enforceable by legal procese. After the constitutionality of this law had been affirmed by the state conrts, business-men were able to protect themselves against tendere of greenbacks effectively by inserting in all their contracts claoses specifying that payment should be made in gold coin. This became the general practice, and consequently the people of California maintained a large circulation of specie during all the seven- teen years that the rest of the United States were using paper money. Greenbacks were not prevented from circu- lating, bat when they were passed it was nsnally at their gold, not at their nominal, valué.1
II. BANK NOTES
As has been said, the withdrawal of gold from circulation in other parts of the United States left the notes of the state banks and the federal treasury the only monetary circulation, aside from "deposit currency," available for use in large transactions. But neither the bank ñor the treasury notes were at that time a legal tender, and consequently the circu- lation of both was for a time beset with difficulties that require discussion in some detaiL
Though all the banks, with the exception of the banks of the states of Ohio, Eentucky, and Indiana, and a few scatter- ing institutions elsewhere like the Chemical Bank of New York, had followed the example of the New York banks very
i Buxa&d Mo«e», " Legal tender Notes in California.** Qmartertf Ecomomie*. VoL VII, pp. 1-25; J. A. Fe**», The Fimameiai Ecomom^ tf tkm V State» IUMMtruttd (San Francisco, 1SS7), Nos. Y, XV.
The Cibculating Médium 145
promptly in suspending specie payments,1 the suspensión was perhaps nowhere complete. Banks very generally con- tinued for some time to supply coin to their customers who required it for the payment of duties or any other necessary parpóse.2 Indeed, in those states where the banking laws imposed penalties for ref usal to pay notes in coin the banks were obliged to redeem their notes whenever the holder insisted apon their so doing. Such was the case in New York. The state superintendent of banking was required by law to cióse any institution that failed to redeem its notes in coin within fífteen days after the notes had been pro- testecL* As the superintendent had no discretion in the matter, the banks were at the mercy of any note holder who chose to insist upon redemption in gold. Certain speculators in currency took advantage of the situation to collect bank notes systematically and send them in to the issuing institu- tions for payment in coin, which they then sold at a premium.4 Fear of such operations made the banks unwilling to pay out their notes freely. Instead of notes they issued many certi- fied checks, which for a time formed a prominent part of the circulating médium.5
For such reasons there was a marked contraction in the bank-note circulation in the first months of 1862. January 4, the New York city banks had outstanding $8,600,000 of notes; by March 1 this circulation had fallen to $5,400,000. The hesitation of the banks ceased, however, when the treasury notes in circulation were made legal tender, for this measure provided funds other than coin which note holders
i Banker»1 Magazine (New York), Yol. XVI, p. 650.
«/Wd., Vol. XVI, p. 648 (Rhodo Island) ; p. 649 (Philadelphia) ; Vol. XVII, p. 760 (Boston) ; H.R. Kxecutive Document No. 25, 37 th CongM Sd Sess., p. 80 (Con- oecticot) ; p. 28 (New Hampshire) ; New York Herald, January 5, 1862. This and the subsequent references to newspapers give the date of the "financial column."
3See text of the law, Bankerí Magazine, Vol. XVI, p. 811.
* New York Herald, January 20, 1862.
*Hunt'$ Merchante Magazine, Vol. XLVI, p. 909.
146 HlSTOBT OP Til Geeexeacks
pressing f or redemptíon cernid be coMpefled lo aocept Aecordingry, the banks begmn to pay ont their notes again, and by May 3 their circolatíoD web pnetieaUj as large as it had been Jannarr 4.1
The sitaation in Ohio, Kenrocky. and indiana where the state banks did not sospend specie paymatts immediatery, did not long maintain it» pecaHarity. líese banks were deierred from foüowing the example of caotein institntions by clanses in their charters whkh forbade the redemption of their notes in anything bat coin. In Ohio» however, the legislatura enacted a law Janoary 16» which granted immonity from the penalties fbr sospension to soch banks as should advance coin to be nsed in paying the intereet on the state's foreign debt.s Similarly in Kentucky, "the banks of issue having consented to loan to the cdtizens of the state $1,000,000 .... the legislatura pasBed an act on March 8, 1862, relieving the banks from the penalties fór sospension of specie payments and aothorizing them to pay ont United States legal-tender notes."*
The Bank of the State of Indiana and its branches, onder the presidency of Hugh McCulloch, held ont somewhat longer. December 31 McColloch issned a statement that onder no circomstances woold the bank fail to redeem the pledge it had given to pay its notes in coin.4 In porsoance of this policy the managers of the branches were instrocted " to redeem promptly in coin all notes that might be pre- sentad ; to anticípate and prevent their return, as far as might be practicable, by taking them op at commercial points with other cash means; [and] to make arrangements with depoei- tors by which deposita of gold shoold be paid in gold,
iSeethe New York city bank statements, ibUL, p. 559; compare Reportoftk* 8ecretary of the Trtaawry, December, 1882, p. 15.
2 Bankcrt' Maoazine, Vol. XVII, pp. 183, and 798, 7M.
3 Knox. Hi*toryof Banking in the United State» (New York, 1900), p. 812. * Bunker*' Magazxnt, Vol. XVI, p. 860.
The Cibculatino Médium 147
deposita of bank notes . . . . in bank notes."1 By this conree "in a few weeks the larger part of the circulating notes of the branches were at rest in their vaults, and the business of the branches was reduced to what conld be safely done opon their capitals and deposita" When, however, the legal-tender act had been passed the qnestion aróse whether the bank might not legally use United States notes in discharge of its notes. After ascertaining that the conrts would give prompt trial to a case involving this important qnestion, Mr. McCulloch, in order to make a test case, directed that greenbacks be tendered in payment of a note. The supreme court of Indiana decided that the legal-tender act was constitutional, and that the bank might redeem its notes in notes of the government. When this decisión was rendered, the bank at once commenced paying ont its notes again.9
The same question regarding the availability of green- backs for redemption of bank notes that under state laws were payable only in coin, had to be faced in other states. In New York the question was peculiarly pressing because the legislature was powerless under the constitution to pass such measures of relief as were enacted in Ohio and Ken- tucky.* To determine whether banks could avail themselves of the act of Congress making treasury notes a legal tender, test cases were arranged by the superintendent of the bank- ing department and a decisión obtained in June, 1863, from the court of appeals maintaining the constitutionality of the law.4 This and similar decisions rendered in other states
i H. McCulloch, Men and Measures of Half a Century, p. 196. *Ibid., pp. 136-8.
* Article VIII, sec. 5 of the constitution providod that "the legislatura shall nave bo power to pass any law sanctioning in any manner .... the suspensión of specie payments by any porson, association, or Corporation issuing bank notes of any description."— Bankerí MaQazine, Vol. XVIII, p. 811.
*See Annual Report of the Superintendent of the Banking Department of the State of New York, January 7, 1854 ; Bankers' MaQazine, Vol. XVIII, pp. 811-13. The full text of the court 's opinión is pubiished ibid., pp. 345 fif.
14& HlSTORY OF THE GrEENBACKS
removed the last doubt about the right of banks to use the greenbacks infltead of gold coin as reserves and put them in a position to issue their own notes freely.
The increase in the circulation of the state banks after the passage of the legal-tender act was very general. Secretary Chase estimated that the notes issued by banks in the loyal states amounted to $167,000,000, November 1, 1862, as com- pared with $130,000,000 a year before.1 The Annual Repori on the Banks in the United States for 1863, though not with- out omissions, made the circulation in the same states about tbe first of the year nearly $18 1,000,00o.1 Bank deposita increased with like rapidity. According to the bank reporta, the deposite in the loyal states were $257,000,000 in Jan- uary, 1862, and $367,000,000 in January, 1863.1 After April 1, 1863, however, the increase of circulation seems to havo been checked by the tax imposed of 1 per cent a year on certain proportions of the notes outstanding and 2 per cent, on amounts in excess of the specifíed proportions.4
Hhortly thereafter the organization of new national banks and the conversión of state into national banks introduced a iiuw element into the circulating médium. As the issue of national bank notes proceeded for several years more rapidly than the withdrawal of the state-bank issues, there was again an increase in the total bank circulation/ But aside from this increase the change was merely the substitution of a more uniform and better-secured kind of notes for the diverse issues of the state banks.
i Heport of the Secretary of the Trtatury, Deeember, 1882, p. 14. > H. K. Kxecutive Document No. J0, S8th Cong., lst SessM p. 210.
• Ibid., loe. cit.% for 1863, and H. R. Executive Document No. 25, 87th Con*., 9d &»««., p. 208, for 1862.
< Aisi of March 3, 1863, seo. 7 ; 12 Statute* ai Loro*, p. 712.
* Hao tho atatement of bank notes ontstanding in the Statiaticat Abttract of the UniU»t State», 1878, p. 14.
N.
The Cibculating Médium 149
iii. old demand notes
The circulation of the demand treasury notes was for a time beset by more difficulties even than was the circtdation of bank notes. The fírst issues of these notes by Secretary Chase in the late summer and autumn of 1861 was opposed by the banks which subscribed to the $150,000,000 loan. When the secretary in3Ísted on making the issues, however, they yielded, and with few exceptions made no difficulty abont receiving such of the notes as were brought to them by depositors.1 The situation changed, however, when the treasury, by suspending specie payments, gave notice that these notes would not be redeemed in coin.' At this time there were $33,460,000 in circulation.1 Early in January the New Tork banks held a meeting to discuss what policy should be pursued with regard to them. Opinión was divided, and the meeting ended with the adoption of a vague resolution:
That before we consent to receive such notes, we must require that such legal provisión be made by Congress as shall insure their speedy redemption, and that a committee of this association be appointed to consider that subject and report to an adjourned meeting.4
i Cf. Part I, chap. i, pp. 26, 27, abo ve.
2 It has been stated in an official document that " the demand notes were paid in gold when presented for redemption,'1 and that such payment with their receivability for all public dues, " preven ted their depreciation."— Information Respecting United State* Bonds, Paper Currency, Coin, etc., revised ed., United State» Treasury Depart- ment Circular No. 123, July 1, 1896, p. 7. This has been thecommon view andis found, e. g.% even in the work of so recent a wríter as Professor A. B. Habt (Life of Chase, p. 242). But none the less it is certainly an error. Mr. Chase himself said : " The banks of New York suspended on the 30th of December, 1861. .... and the government yielded to the same necessity in respect to the United States notes then in circulation." —Report of the Secretary of the Treasury \ 1862, p. 7 : cf. American Annual Cyclopcedia, 1861. p. 300, and Hunt%$ Merchante Magazine, Yol. XLVII, p. 509. More than this, the "oíd demand notes," as the issue carne to be called, did deprecíate in valué, which could hardly ha ve happenod had they been " paid in gold when presented for redemption;" cf. Part II, chap. iii, sec. ii, below.
* Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1862, p. 9.
* Bankers' Magazine, Vol. XVI, p. 647.
ISO HlSTOBY OP THE GbEENBACKS
Of course, this resolution procured no action by Congrese, and the committee was unable to frame a policy acceptable to all the banks. Some institutions took the notes without question as current funds, while others did not1 The Ameri- can Exchange Bank, for example, issued a circular dated Jannary 1, 1862, informing its dealers and correspondente that it would not accept treasury notes from them, unless they would sign a contract to accept payment in the same notes at par.1
But so long as a portion of the subscriptions to the $150,000,000 loan remained unpaid, almost all of the banks were ready to receive demand notes at least in small quanti- ties, because they could be used in making payments into the Bubtreasury.*
After the last instalment of the loan had been paid on the morning of February 4, the disinclination to receive the notes as current f unds became much stronger. Banks could no longer find an outlet for them at the Bubtreasury, and they could not be certain that depositors would accept such notes in payment of checks, since the notes were not yet legal-tender. The metropolitan banks seem to have been rather more liberal than those of Boston, Philadelphia, and other cities.4 But even in New Tork there was apparently a considerable number of large institutions that discriminated against the treasury notes and accepted them only as
i New Tork Herald, Jannary 2, 5, and 6, 1862.
> Bamkert' Jfapoatne, Yol. XVI, p. 647. Compare the similar circula» received by Chicago banks from their New York correspondente Hnnt'$ Mcrckant*' Magamimt, Yol. XLVI, p.
» New York Herald, Febraary 4, 1862, and Hun?» Merckant»' M^atine, ToL XX. Y I. p. 309. The banks of Boston acted in similar fashion. Thongh the» banks were forbidden by their charters to pay ont any notes exeept their o wn, a resolution was adopted, Jannary 10, that banks concerned in the government loan shooJd accept treasury notes " receirable for gorernment dues to the extent of 25 per cent, of their saberription.s to said loan.incladinjr such notes as they may hareon haad.**— Bomben* Jfo0u¿i«c. Yol. XVI. p. 648.
« New York Hcrold, Jannary 24 and 29, 136.
The Cibculating Médium 151
"special deposita," repayable in kind.1 Refusal to take the notes on the part of even a few banks in the clearing-house association made serious trouble for the other institutions that desired to receive them without question. For, if one of the more liberal banks accepted demand notes on deposit as cnrrent funda, it had to make provisión for meeting checks drawn against this deposit and presented at the clearing- honse by other institutions. At the clearing-house, however, the demand notes would not be accepted in payment of a balance, and the bank that had taken such notes from its customers had therefore to provide other funda for meeting the checks, or, if it did not have sufficient currency of other kinds, to take out loan certifícates on which 7 per cent interest was charged.*
This situation seems to have given mnch concern to the treasnry authorities. Thongh the treasury notes were com- monly accepted in business transactions between individuáis without question,8 men could not use them freely at the banks, and consequently persons who received large quanti- ties were compelled to sell them at a slight discount.4 It was the desire to prevent such discrimination against the treasury notes that Mr. Chase gave as his reason for urging the reten tion of the legal-tender clause in the bilí introduced by Mr. Spaulding.5
While the bilí was still pending, another scheme for the same purpose was devised. Mr. Cisco, the head of the New
i Ibid., Febniary 4 and 5, 1862. Huntt Merchante' Magazine states that this ooorse was pursued by a majority of the banks.— Yol, XJLVI, p. 309.
s Hunt's Merchante' Magazine, Vol. XLVI, p. 309. Cf. the remarks of Senatar Simmons in the Congresñonal Globe, 37th Cong., 2d sess., p. 794.
> New York Herald, February 9 ; Shipping and Commercial List, February 19, 1962.
* According to the New York Tribune, Febniary 13, 1862, the selling price was one-fifth of one per cent, below par, while notes could be bought of the street brokers at half this discount.
&Letter of January 29, 1862, to Thaddeus Stevens.— Conorational Globe, Xlth Cong., 3d Sess., p. 618; cf. remarks of Mr. Bingham, ibid., p. 639.
152 HI8TOBY OF THE ÜREENBACK8
York Bubtreasury, suggested, and Chase authorized, the acceptance of the treasury notes on deposit at the sub- treasuries at 5 per cent interest.1 It was apparently their expectation that the banks would now accept the notes with the intention of depositing them at the subtreasury and so drawing interest upon a part of their current funda2 But the plan was received less kindly than had been hoped. On February 8 about half a million was deposited with Mr. Cisco, and by the llth another million had been adde<L* But these deposita seem to have come mainly from savings banks and out-of-town institutions.4 Most of the city banks looked upon the plan as a bid to induce the public to deposit with the subtreasury instead of with themselves.* * For the time, theref ore, this plan accomplished little, and the demand notes continued to rule at a slight discount until the passage of the legal-tender act.e The fírst reporta of the law that reached New Tork indicated that the treasury notes already in circulation, as well as the new issues, had been made a legal tender.7 An amendment to this effect had, indeed, been made by the Senate on motion of John Sherman;* but it had not been agreed to by the House of Representativos,9 and at the recommendation of the com- mittee of conference the Senate receded from it19 Though the report was false, it changed the attitude of the hesitating banks toward the notes. The new law provided that customs should be paid, not in paper money, but in coin. From this
i Cf. SrarcUBS, Life of Cha** p. 2».
t Cf. Humf* Merchante* MagaMine. Vol. XLVI, p. 510; New Tork Herald, Febra-
» New Tork Herald, February 8 and 11, 1862. * /McL, Febroary 14.
»tf«Ai*« Mrrrkant» Magaiine, Vol. XLY1, p. »0i
* New Tork Tribmme* February 13, and Skipping and Oomtmereiai Liat, February
mise.
* New Tork Timm, February 96; Heraldo Marca &
• ON^reaMmoi Gloec, STtb Coa*., Sd Seas^ p. TU.
• /fed^p.»». »IUd^p*Wk
The Cibculating Médium 153
rule, however, an exception was made in favor of the oíd demand notes, because the act under which they were issued declared them " receivable in payment of public dues."1 If made legal tender, then, the oíd notes would differ from the new only in possessing a virtue lacked by the latter — availa- bility for use at the customs house in place of coin. As but $60,000,000 of the demand notes had been authorized, and as they were to be replaced as rapidly as feasible by the new issues, it seemed likely that there would be a strong demand for them from importers who had duties to pay. Conse- quently even the banks that had hitherto refused to receive the notes as current funds now refused to pay them out, and instead of being at a discount of -j^ to £ they rose to a pre- mium of £ to £•.* This advance to a premium, however, proved prematuro. When after three or four days it was found that the retirement of the oíd notes could not com- mence until the new notes were printed, that printing would require at least a month, and that in the meantime the treas- ury must continué to pay out the oíd notes, they fell again to par." And when on the 4th of March the full text of the legal-tender act was received, and it was found that the legal-tender clause included only the new issues, some of the banks reverted to their former policy and began again to discrimínate against the government notes. Accordingly the notes fell once more to a discount.*
The discovery that the oíd demand notes had not been made legal tender seems to have been as much of a surprise to many members of Congress as it was to business men in New York. Steps were taken at once to remedy the omis-
i Act of Augost 5, 1861, Sec. 5, 12 StattUes at Large, p. 313.
2 New York Tima, Febraary 26 and 27, 1862; Herald, Febraary 27 and 28; Com- mercial AdvertUer, Febraary 26, 27, 28, and Marcb 1 ; Shipping and Commercial List, March 1.
3 New York Herald, Marcb 1 and 3; Times, Marcb 3.
* New York Herald, Marcb 4; Commercial AdvertUer and Shipping and Com- "lercioi Liwt, Marcb 5.
154 HlSTOBT OF THE ÜBEENBACK8
sion. A clause making the treasury notes already in circu- lation a legal tender was inserted in the bilí to authorize the parchase of coin for the payment of interest on the public debt, which Thaddeos Stevens introduced into the Honse March 6.1 When this bilí received President Lincoln's signatura, March 17,a there was no louger any reason for discriminating against the demand notes, and they returned for a short time to par.1
Meanwhile the New Tork banks had taken action that put an end to all opposition on their part to the use of the treasury notes. At a meeting held March 7, 1862, they determined to make their clearings in certifícates issned by the assistant treasurer for deposit of the demand notes with him at 5 per cent, interest.4 This arrangement, which went into effect March 10, made treasury notes the standard for all banking operations in current funda5 Foreseeing that when the new notes were ready for issue the oíd notes reoeiv- able for customs would be more valuable, Mr. Cisco pub- lished a notice March 14, that all certifícates of deposit issued in the future would be paid in any notes that were legal tender.6 The new respect in which the oíd demand notes were coming to be held was shown by the fact that this notice caused a falling off in the daily deposita. The check was only temporary, however, for the new notes became themselves available for deposit early in ApriL
From the 7th of March, then, the oíd demand notes were current funds in New Tork and passed without question at par. But soon after the appearance of the greenbacks their
i OmgrtmUmal Globe, STth Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 1108 and 1116.
i\28tatute* at Laryc, p. 370.
• In fact, the notes returned to par as soon as it was known that the clause had been introduced, beca use it was a foregone conclusión that the measure would beeome a la w.— New York Commercial AdvertUer, March 8.
* Banker»' Maoaxine, Yol. XVI, pp. 809-11. & Cf. New York Tima, March 10.
* Seo the text in Annual American Cyclopctáia^ UKL, p. 450.
W
The Circulating Médium 155
position changed again. The fírst greenbacks in New York carne in a remittance of $4,000,000 received by the assistant treasurer April 5.1 A large sum was paid out the same day, and from thís time on issues were so rapid that $90,000,000 was outstanding before the 7th of Jone.2 All through April the oíd demand notes circulated side by side with the new notes at par.* But, as the supplies of the latter currency became sufficient for the wants of business, a difference became apparent between the treatment of the two issues. Owing to their receivability for customs, the oíd demand notes were preferred, and as early as the second week in May they began to be qnoted regularly at a preminm which, slight at first, gradually rose as the volume in circolation became smaller and the premium on gold for which they served as a substituto at the customs-house became higher. The possibility of obtaining this premium caused holders of oíd demand notes to hoard them just as they had hoarded gold in January. When Mr. Chase wrote his letter of June 7 requesting authority for a second issue of greenbacks, he said that the $56,500,000 of the oíd demand notes then outstanding were "held by banks and capitalists, and not used as circulation."4 They were sold from time to time to importers and used in the payment of duties. As they carne into the treasury through the customs-houses, the oíd demand notes were canceled and replaced by greenbacks. By this process the amount outstanding had been reduced to $3,300,000 by June 30, 1863.5 This withdrawal from circulation in May, 1862, closed the brief but eventful history of the oíd demand notes as a part of the circulating médium.
i See tbe flnancial colnmns of the New York papers nnder this date. 2 H.R. Misccllaneou* Document No. 81, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 1.
* Hunt'$ Merchante' Magazine, Vol. XLVII, p. 33.
* H.R. MUcellaneous Document No. 81, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., P* 1*
* Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, Deoember, 186S, p. 45.
156 HI8TOBY OF THE GBEENBACK8
From what has been said it is clear that the bnsiness public must have suffered considerable inconvenience from the uncertainty regarding the currency between the time of suspensión and of abnndant issnes of the greenbacks. Gold had ceased to be used in ordinary transactions; notes of state banks, always inconvenient, were in many cases not issued freely for prudential reasons and had to be replaced in considerable measnre by certifíed checks, and the treasory notes were most of the time discriminated against by many banks. The appearance of the greenbacks in large amounts afforded relief from snch difficulties, though the wide and rapid fluctuations in their valne gave rise to other embarrass- ments of a more serious character.
IV. "8HINPLA8TEB8" AND FBAOTIONAL OUBBENOT
One difficulty with the currency, however, the greenbacks could not meet While they served as a convenient médium of exchange in large transactions, they did not supply the want of small change, for the fírst legal-tender act had for- bidden the issue of notes of less than five dollars.1 Hardly had the perplexities of bnsiness men who handled currency in large amounts been relieved by the free issues of the greenbacks, when yet greater inconveniences began to be felt by everyone from the lack of fractional coins.
When specie payments were suspended the subsidiary silver coins did not disappear from circulation at once, as did gold, for reasons found in existing coinage laws. While a dollar contained 371.25 grains of puré silver, only 345.6 grains were put into two half-dollars, four quarters, or ten dimes.2 In January, 1862, one grain of gold was selling for 15.35 grains of silver.1 At this ratio a silver dollar was worth
i Sec. 1, 12 Staiutet at Large, p. 345.
2 Act of February 21, 1853, 10 Statute* at Large, p. 160; cf. LaüQHLIN, History of Bimetallim in the United State», chap. ▼, sec. 4.
* See the table in Laüqhlin, op. cit., Appendix II, F.
The Ciboulating Médium 157
$1.04 in gold, while two halves, four quarters, or ten dimes were worth but 97.05 cents. While, therefore, there was a profít in treating gold coin as bullion instead of as money, the moment a f ractional premium appeared apon it in paper, there was no profít in exporting or in melting subsidiary silver coins until the premium on gold had risen sufficiently abo ve 3.1 per cent, to give brokers compensation for collect- ing the coins and shipping them to Canadá. For, when gold stood at 103^ a paper dollar was worth 97 cents in gold — just as much as ten dimes. It was therefore a matter of indifference to the possessor of subsidiary silver coins whether he paid it over as current funda in purchasing commodities or sold it for paper money. But when gold rose above 103^, a paper dollar became worth less than ten dimes, and a person who had the latter could make them go farther in the payment of debts by selling them for paper money and giving it to his creditor than by handing him the silver itself. Since, however, some trouble and expense were involved in melting or exporting coins of small denomina- tions, it was a nice question how high the premium on gold must rise above 3^ before the silver would disappear from circulation.
For the first week after payments in specie had been stopped the premium on gold varied from 1 to 3 per cent.1 But on the 8th of January it rose to 3¿ and on the 9th to 4¿. At the latter premium a paper dollar was worth 95.92 cents in gold, or 1.13 cents less than ten dimes. According to the money column of the New York Herald, this slight difference sufficed to induce brokers to begin the purchase of silver coins. "An inquiry has sprung up for silver," reports the financial writer on the 9th, " which has been held at 1 per cent, premium." It is not improbable, how-
1 For this and subsequent references to premium on gold see tables in Appendiz A, below.
158 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS
erer, that parchases of silver on so slight a margin were prompted rather by anticipations of the profit that could be made if the premium on gold continuad to advance, than by the opportnnity for iinmediate profit. If so, the buyers of silver were disappointed, for after rising to 5 on the lOth of Janu&ry, the premium fell again beflow 4. During February the average premium was 3.5, during March 1.8, during April 1.5, and during May 3.3. At such low pnces for gold, or, more accurately, at such high pnces for paper money, there was no profit in buying subsidiary silver coíns for export or melting, and consequently they continued to circuíate as money. But in June, when the hopes of a mpeedj end of the war were being dispelled, the paper money fell in valué, that is, the premium took an upward torn. From 3T% on the first Monday of the month, the premium rose to 4-,5^ on the second Monday, 6| on the third, 7g on the fourth, and 9TV on the fifth.1 With gold at the Lurt-named premium, a paper dollar was worth 91.69 cents ín gold — a pnce which afforded an ampie margin of profit for the purchase for export of silver coins worth 97.05 cents.
Accordingly, the newspapers late in June and early in Joly began to remark a rapid disappearance of small change from circulation. For example, the Springfield Repúblican of July 2, 1862, said: "The ruling premium of 5 to 6 per cent on silver coin, as compared with the paper currency in une, is fast driving it out of circulation. Laboring people *i*d those of small means are constantly to be seen at Sff'kf.rW offices selling $10 to $50 of silver change at 2£ per '-ent, [/remium, which the brokers ship to Europe where they t-uu realize 6 or 7 per cent in comparison with our irredeem- *M¿ \>h\*it currency." Similarly, the New York Times
■ Ti*** fl|VM are averaces of the biches* and lovut price* of gold reoordad
*»■
The Ciboulating Médium 159
of July 18 declared that "the annoyances suffered in this <3ity and throughout the country during the last two or three weeks, on account of the scarcity of specie, have been unspeakable, and in many Unes of business the losa of custom and profit has been heavy."1 Though over $45,- 000,000 of subsidiary coins had been struck nnder the act of 1853,a of which perhaps three-fifths circulated in the loyal states,3 nearly the whole amount seeins to have been with- drawn from use as carrency between the middle of June and the middle of July. Apparently, the brokers who purchased the coin exported a large portion of it. Over $3,750,000 were carried to Canadá in 1862 by a single expresa com- pany.4 American coin became a drug in the Canadian mar- ket and was accepted only at a discount.5 Considerable amounts were shipped also to South America and a sum large in the aggregate was no doubt kept for a long time in small hoards.6
Of course, the disappearance of the silver coins from circulation caused serious inconvenience in retail trade. Various shifts were tried to supply their place. In Philadelphia, and perhaps elsewhere, oíd Spanish quarter- dollars were brought again into use. These coins had formed a considerable portion of the small change before an abun- dant supply of American silver was f urnished under the act of 1853. From long wear they had become light in weight. The act of February 21, 1857, provided that they should be accepted by the government offices for 20 instead of 25 cents.7
i Compare New York Tribune, July 9 and 16 ; Commercial Advertiser, July 10 and 16; Chicago Post, July 15; and other references in the following notes.
a Report of the Director of the Mint, October, 1862, p. 49.
3 Cf. Hunt's MerchanW Magazine, Vol. XLVII, p. 155.
* Annual American Cyclopadia, 1862, p. 468.
'Cf. Bunker* Magazine, Vol. XVIII, pp. 83, 482; Vol. XIX, p. 699.
• Kxox, United States Notes, p. 100.
7 11 Statutes at Large, p. 163, and Lindesman, Money and Legal Tender, p. 32.
160 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS
When the American silver was withdrawn a few of these oíd coins, because of the less amount of silver left in them, carne out of retirement and passed current again as qnarters of a dollar.1
Another method of meeting the situation was to decline to make change for paper bilis at all, or else to charge a premium for the silver returned. This plan is said to have been adopted for a time by transportation companies and man y retail shops in New York city.a A third device was to cut dollar bank bilis into halves or quarters and pass these pieces for 50 and 25 cents. In Hartford, Conn., it was said that some $20,000 of the bilis of the JEtna Bank were floating about cut in two.s A more ingenious scheme was hit upon by the Farmers' Bank of Mount Holly, N. J., which paid out notes for $1.25, $1.50, and $1.75 to enable people to make change within 25 cents by returning a dollar bilí.4 Much commoner, however, was the issne of notes for fractional parts of a dollar, colloquially called ushinplasters." Though the laws of many states forbade any bank to put into circulation notes less than one dollar, a few institutions adopted this plan, relying on the obvious need of fractional currency to secare immunity from prosecution.6 But most of the "shinplasters" seem to have been issned by individuáis or fírms not engaged in banking. In Chicago, for instance, the city railway company supplied 25-cent tickets which the conductora gave in exchange for paper bilis and accepted for fares.6 In Boston, Young's Hotel started a system of checks for 15, 25, and 50 cents
i Springfleld Republican, July 15, 1862.
2 New York Tribunc, July 9 and 16.
3 Bankerti1 Magazinc, Vol. XVII, p. 404. On similar prácticos elsewhere see ibid.% p. 821.
*J6td., p.816.
*For example of such illegal issoes by a banker of Reading, Pa., see ibid.% p. 475.
•Chicago Fort, July 15, 1862.
The Cikoülating Médium 161
with the proprietor's aignature attached — an example that Baloons, restaurante, and retail ahope were quick to follow.1 Many of these issues were made by irresponsible persona and consequently resultad in losa to those who accepted them.3 Partly to protect the public from such loases and partly to obtain a ((loan without interest," aeveral towns and cities provided for municipal issues of amall notes. The city council of Newark, N. J., for inatance, voted July 11, uto isaue promissory notea to the amount of $50,000 in denominationa ranging from ten cents to fifty cents" and redeemable by the city in auma of $10 or more.1 Thia example waa followed by Jersey City, Wilmington, and Albany, and a propoaition of similar character waa dropped in Philadelphia only becauae it waa found to be contrary to state law.4
These various substitutes for the silver coiné furniahed a fractional currency that, although unaatiafactory, had to be tolerated for a time as a makeshift. Secretary Chase, however, took atepa promptly to relieve the general embarraaameni He called the attention of Congreas to the matter in a letter written July 14, and Congress responded by authorizing the use of " the poatage and other atampe of the United Statea " as currency.5
Though this act was approved by the president only three days after Chase's letter was written, aome time elapsed before it afforded substantial relief. The chief immediate effect was to cause the use of ordinary letter postage stamps for small change. In New York where as a rule about $3,000 of stamps were sold daily, the sales ran up
i Springfleld Republicana July 15, 1882.
* Cf. quotations from the Philadelphia Ledger in the Banker$* MagoMine, VoL XVII, p. 828.
* New York Time», July 13, 1862.
* See Bankeri MaQozine* Yol. XVII, pp. 823, 568, 316, and 161 respectirely. *Actof July 17, 1862, 12 Stotefetat ¿arpe, P-H& See Part I, chap, iii, iec. ÜL
162 HlSTOBT OF THE GrEENBACKS
to $10,000 on the day after the bilí was approved, and nert day to $16,000.* Such stamps, however, were exceedingly inconvenient for use as currency because of their small size and their propensity for sticking together and getting crumpled. To take their place Secretary Chase caused a series of special stamps in denominations of 5, 10, 25, and 50 cents to be prepared.2 They were about 2f by 8§ inches in size, printed on both sides and not gummecl* The first issues were made late in August.*
In order to forcé the withdrawal of the "shinplasters," attorneys of the national and local governments in some districts published notices warning the public that the penalties imposed by federal and state laws apon the issne of small notes by unauthorized persona would be vigoronsly enforced by prosecutions.5 Municipal "shinplasters," how- ever, were not affected by the Postage Currency Act, which forbade such issues only to "prívate corporations," firma, and individuáis.6 Town and city notes continued therefore to circuíate unhindered for a considerable time.
The difficulties with the fractional currency do not seem to have come to an end even by the cióse of 1862. The vari- ous substitutes for coin could not be dispensed with until the "postage currency" became abundant enough to supply the demand for small change, and at first the issues were rather slow. By the end of September but $787,700 had been placed in circulation, and in the next two months the total
i Banken' Magazine, Vol. XVII, p. 150.
* Repori of the Secretary of the Treasury, Deeember 1862, p. 2S.
3 Representations of this ** postage currency " are giren by KifOX, Umtmd ffrfirT Note»% pp 106-8.
* Knox, ibid., p. 104 ; Bankcr*' Magazine, Vol. XVII, p. 299L
* For ex ampie, see the not ice giren in New York city, Batüccn* Jfopcutae, VoL XVII. p. 206, and compare the action taken by the bank commissiooers ol P»^ ibiü., p. 567.
* Sec. 2. 12 Statutca at Large% p. 592. See also the coirespondeoce btiwoeu Ü» cha i riñan of the flnance cornmittee of Wilmington and the oommisaicAar of iaÉenal revenue.— Banker* Magazinc, Vol. XVII, p. 566.
The Cibculating Médium 163
reached lesa than $4,000, 000. ' In December Mr. Chase reported that it had been u found impossible to keep pace with the public demand for this currency," and that, althoagh the daily issue had "been rapidly increased to $100,000," and was then being " extended as fast as practicable to twice that amount," the supply was still " largely deficient." 2
In the West the St. Louis Republican of December 10
stated that " there is still much complaint of the scarcity of
small change," * and in the East the Springfíeld Republican
of the same date reported that " shinplasters " were still in
circulation. In the same month the city council of New York
passed an ordinance providing for the issue of 5, 10, 25, and
50-cent notes, which the Bankers1 Magazine declared to be
44 a necessity growing out of the scarcity of change in this
city." 4 Ordinary postage stainps also continued in use side
by side with the deficient " postage currency " despite the
eflforts of the post-office department to prevent it. The post-
master-general in his report dated December 1, 1862, said :
Postmasters were specially instructed to discontinué sales of stamps to persons evidently designing them for use as currency; but, notwithstanding the precaution taken and the checks adoptad, .... the demand has until quite recently been largely in advance of the daily manufacture .... the majority of applications .... from postmasters were only partially fílled,generally but one-half the
number asked for having been sent The aggregate valué of
the postage stamps and stamped envelopes sold at 29 of the larger post-offices during the third quarter of 1862 was $1,400,937.48, and during the corresponding quarter of 1861 was $606,597.40, showing
an excess in favor of 1862 of $794,340.08 Nearly the entire
excess .... has been or is now in use as currency.5
1 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1862, pp. 43 and 12.
*Ibid., pp. 28, 29.
'Quoted in Bankers' Magazine, Vol. XVII, p. 568.
4 Yol. XVII, p. 562. Mayor Opdyke, however, did not agree with this view, and Tet°ed the mensure.— New York Trihune, December 22, 1862.
5H. R. Executive Document No. l, 37th Cong., 3d Sess., Vol. IV, pp. 131, 132.
164 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS
In the winter months, however, the supply of " postage currency " became more adequate to the needfl of retail trade. Nearly $7,000,000 had been issued by the end of December, 1862, and $12,000,000 more were added in the next three months.1 When people could obtain this federal currency, they manifested a strong disposition to reject postage stampe and " shinplasters" — even those issued by the towns. The Springfíeld Republican of January 29 said :
There is a general agreement throughout the country to banish all prívate and corporate shinplasters and use only the government postage currency for change af ter the fírst of February. In Boston, already, none but those of the Parker House remain in circulation, and these are refused at many stores, and are being fást retired. .... A few choice shinplasters may be temporarily retained in special localities, till sufficient of the postal currency works in to
accommodate public wants There are large amounts of the
postal currency in circulation, and much is hoarded that will come out as soon as the other sort is banished.2
As late as March the Philadelphia Ledger said :
Now Philadelphia is tolerably well supplied with small cur- rency authorized by the government, while at New York and other eastern points they are suffering great inconvenience and much loss
by an immense circulation of all sorts of trash So intolerable
has the nuisance become, everybody is denying them, causing quite a panic among the poorer classes — those least able to bear the losa.
.... Nobody but the brokers will deal in them now The
corporation issues of Newark and Jersey City .... more popular than others .... are included in the general decree of banish-
ment The people will takenothing but government postage
currency for small change. There appears to be no lack of it now.3
To protect holders of postage stamps that had been used as currency from losses similar to those suffered by holders
i Baylet, National Loan» of the United State** p. 159.
* Compare the notico publishod by the same newspaper at the head of its editorial section January 23, that " no shinplasters or postage stamps exoept in tbm ■heet" would be receired in romittanccs after that date. See also notioa of January 27.
« QooUd in Banken' Magazine, VoL XVII, p. 823.
The Cibculating Médium 165
of shinplasters the postmaster-general was obliged to order the redemption of such stamps as were evidently uncanceled.1 May 27, 1863, issues of the postage currency ceased, after 120,000,000 had been placed in circulation. Its place was taken by the " fractional currency " authorized by the act of March 3, 1863.a The new notes were made of thinner but stronger paper, could not be counterfeited easily, and were not injured by wetting/ But aside from the technical superiority of the new issues as currency, the change was one only in ñame. The title "postage currency" had been a misnomer, for the notes were not like ordinary postage stamp& Issues of the new notes commenced October 10, 1863. By the 30th of June, 1864, about $7,750,000 of the fractional currency had been put in circulation, while $5,000,- 000 of the postage currency had been withdrawn, so that the whole amount outstanding was not quite $23,000,000/ The same procesa of withdrawal of the oíd and substitution of the new notes was continued during the next year. The amount of postage currency decreased from $15,000,000 to $10,000,000, while the amount of the fractional currency increased from $7,750,000 to $15,000,000. Thus at the end of the war the aggregate fractional currency of both kinds in use was $25,000,000/
V. MINOB COINS
The difficulties with the circulating médium did not stop with the subsidiary coins of silver, but extended even to the minor coins of base metate. The act of February 21, 1857, had provided for replacing the oíd copper cents of 168 grains by coins weighing 72 grains and composed of 88
i Reporto/ the Postmaster- General, cited above, p. 133, and Annual American CyclopcBdia, 1862, p. 463.
» 12 atatutes at Larga, p. 711. * Bankert' Magazine, Yol. XVIII, p. 364.
* Report of the Secretury of the Trea*uryy Decena ber, 1864, p. 45.
* Report of the Secretary of the Treatury, December, 1865, p. 53.
166 HlSTOKY OF THE GbEBNBAOKS
parte copper and 12 parte nickel.1 Of these new cents there had been issued 116,066,000 by June 30, 1862.1 The work of exchanging the new for the oíd coins was still going on, bnt the director of the mint reported in October, 1862, that the number of oíd cents was rapidly diminishing and that they would soon disappear altogether from circulation.1 The new cents, together with such of the oíd as still remained in ose, were the only minor coins, for the making of half-cente had been stopped by the act of 1857, and two, three, and five-cent pieces were not aathorized nntil 1864, 1865, and 1866, respectively.*
The withdrawal of the silver coins from circulation in June and July caused a marked extensión in the use of the nickel cents as substitutos. To make them serve more conveniently in the place of silver, cents were sometimos done up in rolla of twenty-fíve and passed from hand to hand, frequently without opening.5 The demand for these coins at the mint suddenly became very greai As many as 3,600,000 pieces were struck at Philadelphia in July, and there was a great rush to procure them.6 " Large amounts," said the director of the mint in October, " have been sent to every part of the country, and orders beyond our ability to fill are constantly forwarded to the mint" T The number of cents coined increased from 10,000,000 in the fiscal year 1861 and 12,000,000 in 1862, to 48,000,000 in 1863/
It is a curious but well-attested fact that the nickel cents went to a premium almost as soon as the subeidiary silver coins. The New York Cammercial Advertiser of July 10
i Sec 4, 11 Statute» at Large, p. 163.
* RcporU of the Director of the Mint, October, 1857 and 186, pp. 49 and 15 respectirely. Here and in other citations of the RcporU of the Director of the Mint the pages refer to the flnanoe reporta.
»/6id., p.46. « Coinagc Lawe of the United State», 17» to J8M, 4th ed., p. 88L
»8prinjrfield Republicana July 15, 1882.
• Banktri MaQasine, Yol. XVII, p. 880.
Tfteport, p.46. • Report of the Director of the Mint, October, 1885, p,W.
The Cikoulating Médium 167
reported that while gold was at 17 per cent, premium in paper, silver was at 10 and nickel at 4 per cent. A similar condition was noted by the Springfíeld Republican July 15, and the director of the mint in his annual report for 1863 gaid that "for the past two years" cents had " commanded a premium" and were then "scarcely to be had." l
The cause for this premium on cents in 1862 must have been different from the cause for the premium on gold and silver coins. The latter were at a premium because the bullion in them was of more valué than the corresponding Bums of paper money. According to the director of the mint, however, the cent in 1862 cost "the government scarcely half a cent," 9 and again in 1863 he reported that nickel cents contained a " half cent's worth of metal, more or lees, according to market fluctuations." ' These state- ments of cost to the government, however, do not necessarily show the market valué of cents as bullion, because a large part of the metal used in their manufacture was imported,4 and the duties which prívate men would have to pay were remitted to the mint. But these duties were not heavy enough to make a very great difference. Under the tariff act of July 14, 1862, imported nickel paid a tax of but 10 per cent ad válorem, and under the act of June 30, 1864, this rate was increased to but 15 per cent/ Meanwhile copper in pigs, bars, or ingots paid two cents a pound according to the act of March 2, 1861, and 2| cents accord- ing to the act of June 30, 1864.6
Consequently, even if the directoras estimates of cost be taken to mean cost on a specie basis and 10 per cent, be added for the duties, 100 of the 1-cent coins would have had
1 P. 189. a Report, p. 49. 3 Report, p. 188.
4/6íd.f p. 189, and letter of the director of the mint to Chase, March 16, 1864, in Oonemtional Olobe, 38th Cong., lst sess., p. 1228.
*\l8tatutca at Large, p. 550, and 13 Statutea, p. 211.
*\2SUUutc* at Large, p. 182, and 13 Statutea, p. 206.
168 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAOKS
a market valué as bullion of not more than 55 cents in gold. On this estímate cents would not have gone to a premium in paper currency for the same reason that gold and silver did, nntil the specie valué of a paper dollar was leas than 55 cents — that is, until gold was at a premium of almost 82 per cent But so high a premium was not reached until April, 1864. In July, 1862, when a premium is said to have been paid for cents, the average valué of paper dollars was 86.6 cents in gold, and the metal in 100 nickel cents was worth at most about 63£ cents in paper. If men were ready to pay a pre- mium for cents, then, it must have been because of their anxiety to procure a part of the insufficient supply for use as small change — not because they could make a profit by melting or exporting the coins.
This need for 1-cent pieces continued to be felt even after the issue of the postage and fractional currency, for the lowest denominations of the latter were 5 and 3 cents respectively.1 That the supply of cents was not sufficient to meet the demand is clear. Before suspensión they were "considered redundant in quantity," according to the director of the mint, and it "was part of the hourly fínesse of buyers and sellers to get rid of them." * Although 116,- 000,000 of the nickel coins had been issued by June 30, 1862, and 48,000,000 more were added during the next year, the supply was still so short in comparison with the demand that not lesa than three hundred varieties of illegal cent tokens of the same size, but lesa weight than the mint cent, and containing no nickel, were issued by prívate parties in direct violation of the law and " until suppressed were f reely used as coin by the public." * Since the supply was thusdefícient, it is perhaps not surprising that business houses were willing to pay a slight premium for their small change.
i Knox, United States Note», pp. 108 and 104.
* Repori of J*J. p. 1». > Ibid.
The Ciboulating Médium 169
As the amount of cents called for continued to be so great, and as nickel was a costly ingredient, the director of the mint proposed in October, 1863, to substituto bronze for the alloy of nickel and oopper.1 No action was taken upon this recommendation at the time, and on March 2, 1864, the director wrote a letter to Secretar y Chase, calling attention again to the subject:
This change in the material of the cent .... has become a neoessity from the advance[d] príce of nickel (for a supply of which we are at present entirely dependent upon the foreign market, paying for it in gold or its equivalent), and the great uncertainty of procuring an adequate supply for the future from any source at a príce within the legal limit, . . . . if nickel is retained it wiü be impossible to meet the enormous demand for cents, and the increasing cost of production may compel a cessa- tion of that coinage. The demand for cents is now far beyond our ability to supply it.a
Chase sent this letter with one of his own, supporting the director's recommendations, to Fessenden.8 When the pro- posal to drop nickel as an ingredient in the coinage became known, it encountered serious opposition from the f riends of Mr. Joseph Wharton, from whose works in Pennsylvania and New Jersey carne the entire domestic supply.4 To remo ve their objections Mr. Pollock, the director, wrote a second letter March 16, recommending as a compromise that the oíd alloy of 88 per cent, copper and 12 per cent, nickel be retained, but that the weight of the cent be reduced from 72 to 48 grains.5 Mr. Clark, from the Senate finance committee,
i Ibid.
2 Congreuional Globe, 38th Gong., lst Soss., p. 1228. * Ibid., p. 1227.
* Mr. Wharton himself prepared a little pamphlet, Project for Reorganizing the Small Coinage of the United States of America, in which he offered to próvido all the nickel that would be necessary for making not only one- and two-cent pieces, batalso other coins less than twonty-five cents at $2.50 per pound. At this price he estimated that one- and two-cent pieces could be made at a profit of 33% per cent, to the goT- ernment. The pamphlet bears the date April 15, 1864.
5 Congreuional Globe, 38th Cong., lst Sess., p. 1228.
170 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAOKS
however, brought in a bilí for a bronze cent of 48 grains and a 2-cent piece of the same composition, but twice the weight.1 This measure was at once pasead by the Sánate2 and a month later by the House after very brief discussion.* In October the director of the mint reported that the new coinage law had been "highly successfuL" "The demand for the one and two-cent pieces," he added, "has been unpre- cedented, and every effort has been made to meet it." In explaining why the demand continuad greater than the supply, despite daily issaes largely in excess of any former period, he said:
Large quantities are hoarded and thus kept from circulation. They have also been bought and sold by small brokers at a premium. This has induced individuáis to collect them for the purpose of sale, thus producing a scarcity and inconvenience tothe public that ought not to exist.4
The letters of Mr. Pollock to Secretary Chase and theee remarks in the October report indicate that the time had at last come when the bullion valué of nickel cents was approxi- mating their nominal valué as currency. Indeed, as early as March, 1864, Lyman Trumbull, of Illinois, remarked in the Sánate:
The cent as a general thing does not circuíate in the country now, I think. We see some few of them here, but in my travels I very seldom see a cent. I do not know how it may be in other por- tions of the country.5
At this time, March 21, gold was at 162 and paper was accordingly worth 61.7 in specie. If cents were being hoarded, it must have been because the advance in the príce of nickel, of which Mr. Pollock complained, had carried the bullion valué of 100 coins above 62 cents in gold. But
i Otmoremional Qlobc, 88tb Con«., lst Sess., p. 1227. */6id., p. 1226.
»/WdM p. 1763; act of April22, 1864; UStatuUtat Large, p. 64.
* Report, Octobor, 1864, p. 21S.
* CongreuioncU Olote, 88th Cod«., lst 8essM p. 1227.
I
The Cikoulating Médium 171
whether there was a profít in melting or exporting the minor ooins in March, 1864, there apparently was one in Jone and the following months. The monthly average price of gold was above 200 from Jone until February of the next year, inclusive. During this period the average specie valué of paper dollars varied from 38.7 cents in July to 48.7 cents in February. Even had there been no advance in the gold price of nickel, there would have been a margin of profít in collecting coins which would pass current as money at a gold equivalence of considerably less than 50 cents, but could be sold as bullion for perhaps 55 or more. Consequently, it is not improbable that some of the brokers who bought nickel cents at a premium in the summer'of 1864 purchased them to melt or export, not to sell again for change. On the other hand, it should be pointed out that the expense of collecting and handling one-cent pieces would be much greater in proportion to their bullion valué than in the case of silver
coins.
The situation was, of course, somewhat different with the cents struck under the new coinage law. These coins con- tained no nickel and weighed but two-thirds as much as the previous issues. During the fiscal year 1865 the government made a profít of about $400,000 from their manufacture.1 If any premium was paid for them, it inust consequently have been from the desire to obtain change. As the nickel cents appear, from what Senator Trumbull and the director say, to have gone out of circulation in large measure, the scarcity of change less than three cents — the smallest fractional note — must have been severe. Of the bronze cents 5,874,000 were struck before July 1 and of the two-cent pieces 1,822,500.2
i Report of the Director of the Mint, September, 1865, p. 232.
2 No sepárate statement is made by the director of the mint of the coinage of nickel and bronce cents in the fiscal year of 1864, but the aboye figures are obtained by subtracting from the total coinage of cents up to June 30, 1864, the total number of copper and nickel cents struck as given in Coinage Law* of the United 8tate*, T792 -1894, 4th ed., p. 89.
I
172 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAOKS
Though the coinage during the fiscal year 1865 was very rapid — an average of 2,250,000 two-cent pieces and 4,500,- 000 cents each month1 — the supply could not have been sufficient to meet the demand.
One more change was made in the circulation of minor coins before the end of the war. From a pnce of 226 the last day of 1864 gold fell to 200 by the Ist of March, and the rapid progrese of the northern armies then promised a still further fall, which was realized in April and May, when the average price was 148.5 and 135.6 respectively. This fall in gold or rise of paper money seemed to show that the day was cióse at hand when minor coins would remain in circulation without difficulty.2 Accordingly a bilí was passed withont discussion by Congress,» authorizing the issue of a three-cent piece, made of copper and nickel, in the propor- tion of 75 parts of the first and 25 parts of the second. This coin was to be legal tender in payments of sixty cents, and the one and two-cent pieces in payments of four cents. At the same time it was provided that thereafter no frac- tional notes shonld be issued of denominations less than five cents, and that any such notes outstanding should be destroyed when paid into the treasury.4
When the director of the mint prepared his report at the end of September, 1865, he made no further complaints about the premium on minor coins. Paper dollars had then a valué of more than sixty-nine cents in gold, and even the three-cent pieces, containing 25 per cent, of nickel, seemed to have been worth more as currency than as bullion. " The coinage of the cent and the two-cent piece from the bronze alloy," the director said, "has been very large, but not in
i Report of the Director of the Mint, 1865, p. 235.
*Hunt%$ Merchante Magazine for May, 1865, includes "coppors" in ita statement of " the active circulation of the country," Vol. LII, p. 881.
3 Congreuional Olobe, 38th Cong., 2d Seas., PP- 1381 and 1403. * Act of March 3, 1865 ; 13 8tatute$ at Large, p. 517.
The Cibculating Médium 173
excess of the demand. They have been distributed to almost every part of the United States, and many into states, west and south, that heretofore refused to use such coin as cor- rency."1 He closed by suggesting that the policy pnrsued in is8uing a three-cent piece be followed forther by makíng five-cent coins also of 25 per cent, nickel, and that, to make room for their circulation, all fractional notes below ten cents be withdrawn.
VI. TBEASÜBT NOTE8
As was said above, the first greenbacks were issued early in April, 1862. From this time on nntil specie payments were resnmed, January 1, 1879, they served as the standard of valué in all business transactions and also as an impor- tant part of the circulating médium. United States notes to the amount of $98,600,000 were issued before July 1, 1862. From this time on for two years the treasury was paying out large sums in these notes, but was also redeeming those paid in to it and then reissuing them. During the next fiscal year the issues were $291,300,000 as compared with the redemp- tionsof $2,100,000; during 1864, $86,400,000, as compared with $42,600,000, and during 1865, $4,200,000, as compared with $4,300,000. Thus $431,000,000 were left outstanding at the cióse of the war.2 The greenbacks served as a médium of exchange, not only in large, but also in small transactions, for while the first act provided that $5 should be the lowest denomination, the second and third acts per- mitted any denomination not less than a dollar. The amount of the several denominations in use is indicated by the fol- lowing table:
1P. 232.
sBatlet, National Loan» of the United States, p. 157. These s ta temen ts differ slightly from those given year by year in tho contemporaoeous reports of the socre- tary of the treasury.
174
HlSTOBY OF THE GbBENBAOKS
TABLE IV
UWITKD 1TATI8 MOTES OF THB SKYKRJLL DKNOMDí ATION8 OUT8TANDINO AT
OF KACH FISCAL TBAB FBOM 1862 TO 1806 >
(In millions of dollars)
One dollar
Two dollars
Five dollars ,
Ten dollars ,
Twenty dollars ,
Pifty dollars ,
One hundred dollars Five hundred dollars One thousand dollars
Total
Denomination un known, in reserve. .
Net
|
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
1865 |
|
• • • • |
16.0 |
16.8 |
17.8 |
|
• • • • |
. 17.0 |
17.7 |
19.6 |
|
17.1 |
79.9 |
95.5 |
96.0 |
|
15.4 |
90.0 |
108.7 |
109.5 |
|
15.0 |
74.9 |
86.6* |
86.1 |
|
13.0 |
23.0 |
29.9 |
29.7 |
|
13.0 |
30.8 |
34.2 |
33.8 |
|
13.0 |
26.5 |
25.4 |
24.8 |
|
10.0 |
29.5 |
37.1 |
35.8 |
|
96.6 |
387.6 |
451.9 |
453.1 |
|
• • • ■ |
• • • • |
4.6 |
22.0 |
|
96.6 |
387.6 |
447.3 |
431.1 |
1866
17.2 18.8 95.4 109.0 85.1 29.3 33.3 35.4 57.1
480.7
79.9
400.8
But the greenbacks were by no means the only form of government obligations employed as currency. Three other aorta of treasury notes were made a legal tender to the same eztent as United States notes, but differed from the latter in that they bore interest. The third legal-tender act, approved March 3, 1863, authorized the issne of $400,000,-
000 treasury notes, bearing not more than 6 per cent, inter- est, redeemable in not more than three years, and a legal tender for their face valué, excluding interest.2 Under this act Mr. Chase issued $166,500,000 of two-year 5 per cent, notes between July 1, 1863, and June 30, 1864, and $44,500,000 of one-year 5 per cent notes between January
1 and June 30, 1864.'
How far these notes were employed as currency is alto- gether uncertain. It was apparently the expectation of the
i Report of the Secrttary of the Trcatury, Deoember, 1896, p. 62. » 12 8tatute* ai Larpe, seo. 2, p. 710. • Batlbt, op. cit., p 161.
The Cibculating Médium 175
treasury that banks and capitalists into whose hands they carne would retain the notes to secure the interest. This would probably have happened very generally had the inter- est been paid only at maturity. But when, in the autumn of 1863, Mr. Chase borrowed money for paying the troops {rom the banks, to be repaid in 5 per cent, notes, the banks stipnlated that the notes given them shonld bear half-yearly interest coupons.1 One hundred and fifty millions of the $166,500,000 of two-year notes issued were of this form.* They were f ound in practico to be a most unsatisf actory form of currency. After Secretary Chase had roled that the interest coupons mnst be detached in the presence of an officer of the treasury or of a national bank,* the notes were usually paid ont with no regard to the interest until the date on which the next coapon was payable approached, then hoarded for a time, and as soon as the interest had been collected, once more thrown into circulation.4 This tended, of course, to cause periodical expansiona and contractions of the cur- rency embarrassing alike to the business public and to the treasury. The circulation was also rendered irregular by fluctuations in the current ratea of interest on short-time loans in the New York market. When money was at 5 per cent, or leas, men found it advantageous to retain the gov- ernment notes in their own hands ; but when the rates rose to 7 or 8, few would choose to keep their funda in a short- time 5 per cent, security.5
Appreciating these evila, Mr. Chase and Mr. Feasenden, who succeeded him as secretary of the treasury on July 5, 1864, determined to withdraw the coupon notes as rapidly
i Hunt's Merchante Magazine, Vol. L, p. 455.
2 Rcport of the Tre<uwrer% November, 1864, p. 75.
*Hunt%» Merchante Magazine, Vol. L, p. 455.
* Report of the Secretar? of the Treasury , 1864, p. 18 ; Hunt'» Merchante Maoaxine, Vol. L, pp. 215, 216, and Vol. LI, p. 447.
& Hunt$ Merchante Maoaxinc, Vol. L, pp. 215 and 455.
176 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS
as possible. Before December, Secretary Fessenden re- portea, about $90,000,000 of the $150,000,000 issued had been retired.1 Their place was occupied by another form of interest-bearing, legal-tender treasury notes issued under the authority of the acts of March 3, 1863, and Jone 30, 1864.a The new notes ran three years and bore ínterest at 6 per cent., compounded half-yearly but payable only at maturity. Some $17,000,000 were issued before the cióse of the fiscal year 1864, and $180,000,000 during the next year.1 These issues were called compound-interest notes. They were commonly regarded as the least injnríous form of treasury notes devised during the war because of the inducement which the compound interest gave for keeping them as an invest- ment.4 Of course, this inducement became stronger the longer the note had been issued. Thus a $10 note — the smallest de- nominaron— was worth $10.60 at the end of the first year, $11.25 at the end of the second, and $11.94 at the end of the third. Anyone who paid the note away at the end of the first year would therefore lose 60 cents, at the end of the second $1.25, and at the end of the third $1.94.
Nevertheless the compound-interest notes served to in- crease the currency infiation to an uncertain extent, both directly and indirectly. The comptroller of the currency thought that in October, 1865, perhaps $10,000,000 of these notes were in actual circulation as money,6 and in December the secretary of the treasury thought it was "safe to estí- mate" that $30,000,000 of the one- and two-year notes of 1863 and the compound-interest notes together were so used.6 Perhaps the indirect use was really more important.
i Report, p. 18. Cf. Chase's letter of April 17, 1885, to Colonel J. D. Van Burén in 8< mu kerb'b Life, p. 413.
* 12 Htatutc* at Largc, p. 710, and 1S StattUe», p. 218; cf. Batlkt, p. 84.
» Bayley, p. 163. The form of these notes la giren by Knox, p. 111.
« Heport of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1864, p. 18. •
k H. R. Executivc Document No, *, 39th Coa*., lat. Seas., p. 5. • Report. p. 9.
The Ciboülating Médium 177
This was found in practico of banks of holding compound- interest notes as reserves in place of greenbacks that bore no interest. The comptroller of the currency stated that the amount held by national banks October 2, 1865, was $74,- 250,00o.1 Similar use was made of the one- and two-year 5 per cent, notes left outstanding.2 In so far as interest- bearing, legal-tender notes were kept in this fashion, they set free greenbacks for circulation among individuáis.
The list of government obligations emplóyed as cur- rency is not yet complete| Two other forma, although not a legal tender, were used as a circulating médium. The issue of certifícates of indebtedness, bearing interest at 6 per cent, and payable in one year, had been authorized without lim- itation of amount by the act of March 1, 1862.a This method of postponing claims which they had not the funds to meet at once was availed of on a large scale by the secre- tarles of the treasury during the entire war. Fifty millions of such certificates were issued in the fiscal year of 1862, $157,000,000 in 1863, $169,000,000 in 1864, and $131,- 000,000 in 1865/ Most of these notes were paid out to con- tractors and by them used either as collateral for procuring bank loans or directly as currency. Much of the time certifi- cates of indebtedness were at a small discount, but despite this they passed freely from hand to hand as current funds.5
Similar use was made of the "seven-thirties." This was the ñame given to the three-year treasury notes bearing 7.3 per cent, interest issued under the acts of July 17, 1861, June 30, 1864, and March 3, 1865.6 Interest on notes
i Se© refe renco in note 5 on preceding page. They were not, however, a legal tender in payment of bank notes.— 13 Statute» at Large, p. 219.
*Bankcrf Magazine, Vol. XVIII, p. 827; HunV* Merchante' Magazine, Vol. XXJX, p. 384.
3 12 Statute» at Large, p. 352. * Baylet, p. 159.
* Cf. HunV» Merchante Magazine, Vol. LII, p. 382.
« 12 Statute* at Large, p. 259 ; 13 Statute*, pp. 218 and 468.
178 HlSTORY OF THE GbEENBAOKS
issued under the first of these laws was paid in gold, but the second and third issues were payable, principal and interest, in lawful money. In the summer and antnmn of 1864 Sec- retary Fessenden offered 7.30 notes of the second issne in small denominations to army officers and soldiers in pay- ment of their wages. Over $20,000,000 were thos paid out in place of greenbacks.1 In December, 1865, Secretary McCulloch reported that many seven-thirties of these small denominations were in circulation as money.*
VII. BECAPITULATION
Perhaps the clearest view of the confosed state of the monetary circulation of the United States during the Civil War can be obtained from a summary statement of the various coins, government obligations used as corrency, and bank notes outstanding at the cióse of the several fiscal years, so far as the amounts can be asoertained. Snch a statement is presented on the following page, with a few ezplanatory notes.
This table is in tended rather as an indication of the vari- ous kinds of currency in use than as a quantitative statement of the circulating médium. Few of the ítems can be regarded as showing with any degree of definiteness amounts in use as money. The specie circulation, for ezample, is computed on the basis of the statistics of coinage and the director of the mint's estímate that in 1861 there were from $275,000,- 000 to $300,000,000 of specie in the country and that in 1862 there were $45,000,000 of silver coinage.' A different
i Report of the Secretary of the Trceuury, 1864, p. 21.
> Reporta 1865, p. 9. Under the act of Jane 90, 1864, it was prorided that snch of the notes as shoold be made payable principal and interest at matnrity should be a legal tender (13 StattUe* at Larga, p. 218). As, howeror, the secretary preferred to attach interest ooupons of which only the last was payable with the note at matur- ity, they did not possess this property. Cf. W. F. De Knioht, History o/ the Cur- rency of the Country and of the Loan» of the United 8tate$ (Treasnry Department Doc. No. 1943), 1897, p. 96, and form of the 7-30's as giren on the following
3 Report of 1861, p. 62 ; Report, 1862, p. 49.
The Cibculating Médium
179
cmmcT of thb
TABLE V
LOTAL STATES AT THB CLOSB OF RACH FISCAL TBAE FBOM 1860
TO1866
(In millions of dolían)
|
1880 |
1881 |
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
1865 |
1866 |
|
|
I. Speeie:1 |
|||||||
|
184.6 |
245.3 |
22.0 |
22.0 |
22.0 |
22.0 |
22.0 |
|
|
3. Subsidiary sil ver |
39.6 |
42.2 |
3.0 |
3.0 |
3.0 |
3.0 |
3.0 |
|
4. Minor coins. — |
.9 |
1.0 |
1.2 |
1.6 |
2.1 |
3.3 |
3.9 |
|
II. Postage and frac- |
|||||||
|
tional currency ;* |
|||||||
|
1. Poetare currency |
20.2 |
15.2 |
9.9 |
7.0 |
|||
|
2. Fractional curr. |
4 |
7.7 |
15.1 |
20.0 |
|||
|
III. Non-interest bear- |
|||||||
|
ing, legal-tender, |
|||||||
|
treasurv notes: 1. Oíd demand |
|||||||
|
notes9 |
53.0 96.6 |
3.4 387.6 |
.8 447.3 |
.5 431.1 |
.3 |
||
|
400.8 |
|||||||
|
IV. Bank notes:4 |
|||||||
|
1. Notes, state b'ks |
207.1 |
202.0 |
183.8 |
238.7 |
179.2 |
142.9 |
20.0 |
|
2. Notes, nat'l b'ks |
31.2 |
146.1 |
281.5 |
||||
|
V. Intereat-bearing, |
|||||||
|
legal-tender, |
|||||||
|
treasury note*:* |
|||||||
|
l.One-year, 5 per |
|||||||
|
cent., treasury |
|||||||
|
notes of 1863.... |
44.5 |
•\ |
|||||
|
2.Two-year, 5 per |
-42 3 |
3 5 |
|||||
|
cent., treasury |
^Léá • V |
%J • V |
|||||
|
notes of 1863 .. , |
109.0 |
J |
|||||
|
3. Compound inter- |
|||||||
|
15.0 |
193.8 |
159.0 |
|||||
|
VI. Government obli- |
|||||||
|
aations not a legal tender:2 |
|||||||
|
1. Certificate8 of in- |
|||||||
|
49.9 |
156.8 |
160.7 |
115.8 |
26.4 |
|||
|
2.7-30 treasury |
|||||||
|
notes of 1864 . . . |
234.4 |
1 |
|||||
|
3.7-30 treasury |
18063 |
||||||
|
notes of 1865 |
437.2 |
J |
|||||
|
VII. Coin, bullion, and |
-/ |
||||||
|
paper money in |
|||||||
|
the Treasury6.. . |
6.7 |
3.6 |
23.8 |
79.5 |
35.9 |
55.4 |
80.8 |
1 Seo explanations in text below.
1 Compiled f rom the animal Reporta of the Secretary of the Treatury. iSeeTablelY abore.
« BUUittical Abstract of the United State», 1878, p. 14.
1 " Information Respecting U. S. Bonds, Paper Currency, Coin," etc. (rerised ed.t «TftMiry Department Circular No. X29, July 1, 1886), p. 52.
180 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAGKS
result would have been reached had Mr. Chase's guess at the amount of coin been taken in place of the directoras.1 Of course, the coins put down as circulating after 1862 were used only on the Pacific coast. The common guess is that about $25,000,000 were employed there, and this sum has been divided between gold and subsidiary silver again by guesswork.2 The figures íor the minor coins show the amounts struck under the acts of 1857 and the laws of 1864, 1865, and 1866, as given in the current reports of the director of the mint. But, as has been shown, it is probable that a considerable part of these coins were withdrawn from circulation at least during the summer, autumn, and winter of 1864. On the other hand, some of the oíd copper cents made before 1857 remained still in circulation in 1862 and large amounts of cent tokens were privately issued in 1863.
The figures for the postage and fractional currency are drawn from the public debt statements of the annual reports of the secretary of the treasury. They are subject to a con- siderable but indefinite error, particularly in the later years, on account of the large number of these little notes lost and destroyed. It must also be remembered that the place in the currency which they were intended to fill was largely occupied from July, 1862, to perhaps February or March, 1863, by shinplasters and postage stamps.
The next four items in the table are less uncertain. It is well ascertained that the oíd demand notes were not com- monly used as currency after May, 1862. From that time on they were seldom paid out except as a substituto for gold at the customs-houses. The circulation of greenbacks during the war is subject to small doubt, although different official
i Chase made the coin of the loyal ata tes Novena bor 1, 1861, not less than $210,000,- 000 (Rcport, 1882, p. 13). The director of the mint made this same sum somewhere between $255,000,000 and $280,000,000. See note 3, p. 178, a boro.
* Cf. " Information Respecting United States Bonds, Paper Car rene y, Coins, etc.'1 (revised edM Trtfuury Department Circular No. 115, July 1, 1896), p. 52, note 1.
The Cibculating Médium 181
documents do not give precisely identical figures, and the same is true regarding the notes of state and national banks.
In the nezt two divisions — interest-bearing government obligations which were and which were not a legal tender — the amonnt outstanding is stated with accuracy by the regis- ter of the treasury, but no reliable estímate can be made of the amount that was in actnal use as currency at the different dates.
Statements of the volume of the monetary circulation of the United States during the Civil War have been published from time to time in official documents l and frequently accepted uncrítically as the basis of argument in currency discussions. The preceding review of the situation, indefi- nite and tedious as it is, has at least the negativo merit of showing that such statements are subject to a much wider margin of error than is commonly the case — and few would be found to claim a high degree of accuracy for statements of this sort under the most favorable circumstances. To cast up the totals of the above table would be not only useless, but positively misleading, because several of the items are mere guesses, and in the case of others where the amounts are reasonably certain, not all of the sums set down were in use at any time as currency. Ñor could any estimate be made on the basis of the totals that would command confi- dence. But, while the amount of currency in circulation is not and cannot be known, it is evident from the discussion that not least among the unhappy consequences of the legal- tender acts was the disorder into which the circulating médium was thrown — a disorder that caused much incon- venience to the business public. The more serious effects produced by the disturbance of the standard of valué remain to be discussed in other chapters.
i See for example the Statistical Abttract for 1878, p. 14, and the circular of the Treasury Department referred to atore.
CHAPTER III
THB SPECIE VALUÉ OF THE PAPER CURRENCY
1. The Markets for Goid :
Kiwt Dealings in Gold — The Stock Exchange — The Gold Ex- change -The uOpen Board" — The Evening Exchange — Nature of the Bu&inet» in Gold — Tablee of the Premium.
1 1. ¡>\u?tvn, which Affectrd the Gold Price of the Currency:
Vartoua Theoriee of the Premium — The Supply of and Demand tur Oold - Effect of Receivability for Taxes, Convertibility into ttoad» and of the Legal-Tender Clanse on the Valué of Greenbacks RftVot of Additional Issues— Of Pinance Reporta— Of uWar New*" — Of Fblitical Erents— Of Foreign Affaire— The Premium and the Quantity Theory — Speculation.
IU. The Vúurse of Depreciation, January, 186*2, to December, 1865: 1. January to April, 1862—2. The Fall from May, 1882, to Febru- ary, 1883— a The Rise from March to August, 1863—4. The FaU from September, 1863, to July, 1864—011880*8 Oampaign against lh» Oold 8peculatore— 5. The Rise from August, 1864, to May, 1865 — & The Decline from June to December, 1865.
THE MABKET8 FOB GOLD1
A PRKMU'M appeared upon gold as soon as it became known thnt tho twasury and the New York banks had determined Ui nu*|>mul s}iecie pay mente. This premium represented the tMifortmiH* between the community's valuation of gold coin, on tht* uno hand, and of the paper currency, on the other. tu Jauuary, 1862, the latter consisted of bank and treasury iiuti* that had been put into circnlation as tacit or explicit piomiwa to pay gold coin. Of conree, men did not esteem ■uoh |troimaes as equivalent to gold itself after the promisors toad givtm public notice that they were nnable to redeem
i tk» K. (toairwALLis, The Gold Room and the New York Stock Kxchange and (%*«u»t</ Htm* ("Atlas Series/1 No. 8), New York, 1879; Jamvs K. Mbdbuit, Men u«<i SiyUncéo/ Wall Street (Boston, 1810), ohaptera xii, xiii; Hobacb Whitb, Jíoney nmÁ H+nking (Bortón, 1806), pp. 174-90; and fuxiher referenow in footnotes below.
182
Speoie Valué op the Papeb Cubbency 183
their promises f or the present, and when no one knew how long such redemption would be postponed. Henee, when men who reqnired gold coin for any purpose sought to procure it in ezchange for paper money, they had to pay more than $100 of paper for $100 of gold. Whatever excess they paid was, of course, a preminm on gold.
For abont a fortnight after suspensión there was no organizad market for gold in New York. People desiring to buy gold naturally went to the dealers in foreign coin who displayed the precious metáis in their shop Windows, and people who had specie to sell took it to the same places. But very soon the business became too large to be con- ducted in this fashion. The small offices of the money brokers were overcrowded, and traders blocked the sidewalks of narrow Wall street to such an extent that the pólice were given special orders to keep the crowds moving. This state of affairs led to an organization of the traffic and the forma- tion of gold exchanges.
From the published tablea of the premium it appears that regular dealing in gold began on the New Tork stock exchange January 13, 1862. Here it was regarded as the gentlemanly and patriotic thing to sell gold, and the majority of members of the exchange who engaged in the traffic at all were on the "bear" side of the market. A second and less decorous market was formed in a dingy cellar in William street, dubbed the "coal hole." A number of men who were devoting themselves exclusively to dealing in gold took refuge in this place when their business grew too large to be conducted in their prívate offices or in the street. As the number of brokers increased, the "coal hole" was found too small and the company moved to more commodious quarters, first in Gilpin's News Room at the córner of William street and Exchange place; later in the rooms of the oíd stock board at No. 24 Beaver street; and fínally in New street,
184 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAGKS
next door to the stock exchange. For some time the mem- bers of this exchange, that carne to be known as the " Gold Room," contented themselves with a very loóse organization. It was not until October, 1864, that a constitution and by- laws were adopted and regular officers elected.
Besides the stock exchange and the " Gold Room," there were two other markets for gold in New York — the "open board" and Gallagher's evening exchange. The uopen board " of stock brokers was a more popular organization, running as a rival of the "regular board" — ¿ e., the stock exchange — with which it was amalgamated in 1869. The "evening exchange" was a characteristic excrescence of the times. Speculation was carried to an unprecedented extent in New Tork during the winter and spring of 1864. Though the regular exchange was kept open long hours, crowds of men thronged the corridors of the Fifth Avenue hotel speculating at night. A certain Mr. Gallagher seized upon the opportunityin March, 1864, to open a luxuriously appointed room opposite the hotel, where gold and railway and petroleum stocks could be bought and sold till mid- night. So injurious was this continual round of feverish business deemed that after the disclosure of the Ketchum gold-certifícate forgeries1 in August, 1865, the city banks, the stock exchange, the "open board," and the gold exchange united in an effort to suppress the evening exchange by forbidding their members to frequent it. As a result Gal- lagher was forced to cióse his rooms.3
The volume of transactions in these markets became very great. Importers carne to buy gold, not only for payment of customs dues and for making payments to foreigners, but also for protection against fluctuations in the valué of the currency between the time goods were bought and sold.
i 8ee, t. g.% Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, Vol. Lili, p. 226.
>Cy. New York Herald of August 20, and the money artiole of Augost 24, 1865; Tribune, news columns of March 22, 1864.
Specie Valué of the Papeb Cubbenoy 185
Bankers doing business in foreign exchange had to parchase gold for remittances. Exportara and apparently many men engaged in domestic trade or manufactures bought or sold like importers to guard against changes in the valué of the currency. But the volume of speculative dealings probably far exceeded these transactions growing out of the needs of business. Indeed, gold became as favorito an article to speculate in as petroleum stocks or railway shares. Many persona whose occupations presented no need for such opera- tions bought and sold gold — clergymen, physicians, law- yere, small merchante, anyone who had sufficient funds to provide the necessary 10 per cent, margins. Members of Congress, clerks in the government departments, and news- paper reportera frequently tried to obtain pecuniary advan- tage from their positions by operating through gold brokers on the information that carne to them before it was given to the public. Most large operators in gold had correspondente in Washington, Baltimore, or Louisville — the centers of war news — charged with sending them early dispatches con- cerning any event that could affect the credit of the govern- ment. In the "gold room" itself the struggle between oppo- site parties of speculators partook largely of the sectional feeling of the time ; and when the air was full of exciting war news, the "bulls" would often sing "Dixie," and the "bears" try to drown their voices by chanting "John Brown" in choros.1
The price of gold in currency, as determinad by transac- tions in these New York markets, was regularly reported by telegraph in all considerable towns of the United States, and every where accepted as authoritative. There is no necessity for taking account of the premium on gold in other places, because local markets were dominated by the New York quotations. The money columns of the daily newspapers
i See COR2I wallis, op. cit., pp. 4-7.
186 HlSTOBY OF THE GBEENBACKS
and the weekly or monthly issues of the ñnancial journals gave full reporte of current fluctuations, and more permanent records were made by the compilation of a number of tablee showing the highest and lowest pnces each day for a series of years. Such tablea may be found in Hunt's Merchante* Magazine, the Commercial and Financial Chronicle, the Bankers* Magazine, and the annual Reporta of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York.1
All of these tablea appear to be constructed in the same general manner f rom the recorded transactions of the most important of the New York markets. From January 13, 1862, to June 20, 1864, they are based upon sales at the stock exchange. On June 21 the "gold bilí" went into effect and stopped all dealing in gold outside the prívate offices of brokers.2 From this time until the repeal of the "gold bilí" by the act of July 2, there was no organized market, and the quotations are those ruling on the street. After the repeal, transactions in gold on the stock exchange were infrequent, and most of the business was done in the "gold room." From July, 1864, on, therefore, the tablea are based upon the latter market.'
In studying the fluctuations in the gold valué of the paper currency it is necessary to go back to these records of the daily premium. As the differences between the tables mentioned are slight, it matters little which set is accepted as a basis for the investigaron. I have decided to use the tables published in the chamber of commerce reporta, not only because of the official character of the source from which they are taken, but also because they contain fewer obvious errors of the presa than some of the others. To adapt them better to the
i Schuckers, op. cíf., pp. 631-4, publishes similar tables for the years 1882-65 pre- parad by Messrs. B. K. Jamison A Co., bankers, of Philadelphia.
aSee p. 231, below.
• Compare the explanations made regarding the Commercial and Financial Chronicle tables ; e, g., Vol. I, p. 168.
Specie Valüb op the Papeb Cubbenoy 187
purposes of the present chapter I have altered their form. As published, the tablea show the highest and lowest price paid each day in currency for $100 in gold. This form of statement gives the impression that the fluctuations were due to extraordinary changes in the valuation at which gold was held by the community, whereas in fact they were due mainly to changes in the community's valuation of the notes of the government. When the market quotation was 200 the ex- planation, of conree, was not that men esteemed gold twice as highly as they had done in 1861, but rather that they esteemed the paper currency but half as highly as they had when it was redeemable in specie. A much juster impression of the significance of the change in the relativo valúes of gold and paper money is therefore given by quoting currency at a discount in gold than by quoting gold at a premium in paper ; by saying, to use a numerical example, that $100 in green- backs was worth $50 in gold, than by saying that $100 in gold was worth $200 in greenbacks. For this reason the chamber of commerce tables for the years 1862 to 1865 have been con verted into tables showing the highest and lowest daily pnces of currency in gold. These tables, given in full inthe Appendix,1 furnish a basis for studying the remarkable changes in the gold valué of the currency during the Civil War.
II. FACTOBS WHICH AFFEOTED THE GOLD PBICE OF THE
CUBBENCY
So rapid and so violent were the fluctuations in the gold markets that, despite the absorbing interest of military events, they attracted much attention from the treasury ofi- ciáis and the general public. Various attempts were made to account for the changes. Perhaps the simplest theory was that a nominal advance of gold had been produced by
Pp. 425-8, below.
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Speoib Valué of thb Papeb Cubbenoy 189
airrency did not vary concomitantly, as they legitimately ibould have done, and then to launch into a tirade against ¡he unpatriotic gold gamblers.1
Men who observed the transactions of the gold markets iíth care and did not allow their conclusions to be controlled bj preconceived theories, as a rule gave less simple explana- áons of the changes. The momentary credit of the govern- nent, the conrse of military events, the policy of the banks, the export of specie, the demand for gold from importen, the probability of fresh issues of legal-tender paper, treasury iales of gold, speculative manipulation of the markets, the shanceof resmnption of specie payments — these and similar tnatters were declared to affect the premium. Some writers ¡nmbled snch matters together indiscríminately and implied that the price of gold depended in the same manner on all ; >thers attempted to show the logical connection between me set of factors and another; but perhaps no one who itudied the situation with care f ailed to see that the oscilla- dons of the indicator in the gold room generally followed :he news dispatches from Washington and the front.2
Anyone who undertakes nowadays to investígate the ^rounds for these divergent opinions regarding the premium >n gold must make a patient stndy of the transactions in :he gold market from day to day in order to discover what :onsiderations influenced those who bought and sold. For
1 £/., e. í7m Fesbenden and McCulloch in the Finance Report of 1864, pp. 22, 23 wd 52, 53, respectively. Perhaps as near an approach as any to a strict quantity dieory of the premium is found in Hunt't Merchante' Magazinc, Yol. L, p. 299.
i See as examples A. B. Johnson, The Advanced Valué of Gold, Suspended Specie PaymenU, etc. (Utica, N. Y., 1862) ; Alexandeb Delmar, Gold Money and Paper Money (New York, 1863) ; Henrt C. Carey, The Way to Outdo England cithout Fighting Hery 1865, Letters XII-XVI, and other of Carey's pamphlets on the mrrency ; Carl yon Hock, Die Finanzen und die Finanzgeschichte der Vereinigten ttaaten (Stuttgart, 1867), pp. 585-90; H. M. Fitzhuoh, Cath and Credit (Baltimore, 868); Charles A. Mann, Paper Money the Root of Evil (New York, 1872), pp. 66-79; Charle» Moran, Money, Currencie» and Banking (New York, 1875), p. 21; i. E. Thompson, Social Science and National Economy (Philadelphia, 1875), p. 206; ?ael Schürz, Honest Money and Labor: An Addrem (New York, 1879), p. 35; George á. Wbston, Money (New York, 1882), pp. 77-80.
190 HlSTOBY OF THB GbEENBACKS
/_ .
this parpóse it is necessary to have recourse to the ñnancial columna oí the newspapers, in which the fluctuatioDB of the premium were reported and attempts made to acconnt for them. Such reading, however, merely supplies a masa of material of uneven valué and contradictory meaning that requires carefnl analysis before much can be made of it And at best the investigator is forced to admit that his con- clusions regarding many of the fluctnations are open to doubt, either because some of the factors affecting the situa- tion are nnknown to him, or because it is difficult to assign their relative importance to the different factors that were active at the same time. The difficulties arise mainly in explaining the quantitative effects of given causes ; one of ten feels that for aught one knows a certain event might have produced equally well half or double the actual effeci But, as in the case of most economic questions, the qualitative analysis is less uncertain ; one can see why the known factors should have produced a certain sort of consequences, though one would be puzzled to say why these consequences were of the given magnitude.
In analyzing the influences that made themselves felt on the stock exchange and in the gold room, after this fashion, one naturally begins by distinguishing two broad classes. Since the price quoted showed the ratio between gold and paper currency, and changed whenever anything occurred to alter the supply of, or the demand for, either, the factors to be taken account of may be ranged under these heads: (1) factors affecting the valuation of gold, (2) factors affecting the valuation of greenbacks.
But brief attention need be given to the first category. The common assertion that the high premium was due, not to depreciation of the currency, but to an advance in the valuation of gold produced by speculation, commands scant respect in face of the evidence borne by exports of precióos
Speoie Valué of the Papeb Cübbenoy 191
metáis and by the príce tablea. Gold has a world-market per- haps more truly than any other commodity, and the fact is well ascertained that in the early sixties its valué in Euro- pean markets was declining. If, then, the valué of gold had been notably augmented in the United States by "speculation " or any other cause, the export of the precious metáis would inevitably have declined and importa might have begun. But such was by no means the case. In the fiscal year 1861 importa of gold exceeded exports by $14,900,- 000, but after specie payments had been suspended in 1862 exports exceeded importa by $21,500,000, in 1863 by $56,600,000, in 1864 by $89,500,000, in 1865 by $51,900,- 000, and in 1866 by $63,000,000.' As wasremarked at the time, gold really became redundant in the United States when it had been withdrawn from current circulation as money, and when bankers were asked for exchange they could "find no commodity so cheap as gold to ship and draw against."2
Equally decisivo is the testimony of the price tablea. If the ugold-room ganibling" actually causad a rise of gold, pnces of commodities reckoned in gold must have fallen. But, as will be shown at length in the next chapter, this did not happen. On the contrary, the price of gold in currency, momentary fluctuations apaft, rose less than the currency pnces of most commodities. This evidence of the price- tables accords perfectly with the evidence of the gold-export tables and effectually disproves the theory which explains the premium as a consequence of an advance of gold engin- eered by mercenary speculators.
The demonstration, however, that gold did not appreciate in valué in the United States during the war, does not exelude the possibility of temporary fluctuations in the premium
i 8tatutieal Abstract of the United State», 1901, p. 78. 3J7«nT« Merchant»' Magazine, VoL XLVIII, p. 224.
192 HlSTOBY OF THE GbBBNBACKS
caused by changes in the supply and demand for gold in the local market Indeed, it is certain that such changes exercised a perceptible influence apon the gold quotations, especially in quiet times. New York's supply of gold carne mainly from inland towns and from California. Receipts reported from the latter source, it is trae, fell from $32,600,000 in 1861 to $10,400,000 in 1863, becanse of danger of capture by Con- fedérate cruisers that haunted the track of the Aspinwall steamers. But this simply meant that gold destined for export was shipped directly from California under a foreign flag, instead of being brought through New Tork as heretofore. While the shipments from California to New York declined $22,200,000 between 1861 and 1863, the shipments to Eng- land increased $24,400,000.'
Demand for gold in New York was mainly either for pay- ment of customs duties or for export According to the official tablea, the monthly customs receipts varied during the war from $2,500,000 in December, 1862, to nearly $14,000,000 in April, 1864, while the exporta of specie and bullion varied from leas than $500,000 in March, 1865, to nearly $10,000,000 in June, 1862.2 If the fluctuations in the amount of gold used for these two purposes each month from January, 1862, to December, 1865, be compared with the corresponding changes in the average valué of the premium each month, only twenty-two of the forty-seven cases arefound to present concomitan t variations. But while this comparison shows that the demand for gold for such purposes was not the dominant factor in the market, it does* not show that this demand had no effect On the contrary, there can be little doubt that when the market was free
i See tablea of exporis of specie from San Francisco in Commercial and Finan- cial Chroniclc, VoL II, p. 135; and compare Hunft Merchante' Magaxine, Vol. LTV, p.96.
2 Seo the tables pablished in the Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Vol. II, pp. 230, 231.
Speoie Valüb op the Papeb Cübbenot 193
from more powerful influences, purchases of gold for the payment of duties sometimes caused relatively slight increases of the premium ; and that the export demand had similar effects is sufficiently shown by the fact that newa that the Bank of England had raised its discount rate could send up the premium because it made probable larger exporta to London.1
It was a fact noted at the time that what influence this market demand and supply had apon the premium was often in the direction of moderating instead of increasing the fluctuations. When the premium rose sharply, gold that had been hoarded would be sent to be sold on the stock exchange in order to benefít by the high price. At this high price, however, importers would find it unprofitable to buy the gold they required to pay customs duties or remit abroacL Thus, demand would decrease while the supply increased. Precisely the opposite resulta were noticed when the price fell rapidly. To an extent, therefore, the supply and demand for gold, instead of controlling, were themselves controlled by the fluctuations of the premium.9
Aside from fluctuations caused by changes in the actual supply of and demand for gold, it was possible for a strong clique of dealers to produce fluctuations by "cornering" the local supply at a time when many men had entered into contracts that required the purchase of gold in large amounts within a limited time. Such attempts at 11 manipulating " the market appear to have been frequent, ^>ut their effect was neces8arily temporary. Unless the clique could persuade the public that there was some real reason for a low valuation of the government's notes in comparison with gold, they could not long maintain an
i See, e. p., money articles of New York Times, February 3, 1864 ; May 17, 1864.
2 See HurW* Merchante1 Magaxine, Yol. LIV, pp. 96, 97 ; money articles of New York Tima for June 16, 17, and July 24, 1862.
102
HlSTOBY OF TU E <
caused by changes in thesupply ■•■■ local market Indeed, it is certain 0- a ¡Mírceptible influence u[>on the po!*1 quict times. New York's supply in la nd towns and from California. T* latter source, it is true, fell fmT" $10,400,000 in 18<W, hc-rause of <* fedérate craisers that haunted tí- steamers. But this siniply meant t *• was ship]>ed directly from Culi í instead of l>eing brought throuffh While the shipments from Calit«- $22/200,(XM) between 1SIÍ1 and 1°~ Innd increased $24,400,000.'
Deniand for gold in New YnrV* ineiit of eustoms duties or for exp« tables, the monthly customs iw** froin $2,500,000 in Deceiuber, *~ in April, lMU, while the exp -' variod from lesa than $500,00**" $10,000,000 in June, lb62.J auiount of gold used for the? from January, lstJ2t to Decem^ the oorre#iKUuling changes ir premium each month, only rv *' casos arcYound to present con** thi* coniparison shows that purposes was not the domina!** r not show that this deninnd Ik1 llu-re can Iv little doiibt fl**
>»»■ :^ x^b>> |tuhli«hcd in.tho rsv -V SI.
^ 'Bjmnation of the rollo wed by a then, specu- the domi- that govemed They are f ound tí*., the con- "s valuation of
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uf paper taraes wrre made s^ifM ILcfcap* ii. aec. tí. «bore. tdar to obtain ooin for i± «M^ iv, p. 1& atoro*
i Valué op the Paper Currencv 195
1 a premium in greenbacks from early iii May, they were receivable for all dues to the t witbout exception.' Had the greenbacks been t legal tender like tbe oíd demand notes, ran the , they would have maíntained as high a valué.* It , however, as was so freqnently asserted, that the notes did not deprecíate after suspensión. L availability for customs, in conjuuction with their ely Btnall amount, caused them to Ije preferred above ¡, bnt the premium which they hore was not equai i premium upon gold, nntil practically all had been iwq from cireulation. The degree of their deprecia- k aa compared with that of greenbacks is shown by the Ing table, based upon the weekly quotations given in i Merckants' Magaztne. While this table shows thnt receivability for customs Hmited the máximum deprecíatíon of the oíd demand notes to lesa than 10 per cent, in gold, it does not at all follow that the greenbacks would have remained as near par had they been endowed with the same property. Indeed, this property had so powerful an effect in buoying up the demand noti-s precise ly because it was not shared with other forma of ¡tajar money. Only $60,000,000 of the demand notes kk re isaued, and the first legal-tender act provided that they íhould be canceled and re placed by United States notes aa nipirfly as feasible. In contrast, more than seven times this anxmnt of greenbacks were issued and they were paid out Bain about as rapidly as they were paid in.
The second congressional provisión for sustaining the valué of the greenbacks — the privilege of exchanging them at par for bonds bearing 6 per cent, interest in coin, redeem-
> Sce Pait II. cfaap. li. see. iii, abore.
ISM dtatiou f rom greenback literatura gi»en by R. M. BHOWOUDOK, "Tbo l>-mun.l Notos of U61," Sumid CBrwnc», Tol. V, p. 331.
196
HlSTOBY OP THE GbEENBAOKS
TABLE VI
DBPBBCIATION OF UNITBD STATES NOTBS AND OF OLD DBMAND AT VARIOÜ8 DATES IN 1882 AND 1863 1
|
CURRKNCT |
Gold |
CURRBNCT |
Gold |
||||||
|
Valüb OF |
Valué of |
Date |
Valüe OF |
Valüe of |
|||||
|
Dath |
|||||||||
|
Oíd De- |
Cur- |
Oíd De- |
OldDe- |
Cur- |
OldDe- |
||||
|
Gold |
mand |
mand |
Gold |
mand |
maod |
||||
|
Notes |
rency |
Notes |
Notes |
rency |
Notes |
||||
|
1862 |
1862 |
||||||||
|
Apr. 12 |
101i |
100 |
98.1 |
98.1 |
Oct 4 |
122} |
119* |
81.5 |
97.3 |
|
19 |
101A |
100 |
98.4 |
98.4 |
11 |
128J |
123} |
78.1 |
96.6 |
|
26 |
101A |
100 |
98.4 |
98.4 |
18 |
130* |
129 |
76.8 |
99.1 |
|
May 3 |
102| |
100 |
97.4 |
97.4 |
25 |
130| |
127 |
76.6 |
97.2 |
|
10 |
HBft |
1001 |
96.8 |
97.0 |
Nov. 1 |
130A |
126* |
76.7 |
97.0 |
|
17 |
K»A |
lOOf |
97.0 |
97.6 |
8 |
132* |
126 |
75.6 |
95.3 |
|
24 |
103* |
100| |
96.6 |
97.2 |
15 |
131J |
126* |
75.8 |
95.9 |
|
31 |
M3,V |
lOOf |
96.6 |
97.2 |
22 |
130| |
124* |
76.6 |
95.1 |
|
June 7 |
104 h |
101 |
96.1 |
97.1 |
29 |
129* |
124* |
77.5 |
96.4 |
|
14 |
106U |
103 |
94.6 |
97.5 |
Dea 6 |
131* |
125 |
76.2 |
95.2 |
|
23 |
107| |
103 |
93.1 |
95.9 |
13 |
131* |
126* |
76.0 |
96.2 |
|
26 |
109* |
KM* |
91.7 |
95.8 |
20 |
132A 132J |
127* |
75.5 |
96.3 |
|
July 5 |
109} J |
1051 |
91.2 |
96.0 |
27 |
129 |
75.6 |
97.5 |
|
|
12 |
114* |
1071 |
87.6 |
93.9 |
1863 |
• • • • |
• • • • |
• • • • |
• • • • |
|
19 |
H8| |
108 |
84.5 |
91.2 |
Jan. 3 |
134J |
129 |
74.6 |
96.2 |
|
26 |
1171 |
106* |
85.3 |
90.8 |
10 |
137JI |
135 |
72.6 |
98.0 |
|
Aug. 2 |
H5i |
1Q5J |
86.9 |
91.4 |
17 |
147* |
143 |
67.9 |
97.1 |
|
9 |
112» |
105* |
88.7 |
93.6 |
24 |
149* |
144} |
67.0 |
97.0 |
|
16 |
114* |
107* |
87.3 |
93.8 |
31 |
159J |
153 |
62.5 |
95.7 |
|
23 |
115* |
108 |
86.6 |
93.5 |
Feb. 7 |
157J |
155 |
63.6 |
98.6 |
|
30 |
115H |
108J |
86.4 |
93.6 |
14 |
155| |
151 |
64.3 |
97.0 |
|
Sept. 6 |
119 |
108 |
84.0 |
90.8 |
21 |
162} |
162 |
61.5 |
99.5 |
|
13 |
118J |
108} |
84.7 |
92.1 |
28 |
172 |
171 |
58.1 |
99.4 |
|
20 |
116H |
112* |
85.5 |
96.2 |
Mar. 7 |
155* |
153 |
64.5 |
98.6 |
|
26 |
120| |
116* |
83.1 |
96.8 |
14 |
158* |
153 |
63.2 |
96.7 |
able in five and payable in twenty years — was never very effective and was repealed after a year and a halfs trial. There has already been occasion to remark that the right A conversión was little exercised in 1862, and that, in the hope
1 Quotations of gold are from the New York Ckambcr of Commercc Reporta referred to aboyo; quotations of oíd demand notes from Huntt Merchante* Magazine, Vol. XLVII. pp. 33, 338; Vol. XLVIII, pp. 09, 306. The statements of the premium on gold in the latter soarce differ slightly from those ased; they are not takcn becauso of inconsistencies and obvióos misprints. — See, c. g.y last referenoe. Quotations of oíd demand notes cease in HunV» Merchante* Magazine after March 14, when all but aboat $5,375,000 had been retirad. The daily papera, however, oon- tinued to quote them for a few weeks longer.
Specie Valub of thb Papeb Cubbbngy 197
of getting better terms for bonds, discretionary power was granted Secretary Chase to abrógate the right after July 1, 1863.1 Duxing the continuance of the war, however, this repeal of the funding provisión made little difference in the valué of the currency, because holders of greenbacks who deeired to invest them ia government securities conld still get five-twenty bonds at rates not far from par. Up to the cióse of subscriptions for the five-twenties of 1862 nnder the agency of Jay Cooke these bonds conld be bonght at par from the government. After this date, Jannary 21, 1864, they could be bonght in the New York stock market at the fol- io wing rates:
TABLE VII
MONTHLT HIOHB8T AND LOWB8T PRICS8 OF JTV»-TWBNTY OOUPOM
NXW TOEK STOCK MAJUtBT IN 1864 AND 1865 >
BONDS IN THB
Month
1864
Lowest
January. . . Pebruary. .
March
April
May
June
July
August . . . September Óctober . . . November . December.
101*
103%
107
106
105*
101
101*
106 *
106
106*
íoo*
106*
Highest
lOáJg
107
110*
114
107*
106%
109
113
111* 108*
107*
110
1865
|
Lowest |
Highest |
|
106* |
110 |
|
ioejg |
112 |
|
10á% |
111% |
|
106* |
109* |
|
102* |
107 |
|
102 |
104* |
|
103% |
106 |
|
106* |
106% |
|
106% |
106* |
|
101% |
106* |
|
99* |
103 |
|
100 |
106* |
«This table shows that, after allowance is made for accumn- d interest, the five-twenties at no time in 1864 or 1865 rose more than a few per cent, above par in the paper cur- rency. This few per cent, marks the máximum difference which continuation of the right of exchanging United States
i See Part I, chap. W, pp. 104, 107, 115, aboye.
* From the Financial Rcoicw, 1873, p. 17 (snpplement of the Oomwterical and Financial ChronicU).
198 HlSTOBT OF THE GllEEKBáCKS
notes at par f or five-twenties could possibly ha ve added to tho valué o( the former. Of conree, the reasou why the conversión Bcheme was not more effective, wbile it lasted, in preventíng depreciation of the currency is fbnnd ín the fact, that while the government was waging a war of enormone coet and nncertain iasue, investors did not pnt a high valae apon its bonds. To attempt to maintain the credit of one set of promíaes to pay by means of a aecond aet could avail little when the ability of the promisor to keep either set vas regarded as doubtfal.1
As for the legal tender clauae — the third provisión against depreciation — ¡t could compel a creditor to receive paper money as the eqtüvalent of gold only for debts already con- tracted. It could not control contracta to be made in the futuro. Soliera veré free to charge hígher prices for their goods when they knew the payment would be in greenbacks; and they did so. Not only did the legal-tender clause fail to prevent depreciation, but, had it been the only support of the valne of the greenbacks, the depreciation might have been as great as was the depreciation, for example, of the Ruasian legal-tender paper money in the first qoarter of last centnry.
But, thongh these artificial provisions proved rutile, one important consideration remained. Greenbacks were notes of the government of the United States, and as such their valué — like the valne of the notes of a prívate person — depended npon the credit of the issuer. If confídence in th¡ government' a ability ultimately to redeem its notes had t entirely destroyed, the paper money would have deprecíate to the level finally reached by the Confedérate currency. On the other hand, if the credit of the government had saffered no diminution, its notes would have depreciated
' Whether the abrogation of the richt of hradin* greanbaclta to bonds delarsd naamptioo of ipecie parmaots aft*r the war U a fartbar quHtlon. divoavtioa ol wbJch t> not in plao» bare.
Speoie Valüb op thb Papeb Cubbbnoy 199
little, if at all. Fluctuations between these two limite — par and zero — followed the varying estimates which the com- munity was all the time making of the government's present and prospective ability to meet its obligations. It íb there- fore necessary to analyze the elementa that entered into these varying estimates.
First, it is plain that an increase in the amount of\ the demand debt made speedy repaymenl more doubtful. j Henee the effect of every suggestion of an increase in the \ amount of the paper curreney was to decrease the valué of the greenbacks already in circulation. This is clearly shown by the influence of the second and third legal-tender acts.
Jnne 11, 1862, the gold valué of $100 in paper curreney was $96.22. 1 The next day it was officially announced that the secretary of the treasury had requested Congress to authorize a second issue of United States notes.9 Immedi- ately the valué of the curreney declined to $94.96. As the probability increased that the request would be complied with, the fall continued, until, on the day when the final vote was taken on the second legal-tender act, July 8, the cur- reney price was $89.79.8
Even more striking was the fall caused by the third legal- tender act. December 1, 1862, just before Congress con- vened, curreney was worth $76.94. Three days later a fall to $74.63 was caused by a rumor that the annual finance report would recommend another issue of United States notes.4 A denial produced a reaction to $76.63. But on the 8th Thaddeus Stevens introduced a bilí providing for
i See the tables of daily prices in the Appendix, pp. 425-8. The figures in the text for certain days are sometimos the highest or lowest prices, sometimos (as here) the average of the two.
2 See the New York Time», June 12, 1862.
3 CongreuioruU Globo, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3182. ♦ Bankeri Maoazinc, New York, Vol. XVII, p. 560.
200 HlSTOBY OF THE GBEENBACK8
an issue of {200,000,000/ which brought about a relapso the next day to $75.19. When he admitted, a few days later, tbat there was no chance of his measure passing, a slight rise followed.* But January 8 the Committee of Ways and Means submitted a measure authorizing the issue of $300,000,000 of United States notes.» The currency fell to $72.99. Six days later the Hoose of Representativos passed a joint resolntion for the issue of $100,000,000 to secure the immediate payment of the army and navy.4 The fall reáched $67.57. The acquiescence of the Senate caused a slight further decline.
Meanwhile the Ways and Means bilí was onder discussion in the House. When it was passed and sent to the Senate, the notes were depressed to $65.90.* Three weeks later the measure carne back with the Senate amendments, one of which reduced the new issue of legal- tender notes from $800,000,000 to $150,000,000. A drop of $1.46 followed the House' s refusal to agree to the change. During the next two days it was thought in New Tork that the Senate would yield, and the decline of the currency continued to $60.98. When this idea was dissipated there was another reaction. But February 26 the House yielded and passed the bilL* This action made the increase of notes certain, and their valué fell to $57.97. After this extreme depression carne a slight reaction to $58.48 on the day the bilí beoame a law.7
Glote. TTU» Ooajr., 3d Sess^ pp. 2S. 145; New Tork bar *» UC TW igfetwaeeis to tfce daily papers are, aolea» otfcerwise speciAed, to ti» of tto wmoutj artidcts. >q» ■iiíjiiif 6 loor, k*. cit^ p, ll& í/W^p.35. S«e¿ec3oí Ü*biU.p.S*4.
«fl«¿.p»3U. »J*M&iy&—/»i«\,p.S&.
•For ScaAte UMMhMto m t*td^ pp. «K.9C7; for «etíom of tU How^pp.
•X&frfclliCl TW probmbüit; of furtkor imas of tp »o »*«&$ tW ottlj o>pr«w»ia* uUtoeao» afftcti^ Üm> Tafo» of tk» (mwkj wkile «itWr ik* jceoad or Uini legal twW biUs wms p—itimg a
Speoie Valué of the Papeb Cübbenoy 201
Not only the amonnt of notes which the government issued, but also the condition of the resources at its dis- posal for meeting obligations, affected the probability of a epeedy redemption of the paper currency. This explains why almost every important public event was reflected in the fluctuations of the gold market. Few things could happen to the government that would not directly or indirectly influence its credit, and therefore the valué of its notes. Conseqnently notice must be taken of the effect of financial, military, political, and diplomatic events opon the course of the depreciation.
Since the fírst condition of redeeming the paper currency was financial strength, the condition of the treasory was narrowly watched by the gold market For example, the annual reporte of the secretary of the treasury were anxiously awaited each December and their appearance caosed a rise or fall of the currency according as the condition of the finances presented seemed hopeful or gloomy. In Decem- ber, 1862, the day before the report was published, a rumor was circulated in New Tork that another issue of greenbacks would be proposed. The currency fell from $76.34 to $74.63, but rose again to $76.63, when the report appeared recommending a national bank currency as preferable to government notes. Next year the report was responsible for a slight decline; for, though Secretary Chase declared gpecifically against an increase of the greenbacks, the esti- mated expenditures so far exceeded receipts that he was obliged to ask for a loan of $900,000,000. Again in 1864 the report caused a fall, for even the New York Tribune admitted that it was disappointing.1 By December, 1865, the gold market had become much steadier, but Secretary McCulloch's report recommending a speedy resumption of
i See the editorial article in the issoe of Deoember 8, 1864, and the money article for December 7.
202 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAGE£
specie payments was warmly received and caused a rifie of the currency from $67.34 on the 5th to $68.14 on the 6th.1
Ability of the government to borrow also influenced the ralue of the currency ; f or the f ate of a loan indicated pub- lic confidence or distrust, and snccess provided means for oontinuing the war withont the issue of more legal-tender notes. Thus, in the spring of 1863, Mr. Jay Cooke's snc- cess as agent of the government in obtaining snbscriptions for five-twenty bonds at the rate of $2,000,000 a day caused the currency to rise from a level of about $65, prior to March 23, to $71.68 on the 25th, when the favorable result of his operations seemed assured.' In October, 1863, the report that a foreign loan had been obtained caused a rise from $68.49 on the 21st to $70.05 on the 22d. Next day the report was discredited, and the currency fell back to $68.26.* Again, in September, 1864, a loan of some $32,- 500,000 was subscribed twice over and the sum advertised awarded at a premium of 4 per cent, and upwards. This newB caused a rise from $42.37 on the 9th to $45.87 on the 10th.4
Changes in the officials of the Treasury Department con- stituted another important factor. The resignation of the ■anrlniít treasurer in New York caused a fall June 2, 1864, from $53.05 to $52.63. July 1, of the same year, Secretary Chases resignation depressed the currency to $40. A few boors later, upon the receipt of a dispatch announcing Sen- «¿or Fessenden's appointment to the vacant post, there was a reactioo to $45.05. Mr. McCulloch's nomination the fol- lowing March occasioned an advance from $50.25 on the 7th to $51.05 on the Sth.
m fcw Ottofctr fi aad B> T«0. LUK
Specie Valué op the Papeb Cübbency 203
Even more striking than the influence of financial events upon the currency was the effect of the "war news." While the war continned there could be no thought of redeem- ing the government's notes. Henee every victory that made the end of hostilities seem nearer raised the valué of the currency, and every defeat depressed it. The failures and successes of the Union armies were recorded by the indicator in the gold room more rapidly than by the daily prese. A few instances may be cited.
Chancellorsville, fonght May 3, 1863, was one of the most (lisastrons battles of the war. Bnt the first reporta that reached New York were favorable, and caused a rise of the currency to $67.45. Next day, however, adverse rumora began to arrive, and the quotations were lower. On the 6th a partial confírmation of the bad news continned the fall. When all uncertainty about the disaster was removed onvthe 7th, the currency dropped to $64.62. !
Following up the advantage gained at Chancellorsville, General Lee crossed the Potomac and invaded the North. With the progresa of his movement the currency fell from $71.17 on the lOth of June, 1863, to $67.40 on the 16th.
Similarly the battle of Chickamauga caused a decline from $74.77 on the 19th of September, 1863, to $71.81 on the 21st; in April, 1864, the currency fell from $57.43 on the 23d to $54.79 on the 25th, because of the report that the Confederates had captured Plymouth, N. C. ; General Butler's failure to take Fort Fisher was the occasion of a drop from $46.24 to $44.64, December 28, 1864: the knowl- edge of the ill succeas of the Yazco river expedition brought a fall of over $4, from $67.34 March 31 to $63.34 April 1, 1863.2
The power of victories to raise the valué of the currency
i Seo conflicting reporte from the battles in the New York papen of May 4 to 8, 1863.
* See the news colomns of the papers of April 2, 1868.
204 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS
was most strikingly illustrated by the series of trinmphs in July, 1863. On the first three days of that month the battle of Gettysburg was being f ought. The 4th was the national holi- day ; the 5th Sunday. When the gold market opened on the 6th, currency, which on the lst had been at $68.97, rose to $72.46. Next day news carne of the capture of Vicksburg; currency reached $75.47. Despite the draft riots in New Tork city, the reaction was small, and when the capture of Port Hudson was announced, July 15, there was a further advance to $77.59. With the increase of confidence the currency continued to appreciate, un til upon the 20th it was worth $81.14. Thufl the gain was $12.17 in twenty days, due to favorable war news.
Grant's series of victories at Ohattanooga caused a rise of $4.99 in four days. The victory of Sheridan over Early at Opequan Creek and two days later at Fisher's HUÍ led to an advance from $44. 10 to $46.30. Sherman's capture of Atlanta, announced in New York September 3, 1864, occasioned a rise from $39.29 on the preceding day to $42.37. Later, after Sherman had started north from Georgia, no news carne from his army for some time, and fears were entertained for his safety until March 14, 1865, when a dispatch was received stating that he had reached Laurel Hill, N. C, and that all was well. This news caused the currency to appreciate from $52.22 to $56.26. More examples might readily be given.
Many of the fluctuations of the currency were due to mis- taken reporta of military events. Thus, September 3, 1862, an absurd story that Stonewall Jackson was marching on Baltimore with 40,000 men caused a fall from $85.84 — the price of the previous day — to $84.75.1 A rumor that Atlanta had been evacuated by the Conf ederates produced a rise from $38.80 to $39.92 on July 22, 1864.2 Another false report of
i New Tork Times, money article, September, 8, 1882. 2 Ibid., money article for July 22, 1864.
Speoie Valué of the Papbb Cubbbnot 205
the fall of Petersbnrg led to an advance from $48.78 to $51.28.' A similar story of the evacnation of Richmond was the occasion of the change from $56.54 to $58.74 on the 16th of March, 1865.' Peace rumora were especially freqnent. The ((peace mission" of the two Blairs was folio wed with much anxiety. A report that the eider Blair was in Richmond caused a rise from $46.54 to $48.08 January 19, 1865.9 On the last day of the month news carne that three Confedérate commissioners were within the Union Unes.4 Currency rose from $47.39 to $49.50; bnt fell back again to $46.62 on the annonncement, a f ew days later, that the conference wonld áccomplish nothing.
Being of leas freqnent occurrence, political changes played a less prominent role in the gold market than finan- cial and military affairs. The best example of their influence is shown by the e venís attending the presidential election of 1864. Mr. Lincoln was the Repnblican nominee. The Democratic party, which did not hold its convention nntil Angust 31, finally nominated General McClellan. News of this choice caused the currency to fall from $42.73 to $41.15. The canvass that followed was spirited, and for a time the result seemed doubtful to many. The Pennsylvania state election in October was looked to for an indication of the probable outcome. Por a day or two after the votes had been casi it was uncertain which party had won. October 11 the New York World claimed that the Demócrata had made large gains and would carry the state. Because of this report the currency fell from $50.41 to $49.17. Curiously, the Repnblican triumph in November had the same effect upon the currency as this promise of Democratic success had exercised. It seems to have been argued that
i September 28, 1864; see New York Herald, money article.
* New York Herald, money article, March 16, 1865.
« JWd., January 19, 1865. * Ibid., January SI, 1865.
206 HlSTOBY OP THE Gbbbkbaoks
President Linooln's re-election meant un indefinito prolonga- tion of the war, and henee destroyed any chance of a apeedy redemption of the paper money.1 On the strength of this view there was a fall on the 9th from $40.65 to $38.46. However, a reaction qnickly followed.
Presiden t Lincoln'e assassination ocenrred af ter the regu- lar gold market had closed on the eveoingof April 14, 1866. Currency had ranged between $67.97 and $68.49. The newa was received, however, at the "evening exchange." At the firet fihock there was a fall to $60.61. Thia fall was followed by a qoick reaction, so that the market cloeed abont $63.90.* Next day the gold exchangea remained closed, and the following day was Sunday. The intermission gave an opportnnity for the panic to subeide. On Monday the opening price was 365.30, but it soon rose to $67.51, and the next day the correney nearly regained the level which it had beld before the assassination.
Thongh the country's foreign relationg were overshadowed dnring the war by domestic affairs, they ezerciaed aome influ- ente npon the valae of the paper money. There were two im portan t matters of diplomatic concern: the chance of for- eign interven t ion between the federal and confedérate gy vera mente and tbe French ocenpation of México. Fears on the fonner acore were in a measnre pnt to reet on Jnly 30, 1862, by the arrival of a ateamer from England bringing reporta of a apeech of the prime minister, Lord Palmeraton, wbich waa interpreted to mean that the British govern- ment had no i n ten t ion of interfering in the American war.* Currency rose from $85.84 — the lowest price on the 2i«b— to $87.43. On the lOth of the following Februarr • report that the French emperor was attempting to bring
i Sw «ditorül inicie In New York Erprw, Norember B, 180*.
■ Kew York Herald, dooft arttcle (Uwd April 14. IMS.
* tm tka duvalefaa* to U» Now Tork p»p«n. <rf Joljil, I9R, u) MtUmial ooar
Specie Valué op the Papeb Cübbency 207
about a conference between the North and South caused the paper money to appreciate from $63.90 to $65.57.' The news of the withdrawal by England of the recognition which it had accorded the Confederacy as a belligerent occasioned a rise from $68.91 to $71.43 on the 19th of June, 1865.a
May 3, 1864, the publication in Le Moniteur of the con- vention assuríng the stay of French troops in México caused the currency to deprecíate from $56.50 to $55.63.' At the cióse of the war the administration attacked the Mexican question with vigor. June 5, 1865, word carne that Napoleón
#had been urged to withdraw his troops. This news showed the possibility of trouble with France, and caused a slight decline — from $73.94 to $73.13.* During the summer many con- flicting reporta were circulated concerning complications on the Rio Grande, causing considerable fluctuations in the gold market.5 But the beginning of the end carne November 7, with the report that the cabinet had decided to notify the French government that the sending of further troops to México would meet with the disapprobation of the United States. That little fear of a serious complication was enter- tained is shown by the slight extent of the fall caused by
'this news— $68.03 on the 6th to $67.91 on the 7th.6
Perhaps some explanation should be given why two mat- ters of which much was made by contemporary commenta- tors on the premium have been passed over so lightly in the preceding analysis, viz., the quantity of money in circula- tion and speculation. Statistical attempts to demónstrate or/ disprove the validity of the quantity theory of the valué of money must always be inconclusive so long as there are no
i New York Times, money article, Febrnary 10, 1865. 2 New York Herald, money article. Jane 19, 1865.
* New York Time», money article, May 3, 1864.
* New York Herald, money article, June 5, 1865.
* Hunt't Merchante Magazine, Vol. Luí, p. 133.
6 New York Herald, money article, November 7, 1865.
208 HlSTOBY OF THE GBEENBAOK8
accurate data regarding the volóme of exchanges to be per- formed by the use of money and the rapidity of circula- tion.1 Of conree, no such data are to be had for the years of the Civil War, and besides there is the added embarrass- ment that the quantity of money in use is involved in even more obscurity than common.3 A rigorous comparison between the quantity and the gold valué of the currency or between quantity and prices is therefore out of the ques- Üon. But at least this much may be said with confídence j the fluctuations of the gold premium cannot be aocounteq for by actual issues and redemptions of government notes! Aa the abo ve remarks upon the second and third legal-tender acts show, additional issues of United States notes affected the valué of the notes already in circulation as soon as their probability was known and long before they were actually nade or even authorized. Indeed, in the six months follow- ing the passage of the third legal-tender act, when notes veré being issued in accordance with its provisions, the valué of the currency appreciated in a marked degree.* That ial tbe quantity of the greenbacks influenced their specie valué! nsher bj affecting the credit of the government than byl al&eriag the volóme of the eirvulating médium.
Xor is the case of the quantity theorisl improved by tak- iac acooont of all forma of money in ciirulatkm iimtfiad of ra* zr^rnbacks alone, Most discassiotts of tbe vatoe of an ■uxnmrrtibie paj**r cunvncy prawed on tbe ■wwiptiiHi giac r» qnantitr is arbttxarilv determinad by government, ma¿ ¿Ltí tbe bosixwtss cvMnmunUT svi »dapt itsetf to tbe meaocázm, Bst 5och an as$amptoc«i is fcaidhr more trae of xt*r X ztr*k éxñsts: *£* nr út&n of ti* wboie coutzy before m^méaL In K>íi p«>o*i$ fiw w* w m*de of bank
v&
Specie Valué of the Papbb Cubbenct 209
notes and bank deposita as cnrrency, and of conree the vol- óme of these elemente in the circnlating médium followedt* the needs of the pnblic. More than this, the amonnt of gov-l ernment cnrrency in use as money was in neither case deter- \ mined solely by treasnry policy. Before suspensión, free coinage and free export provided for an antomatic regnlation of the snpply of specie ; af ter suspensión a somewhat similar element of elasticity was fonnd in the presence of legal- tender, interest-bearing treasnry notes which conld be treated as an investment or nsed as money at the convenience of the holder.1 It wonld be difficult, indeed, to show that the vol- ume of a cnrrency comprising elements so elastio as these interest-bearing legal tendera and the notes and deposite of banks was the ultímate f act that regulated the valué of the whole circnlating médium.
As for speculation, there seems to be more danger of exaggerating than of minimizing its importance as an inde- pendent factor in the gold market. No donbt, as has been suggested, the formation of highly organized markete, where engagements were entered into to receive or deliver large amounts of gold within stipulated times, gave opportnnity for artificial manipnlation. No donbt, also, many of the false rumore so industriously circulated were concocted by operators with special intent to affect the premium.3 Bnt it must be remembered that there were two parties in the mar- ket, and the arts of " bulls " were set off against the arte of
i See Part II, chap. ii, sec. tí, aboye.
*The most notable instance of this character was the frandnlent proolamation of President Lincoln, taken by nnknown persons to the offices of all the New Tork papera except the Tribvne about 8 : 30 o'clock on the morning of May 18, 1864. It stated that Grant's campaign was virtually at an end ; that the Red Riror expedí tion was a f ailnre, that 400,000 additional meo wonld be raised by draft if the state qnotas were not filled by June 15, and that May 26 would be obseryed as a day of fasting and prayer. Though the World and Journal of Commerce alone were dnped into pub- lishing the docnment, it cansed a rapid riso in the premiom before the opening of the exchanges. As the World at once denonnced the forgery on its bnlletin board, the fright snbsided qnickly and the transactions on the stock exchange were at a ▼ery slight advance over the preceding day. See the newspapers of May 18 and 19.
210 HlBTOBY OP THE GfiEEKBACKS
"beare." Which party canied the day depended in tho long run od mattera o ver which neither had control — prima- rily the condition of the finances and the war news. Yiewed in a broad way, it is therefore a Berions mistake to look on the gold market as a place where a few gamblere were toss- ing the premium about to snit their eelfish schemes; a mneh saner view is that it was the place where the commnnity's estímate of the government's credit was visibly reoorded Here, as in other markets, those operators snoceeded who forecast the fnture correctly, and men who tried to advanoe the price of gold when public confidence was increasing, or to depresa it when confidence was on the wane, learned to their cost that they were not masters of the sitoation.
III. THE OOUBSE OF DEPRECIATION, JANDABY, 1868, TO DECEHBEB, 1865
In order to facilítate etady of the progrese of depreciation daring the war, the highest, average and loweet gold valué of the currency for each month from 1862 to 1865 is shown apon the accompanying chart. From this graphic repre- sentation it is readily Been that there were su strongly marked perioda in the general conree of the flactaations : (1) Jannary to April, 1862, the depreciation was slight and almost constant. (2) After April there occnrred an almost unbroken fall until Febrnary, 1863, when the average valse of the currency for the month was but $62.30. (3) This fall was eacceeded by an appreciation, which culminated in the following August, when the average price reached to $79.50. (4) A eecond and more serióos decline followed, until, in July, 1864, the lowest valué of the war was reached — $38.70 for the month. (5) August, 1864, to May, 1865, an npward movement, interrupted by a reactton in Xovember, carried the currency to $73.70. (6) After May there was a slow decline ti 11 the end of the year.
Spboib Valué op thb Fapbb Cubbehoy 211
8 ■ 3
212 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAOKS
1. January to April% 1862. — From a gold valué of $99.50 on the lst of January the currency fell as low as $95.24 on the lOth, but from this poínt there was a rally, so that the average valué for the month was $97.60. The perplexities of the financial situation, particularly the slow- ness of Congress in framíng tax bilis, exercised a depressing influence in the fírst half of February, that was counteracted in the latter half by Grant's capture of Fort Donelson and the provisión made for the treasury by the first legal-tender act. Despite this rally, the average for the month was $1 lesa than in January. March, however, more than restored this losa Curtís defeated the Confederates decisively at Pea Ridge, the "Monitor" proved itself more than a match for the "Merrimac," McCleüan advanced into Western Virginia, and Shields defeated Stonewall Jackson at Win- chester on the 23rd.1 Confidence in the speedy end of the war was high, and consequently the valué of the currency was but 1.8 per cent, below par in gold.
During April the depreciation was even lesa So confi- dent was the administration that peace was at hand that the adjutant-general issued an order stopping recruiting. While Grant suffered a severe check at Pittsburgh Landing on the 6th, he more than recovered the lost ground on the 7th. Island No. 10 surrendered, Halleck telegraphed that Pope had captured 6,000 prisoners in Missouri ; on the 15th news carne to New York that Fort Pulaski, guarding the entrance to Savannah, had been taken ; and to crown the month, New Orleans fell into Union hands, in its closing weeL Moreover, the greenbacks, which now, for the first
i As moet of the events referred to in the following review of the eonrae of depre- ciation are very well known, I have not oonsidered it necessary to insert references to war histories. The newspapers have been my main reliance, boca use the preminm was affeeted rather by what was reported concerning battles, etc., than by what really happened ; but I have also used the diarios in Harpcr's Monthly Magazine, and Moorb's Record of the Rcbellion, besides Drapkb'8 Civil War in America* and J. F. Rhodbs'8 Huiory of the United State*.
Speoie Valué of the Papeb Cubbenoy 213
time, began to come into general circulation, were moet favorably received, for it was considerad highly patríotic to accept the government's notes as nearly the eqnivalent of golcl Thus, under the stimulus of victories and universal confidence, the paper money reached the highest valué of the war — $98.50, a depreciation of but $1.50.
2. The fall from May, 1862, to February, 1863.— In May military operations turned against the North. The Confederates quietly slipped out of Yorktown after Mc- Clellan had made elabórate preparations for a siege, and McClellan followed so slowly as to lose his advantage. Far- ragut took Natchez on the 13th, but all the successes of the month were overshadowed by Jackson's brilliant operations iu the Shenandoah valley, where he defeated the Union forces at Front Royal, drove Banks across the Potomac, eluded the attempts of McDowell and Fremont to cut off his retreat, repulsed their attacks at Cross Keys and Port Republic, and finally effected a junction with Lee. So great was the consternation at Washington that the gover- nors were called upon by Stanton to forward all their militia and volunteers for the defense of the capital. From $97.92 on the lst of the month the currency declined to $96.04 on the 27th, when the f right in Washington was at its height and the average for the month was $1.70 less than it had been in April.
A further fall of $2.90 carne in June. Hanover Court- House, Seven Pines, and Fair Oaks caused a slight rise in the last days of May and the first days of June ; Fort Pillow was taken on the 4th and Memphis two days later. But on the 12th Chase's request for a second issue of greenbacks was an- nounced. Meanwhile McClellan lay inactivo while Stuart's cavalry rodé around his army, capturing prisoners and burn- ing supplies.
July brought yet greater disasters. McClellan's peninsu-
'l
214 HlSTOBY OF THE GfiEENBACKB
lar campaigu, which was to have ended with the captare of Richmond, ended instead with the desperate retreat to Harri- son's Landing, where he remained qniescent Cor the reet of the month. The dream of a prompt cióse of hostilities was rudely dispelled, and the president issued a cali for 800,000 voluntes re. Meanwhile Morgan was raiding in Kentocky , and Congreas paased the eecond legal tender act. Under such depreaaíng inflaences the currency fell rapidly, and the average for the month was $7.80 lesa than in Jone.
After the 22d of July there was a rally from the extreme depression that lasted during the first part of Aogust. Hal- leck's appointment as general-ín-chief had a good effect Reporta were received of a debate in the Hoose of Commons that was interpretad to mean that the English government had no íntention of ¡ntervening in favor of the South. Such news more than offset the draft of 300,000 nine- montlia' militia ordered on the 4th. Bnt after the llth of August the cnrrent set in the oppoeite direction. Lee torced Pope into the defenses before Washington, and oponed the way into Maryland, while Bragg was execnting a similar northward movement in Kentncky. Abont the same time the Sioux Indians snddenly commenced their ontragee in Minnesota. '- *** ■ ■
During September the depreciation continued. Lee's advanee caused grave fears for the safety of Bal ti more, Har- risbnrg, and Philadelphia. The public archives of Penoayl- vania were eent to New York for safekeeping, and Governor Cnrtin called for 50,000 men to repel the invasión. Similar fears were entertained for Lonisville and Cincinnati, which Bragg and Kirby Smith were threatening. The fall was Btopped for a week in the middle of the month by thebattles of South Mountain on the llth and Antietam on the 17th, bnt the latter was too dearly bought a viotory to compénsate for Jackson's captare of Harper's Ferry with its i
Speoib Valué of the Papbb Cubbbngt 215
stores and garrison of over 11,000 meñ. When it was found that McOlellan had failed to follow up his advantage and that Lee had recrossed the Potomac in safety, the disap- pointment was keen, and despite Roeecrans's victory at Iuka the f all of the currency recommenced, and the lowest price was that of the last day of the month.
In October McClellan remained inactive, despite the urg- ing of the president and the impatience of the public. Lee had time to recover in a measure from the loases of his sortie into the free states, and he caosed great exasperation by sending Stuart on another raid entirely around McClellan 's idle army. In the West military operations favored the North. The desperate attempt to recaptnre Corinth was f oiled by Rosecrans ; and Bragg, af ter his f ailnre to capture Louisville, retreated from Kentucky, suffering rather greater losa than he inflicted at the battle of Perryville on the way. While these snccesses tended to offset Stuart's raid and McCleüan's inactivity, the autumn elections had a very depressing influence. Almost every where the administration lost ground. In Maine and Michigan the Republican majori- ties were greatly reduced ; Wisconsin, Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and New York went Democratic. A majoríty for the opposition was predicted in the House of Represen- tatives.1 The net effect of these various inflnences was an average price of the currency $6.60 below that of September.
November was a quieter month, with a much narro wer range of fluctuations, although the average valué of the currency was somewhat less. Military events were not of great consequence, and the market was dull awaiting the convening of Congress in December. The lowest quotation of the month occurred on the lOth, when the order relieving General McClellan was published.*
i Cf. Blaiíte, Twenty Years of Congress, Vol. I, pp. 441-8. * Cf. money articlo in New York Times, November 10, 1882.
i
216 HlSTOBT OF THE GBEENBACK8
When Congress assembled Chase" s report showed that impaid reqnisitions were accumulating at a rapid rate, and that the secretary had no suggestions for incieased taxation, but laid great stress apon his widely distrusted banking scheme. Presently, inquiry in Congress called public atten- tion to the f act that the pay of the army was in arreara, and a third issne of United States notes was foreshadowed. The administration was also sharply attacked for the suspensión of the writ of habeos corpus and for the monitory prociama- tion of emancipation. Meanwhile there was a qnarrel in the Bepnblican ranks. The caucus of the Senate advised the presiden t to reconstrnct his cabinet, and in consequence the secretaríes of state and of the treasnry both resigned, but were prevailed upon by Mr. Lincoln to remain in office. The great military e vent of the month was Bornside's bloody repulse at Fredericksburg with a loss of nearly 14,000 men. Under this combination of depressing inflnences the first yearof the paper standard closed with a depreciation of 25 per cent.
In January and February the fall of the cnrrency was accelerated in the manner shown above by the framing of the third legal-tender act. On the Potomac Hooker, who succe<*ded Barnside, was qnietly engaged in reorganizing the army and preparing for a spring campaign. Meanwhile it became known that Grant's first campaign against Vicks- burg had been frustrated by the destraction of his depot at Holly Hprings, and by Sherman's repulse at Chickasaw Bayou on tíie 29th of December. The next day the "Monitor" fotuidered off Cape Hatteras, Forrest's Confedérate cavalry w«m beaten at Parker' s Cross Roads, and the great battle of Muríreesboro Iwgan. On the first of the new year Magruder n«!aptun«l Ualvoston, but ten days later Sherman, on his return írom the Yazoo river, captured» Arkansas Post with 0,000 prÍHonors. Early in February a Federal attack on Fort MeAllister in Georgia and a Confedérate attack on Fort
Specie Valué op the Paper Cübbenoy 217
Donelson in Tennessee were repulsed. The rest of the month was rather quiet and the dominating influence in the gold market was the progresa of the third legal-tender act.
This period, May, 1862, to February, 1863, commenced with a depreciation of but 2 per cent., and ended with one of 42 per cent. From May to November the dominating canses of the decline were military disasters and the second issue of greenbacks. McClelland peninsular campaign was a mel- ancholy failore. Richmond was not taken; instead, Lee invaded the North. Thongh his sortie was checked at Antietam, fnll advantage was not taken of the situation. When the offensive was at last resumed with vigor, the defeat of Fredericksburg resulted. What slight advantages had been gained in the West could not counterbalance snch dis- asters. To this ill fortune in war was added the political defeat of the administration in the autumn elections, the dis- sensions among Republican leaders in Congress and the cabi- net, and the gloomy fínancial prospect. In January and February the depreciation was accelerated, but now because of the legislation pending in Congress rather than because of military events.
3. The rise from March to August, 1863. — February closed with the currency at about $58. In March a reaction began. There were no decisive military operations ; f or Grant was vainly trying to get at Vicksburg from the North, Far- ragut bombarded Port Hudson without result, and in Ten- nessee and Virginia the fighting was mainly confined to the cavalry. But Congress had passed the supplementary inter- nal revenue act, the national banking act, and the $900,- 000,000 loan act; and the enactment of these laws was fol- lowed, as Secretary Chase said, "by an immediate revival of public credit."1
The same favorable causes continued to opérate in April.
1 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December 1863, p. 2.
218 HlSTOBY OP THE GbBENBAOKS
Jay Cooke now bad bis system of agencies for the five- twenty loan well organized, and anbscriptions began to come in. An onsaccesaful bombardmeDt of tbe forte in Charles- ton harbor cbecked tbe rise for a time ; but Banks was anc- cessfnl in bis operations along the Bayou Teche in Lonisiana, and Grant shifted bis forcea to the west of tbe Misaissippi, marched them soutb of Vickabnrg, ran his gnnboats and transporta past tbe batteriea with slight losa, and prepared to croas again and attack tbe city from the south. Mean- wbüe Hooker executed a well -planned movement aeróse the Bappabannock and Beemed to have Lee at a disadvantage. For tbeae reasons the average valué of tbe cnrrency was a little bigber in April tban in Marcb.
Doring the first week in May there was a fall cansed by the dísaatrons battle of Cbancellorsville. Bnt Grant's cav- alry reached Baton Rouge after cutting the Communications of Vicksburg witb the East, and his main army effected ita landing on the eastern bank of the Mississippi and won the series of victories that forced Pemberton back into the city and completad ita inveatment. A trifle later in the month Banks cloeed in on Port Hudeon farther down the river. Tbeae events witb increaaing anbscriptions to the loan' c&uaed another advance ¡n the valué of the cnrrency, so that the average for tbe month was slightly higher than for April.
June presenta a striking example of an appreeiation of the currency— stnall, to be aure — despite military revereos. After Chancelloreville, the Army of Virginia waa reinforced by conscriptions and fitted out better than ever before. On the 3d of June Lee set forward on a second grand invasión of the North. At Winchester he captured nearly 4,000 prísonera, with many guns and large suppliea, and proceeded tbrongh the Shenandoah valley to Chambersburg in Pennsylvania —
i Cf. Bamkrrt- Macatine, Yol. XVII. p. 817.
Specie Valué op thb Paper Cubbency 219
On the 15th President Lincoln issued a cali for 100,000 militia from Maryland, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Vir- ginia, to aid in repelling the invasión. In the West nothing decisive was accomplished. Grant was pressing Vicksburg closely and Banks Port Hudson, bnt their attacks upon the works were repulsed withont snbstantial gains. Meanwhile the political opponents of the administration seized the moment to pnsh their agitation against the conduct of the war. Mr. C. L. Vallandingham, who had been arrested for treasonable utterances, was nominated for governor of Ohio. At New York a great "peace meeting" was held. All this made the latter half of June a very dark period for the Union canse. But the machinery of the national loan was now thoroughly organized, and, while Lee was advancing, the treasury was receiving $1,500,000 to $2,500,000 daily for government bonds.1 The fact that the government was able to borrow on so large a scale, even at this crisis, had a great effect in maintaining its credit, and henee the valué of its notes. ' So, while Lee's invasión caused a heavy fall in the middle of the month, there was a reaction after the fírst scare subsided, and for the month the average valué of the cur- reney was $2 higher than in May.
If June had shown the possibility of a rise in the face of military reverses, July showed how powerf ul a stimulant was military success. It was a month of victories — Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Port Hudson. These great successes, with Sherman's expulsión of Johnson from Jackson, the repulse of the Confederates at Helena, and the capture of Morgan and his raiders in Ohio, completely overshadowed the draft riot in New York and a few Union reverses. On the 15th President Lincoln appointed a day of thanksgiving, and on the 25th President Davis a day of fasting and prayer. The advance of the curreney over June was $7.40.
i Bankers' Magazine, Vol. XVIII, p. 007.
220 HlSTOBY OF THE GrEBNBAOKS
Angnst continued the good times. In a milítary way the monto lacked dramatic features, for Grant, Meade, and Lee were allowing their troupe a rest, easential after the furioufl campaigning of July. Roaecrana, however, began hia advanee against Bragg at Chattanooga, and Burnside moved on Knoxville. Much encouragement was received from the vigorons pnshing of the siege of Charles ton.1 The draft in New York, which had been intermpted by rióte, was reeomed and completed. Elections in Kentucky, Vermont, and Cali- fornia resulted most favorably for the administration candi- dates. Under these circumstances the currency reached $79.50 — a higher level than was again att&ined dnring the wnr.
4. The fállfrom September, 1863, to July, 1864.— Mimj had expected after the great victorias of July that the end of the rebellion was at hand. Bnt much to the chagrín of the president and the public, Lee, instead of being annihi- lated was suffered to withdraw unmolested across the Poto- mac, and was soon confronting Meade in the oíd pdeitiona along the Rappahannock. Early in September news of positive disaster was added to this disappointment. At Chickamauga Rosecrans lost 16,000 men and narrowly escaped the destruction of his whole army. The news catised a fall of nearly $3 in a single day. So the currency declined from $78.82 on the opening day of September to $69.87 on the 29th.
From the last of September to the cióse of the year there was a slow but tolerably steady depreciation. The lowest point of the period was $63.80, October 15, caused by rumora of another forward movement by Lee. After Longstreet had been sent west to reinforce Bragg, Hookerwasalsodispatched with two corpB to help Rosee rans. Lee then threatened to tnrn Meade's flank and compelled him to fall back on Bull
l New York Tima, monej articles. Jolr 15, 11, nnd Anguit 2S, 1MB.
Specie Valué of the Paper Cubbenoy 221
Run. The operations in Virginia, however, were leas important than those in Tennessee, where Grant relieved Roeecrans, who had allowed himself to be cooped up in Chattanooga by Bragg. In November the lowest prices, those of the 21st and 23d, were due to the investment by Longstreet of Knox- ville, where Burnside's forcea lay ; the highest, on the 27 th, to Grant' s spectacular victoríes at Chattanooga. December was a very quiet month with a slight range of varíation. Sherman averted disaster to Bornside by hurrying from Chattanooga to Knoxville and forcing Longstreet to raise the eiege. In the East Meade recrossed the Rapidan and went into winter quarters. Congress assembled and received a treasury report of rather cheerful tenor, despite the fact that Chase found it necessary to ask authority for borrowing $900,000,000.
During the first three months of 1864 the slow decline continued. In January the armies lay nearly still both east and west. On the lst of February a draft was ordered for half a million men to serve three years or for the war. Butler's sally from Fortress Monroe, made in the hope of taking Richmond by surprise and freeing the prisoners of war, was frustrated by a deserter who alarmed the Confed- erates, and Kilpatrick's cavalry on a similar mission suc- ceeded in penetrating the first and second line of defenses about the city, but were repulsed from the third. Late in the month the Florida expedition received a serióos check at Olustree. In Mississippi Sherman succeeded in destroying Meridian and effectually cutting the line of railway that supplied Mobile from the North, but the hoped-for destruc- tion of Pope's army was not accomplished because the co-op- erating cavalry failed to do its expected part in the cam- paign. In March the ill-fated Red River expedition set out, and the Confedérate general Forrest defeated W. S. Smith at Okalona, re-captured Jackson, the capital of Mississippi,
222 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS
but late in tbe month was repulsed at Padocah with a loas of 1,500 men. More importan t in its effect apon the gold market was tbe slowness of Congress in passing the finance bilis. Even the New York Tribune became impatient "A Congress fit to exist," it said, " would have matured and per- fected some sort of finance system before the cióse of its fourth month."1
In April Congress still passed no revenue laws, and the war news was unfavorable. The massacre of Fort Pillow, the failure of the Red River expedition, Steel's forced evacuation of his position in Arkansas, the Confedérate capture of Fort Williams, and later of Plymouth, in North Carolina, all combined to make a gloomy commencement of the spring campaign.3 Slight successes in Texas, Grant's preparations for a vigorous advance, and Union gains in the elections in Connecticnt, Rhode Island, Missouri, and New Jersey could not counterbalance these disasters and the inactivity of Congress. Consequently the currency fell $3.50 below the average of March.
In the first half of May there was a rise. Sherman set- ting out from Chattanooga succeeded by skilful maneuvere in f orcing Johnson back from Dalton, then from Resaca and then from Allatoona Pass. At the same time Grantcroesed the Rapidan and fought the desperate battles of the Wilder- ness and Spottsylvania Court House. Every rumor from the field caused a rise or fall of the currency,* but despite Grant's enormous losses, he was believed to have the advan- tage, so that the general trend of the fluctuations was upward until near the middle of the month. But on the lOth Ave-
i Editorial article, March 29, 1864.
> Tho feeling of depression is shown by the New York Tribune'» remark : "With perhaps a single exception, the i m portan t military ©vents which we haré been eaUed opon to record si neo the early opening of the campaign haré been disasters to ths national canse " (April 29, 1864).
> E. g., see New York Time», money article, May 12, 1864.
Specie Valué op the Paper Cübbency 223
rill's cavalry was defeated by Stxiart, on the 15th Siegel was rooted at Newmarket, and on the 16th Beauregard forced Butler back upon Bermuda Hundred and intrenched along his front so strongly as to prevent his co-operating with Grant. Meantime Lee forestalled Grant in his move- ment to the North Anna, and Congress still failed to pase the tax bilis. Consequently after the lOth currency fell again ; by the 17th it was back to the opening valué of the month, and as the depreciation continuad the average valué was $1.20 less than in Apríl.
During these fírst fíve months of 1864 there had been a depreciation of less than $2 a month, due to lack of prog- rese in subduing the rebellion and the dilatoriness of Con- gress in voting taxes. In the next two months this rate of depreciation was greatly accelerated, in part at least because of the appearance of a new factor in the market — the "gold bilí." This measure, however, was only the last of a seríes of governmental attempts to control the price of gold. As was shown in the preceding section, the treasnry officials believed that the premium was in very large measure due to a rise in the valué of gold effected by the nefarious arta of speculators. Could this speculation be broken up, they thought that the premium would f all back to a modérate figure and the credit of the government be greatly enhanced. Acting on this principie, Congress, on March 3, 1863, laid a stamp tax upon time sales of gold, amounting to one-half of 1 per cent, of the amount plus interest at 6 per cent, per annum, and at the same time forbade loans on the pledge of coin in excess of its par valué.1 News of the passing of this law was followed by an advance of the currency from $58.22
1 12 Statutes at Large, secs. 4, 5, p. 719. At the same time a bilí was pending in the New York legislature to prohibit banks from selling specie above par and from loan- ing upon specie so long as specie payments were suspended. It had some effect upon the market, although it finally failed of becoming law. See money articles of New York Tribune, February 6, 7, and March 5, 1863; Time», March 4, and April 17, 1863.
224 HlSTOBY OF THE GfiEENBACK8
on the 3d of March to $66.67 on tbe 6th ; but the gold market quickly rallied, and by tbe lOth tbe currency had fallen again to $61. 35. !
Thougb this measure produced but little effect, for other reasons, the average gold valué of the currency advanced slowly from March to June, 1863, and much more rapidly in July and August. During this period, therefore, the public concerned itself little witb the iniquity of gold specu- lation. But when tbe current turned and the premium began to advance again, denunciation of the speculators recommenced. As a specimen of the way in which they and their works were regarded by a large section of the most earnest northern people, one of the numerous edi- torial articles on tbe subject may be quoted from the New York Tríbune:
For years past, the partisans of the Rebellion quartered in our city ha ve systematically and by concert stríven and employed their means to increase the premium on gold. Their interceptad letters prove that they did this in behalf of their master, Jeff. Davis, and in the conviction that they were aiding the Rebellion as truly and palpably as though they were wielding muskets in the front ranks of Lee's army.2
When Congress assembled in December the prevalenoe of the feeling that the premium was largely due to specula- tion, and speculation to treason, manifested itself in propoeals to enact restrictive legislation. But it was some time before these proposals were given serious attention. In the Senate Mr. Lañe, of Eansas, introduced a bilí December 15, 1863, to prohibit speculative transactions in gold, and another January 13, prohibiting the sale of gold at a príce higher than that of 6 per cent, federal bonds. Both these measuree
i Seo money articles of this period.
3 Jane 15, 1864. Moro or less similar outbursts can be found in most of the New York papero at any time that the premium was advancing rapidly. QT., e. pM New York Times, money article, February 3, 1864.
Specie Valué of thb Paper Cubbency 225
were ref erred to the Committee on Finance and were no more heard of.1 A third bilí of the same character met a similar fate, though introduced by so influential a senator as John Sherman.3 In the House Mr. Clay's "bilí to regálate con- tracta for gold" was killed by the Committee on Judi- ciary, to which it had been referred.1 But while Congress was not yet ready to attack the bosiness of dealing in gold directly, it assented to a measure of which the object was the rednction of the preminm.
Just at this time the government was receiving more gold from customs duties than was required for meeting the inter- est on the public debt. The excess was accumulating in the New Tork subtreasury. It was thought that, if this large snpply could be suddenly thrown on the market, it wonld break the "córner" in gold and cause the premium to fall. With this intent, the secretary of the treasury was author- ized to dispose of any surplus gold not required for interest.4 The passage of this measure, like that of the tax provisión of March, 1863, was followéd by a temporary appreciation of the currency from $59.61 on the 9th of March, when its defeat was expected, to $62.06 on the 17th, when it was approved by the president.5
Mr. Chase, however, was loath to use the power thus
i CongrtuUmal Globc, 38th Cong., lst Sess., pp. 24, 173. When the committee was asked what it had done with the bilis, Fessenden replied that it still had the matter under consideration.— JWd., p. 960.
2 Ibid., p. 539. s Ibid., pp. 730, 2773.
* Joint resolution of March 17, 1864, 13 8tatuie* at Large% p. 404. For the gronnds on which the bilí was urged see Sherman, Congressional GIo6e, 38th Cong., lst Sess., p. 1023; Hooper, ibid., p. 731 ; Kasson, pp. 707, 737, 738; Garfield, p. 734. On the other sidesoe Pendleton, pp. 731,732; Brooks, p. 733; Hendricks, pp. 1045, 1046; Reverdy Johnson, pp. 1050, 1051. As the bilí passed the House, it merely authorized the secre- tary to anticípate the payment of interest in gold, but the Senate Committee on Finance reported an amendment permitting the secretary to sell any gold in the treasury not needed for the payment of interest (p. 1023). This resolution as amended was adoptad by the Senate after a yea and nay vote of 30 to 8on March 11 (p. 1052), and after much discussion was accepted by the House March 16, by 84 votes to 57 (p. 1147).
* New York Tinte», money articles, March 9, 11, 12, 15, 1864.
226 HlSTOBY OF THE GBEENBACK8
given him to sell gold, except as a last resort. He had another plan. Importers with customs duties to pay had to buy the necessary coin in the gold room or on the stock exchange. Chase thought the premium might fall if this demand were taken out of the market Consequently he announced that importers would be allowed to depoeit paper currency with the subtreasury, receive in return certifícates of deposit of gold at a rate a trifle below the cnrrent pre- mium, and use these certifícates in payment of customs.1
The announcement of this plan caused a fall of gold from 169| on the 26th to 165| on the 29th of Marck This day certifícates were sold at 165¿, and for the 30th the price was set at 164. The market quotation followed, and for the next day the price of certifícates was 163¿. But this time the market did not yield, and in consequence the rate for certifícates had to be raised to 165 on April 1, and to 166 on the 2cL This advance meant the def eat of the plan. Instead of the treasury being able to díctate to the market what the price of gold should be each day, it was obliged itself to accept the dictation of the market. However, the plan was kept in operation two weeks longer. The rate for certifí- cates was set permanently at 165 ; but the market quotation regardless of this rose to 175 on the 12th. The next day Mr. Chase issued an order stopping the sale of certifícates after the 16th.2
Balked in his fírst scheme, Mr. Chase went to New York on the night of April 13 and ordered the surplus gold in the subtreasury to be sold.1 On the 14th the gold quotation reached 177^. By selling about $11,000,000 of gold in fíve days Chase forced the premium down to 66£ on the 21st. In comparison with the effort made, the result was tri
i Seo offlcial announcement in the New York papen of March 29, 1861. 5 Published in New York Tribuna money article, April 16, 1861. all be followed best in the cnrrent money articles. * SCHTJCKRS, op. ciL, p. 358.
Speoib Valué op the Paper Cubbency 227
The policy could not be continued indefinitely, because suf- ficient gold had to be kept in the treasury to meet interest. When the pressure was removed, the advance recommenced, and by the 25th of April the premium was higher than ever.1
At the outset of this campaign in the gold market Mr. Chase seems to have been inflnenced by outside pressure rather than by any conviction of his own that the expedienta adopted would produce a permanently beneficial result. Many business men as well as many politicians, who had become alarmed by the rapid leaps upward of the premium in the spring of 1864, were urging him to suppress the gam- bling in gold by any means in his power.' But even when he was beginning the sales of gold Chase wrote to President Lincoln: "The sales which have been made — yesterday and today — seem to have reduced the price, but the reduction is only temporary, unless most decisivo measures for reducing the amount of circulation and arresting the rapid increase of debt, be adopted." * And after the sales were over he wrote to Mr. S. D. Bloodgood, of New York: "I see that gold is again going up. This is not unexpected. Military success is indispensable to its permanent decline, or, in the absence of military success, taxation sufficient upon state bank issues and state bank credits to secure . . . . an exclusive national* currency ; and sufficient, also, to defray so large a proportion of current expenditures as to reduce the necessity for bor- rowing to the mínimum."4
But neither this olear insight into the situation, ñor his
i Though these operations had but a fleeting effect opon the price of gold, the y produceda severo panic in the stock market. Money beca me exceedingly "cióse/* and speculators holding stocks for an advance were obliged to sell at heavy sacri- flces. Cf. Cornwallis, The Gold Boom, p. 8; Medbebbt, Men and Mystcriet of Wall 8treet, pp. 248, 249.
3cy. Schückers, op. cit., pp. 357, 358. Schuckers says that the plan of selling customs-house certiflcates was adopted at the recommendation of the New York chamber of commerce (p. 361).
3 Letter of April 15, ibid.% pp. 358, 359.
« Letter of April 26, 1864, Warden, Life of Chote, p. 582.
22S HlSTOBY OF THE GbEEXBACKS
former faílures, deterred Chase from trving a third plan — íbñt of satisfying the export demand for gold by selling exchange opon London at a rate below that preTailing in ibe market.1 This plan had still lesa effect than its pre- decemon. It caused a fall of gold from 181| on May 19 to 181 on the 20th. But the nert day gold began to rise again, and on the 24th the treasorj was forced to rmise its price for exchange,3 thus acknowledging another deféat
Why all the attempts to reduce the premium on gold had fáil*d is not difficult to see. They were based on the **¡#umptíon that speculators had increased the valué of gold — whüe the fací was rather that the government's notes had falUm ín common esteem Neither increasing the market nurrfily of gold by selling the coin in the treasury, ñor dimin- inhing the market demand for gold by selling customs-house <wrtlftanUi% or foreign exchange, conld better the govern- mtitiVu credit, and therefore snch measnres conld have noth- iritf more than a temporary effect opon the premium. What Wft* wmded was, as Mr. Chase himself wrote, Tictories and hfcAvinr tnxm.
By thÍH time, however, the secretary's temper had become rutÜtul by defeat, and he was ready to try extreme meas- urna, *'The price of gold must and shall come down," he wrot* to Hornee Greeley, June 16, "or TU qnit and let m$lUH\**\y i?l*e try."* One resort was left: the govemment hml fallad to control the gold market; it remained to try *U'li«hiri# the market altogether.
A tiitl with this purpose had been sent by Chase to the MefiJiU) (Jommittee on Finance and reported by Shennan Apríl 14/ Thw measure prohibited under heary penalties *)| n*u\riu't* for the sale of gold for f ature delivery and also
• Mr.» iutb Tlmm% mooey article, May 30, 1864.
* li.ul , M«y U, «WAMHDi,op.c*l.,p.0Oa. t i imu'**»i«***l OU>he% »th Con*., Ut Se»., p. 161S. Compara Fi
MkU«u* i,9 I tai «.uro* of the bilí, p. 1680.
Specie Valué op the Papeb Cübbenoy 229
forbade the sale of gold by a broker outside his own office.1 Of course the bilí, if it became law, would make dealing in "futures" illegal, break up the gold room, and prevent sales at the stock exchange.
It was with much misgiving that the Committee on Finance brought the bilí before the Senate and few advo- cates were found who would say more than that they hoped it might accomplish some good. Fessenden spoke for the majority of his colleagues when he said:
Although we may not believe .... that a bilí of this kind will necessarily produce the effect . . . . it is nevertheless a duty in the present condition of things in this country to leave nothing untried which offers even a reasonable ground of hope ; and it is upon that supposition .... that the committee recommend the measure .... a bilí of this kind may produce an effect in two ways; fírst by operating upon public opinión, and second by high penalties . . . . it may .... have an effect to check in some, perhaps not any inconsiderable, degree, the rampant and heartless and wicked spirít which is actuating men with reference to this subject.2
If those who voted for the bilí spoke doubtfully of it, those who voted against it were more certain of their ground. With one accord they declared that such legisla- tion could not accomplish what the secretary expected. Mr. Henderson, for example, reminded the Senate that the act authorizing sales of gold had been " a total failure " and added: "It is utterly futile for us, unless we can keep up the character of the currency of the United States, to under- take to interfere with the price of gold." *
Senator Collamer took similar ground: "Gold does not fluctuate in price," he said, " . . . . because they gamble
i See text, ibid., p. 1640.
¡Ibid., p. 1640; compare similar remarles of Chandler, p. 1644; Hale, p. 1671; Bherman, pp. 1640, 1646.
*/Wd., p. 1670. Cf. remarles of Clark, p. 1649; Powell, p. 1671; Reverdy Johnson, K>.1S45.
230 HlSTOBY OF THE GBEENBACK8
in it ; bot they gamble in it because it fluctuates. .... But the fluctuation is not in tbe gold ; the fluctuation is in the currency, and it is a fluctuation utterly beyond the control of individuáis." '
The true way to restore national credit, said Oowan» was not to pass fu tile enactments against gold speculation, but to prosecute the war vigorously and to raise large sums by taxation. uIf we do that," he concluded, "if in the first place we satisfy the money lender that we are going to put down the rebellion, and in the second place that we are going to pay the expenses .... then the public credit at once will appreciate and public securities will rise, or, if yon choose the other phrase, gold will apparently go down." *
Perhaps the only senator who heartily approved of the bilí was Lañe, of Eansas: "It is my opinión," he said, "and the opinión of loyal and sagacious business men of the city of New York, that the Confedérate government is to day, and has been since last December, through its foreign agenta, engaged in the effort to deprecíate our currency by gam- bling." His only objection was that Secretary Chase was being credited with the authorship of the bilí, when he himself had introduced a very similar measure several months before.*
Though the bilí was passed by the Senate April 16/ its consideration in the House was delayed while Mr. Chase was trying his other experimente in the gold market. WheiE they had all failed he wrote a note to Samuel Hooper urg- ing that the bilí be acted on. "Its passage," he said, "will probably check the ad vanee and give a little time for furtheC measures."* Accordingly the bilí was taken up June 7, bu* so closely was opinión divided that the speakeres castin^g
i Ibid.% pp. íee^ 1067. » /WdM p. lMt « AfaL, p,
* Tho final vote was 23 to 17.— Ibid.t p. 1678.
* Letter of Jane 2, W arden, op. c»<M p. 500.
Specie Valué of the Papeb Cübbency 231
vote was required to secare consideration for the subject1 A week later the bilí was passed after very little discussion in the House by a vote of 76 yeas to 62 naya.2 It received the presidenta signatura Jone 17.s
Gold opened in June at 190 and rose at the prospect that the gold bilí would be passed. On the 14th, when the House agreed to the bilí, the price touched 197£. When the law was put in operation on the 21st of June, the gold room was closed, and at the stock exchange the precious metala were dropped from the cali list; for it was now unlawful for brokers to buy and sell gold outside of their offices. Persona who needed gold to pay customs or to send abroad were forced to go from one office to another inquir- ing the price.' There being no organized market, there was no regular quotation, and the prices demanded by different brokers varied so widely that June 27 there was a difference of 19 points between the lowest and highest selling ratea reported. Business was so greatly inconvenienced that a meeting of bankers and merchants convened on the 22d and appointed a committee to recommend necessary alterations in the law.5 Two days later the committee called upon Mr. Chase in Washington to urge the repeal of the acie At a loss what to do, Chase liad already authorized the assistant treas- urer at New York and Mr. Jay Cooke to take such measures as would arrest the rise of the premium.7 But they could do nothing, and the rise went on. Mr. Chase was very loath to recommend the repeai of the bilí, and yet he saw no other way
i Oongrcetional Globo, 38th Cong., lst Sess., pp. 2793, 2794.
2 Forty-three members did not voto.— Ibid., p. 2937. The Senate concurred in 'the House amendments. which did not affeet the snbstance of the bilí, on the same <kj.-P. 2930.
3 13 atatuie» at Large, p. 132.
* New York Herald, editorial article, Jone 24, 1864.
6 Seo accoant of the meeting in New York papera of June 28, 1864.
* Extract from Chase 's diary, W arden, Life of Chote, p. 607.
7 Letter to J. Cooke, June 21, Wa&den, p. 606.
232 HlSTOBY OF THE GBEENBAOK8
to remedy the situation.1 Before this dilemma was settled he sent his resignation to President Lincoln, June 29, and next day it was accepted. The vacant position was offered to Governor David Tod of Ohio. When he declinad it, Senator Fessenden was prevailed apon to assume its duties.1
Meanwhile the gold bilí had been repealed. Unanimous consent to introduce a bilí for this purpose was granted to Senator Reverdy Johnson on the 22d of Juna* July 1, this bilí was called up and passed with no debate except Johnson' b brief explanation :
The universal impression, so fár as I have been able to oollect it, in Gongress and out of Gongress, now is that .... the gold bilí is doing nothing but mischief ; and I have Communications, and other Senators have reoeived them, f rom New Tork especially, beg- ging that that bilí shall be repealed. I do not know any member of the Senate who f ormerly was willing to give that bilí his sanction who is not now just as willing to repeal it. It has had its trial and has failed to produce anything but mischief.4
Later in the same day the bilí for repeal was passed by the House without any discussion.* It was signed by Presi- dent Lincoln July 2;6 the 3d was Sunday, and the 4th Inde- pendence Day, but on the 5th the gold room was reopened and the business of dealing in gold resumed its wonted conree.7
The great fall of the currency, shown by the spectacular advance of the premium in June and July, was by no means due solely to the gold-bill blunder. Military news was unfavorable. After his frightful loases in the Wilder-
i See his own aooonnt of what he said to Fesaendan in regmrd to the mattar. Waidkm, p. 619.
> Compare Part I, chap. t, sec. ü, p. 124, abore.
> ConoreHional Olote, S8th Con*., lst Sess., p. 3160. */McL, p. 8446. » Ibid.¡ p. 3468. The voto was: yeas,87; naja, 29; not ▼otinf,66.
• 13 StcUutet ai Large* p. 344.
i At the stock exchange, howover, tranaaetions in ex>ld were nerer re^nlarly raanmed after Jone 20. Cf. Commercial and Financial Ckronicle, VoL I, p, 166.
Speoie Valué of the Paper Cübbenoy 233
ness and at Spottsylvania, Grant had been compelled to give up his plan of taking Richmond by assaults on Lee's linee. Tbe bloody repulse at Cold Harbor, June 3, was fol- lowed by ten days of inaction. When Grant crossed the James in tbe middle of the month, Lee merely fell back on Richmond and seemed as safe as before. The attempt to secure the Weldon railway south of Petersburg by swinging inf antry corps to the lef t was foiled by Ewell's fierce attacks, and though Wilson's cavalry succeeded in cutting the rail- way, they were af terward defeated and the damage repaired. On the last day of June the mine was exploded at Peters- burg, but the assault through the breach failed miserably. Meantime Hunter, advancing on Lynchburg, was compelled to retreat into West Virginia by the sudden appearance of Early on his front with a superior forcé. This move opened the way for Early's dash on Washington in the first fort- night of July, which was almost successf al. Though miss- ing this prize, the Confederates operated in the Shenandoah for the rest of the month and on the 30th burned Chambers- burg in Pennsylvania. Grant in the meanwhile was reduced to acting on the defensive ; for he had been compelled to send an army corps and two divisions of cavalry to confront Early. In the South Sherman seemed to be making slow progress against the wary Johnston in his campaign about Atlanta, and all attempts to capture Forrest's cavalry in Mississippi proved futile. It seemed, indeed, in June and July that almost no progress was being made toward sub- duing the Confederacy, despite the prodigious expenditure of money and blood.
The fínancial outlook was no better. In contrast with the five-twenty loan which had closed in January, the ten- forty loan was a dismal failure. Another loan on seventeen- year bonds advertised June 25 met with so unflattering a reception that it had to be withdrawn on the 2d of July.
L
234 HlSTOBY OF THE GBEENBACK8
The outstanding certificates of indebtedness had monnted to $162,000,000 and there were unpaid requisitions on the treasurer of $72,000,000. The expenditures were $2,250,000 a day, while the income f rom customs was hardly more than sufficient to pay the coin interest on the debt, and even the secretary's overestimate made the daily receipts from inter- nal taxes but $750,000/ Add to this the fact that there was little chance of quick improvement becanse Congrees had delayed passing the revenae bilis until the last day of Jone, and the unhappy state of the fínances becomes apparent.' • Under the combination of unf avorable circnmstanoes it is not strange that the valué of the currency fell rapidly. News of Mr. Chase 's resignation carne to New York July 1, and was declared by the World to mean that the treasury was practically bankrupt.* This seems to have been the construc- tion generally put on the resignation at fírst, and it was not until July 7 that the Tribune denied this story and declared that Chase withdrew simply because he and the president could not agree on a successor to Mr. Cisco. Senator Fes- senden's appointment produced a temporary reaction, but Early's raid was creating too much consternation to allow of much improvement. Sunday, July 10, he was within ten miles of Washington, where there was no forcé that seemed capable of withstanding his veterana Next day the price of gold touched 285 — the highest valué of the war — that is, the currency fell to a specie valué of $35.09.* Though the crisis was passed, the market yielded stubbornly. Feesen-
i Cf. Report of the Sccrctary of the Treasury, Deoember, 1854, pp. 19, 20, and Part I, chap. v, sec. ii, above.
* The tariff act, the ways and means act, and the internal revenue act were all approved June 30.— 13 Statute» at Largc, pp. 202, 218, 223.
a See the reply of the Tribune, July 7.
* After the regular market had closed for the day, tran&actions in gold at a stUl higher price are said to have taken plaoe. Mkdberrt telU a circumstantial story of a frightened Missouri banker who bought $100,000 of gold at 310, in Men and Myteric* of WaUStreeU p. 25a
Specie Valué of the Papeb Cubbenoy 235
den's attempt to relieve the treasury by securing a loan from the banks f ailed on account of the limitations imposed by the subtreasury law, and the seven-thirty loan which he advertised on the 25th of July was not very well received.1 Consequently while the currency reached $40.98 on the 15th, it fell back again and closed for the month at about $39.
Contemporary observers were wont to declare that this extraordinary rise of the premium after the gold room had been reopened was due solely to a well-concerted córner which had been arranged while the gold bilí was still in forcé.1 When one examines the military and financia^ situation, however, one fínds little gronnd for sorprise that the credit of the federal treasury was at a low ebb in the first half of July. No doubt the "bulls" in the gold room were doing their utmost to raise the price, but their signal triumph over the " bears " would have been impossible had July, 1864, been like July, 1863, a month of great sub- scriptions to national loans and decisive victories in the field.
5. The rise froin Augusta 1864, to May, 1865. — In Au- gust there was a slow but tolerably steady appreciation in the valué of the currency, due to the improving military prospect. Sheridan took command in the Shenandoah, and while he accomplished nothing decisive against Early un til September, all fear of the capture of Washington was removed. Grant was able at last to resume the offensive against Lee, and by feinting with his right wing succeeded in seizing the Weldon railway with his left and holding it against fíerce assaults. In the South Sherman continued his flanking movements against Atlanta, and Farragut cap- tured the Confedérate vessels in Mobile bay and reduced
i Part I, chap. y, sec. ü, p. 125, atore.
*Cf. Medberrt, op. ctí., p. 250; Cornw allis, op. cif., p. 10; Chase 'b letter of Jone 21, to Jay Cooke, Wabden, op. ciL, p. 606; editorial artioles of New York Tribuna, July 8 and 15.
236 HlSTOBY OF THE GfiEENBACKS
the forta The rate of advance, however, was checked by the condition of the fínances. At one time the unpaid requisitions reached $130,000,000, ! and the secretary'e attempts to sell bonds were but moderately successfuL
Early in September news carne of the captare of Atlanta, and later in the month Sheridan defeated Early at Opeqnan and Fisher's Hill. The meeting of the Democratic conven- tion in Chicago at the very end of August had caused a reaction, but this was overeóme by the good news from the front, and the average valué of the curreney for the month as $5.50 abo ve that for the previous month.
During October the appreciation continued, for though Kautz's cavalry was defeated on the 7th and lost its gnus, Hood in his advance into Tennessee was repulsed at Alla- toona Pass and Resaca, Sheridan destroyed Early's army at Cedar Creek, Lieutenant Cushing sank the "Albemarle" with a torpedo, and the cruiser " Florida " was captured. In November there was a curious reaction, due mainly to the presiden tial election. Mr. Lincoln' s triumph was taken to mean an indefinito continuation of the war, and so depressed the valué of the government's notes. In a military way the most important event was that Sherman cut connections with the North and started from Atlanta on his march to the sea. Hood meanwhile was still pressing north, while the imperturbable Thomas continued quiet preparations for his reception at Nashville. Schofield's withdrawal from the fíeld after the battle of Franklin was construed as a defeat.
The interrupted rise recommenced in Deoember when word was received from Sherman that he had reached the sea in perfect safety and taken Savannah. A little later Thomas destroyed Hood's army at the battle of Nashville. The favorable effect of these great successes was partially neutralized by the disappointment felt over Secretary Fes-
i Report of the 8ecrttary of the Treatury, Deoember, 1854, p. H.
Specie Valué of the Paper Cubbengt 237
senden's finance report, by a curious bilí introduced into the Honse of Representatives by Thaddeus Stevens imposing penalties apon anyone who should pay more than its face valué for gold coin, or leas than its full valué for paper money,1 and by Butler's failure to take Fort Fisher.
In January Terry did what Butler had failed to do by capturing Fort Fisher, and Sherman got ready for his march north from Savannah. On the 23d an attempt to destroy Grant' s shipping in the James failed. These events, with the prevalence of peace rumora, sufficed to continué the gradual advance of the currency. In February Grant's attempt to turn the Confedérate Unes at Hatcher's Run was unsuccess- ful, but Charleston and Wilmington fell in consequence of Sherman's advance. The failure of the " peace conf erence" at Hampton Roads was depressing. Still, the rise continued until the currency regained the level which it had held in October before the relapse caused by the election.
In March the very slow rate of appreciation suddenly became very rapid, because of the opening of the spring campaign. Word carne March 14 from Sherman, who had not been heard from since early in February, that his army had safely reached Laurel Hill, in North Carolina ; and later carne reporta of his victories at Averysboro and Bentonville. Meantime Sheridan joined Grant before Petersburg. Lee's position becoming desperate, he made a last assault upon the encompassing lines, but was driven back. Then Grant began the advance that was to end the war. In Wash- ington President Lincoln's second inauguration occurred, and Senator Fessenden was replaced by Hugh McCulloch as secretary of the treasury. All this was favorable, and the average valué of currency for the month was $8.80 higher than it had been in February.
i The full text of this bilí may be found in the New York Tribuna, December 10, US4. For its effeot apon the gold market see ibid., money árdeles, December 6 and 7.
23 S HlSTOBY OF THE GrEENBAOKS
In the fírst t wo weeks of April matters culminated with the victory of Five Forks, the capture of Petersburg and Richmond, Lee's retreat and surrender. A little later Sher- man took Raleigh, and Johnston's army capitulated. Presi- dent Lincoln's death was the one untoward event Not- withstanding it, the currency gained $9.80 over March.
During May there was a fnrther advance of $6.40 above the average for April. Armed resistance ceased, President Davis was captured, and the war was over. Moreover, Jay Cooke was meeting with great success in selling seven-thirty notes to obtain funds for paying the army. In these last three months of the war there was an appreciation above Pebrnary of $25.
6. Decline from June to December, 1865. — After the war was over, the gold market became calm, indeed, com- pared with what it had been. Great fluctuations gave place to slight variations from day to day. A reaction natarally followed on the fírst joy caused by the cessation of hostili- ties. May 11 marked the high-water point — $77.82. After that there was a slow decline. Although the seven-thirty loan was readily subscribed, it led to a great increase of the debt. Moreover, there was some danger of war with France because of Napoleones maintenance of Maximilian in México. By November the currency had depreciated $5.70 below the level for May.
In December there was a slight reaction, due to McCul- loch's fínance report recommending a speedy resumption of specie payments and the warm indorsement of this policy by the House of Representativos. *
i See Part I, chap. t, sec. iii, above.
y
CHAPTER IV
PRICES
I. Fatkner's Table of Relative Prices:
Price Data of the Aldrich Report — Criticisms of Falkner's Príce Table — Effect of Using Price Quotations for Different Months.
[I. A New Table of Relative Prices by Quarters :
Method of Construction — Data Employed — Range of Fluctua- tions — Aríthmetic Mean of Relative Prices — Discrepancy between New Figures and Falkner's — Grouping of Closely Related Price Series — Second Series of Aríthmetic Means — Treatment of South- ern Products — Third Series of Aríthmetic Means — Median of Related Prices.
[I. Relative Prices Paid by the Federal Oovernment for Supplies: Data Employed — Resulte of Computations — Comparison with Wholesale Prices.
V. Relative Prices of Various Necessities at Retail:
Weeks's Report on Retail Prices — Relative Prices of Twenty-three Commodities at Wholesale and at Retail — Relative Retail Prices of Sixty Commodities — Comparison with Wholesale and Govern- ment Prices.
V. General Causes of the Price Fluctuations Other than the Currency: Government Purchases — Diminished Supply of Southern Staples — War Taxation — Rise of Money Wages — Speculation — Quan tity of Money — International Trade Relations — Decline in Valué of Gold.
rI. The Currency as a Cause of the Price Fluctuations:
Concomí tan t Variations of Prices and the Premium — Conclusión
i. falkner's table of relative prioes
For the study of prices during the Civil War the most opious and trustworthy source of material is the report upon Vholesale Prices, Wages, and Transportation made by Mr. Lldrich from the Senate Committee on Finance in 1893.1 n Part I of this document there is an elabórate table, com-
i Señóte Report No. 1394, 52d Cong., 2d Seas, (four parte), pp. 658, 1966. For the ike of brevity this document is hereafter cited simply as the Aldrich Report.
OQQ
240 HlSTOBY OF THE GBEENBACK8
piled under the direction of Professor Roland P. Falkner, the statistician of the committee, showing the relativo pricee at wholesale of some 230 commodities each year from 1860 to 1891. As the base from which variations in price are ineasured in this table is 1860, a proper starting-point for investigating the effect of the legal-tender acts upon pricee, it may seem that the present chapter can be confined to an analysis of Professor Falkner's carefully elaborated resnlts. Slight examination of the table, however, suffices to show that it cannot be accepted as a satisfactory índex of the courso of prices during the war.
In the fírst place, Falkner' s table gives but a single index numlx^r for each year, and therefore does not enable one to investiga te in any detail the point of primary interest — the relation between the fluctúa tions of prices and the constantly ohanging premium on coin. Second, the prices of the single commodities used in compating the average relativo price for each year do not all refer to the same month. In col- lecting material, Professor Falkner explains, an attempt was mado to get four quotations each year for every article. In a few cases, however, this was not possible, and it was necee- aary to take instead average prices for the year. Where the prices weiv obtained by quarters the analysis proceeded on the hasis of the quotations for January. "An exception to this rule is inade. of course," he continúes, "for articles for which the January price is not the distinctive price for the year, as for fresh vegetables and the like. Thus, in the coet of potatoee^ October is taken as the t y pical month, but the exeeptions to the rule that January is the basis of the com- parison an» very few. " l
lt is probable that in years of lees violent price fluctoa- tioos this use of some quotations for July, for example, in fdace of quotatious for January wouki make little» if any,
Pbices 241
difference in the general average for all commodities. But in the years of the Civil War the case is different. The tablea of the last chapter show that the specie valué of the currency in which all pnces were reckoned, fell 40 per cent, between January and July, 1864, and rose 52 per cent, be- tween January and July, 1865. When one is trying to ascertain what effect changes in the specie valué of the cur- rency had upon prices, it is clearly inadmissible to include in the índex numbers for years marked by such extraordinary perturbations relative prices for both January and July.
Ñor is this point one of merely theoretical significance. To determine how frequent is the use of quotations for other months than January, I have recomputed from the original data in Part II of the AJdrich Report all the relative prices given in Table I for 1865. The result indicates that the cases of divergence from the general rule of using the Janu- ary price are much more numerous than Professor Falkner's language would lead one to infer. Of the 222 relative prices for that year only 99 are based on quotations for January. Of the remainder, 74 refer to unstated months or to averages for the year, 26 to July, 6 to March, 6 to the average of January and July, 4 to February, and 7 to various other months.1
i As these statements seem in some measure inoonsistent with the impressioo giren by the language of the report, I append a list of the relatire prices for 1865 that are not based on January quotations :
1. Time within year not specifled : flsh, mackerel, No. 1, No. 2, No. 8; lard, pnre leaf ; meat, bacon clear and ham ; salt, coarse solar, and fine boiled; blankets, cot- ton warp, all wool fllling; broadcloths, flrst and second qnality ; eassimeres, Nos. 1, 2, and 3 ; checks ; hides ; horse blankets ; shawls ; solé leather ; wool, médium and fine ; anvils ; bar-iron ; door knobs ; iron rails ; iron rods ; lead, pig. No. 2 ; locks, mortise and rim; meat cutters; nails; pig iron; pocketknives, Nos. 1 to 25; saws. Nos. 1 to 4; scythes; carbonate of lead; maple boards; oak boards; shingles, Nos. S and 4 ; calomel ; glycerine ; glassware, Nos. 1 to 5.
2. July: starch, corn, No. 2; calicó; print cloths. Nos. 1 and 2; iron wire; brick; cement ; chestnut logs ; hemlock logs ; lime ; oxide of zinc ; pine boards, Nos. 1, 3, 5, and 6; pine logs; putty; shingles, No. 1; sprace boards; tar; turpentine; window glass. Nos. 1 to 4; starch, ordinary laundry.
8. Average of January and July: doors; hemlock boards; pine boards, Nos. 2, 4, and 7 ; pine shingles, No. 2.
242 HlSTOBT OF THE Grkenbacks
Precisely how great an effect these very freqaent devia- tíon» from the rule have apon Falkner's index nnmber for 1 8<!5 ít j« impossible to tell. In eleven of the above cases oí deviation tbe príce for the other month ia identical with that for Jaunary, bnt in tbe majority of instances where a Jann- ary qaotation is available for comparíson the difference is considerable. Perhaps tbe best way to get a qnantitative eipression of this difference is to examine tbe case of tbe twenty-tbree commodities for which botb Jannary and July pnces are giren in tbe exhibits, bnt wbere tbe relativo pricee for 1865 are baaed on the latter qaotation. The average relativo príce of these articles for Jannary is 268, for July 202 — a difference of 66 points.
It is evident tbat Profeasor Falkner's average which includes relativo príceB based upon these twenty-three Joly qnotationB, to eay notbing of the mnch larger nomber of relativo prices based upon quotations for other months besides January, cannot show the trae average relativo príce of the 222 articles for January, or for any single month, or for the year as a wholo, and therofore cannot with propríety be cooiparod with tbe premium on gold for any single month or f<>r tbe year.1 Cloarly, then, all thooght of using tho table of relativo prices in the form in which it is pnblisbed in the ropurt for invostigating tbe relation botween tbe ríse of prices and tbe depreciation of the cnrrency in relation to specie must be given up.'
*. Marah i plato «lass. Nos. t to 8.
5. Februarj: llih, ood; meat, boef loins, bwf ribj, and amttun.
8, A|.ril: oarpeU, Wlltoo; lUrah, Ontario.
1. Oelober: mal. anthracita, pea; potatoes. No. !.
». Mí, : poarder. rifle. So. i.
10. NoTembrr: potatovs. Ni.. 1.
iProfMwr Falkü-r. .iierWiiim the nalor* of bis ateraae, dtotojM U» arenca rala ti™ prlon tor each j^ar from 1*2 (o 1878 bj the prorninm un «oíd In Jannarj, and lana obtaiu a Ubi* which ho falla " Belatire Frióos in Uold." -IbitL, p. SO.
i Other uh)«(i..ni niiíhi be nrfed ajmiiist Falkner'a «ble, mch ai tía* i m Jaiba Of man? .lilT,.ront asri» for rJlafalIr diffpnnt forma ol ti» tama a niele, ato. Bul «bal ha* bean aaid la lulbcient to tbow tha masón for nompilin» a naw tabla.
Pbices 243
Fortunately, while the table of relative pnces published in Part I of the Aldrich Eeport is thus unsui table for the present parpóse, all of the material from which that table was constructed is published at length in the "Exhibits" of Part II. As this collection of data was made from authen- tic sources with scrupulous care, the student who fínds that he cannot employ Professor Falkner's averages is able in many cases to go back to the original material and compile from it new tables specially adapted to his needs. This is the task attempted in the next section.
II. A NEW TABLE OF RELATIVE PBICES BT QUABTEBS
The preceding criticism of Falkner's table of relative pnces indicates what shonld be the distinctive features of the new table. First, in order that the comparison between the fluctuations of prices and of gold may be as full as pos- sible, it is desirable that several index nambers shoald be # obtained for each year — the more the better. The attain- ment of this desiderátum in partial measore is made possible by the fact that for a large number of articles prices are given four times a year — for January, April, July, and October, and in a very few cases for February, May, August, and November. Second, in order that the meaning of the averages shall be clear when they are obtained, all articles that are not quoted in this manner must be excluded. By observing these two rules, a table can be made that will show the relative prices of a considerable number of commodities at four dates in each year for the period of the Civil War.
Two points remain to be settled — What prices shall be used as the basis upon which to compute variations, and, How shall the average of the price variations of the single commodities be struck? On the fírst point it seems well to follow the precedent set by Professor Falkner and take the quotations for January, 1860, as the basis, except in
244 HlBTOBY OF THB GREENBACK8
cases wbere the qnotation for some other month or for the year as a whole is clearly more representativo.1 As prices remained nearly stationary during this whole year and the first quarter of 1861, the general resolte obtained in this fashion will not vary appreciably from those that might be obtained from the use of the average for the year 1860, or for the fífteen months from January, 1860, to April, 1861. The advantage of the course chosen is that it facilitates comparison with Falkner's table.
The mime reason may be given for taking a simple arith- tnetic uicnn of the several relativo prices each quarter as the firnt average. Afterward other methods of averaging will be tried. Weights, however, will not be in place in any of the averages that may be employed in this chapter. When otio is concerned simply with ascertaining what effect mone- tAry conditions have had upon prices, the importance of a ootnmodity for purposes of consumption is a wholly irrelevant fftct, To take a concrete illastration, the flactnations in the ( prico of cotton, while more signifícant than the flactnations of, sAy, wood-screws, when a compntation is being made of the increase in cost of living, are mnch leas signifícant when the effect of the greenlwck issnes upon prices is the snbject of investiga tion. In the following tables, therefore, all com- modities will be treated precisely alike, so far as the qnanti- tie«* produced or eonsumed are concerned.
Kxamination of Table XI of Part II of the Aldriek Refh>ri* from which Falkner%s table of relative prices was made, shows that then? are tolerably complete series of quartorly quotations for 120 commodities. In Part IV there i* a supplemontary table (XXI) that fnrnishes two more series. Flirt hor, as thore i» no reason for excluding from the inves- tigat ion any olas* of oommodities for which the requisito data ar* obtamable, thirtecn more series may be added for the
Pbiobs
246
farm producís grouped by themselves in Table X of Part II. This makes a total of 135 nominally distinct articles — a num- ber considerably smaller than that included in Falkner's table, but largor than the nnmber inclnded in some of the currently received foreign tablea. The relative pnces of these commodities have been compnted in the usual f ashion as per- centages of the quotations for 1860. All of the resulting seríes are published at length in the Appendix.
Anyone who looks over these individual seríes will find that, while there was a very general and violent advance of prices from 1860 to 1865, this advance was far from uni- form. A few of the most extreme examples of dissimilar fluctuations may be presented, side by side to show how great the differences were:
table vm
EXAMPLES OF DIBBIMILAR PKICE FLUCTUATIONS
Gold
1860, January April . . . July . . . October
1861, January April . . .
July
October
1862, January
April
July
October
1863, January April . . .
July
October.
1864, January
April
July
October ,
1865, January
April
July
October ,
|
Silk : Raw Italian |
Cotton: Upland Middling |
Matches |
Mercury |
Wood Scraws |
|
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
100 |
101 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
106 |
98 |
100 |
100 |
81 |
|
100 |
98 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
|
100 |
109 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
|
83 |
117 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
|
78 |
134 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
|
72 |
196 |
100 |
82 |
117 |
|
72 |
327 |
100 |
82 |
117 |
|
72 |
250 |
100 |
82 |
117 |
|
83 |
336 |
100 |
82 |
117 |
|
81 |
509 |
100 |
109 |
117 |
|
75 |
614 |
100 |
127 |
135 |
|
72 |
664 |
100 |
127 |
158 |
|
67 |
627 |
100 |
127 |
158 |
|
67 |
768 |
100 |
142 |
119 |
|
69 |
736 |
100 |
151 |
158 |
|
75 |
691 |
100 |
200 |
158 |
|
89 |
1400 |
208 |
282 |
216 |
|
94 |
1091 |
208 |
346 |
216 |
|
89 |
1091 |
208 |
251 |
216 |
|
100 |
318 |
396 |
182 |
216 |
|
111 |
455 |
396 |
96 |
216 |
|
100 |
400 |
396 |
96 |
216 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 103 102 116 129 145 152 131 148 156 173 258 207 216 149 142 146
ZMr HfSTOBY OF THI GEEE5BACK8
A Jes* spectacular, bnt more comprehensiYe, Yiew oí the fltftg* (A príce fluctuations ma y be had from Table IX, which itorwn the 135 commoditiee claasified each qnarter aooording to the degree of their rifle or fall in prioe.
The chieí valué of such an exhibit is that it emphasizeB a fa/ít that one interested in tracing the effect upon pnces of the monetary changes of the war ia prone to slur over — fiamely, that, however powerful a factor in determining the rníUm of oxchange between dollars and commoditiee, the shift from a apéele to an irredeemable paper standard may have bneti, it waa by no means solely responsible for the changes that took place. Every article booght and sold continued to feel tu undiminished forcé the effect of all changes in the (H)tuliíiona affccting its own particular demand and snpply, aa wnll aa of changes in the specie valué of the currency. Huí fmm the presont point of view all matters that caused prleo fluctuations, except those connected with the cur- reney» are diaturbing factors to be eliminated so fax as possi- ble. To attain thia end it is customary to strike an average of the rolative pnces at stated intervalo on the theory that in auch an average the effect of the conditions peculiar to each article that causo sotne to ríse while others fall will neutral- ice each othor and thua leave evident only those changes oonneotod with the currencv or some other common cause. \*vordinglj\ in Table X are shown the aríthmetic means of the relativo pnce*, of the 135 quarterly series, side by side with Falkner** cx>rrc*ponding figures for 290 commodities.
tn exawining this tablc and the material from which it ia w*tii\ one fimU two matrera that shake coafidence in the ivp*v*enta1i>-e charaetet of the rrenalts. He more obvióos is tKe *tM tnco*t*tdor*h)c dwvwpancr betwera the figmes of the ^**rt^rlr lable and of Falkner** anana! table. l\is discrep- an v , )íimvw, i* moTv apparent than real, and need oasse Uttle ^^Hinw VVmti m hat vas «od in the preoedií^ «kOobi of
|
1 |
jaqowo |
SS2^t-íB'í:,-'5,"rt' :" :" |
|||
|
*inr |
•*• =r^ O »■?! -n-n-- 5SP---H W -rt ■■£ |
||||
|
[jjdy |
o«^2(3Si:BC30'iaM*,""e*"* :*° |
||||
|
¿iinn»r |
r-mi'2iE5gogSaeoc,'e,M,off,HO |
||||
|
i |
J4í|cMí>0 |
— - rr ^ = rj — ■£ m cr w - :. -. — . — |
|||
|
^inr |
H ~ " Si ñ I ^ "" ^'^"j-*^4oe^7-iO |
||||
|
Ijidy |
N<Baaast-t-"ea"cirt" ^ |
||||
|
*«■** |
-SñS22t--*""rH*' :N^ :° |
||||
|
S |
j»qowo |
e0?5í3SÍ3*í,^'^*,'H :°* :rt- :rt |
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|
<i"í- |
0!'Sg82*-',¡, :■ :** t^-4 r" |
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|
lijdv |
<°8¡S5<s=¡'oc:*,C-'rH :M : :" |
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|
ÍJBnODf |
asss-— ñf ::-:••« |
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|
¡ |
joqojoo |
SaSS»"-""^:* ::«::* |
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|
*l»f |
SS23"1— - : A : : : :" |
||||
|
1«"Y |
SSS"™"-" ::::::: :° |
||||
|
ilBOOOf |
¡^«t-*» -. ■ — . |
||||
|
í |
jsqoíool SS"'-*' :~ :::"":.:: :" |
||||
|
J|Df |
SS» ::-::::::::::- |
||||
|
HJdy |
B.t-"- :::::::::« |
||||
|
¿i.umrf |
SS«- ;:::::::::::- |
||||
|
i |
nqowi |
!9ffi<0-' :::::::::: :° |
|||
|
X,nr |
SS» ;::::::::::: :<> |
||||
|
iH^vlaS** :::::: |
|||||
|
^.nD.P |
|||||
|
1 i !, P |
1 i |
- |
'i |
180-174 176-199 200-224 225-249 360-274 276-299 300-349 36039» 400-449 450-490 500-749 750-998 1000+ Relativa p riera lacking |
248
HlSTOBT OF THB GbEENBACKS
TABLE X
ABITH10TIC MRAN OF THB RBLATIVB PRICKS AT WHOLBSALB OF 135
BT QUARTBRS, 1860-65 >
|
135 |
Falkner's |
135 |
Falkner's |
||
|
Dato |
Commodi- |
General |
Date |
Commodi- |
General |
|
ties |
Ayerage |
ties |
Ayerage |
||
|
1860, January . . |
101a |
100 |
1863, January.. |
147 |
149 |
|
April |
102 |
April |
165 |
||
|
July |
100 |
July |
159 |
||
|
October. . |
102 |
October.. |
160 |
||
|
1861, January.. |
98 |
101 |
1864, January.. |
185 |
191 |
|
April |
98 |
201 |
|||
|
July |
94 |
July |
254 |
||
|
October. . |
101 |
October.. |
254 |
||
|
1882, January.. |
111 |
118 |
1865, January.. |
262 |
217 |
|
April |
111 |
211 |
|||
|
July |
115 |
July |
193 |
||
|
October. . |
130 |
October.. |
213 |
the elementa from which Falkner's average is constructed, it follows that the two averages would not agree, even were the list of articles included in both identical. The use of so many quotations for other months than January necessarily makee Falkner's figure higher than that in the other table for January in years when pnces were rising, and lower in yeare when pnces were falling. As the observed discrepancies are
i A table somewhat like the aboye was made in 1895 by Misa S. McLkav Habdt and published in the Journal of Political Economy, VoL ni, p. 158. Her table, how- erer, corored only the quarters from January, 1881, to Jannary, 1865, inclusire, and eotttained 114 instead of 135 commodities. She omitted the thirteen farm producta, raw silk, and tin plates from Table XXI of the Aldrich Report, and calicó, denims, tíekincs, añoréis, castor oil, and jute from Table XI. The omiasion of the last two articles of this list alone is explained, bot the reasons giren — that the prioe of jote is expressed part of the time in gold and that there is a chance in the nnit of meas* «re applied to castor oil — do not apply to the period coTcred by either table. I haré not been able to use Miss Hardy'9 figures oven for the articles and quarters commoo to both tablea, boca use of the discovery of numeróos errors in her computations. Most of these, however, are minute, and the only case in which they seem apprecia- bly to affect the general result is in October, 1861, when her table, apparently beeaust of a mistake in addition, shows a very sudden ádranos from 95 to 125, foUowed by a Cali to 113. In no other quarter is the difference between Misa Hardy's resulta for HA commodities and mine for 135 greater than four points.
*The reason why the arithmetio mean in January, 1880, is not 100 is that the relalJTe priers of agricultural prodoets is based upon the arerage prioes for four quarters, and, of course, the January prioe is in most cases abore this aTerage.
Pbioes 249
of this character, they are cause for conñdence rather than for distrnst.
The second reason for doubting the fairness of the quar- terly table as an índex of price movements, though lesa obtrusive, is more serious. On looking over the 135 series that enter into the quarterly table one fínds a considerable number of cases where two or more series of relativo pnces are given for more or less similar varieties of the same com- modities. These cases are as follows: bread — Boston crack - ere, three seríes; beeves — beef loins, beef riba, salt mess beef; sheep, mutton; hogs and pork — pork, salt mess; molasses — New Orleans and Porto Rico; salt — Ashton's, Ashton's Liverpool fine, Turk's Island; sngar — fair refining, Havana brown, refined; vegetables — fresh potatoes, two series; carpets — B ruaseis, ingrain, Wilton; print cloths — metacomet, standard; sngar of lead — brown, white; furni- tnre — chairs, bedroom, kitchen; pails — wooden, two-hoops (two seríes), three-hoops, tubs (four seríes) ; starch — Ontario, pearl, pnre, refined, silver gloss; coal, anthracite — chestnut, egg, grate, stove; copper — ingot, sheet; lead — drop shot, pig, pipe; rope — Manila, tarred American; pine — boards, lamber in log; window-glass — American firsts and thirds, French firsts and thirds.
Now, according to the logic of the average whon used for such a purpose as the present, it is not admissible to include more than one series of relative prices for any single article. For, as has been said, the average is employed here as a device for eliminating price changes due to conditions affecting the snpply and demand of the individual commodities. This elimination is believed to take place because, when a large number of commodities are selected at random, it is probable that the cases where these changes in snpply and demand are in the direction of higher prices will be about as numer- ous as the cases where they are in the direction of lower
250 Histoby op the Gbeenbacks
pnces. But if one commodity is counted two or more times, and others but once, the factors affecting that one commodity are given undue prominence, and the chance is diminished of their being offset by changes of an opposite character in the case of other commodities.1
The inclusión of several series for different varieties of the same article is not quite so objectionable as the counting of a single series several times over, because the chances are small that these different varieties will all be snbject to pre- cisely the same changes of supply and demand. To take the instance of starch, for which the greatest number of series are given in the quarterly table it appears from the table on the following page that no two of the five series showed the same variations.
But while the fluctuations in the relativo prices of the several kinds of any commodity may not be identical — there is a difference of 56 points between the highest and lowest relativo prices of starch in January, 1865 — they usually resemble each other enough to snbstantiate the belief that there are certain broad conditions of supply and demand that affect all the varieties in somewhat the same fashion. By including series for the different varieties these broad conditions are given more prominence than similar conditions affecting other commodities. Theref ore the chance of obtaining an average in which the effect of price changes due to fluctuations in the supply and demand for the varióos commodities is substantially eliminated, seems to be improved by taking but one series for each distinct commodity. But the question what shall be deemed distinct commodities is not easy to answer. The general rule must be that com-
> Of ceñirse, these remarles have no application to index-numbers when raed for pnrposes that make weighted avorages desirable. Frequentlj in such caaes th» weighting can best bo performed by using seyeral series for articles of great impor- tance and but one for the majority of other articles. But, as has been explained weights are to be avoidod when one is investigating the effect of monetary chanfc* apon the general trend of prices.
Pbioes
251
TABLB XI
BBLATTVB PBICB8 OF FITO V ASISTO» OF 8TABOH
Dato
Ontario
1860,
1861,
1862,
1863,
1864,
1865,
Jan.. Apr.. July. Oct.. Jan. . Apr.. July . Oct.. Jan.. Apr.. July . Oct.. Jan.. Apr. . July . Oct.. Jan. . Apr. . July . Oct.. Jan. . Apr. . July . Oct ..
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 110 130 140 130 130 160 180 200 244 240 240 200 200
Pearl
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 92 92 92 92 100 117 125 117 117 142 158 175 192 208 208 175 175
Pura
100 100
100 100 100 100 100 92 92 92 92 100 115 123 115 115 139 154 169 185 200 200 169 169
Reflned
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 93 93 93 93 100 114 121 114 114 136 150 164 179 193 193 164 164
Sil y' r Glosa
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 94 94 94 94 100 113 119 113 113 132 145 158 171 184 184 158 158
Ayera^e
100 100
100 100 100 100 100 94 94 94 94 102 118 126 118 118 142 158 173 194 205 205 173 173
modities are distinct for the present purpose when the con- ditions affecting their production and consumption, their supply and demand, are distinct. This line, however, is diffi- cult to draw because of the many degrees of relationship between different goods. While everyone may admit that the difference between wocden paila with two hoops and with three hoops is not sufficient to entitle the articles to be treated as distinct commodities, there is room for difference of opinión regarding snch articles as brown and refined sugar, Brussels, ingrain and Wilton carpeta, etc. In the present case, I have thonght it best to err rather on the side of drawing the line too strictly than too loosely. With this purpose I have taken the average relativo pnces of all the
252
HlSTOBT OF THE GbBBNBAOKS
above enumerated groups of relatad articles, and reoom- puted the arithmetic mean for each quarter, using theee averages in place of the original seríes. This procedure reduces the number of seríes that enter into the average from 135 to 97. It will be noticed that the new seríes of averages is somewhat higher than the former one from Table X, which is introduced into the new table to facilítate comparison.
TABLE XII
AUTHIRTIC MEAN OF RXLATIVB PRICKS OF 135 OOMMODITCES BKFOU AJTD
AVS&AOINO SERIES FOR DIFFERENT VARIETTES OF THB 8AMB OOMMODITT
Date
1860, January. April . . . July.... October.
1861, January. April . . . July.... October.
1862, January. April . . . July.... October .
|
Before |
After |
|
Ayeraging |
Averaging |
|
Seríes for |
Seríes for |
|
Different |
Different |
|
Varieties |
Varieties |
|
of Same |
of Same |
|
Commo- |
Commo |
|
dity |
dity |
|
101 |
102 |
|
102 |
102 |
|
100 |
100 |
|
102 |
104 |
|
98 |
98 |
|
98 |
98 |
|
94 |
94 |
|
101 |
101 |
|
111 |
114 |
|
111 |
113 |
|
115 |
117 |
|
130 |
134 |
|
Before |
|
|
ÁTeraging |
|
|
Series for |
|
|
Different |
|
|
Date |
Varieties |
|
of Same |
|
|
Commo- |
|
|
dity |
|
|
1863, January.. |
147 |
|
April |
165 |
|
July |
159 |
|
October. . |
160 |
|
1864, January.. |
185 |
|
April .... |
201 |
|
July |
254 |
|
October.. |
254 |
|
1865, J&nuary.. |
262 |
|
April |
211 |
|
July |
193 |
|
October. . |
213 |
After
Series for
Different
Varietiss
of Same
Commo-
dity
154 173 165 166 193 206 264 262 272 216 197 214
One objection against the average, even after the cor- rection has been made for different varíeties of the same commodities, remains to be dealt with. On looking over the amended list of seríes one fínds a number of articles that show extraordinary fluctuations which are clearly due to other causes than the currency — especially the staple southern products, cotton, molasses, sugar, turpentine, and finished producís made of these materíals, like cotton fabrica. It may seem at first sight that there can be no question about the
Pbioes 253
propriety of excluding all such articles from the list on tho ground that their price pertorbations are assignable in large measure to known canses other than the changes in the currency. Bnt, after all, the matter is not so simple. Every seríes in the table has a valne not only as an indication of the effect of the currency on the price of the specific com- modity which it represente, bnt also as bearing within it a corrective for the effect opon the average of changes in the supply and demand of other commodities. If, then, one commodity is thrown ont because the investigator hap- pens to know something of the conditions affecting its demand and supply, there is danger that the effect of oppo- site conditions affecting some other commodity about which he happens to know less will not be offset.
In other words, use of the average to ascertain the effect npon prices of any general cause like the issue of an irre- deemable paper currency, implies reliance npon the laws of chance, and the operation of these laws should not be lightly interf ered with by limiting the number of cases submitted to them. Of course, this reliance upon chance is not and should not be blind. The investigator properly uses his discretion in determining whether the material which he subjects to the process of averaging is of a representativo character. Under this head comes, for example, his liberty to combine series that represent the effects of the same set of particular con- ditions. But the mere fact that he happens to know some- thing of the reasons why one article advanced or fell in price much more than the majority gives him no logical right to throw it out. If he were to commence npon the process of excluding all articles for the deviation of which from the mode he could account, consistency would demand that he make a careful study of the conditions affecting the supply of and demand for all articles in his list and try to distinguish in each and every case between the
254 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS
offects apon price of the monetary conditions and of other factors. But it is precisely because such discrímination of the part played by different causes in prodncing the given result is admitted to be impossible that he has reconrse to the device of the average. When he employs that device at all, he should employ it consistently, and not allow his accidental knowledge of the market conditions affecting cer- tain commodities, and his inevitable ignorance of the market conditions affecting other commodities, to interfere with the operations of the laws of chance.
But, while it would be inconsistent to exelude the whole list of southern produets because the cause of their remark- able advance in price is known, there is the same reason for cutting down the representation of one group of them as for using but a single series for the five different kinds of starch. The extreme advance in the price of cotton caused by the practical cessation of exporta from the South, com- municated itself in large measure to all goods made of cot- ton— print cloths, drillings, shirtings, sheetingB, calicó, denims, and tickings. To include all of these sepárate series would give an undue prominence to the changes in the sup- ply of and demand for cotton, precisely like the undue prominence given to the corresponding particular conditions affecting starch by the use of the five series for it. There- fore it seems probable that the representativo character of the average will be improved by treating cotton and cotton fabrics like the other groups of closely related commodities, i. e.j by substituting for the original eight seríes their aver- age relative price. When tbis change has been made the new average given in the next table side by side with the preceding two is obtained.
The preceding discussion points to the conclusión that the third of these columns has a better claim upon accept- ance as an index of the general trend of price fluctuations
TABLE Iin
UTB1UT1C MKAN Or 1» Bl
|
Dau |
i i m |
í -: % ■T' |
m - ,- |
Dato |
■fe! tí? |
i |
|
|
0 |
•«a |
||||||
|
60, January. |
101 |
102 |
102 |
1803, January. , |
147 |
154 |
149 |
|
102 |
109 |
102 |
106 |
it;í |
169 |
||
|
July |
100 |
100 |
100 |
July |
168 |
166 |
166 |
|
October . |
102 |
101 |
104 |
October . . |
leo |
168 |
154 |
|
81, January. |
86 |
96 |
97 |
1B84, January.. |
185 |
193 |
176 |
|
88 |
301 |
aw |
mt |
||||
|
July |
94 |
94 |
93 |
July |
9N |
264 |
233 |
|
October . |
101 |
101 |
100 |
264 |
262 |
234 |
|
|
62, January . |
111 |
114 |
111 |
1365, January. . |
262 |
279 |
247 |
|
111 |
113 |
11Ü |
211 |
216 |
907 |
||
|
July |
115 |
117 |
113 |
July |
193 |
197 |
184 |
|
October . |
130 |
134 |
124 |
October.. |
913 |
914 |
199 |
tan either of the others. But, granting that this series jsts upon the best arrangement of the available data, the oestíou mny well be asked whether the arithmetic mean is le best method of averaging to employ. It has been ointed out frequently since the days of Jevous that in an rithmetic mean a few cases of extraordinary advance in rice will offset man y cases of decline. As such cases of n usual advance are not wanting in the series eren as finally uended, it seems wise to try some method of striking an rerage not open to this criticism. For this purpose the ledian may be used — that is, the point which divides the hole number of relativo prices each quarter into two equal ronps, one showing advances in price greater than the ledian, and the other lesa. In ascertaining the median, the nal gronping of price series used in making Table XIII has
256
HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS
been used as the basis, and the resulte are presentad side by side with the final set of aríthmetic means from the same table.
TABLEXIY
MEDIAN AND ARITHMCTIC MBAN OF THB 135 8KRIB8 OF BBLAttVB FBZOBB
AGINO ALL CLOSRL.T BMLATBD 8KRIB8
Date
1860, January . .
April
July
October . .
1861, January. .
April
July
October . .
1862, January..
April
July
October . .
|
Median |
Aríthmetic Mean |
|
100 |
102 |
|
100 |
102 |
|
100 |
100 |
|
100 |
104 |
|
100 |
97 |
|
97 |
98 |
|
95 |
93 |
|
100 |
100 |
|
100 |
111 |
|
100 |
110 |
|
103 |
113 |
|
117 |
124 |
|
Date |
Median |
|
1863, January . . |
130 |
|
142 |
|
|
July |
139 |
|
October . . |
140 |
|
1864, January. . |
161 |
|
April |
175 |
|
July |
200 |
|
October . . |
208 |
|
1865, January. |
228 |
|
April |
184 |
|
July |
160 |
|
October . . |
180 |
Aríthmetic Mean
142 162 156 154 176 194 233 234 247 207 184 199
On the whole, I incline to believe that the column show- ing the median is the most trustworthy indication of the general character and degree of price fluctuations that can be obtained from the data for wholesale pnces given in the Aldrich Report. It is interesting, however, to see whether the results thus obtained agree with corresponding figures from other sources. Such material as is available for the parpóse of comparison is analyzed in the next two sections.
III. BELATIVE PBIOES PAID BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
FOB SUPPLIES
In Part IV of the Aldrich Report there is a series of tables showing the prices paid by various bureaos of the federal government for a large variety of articles. From these tables it is possible to obtain fifty series representlng the sums paid contractors for various kinds of food, clothing, and drugs for the years 1860 to 1865, and twenty-nine addi-
Pbices
257
tional series of similar character for 1861 to 1865. In the majority of cases it is stated that the prices are averages for the year, or else the prices are given by months so that an average can be struck ; but in the case of twenty-three of the series the time of the year to which they refer is not explicitly indicated. For this reason, becaose there were probably changes in the quality of the supplies furnished by army contractors from time to time, and because nearly half of the series are for a single class of articles — droga — these data have not so high a character as the data dealt with in sea ii. However, any credible price data deserve a brief analysis, if only for the pnrpose of comparison with the preceding tables. With this end in view the arithmetic means of the series have been computad, fírst before, and second after, grouping the intimately related articles, and then the mediana of the series as they stand after grouping have been ascertained. These three sets of resulte are pre- Bented in the next table side by side with the annual averages of the qnarterly index-numbers obtained by similar methods from the data for wholesale prices:
TABLE xv
RELATTVE PRICES PAID BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR SCPPLTES COMPARO WITH
RELATIVE PRICES IN WHOLESALE MARKJBT8
Date
1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865
|
Arithmetic Mean of All Series Before Grouping of Relat- ed Commodities |
Arithmetic Mean After Grouping of Related Commodi- ties |
||
|
Govern- ment Sup- plies |
Wholesale Market Prices |
Govern- ment Sup- plies |
Wholesale Market Prices |
|
100 |
101 |
100 |
102 |
|
101 |
98 |
101 |
97 |
|
110 |
117 |
109 |
115 |
|
126 |
158 |
123 |
154 |
|
179 |
224 |
176 |
209 |
|
206 |
220 |
202 |
209 |
Median After Group- ing of Related Commodities
Govern- ment Sup- plies
100 100 100 113 173 187
Wholesale
Market
Prices
100 98 105 138 186 188
258 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS
It will be noticed that the grouping of the related series reduces the average relativo prices of government snpplies somewhat lesa than it reduces the average relativo wholesale prices, and the same is trae of the subetitution of the median for the arithmetic mean as an average. Whatever method of grouping and averaging is employed, however, the table indicates that the advance in the price of the commoditiee purchased by the government for which data are available was less than the advance in the price of a somewhat larger list of commoditiee dealt in upon the wholesale markets. Whether this result is due to the imperfections of the materials on which the table is based, or whether it is fairly representativo of the relativo advance in the prices paid by the government and by prívate persona, it is difficult to say. The common opinión has been that tho demand for war sup- plies was a vory important factor in causing the advance of prices and that those articles purchased by the government on a large scale advanced much more in price than the majority of other tilinga. No doubt this opinión is well founded when expressed with reforence to tho fírst year of the war, when there was a sudden as well as a large increase in the quantities of goods ordered by the war and navy departments. To ñll such large orders at once was difficult, and accordingly competing contractors f ound it possible and necessary to advance prices. This condition of affairs is reflected by the table, which indicates that, while there was a general decline in the prices paid in wholesale markets in 1861, tho prices of government supplies did not fall but rose slightly. But one need not be surprised to find that after sufficient time had been given to readjust the machinery of production to meet the government demand and to organ- izo tho intricate business of furnishing supplies, tho very increase in the quantities ordered enabled contractors to supply the majority of articles at an advance in price someu»
Pbices 259
what lesa than purchasers in the open market were asked to pay. While, however, there is no inherent improbability in the resulte of the comparison between the advance in prices paid by government and by prívate persona, the statistical material on which that comparison is based is not of sufficient scope or of sufficiently nniform character to make one comfortably snre of its reliability.
IV. BELATIVE PBIOES OF VABIOUS NEGESSITIBS AT BETAIL
Another interesting body of price data is foond in the twentieth volume of the Tenth Censos, which contains a "Report on the Average Retail Prices of Necessaries of Life in the United States,9' by Joseph D. Weeks. The material for this report was collected by sending a large nnmber of schednles to retail merchants in varióos sections of the country, with the request that they report the prices of specified staple articles in which they dealt. Some 409 returns were received giving the retail prices of abont sixty different commodities for longer or shorter periods of time. As Mr. Weeks says,it is not probable that the articles qnoted by different dealers under the same caption — as, c.gr., rice, cheese, starch, beans, etc. — are all of precisely the same quality. But this fact did not seriously diminish the valué of the material for the calculation of relative prices in Mr. Weeks's opinión, because he thought it " fair to presume that in a given tabulation the price of the same quality or grade of each article, as near as is possible, is quoted for the different years, as the report is made by the same person and of the prices at the same shop." l
While the material thus collected was tabulated with care and published at length in Mr. Weeks's report, no attempt was made to analyze or combine the different series for the same or different articles in such a manner as to show the
i P. 2 of the " Report."
It . -:**¡ui*utl}-, little. if
ndii.'. • - 'ir.v by studcnis nf
rtuiTi-v- _ ..- --T^t u¡)i>n thc vi-ry
|irifi-- -■v-tQ tile Huctuntions
fnr !■ ... vvver, it seoiiiH wll
uf»' . "-VrtíkB'B data f»r tlu-
¡mi! _ :. ^1 thu mctliods raed
l„n-, . •■■■/, Er¡¡oH.
vnif '■ - " whit'li tliis Oiisns
lisi ■ . .-salí1 prk-t' liets of tlii1
Wl- - 'v-nty-thn'i' comimxli-
riift- • ' bf idéntica!, ur very
n|. ■ ^jmrison betwwn tln-
|h- - i-./ieeaU1 and at rvtiiil.
Tin . *."-í ceiiHoa Renes usi'd
!■[.. - : thi- year, whíle the
|,r
:.t ft'iir iiKtnths only . ■ , iiul Octobtrr. It i* - -\gi> ¡"rices of tlii'se four ■o ínr tln.' ywir— a pn>- .-*.,: of otlier taliles te» 1*' .w .vmparisun is ¡jiveu in je n-sults is presen ted in
-> \: rv:«il cuntinued to cor-
i .-.-.s in whi'WnU* pnces,
:'.-.c paper cunvni'y, Iml
*.■._;„-.-:•.. t*n<iu the li^ures
:■■■ ;~ ::. lln> ppriüi; and
. -w^«-. :i .•: re in i: tan ees fri>m
.': \\ ¡v.-ius.- ii w:i- ■.:.-.■ ;.;-: tiuurtiT of I he
Pbiobs
261
|
TABLEXVI BBLATTVB PBICB8 OF TWBMTI-THBXB 0OMM0DX* TIB8 AT WHOLBBAIB AND AT BBTAXI«1 |
|||||
|
Datb |
Avebagb Pbiobs Pbb Ybab |
||||
|
Whole- sale |
Reteil |
||||
|
1860.. |
100 88 105 138 221 222 206 |
100 |
|||
|
1861.. |
107 |
||||
|
1862.. |
129 |
||||
|
1863.. |
165 |
||||
|
1864.. |
211 |
||||
|
1865.. |
214 |
||||
|
1866.. |
208 |
||||
year.' On the other hand, the advance of wholesale prioee from 1863 to 1864 under the stimulus of the paper issues was more prompt and more considerable than the advance of pnces at retail. Finally wholesale pnces fell rather more rapidly when the war ended and the paper money began to appreciate in valué.
The uses of the censas data, however, are not exhausted by this comparison of the relative pnces of the articles which appear both in the Weeks and the Aldrich Report. Similar materials are given for the retail pnces of thirty-seven other commodities, and it will be well to employ all the data available in the compntation of a new set of index-nnmbers. While the whole number of commodities inclnded by Mr. Weeks's investigation (sixty) is less than half as great as the number in the preceding quarterly tables and is only one- quarter as great as that in Falkner's table, it is still con- siderable enough to afford a fair average. In transcribing the actual pnces as given in the census volume, all seríes
i While the number of articles inclnded in this table is not large, the ehaages in the relativo retail prices are almost identical with those of the flfty-eifht articles for which prices are given below from the same souxee. On the aTerage there are more than ten series from different towns for each of the twenty-three articles,
a See Table XIV abo?e.
2G0
HlSTOKT OF T1I1-:
general trend of price movcnit . any, ose has ever been madi> nf prices. In the hope of gofting interesting question of the rclnti of prices at wholesale and at r- worth while to se© what can t»- ■■ years of the Civil War by applv:- in dealing with the material <>f
A collation of the list nf »r: report gives retail prices wllli ' Ahlrich Report shows tliat Mí- tica included in both Bourccf* ti similar. This fact maltes ■ relativo prices of these ar' There is, howevor, onc* m*»' purport to show nvi;riig<- Aldrich Beries givo rehuí in most (.-asea Januuiv . ■ ■ .. accordingly neeessnry lu > ■ - months as representiny i' cednre that seems fnun legitímate. The full il- 1 ^..* the Appendix and a »ui[> f r¡
Table XVI. Ti*
This table indicatea \m * ** respond roughly with t1- 7':* despite the disturba» i r. « t
that their movements wwr ' ■ * -J¡ it seems that tlio fall infri '•*.'. '<* suuimer of 18G1 can* ■ } ^ *
the South that embar: was not rcflectetl ii i ■ - followed by the sharjn*, Nf
1 fiimpnrp Pjtt I. chup. 1. ;
• «vtu-'iriT said to gire la-i.-tmise was neces- Kití it reduces con-
K-ina-íeB, 556 are left
__».. t -jach of the sixty ...ile Beries of reía- . ,-tru to form a single ._— . wre treated aa the n.» ■J«t referred. The _? .-pwndix and a notion ¿s .jcmed from the next
|
-1* |
|||||
|
¿■a w¡ |
un |
IBM |
da |
IM |
|
|
:ai i« |
■90 |
402 |
xt |
296 |
|
|
:ui |
119 |
m |
1SM5 |
ltifi |
L5I |
|
:ut |
1-3 |
w-i |
3f. |
213 |
-11 |
|
\%ST |
114 |
i -7* I |
196 |
196 |
«<I3 |
|
ytt |
m |
tu |
|:vj |
102 |
193 |
|
* |
112 |
lüfl |
1W |
187 |
107 |
|
3* |
n |
las |
1ÍY7 |
100 |
161 |
|
3J» |
ni |
m |
136 |
Efil |
158 |
|
m U7 |
ni |
IBS |
187 |
186 |
|
|
* 112 |
127 |
1S0 |
155 |
159 |
|
|
*> 107 |
1.30 |
102 |
183 |
1>2 |
|
|
SM 118 |
l.V! |
17:1 |
17t! |
171 |
|
|
* 107 |
m |
131 |
i:«.i |
139 |
|
|
» "» |
ra |
151 |
160 |
156 |
|
|
" |
un |
105 |
w |
¿11 |
301 |
PBI0E8 263
4
In . this table the average relativo price is not the aver- age of the índex numbers of the groups, bnt the average of the relativo prices of the fifty-eight commodities. Board is excluded from the average becanse of the proba- bility that the character of the food furnished at moet boarding-houses changed very much as the restdt of the advance in prices.
As in the case of the wholesale-price tables, a considerable variety is to be observed in the price movements of the different groups. For example, in 1865 dry goods, which here consist entirely of cotton fabrica, show an advance of 264 per cent, over the prices prevailing before the war, while físh show an increase of 55 and house rent of bnt 36 per cent. A stndy of the 556 series given in the Appendix from which the averages for the several groups have been made will diBcover still greater divergencies. Even in the case of the same articles the relative change in the retail price in different towns is by no means uniform, for the equalizing effect of competition is much less felt in the case of prices at retail than at wholesale. But the number of quotations used is considerable enough to give some ground for accept- ing the general average as fairly representativo of the fluctu- ations in the retail prices of some of the most important articles of daily consumption.
In order to make possible comparisons with what have been regarded as the better forma of the preceding tables, a new series of arithmetic means and one of mediana have been computed from the above data after grouping the closely related commodities. The results of these computations with the corresponding figures for wholesale prices and for government supplies are shown in Table XVIII. In order to make the character of the material more uniform, ordinary commodities alone are included — that is, the series for board aud house rent are not used.
264
HlSTOBT OF THE GkEENBACKS
TABLE XVIH
AUTIMinO MEAN AND MEDIAN OF EELATIVE EBTAIL, WHOLESALE AMD MENT PEICBE, ATTEE AVEEAQINQ 8EEIE8 FOE EELATED AETICLES
|
9 |
Aeithmetic Mean of |
Media* of |
||||
|
Dati |
Relatire RetaU Prioes |
RelaÜTe Wholesale Prioes |
Relatire P rices of GoYernm't Suppiies |
RelatiTe RetaU Pnces |
BelatiTe Wholesale Prioes |
Relative Prioes of Gorernm't 8opplies |
|
1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 |
100 105 121 150 184 191 |
102 97 115 154 209 209 |
100 101 109 123 176 202 |
100 103 115 144 172 181 |
100 98 105 138 186 188 |
100 100 100 113 173 187 |
When the differences between the sourcee from which the data for these three sets of averages are drawn, the lista of articles which enter into them, and the character of the material, are taken account of, the correspondence between them must be regarded as fairly cióse. Confídence in the representativo character of each series is materially inereased by the confirmation borne by the other two. The greateat advance is shown by the largest and most folly authenticated set of series — that for wholesale prioes. Re- taU prioes, on the contrary, show the steadiest movement — a faot that may be dne in part to the lees complete organi- sation of retail markets and in part perhaps to the fact that the series used for each commodity in making up the table is itaelf an average of several series from different towns.
V. ORNRRAL OAUSSS OF THE PRICE FLÜCTÜATIONS OTHER
THAN THE CURRENOT
The tablea in the three preceding sections present the (acta coneerning the price changes of the Civil War as folly us they can be ascertained from the available data by the cuiuuion inethods of analysia Bnt, while a price table may
Pbices 265
show with approximate fairness the general trend of price movements, it does not show to what causes these move- ments are due. The only help a table gives in solving this problem is by eliminating the eflfect of fluctuations in the particular supply of and demand for single commodi- ties or small groups of commodities. But if changos of a tolerably uniform character have taken place in the supply of and demand for a large number of the commodities in- cluded in the table, their effect will not be eliminated by the process of averaging. Before concluding that the resulta shown by the price tables were produced by the issue of the greenbacks, it is therefore necessary to consider what other general causes of price perturbations were active during ¿he Civil War. Such a study is the more imperativo because oontemporary observers were in many cases inclined to ascribe the price disturbances mainly to other factors than the currency.
Two of these other factors on which much stress has been
laid have already been noticed briefly — government pur-
chases and the interruption in the supply of southern
products. On the whole, there seems to be much more
danger of o ver- than of underestimating the importance of both
these causes. The government demand for many articles
i was not at all an increase in the whole amount required by
I the community, but amounted merely to a change in the
j channel through which the commodities reached their con-
í sumers. For example, the War Department purchased each
y ear thousands of uniforma and vast quantities of rations ; but
had the volunteers remained at honie, they would doubtless
have bought nearly as much clothing and eaten an equal
amount of food. While the demand for certain kinds of food
and clothing was increased, the demand for other kinds fell
off in nearly the same degree. Indeed it is not unlikely
that the increase of price from the former cause was less
266 HlSTORT OF THE GbEENBAOKS
considerable than the decrease from the latter, becanse a given quantity can be fornished at lower pnces when there is but little variety in quantity and style, as in the case of army uniforma and rations, than when there is a great diver- sity in these respecta as is the case with food and clothing used by the general public. Finally, if the war increased the total demand for certain articles, like lead, it indirectly decreaaed the total demand for others, like brick.1 Such opposite changes in the demand for different articles may be ezpected to neutraliza each other in the averages of a large price table. But speculative analysis is not the only reeort in dealing with this question. It has already been shown th^t there is available a considerable body of statistical data regarding the pnces paid by government bureans for war supplies, and that these data indicate an average increase rather less than that indicated by other data for ordinary wholesale markets. If one accepts the evidence, therefore, one must conclude that this factor is responsible in very slight degree, if at all, for the great advance in pnces shown by the tablea.
Much the same must be said of the interruption in the supply of the staple producta of the Confedérate statee. The diminished supply of cotton, tar, turpentine, etc., cauaed a spectacnlar advance in their pnces ; but it is also trae that the cessation of southern demand for northern products tended to lower the prices of the latter articles. The latter effect was much less noticeable than the former, becanse less extreme, but it was probably felt by a larger number of com- modities. In the preceding price tablea, as they stand after the grouping of cotton and cotton fabrica under a single series, there seems little reason to fear that the peculiar con- ditions affecting the few aouthern products included in the list exercise undue influence upon the general averages —
i Relatirely few new baildings seern to haré been constracted durinff the war.
Pbices 267
especially when the median is substituted for the aríthmetic mean.1
A third much-emphasized factor in causing the advance of pnces was the war taxation. In its need of revenue the federal government subjected almost all imported articles to heavy customs duties, and levied internal taxes upon almost all articles produced within the cotintry. These taxes, it has been held, were equivalent to a general ulerease in cost of prodnetion and as snch were added to the selling prices of produets.8
This contention raises a most complex qnestion which it is obviously impossible to disenss fully in this place — namely, the incidence of the war taxes. But a little consideration serves to show that the danger again lies in nndnly exaggerating rather than in unduly minimizing the importance of the factor. For, in the fírst place, not all of the internal taxes at least were of a nature to be shifted — e, g., the tax npon incomes was not. And, second, the shifting of the taxes npon manufactures, sales, etc., was seriously impeded by the very universality of the levies. A tax npon a few competitivo producís is usually trans- ferred to the consumere, because, unless they will submit to the addition of the tax to the price, the prodneers out of whose pockets the money is taken in the first instance have the alternativo of gradually turning their attention at least in part to nntaxed branches of industry. But when nearly all branches of industry are taxed at a tolerably uniform rate, as was the case during the Civil War, there is no sucb alternative open to the producen He must pay the tax out of his profíts and sell at the oíd rates, or add all or a part
i For, as stated above, an advance in relative prioe very mnch in excess of the arerage, has no more effect upon the median than an advanoe very little in ezoess of the arerage.
»See, e. g.¡ J. S. Gibbons, The Public Debt of the United State» (New York, 1887), pp. 219-32.
268
HlSTOBY OP THE GbEENBAOKS
of the tax to his price and submit to a diminished volóme of sales in consequence. Which policy will be pursued will depend upon a nnmber of circumstances, such as the elasticity of the demand for the producís taxed, the closeness of com- petition among producen», etc. If this statement be true, it is clearly inadmissible to assume that in the case of all articles the full amount of tax was added to the price, though some addition must have been made in many cases on this account. It is accordingly impossible to determine, by reasoning upon the incidence of the internal taxes, how much importance should be attached to taxation in ad- vancing prices.
Unfortunately no satisfactory statistical test can be applied to supplement this indeterminate analysis. The most promising test case turns out on examination to have little significance. The 5 per cent, tax on sales, of which most has been said as a factor in raising prices, imposed by the act of June 30, 1864, and increased to 6 per cent, in March, 1865, applied to most domestic producís except lumber, breadstuffs and a few less imporíaní articles.1 Accordingly one might hope to gauge the effect of this levy roughly by seeing whether by 1865 these excepted articles had risen in price less than the average.2 Examination shows that the average relativo price of the eight grains and the five
l H. R. Ezecutive DocumetU No. 34, p. 13, 39th Cong., lst Sess.
* The average relativo prices of the thirteen commodities referred to compare as follows with the general indez nambers for 1862 and 1865 :
|
1862 |
1865 |
|||
|
lfonth |
Thirteen Commodi- ties |
All Com- modities |
Thirteen Commodi- ties |
All Com- modities |
|
January April July |
101 107 106 113 |
111 110 113 124 |
212 179 157 168 |
247 207 184 199 |
Pbices 269
kinds of lamber included in the quarterly table of sea ii was indeed less than the average for all articles in 1865, but also that it was less before this tax was thought of. Accordingly, quite aside from the objection that might hold against this comparison on the score of the scanty number of commodities included, it throws no new light on the problem.
There are two facts, however, of some significance, to which attention may be called: first, prices had reached almost their highest point before the 5 per cent tax on sales was imposed; second, the repeal of the internal reve- nne duties after the war did not cause any considerable decline of prices. David A. Wells, special commissioner of the revenue, who had maintained in his report of December, 1866, that "the burden of national taxation" was "perhaps the most influential" of the causes to which the uinflation of prices may be attributed," admitted in his report of January, 1869, that he was "constrained to confesa, that thus far the abatement of prices consequent upon the large annual reduction of taxes has not been what was antici- pa ted.,n
A somewhat more definite conclusión can be reached regarding the effect of duties on importa. Successive tariff acts advanced these duties to a much higher point than had ever been reached before in the United States, and as the legal tender acts forbade the acceptance of greenbacks at the cus- toms house, the real increase of taxation was greater than in the case of excises which were paid in paper money. Importers had consequently to buy goods abroad for specie, pay duties upon them in gold, and fínally sell them for paper money. New duties would therefore increase directly the prices charged to American consumere of imported
i Senate Executive Document No. 2, p. 26, 39th Cong., 2d Sess., and H. R. Execu- tive Document No. 16, p. 23, 40th Cong,% 3d Sess.
270 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS
goods withont compelling the foreign prodncer to accept a lower price — except perhaps indirectly if there were a con- siderable falling off in sales which the prodncer hoped to remedy by making concessions. One expects to fínd, there- fore, that imported commodities on the average advanced somewhat more rapidly in price than domestic prodncts, and an examination of the price series in the Appendix will show that this expectation is justified, so far as materials for making the comparison exist. It seems altogether probable, therefore, that the war tariffs and perhaps the internal taxes also are responsible for some portion of the advance in pnces as shown in the preceding tablea.
Three other matters that have played roles in the dia- cnssions of war pnces may be dismissed more briefly. Withdrawal of men from their ordinary occupations to fill the armies, it has been freqnently argned, made labor acaree; conseqnently wages rose, expenses of production increased in proportion, and this increase made it necessary to advance pnces.1 Bnt, as will be shown in the next chapter, the rise of wages was subsequent, not prior, to the rise of pnces. Wages did not advance fírst and increase pnces by augment* ing cost; bnt quite the contrary, pnces rose so sharply as to 'decrease real wages in a marked degree, and this decrease led, thongh not immediately, to an increase in money wages. That the rise of money wages when once secnred was an obstacle in the way of reducing pnces is trae, bnt it can y [ hardly be that the advance of wages caused the preceding I rise of pnces. In fact, depreciation actually decreased the cost of labor to the employer and so worked in the direction of a fall, not a rise, of pnces.
Contemporary observers were apt to hold speculation responsible for the advance of pnces as for the advance of ♦
i E. g.% aee C. A. Mann, Paper Money (New York, 1872), p. 290; Jom Pames in the Money Market (New York, 1873), p. 24.
•
Pbioes 271
the premium on gold.1 But it wotdd probably be more trae to say that the marked speculation of the war time was the eif§ct_than that it was the cause of the price movements — although neither statement is trae without qualification. So universal and long-continued a rise of prices cannot have been due to artificial cornering of the supply of nearly all articles. The really important part, with reference to prices, that speculators played then as at other times, was in fore- seeing the advances that were coming from the general conditions of the market — monetary and other — and pur- chasing commodities at a lower range of prices in the hope of selling at a higher. Such operations had the effect of accelerating the advance, but also of tempering its excesses, for the stocks of speculators, sold after prices had risen in order to realize profits, tended to depress the market.
Finally a word may be said about the relation between prices and the quantity of money in circulation — a subject that was much debated by the pamphleteers of the greenback agitation.2 It is altogether impossible to determine whether there was a cióse correspondence between the conree of prices and the volume of the currency, as was affirmed by some writers and denied by others, because, as has been shown at length,8 the quantity of money in use cannot be ascertained. And more than this, the circumspect quantity- theorist would hardly expect to find a cióse correspondence at a time when " other things" were so far from "being equal." To add one important, but unobstrusive, point to the list of these inconstant ** other things" that readily come to mind — there was a very decided contraction of
i E. y., see Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Yol. II, p. 2.
2Soe, e. g.< H. C. Carey, Contraction or Expansión f (Philadelphia, 1866), Lettera in and IV; J. S. Gibbonb, Public Dtbt of the United State» (New York, 1867), pp. 219-32.
s Part II, chap. ii, sec. rii.
>
V
y /
272 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAOKS
credit during the war, arising from the unstable volóme of the paper currency, and conseqnently, a considerably larger proportion of exchanges than usual was performed by the use of cash.1
While the importance of all the foregoing considerations in the study of the war pnces has been frequently observed and exaggerated, there remains another factor that has attracted little, if any, attention. The notion that pnces in any country which has important commercial relations with other nations are necessarily influenced by the course of prices elsewhere has long been familiar, but it was probably not until the compilation of elabórate tables of relative prices for different countries that the degree of correspondence between the direction of price movements was duly appre- ciated. After examining such tables, a careful student would hardly think of discussing the fluctuations in the price level of the United States, without taking account of the trend of prices in England and Europe. But the aban- donment of the specie for the greenback standard in 1862 seemed to sever the connection between prices in America and elsewhere. The fluctuations of prices in the United States were so exceedingly violent that they appeared to have no relation to the gentle undulations of the foreign price level. How great the differences were is best seen by comparing Sauerbeck's index-numbers for England and Soetbeer's for Germany, as recomputed by Falkner upon the basis of prices in 1860, with averages of the quarterly arithmetic means for each year from the preceding tables.
But this emancipation of American prices from the influence of the international markets for goods and gold was more apparent than real. Even the barriere of a war tariff did not greatly diminish the extent of exports and importe, and so long as such commercial relations continued,
i Seo Part II, chap. vii, sec iii.
V
Pbioes
278
TABLE XH
OOMPABISON OF BBLATIVB PBICB8 IN THB UNITKD 8TATB8, BNOLAND, AND OERMANT 1
|
Date |
United States |
England |
Gennany |
|
1800 |
102 |
100 |
100 |
|
1861 |
97 |
99.6 |
97.6 |
|
1882 |
115 |
105.5 |
101.4 |
|
1863 |
154 |
109.3 |
103.7 |
|
1864 |
209 |
112.3 |
106.9 |
|
1865 |
209 |
105.8 |
101.4 |
the conditions of supply and demand in one market necee- sarily exercised a very considerable influence over the cor- responding conditions in all related markets. During the paper-money period the influence of these commercial rela- tions was towards making the advance of pnces in the United States conform to the decline in the specie valué of Ameri- can currency, in the same manner that before suspensión it had been toward making the movements of gold pnces in the United States correspond in a general way with similar movements abroad. For, had the pnces of exportable com- modities in the United States not risen above their specie pnces elsewhere in proportion as the pnce of gold in paper money advanced, there would have been a large profít in sending gold from London to New York, selling it for greenbacks, investing the latter in American producís, and shipping them abroad to sell again for gold with which to repeat the operation. Of course, the influence of such oper- ations would be to depress the price of gold and raise the prices of commodities until the divergence between their relative advances in price had been reduced to compara-
i For theEnglish and Germán prices see Aldrich Reporta Part I, pp. 255, 295. Sauerbeck's figures for England are distinctly superior to those of the London Economist at tais period, because the inclusión in the latter of so manjr articles affected by the price of cotton gives altogether too much weight to the diminished supply of that article as a price factor. As recomputed on the basis of 1800, the Kconomist figures are, 1801,102; 1862,109; 1863,135.9; 1864,144.8; 1865, 135.5.- Ibid.% p.226.
212 j
1 credit during thtí paper eiir: i proportiou ,,( i ase of ciish.1 ' Whiltí t!,. in the sfmly . and vxnfg* - . attnicted lie!. auv cornil ry other mili-., prives elsiw' not until (!:. for diftVn-i,< bctWeen i],, cínted. ,u-
Would h:ip|!
priee. Ifvi-I . thetnoiri'.
doilIllITjl '.i '
Bet'in.il i,, ,., ■ and i-]-..- n-i.. State* iv. r- liave i... n
prw I. bv .-..„, So.il„, bn»¡» .,
■rilllll:.
I¡:ii inHii. ■,
WUS ir.
turiir ..
- -. :-.ni the priivi of
-_ iJUTtj their pnces
- — - - "~«^ preminni on
■■- -4^-nl by shipping
. w->. *^ingthem at the
_ - w*r money received
. -^ - ■.el. and taking the
- . irrioles for export.
- —-icrioii of bringJHg — :■ -¿'.ira iu tbe United
_ .t r-n<iof the Europenn
*-- ':■;: thia timo tile
..?.—• nt :he iucreased huii-
- . 2t premium from the
.„■. -. nial not be pushed
.^ . •JE-erícan produets for
-Kciai was much above
„!^i bv iaw, the converse _-w¿ the premium would
;- i^adutiesujxjuimpor-
: .varee, tbe American
~>ja.3 above the Enrocan
~ ¡ai :hf «»t of transjwrta-
...- ^ the general level, a
bv too
s indi-
.. ._■ : vmplicated ojuTatiuns
_. i- j y hazanluua durin» the
, .... „* polh of (be pn-iiiiiim
u.. ;:i: !>romist-d n lingt» nutr-
^ ■_- .¿.mge More tln- nene*
_....t«k «¿ t-1 milwtitute lusa fnr
_ . *-*f divergi-ncies U'lweeu
. ... .-i j'rioeu is quite eonijiati-
4«wi:: h"t if tbe arruinen!
Pbices 275
is valid, one would not expect to fínd a wide divergence long-continued. (3) The trend of the commercial forcee was not in the direction of making the movement of com- modity prices and of the gold premium in the United States parallel, but in the direction of making the movements harmonize with the relative valué of commodities and gold abroad. At the time of the Civil War the purchasing power of gold was every where slowly declining in conse- qnence of the immense prodnction from the Californian and Australian mines. Consequently one would expect to fínd in the United States a corresponding advance of relative prices of commodities slightly greater than the advance of the premium on gold.
One must not be betrayed, then, by the very great differ- ence between the course of specie prices in England and Germany and of greenback prices in the United States, into treating the latter as entirely independent of the former. In fact, barring the influence of increased taxation in this country, the connection between the markets of the great commercial nations was quite as real during the paper- money period as at other times, and the common influences upon prices were as truly felt, despite the fact that their effect in the United States was effectually concealed from superficial observation. Had there been no war and no paper standard, doubtless prices would have advanced here in somewhat the same degree as they advanced in England and Germany, and we seem bound to believe that some part — though, of course, a small part — of the violent rise actually experienced was due to the decline in the exchange valué of gold.
VI. THE CUBBENCY AS A CAUSE OP THE PBICE PLÜOTÜATIONS
The argument has at last reached a stage where the prob- lem of chief interest may be attacked : How far were the fluctuations of prices due to the disorders of the greenback
276 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS
currency ? By procesa of exclusión the conclusión has been reached that these fluctuations cannot be accounted for, ezcept in small measnre, on any other ground than has been snggested; but it remains to be seen whether any poeitive evidence can be adduced for the opinión that the monetary conditions preponderated over all other factors as a price determinant. The most effective method of dealing with this problem is to apply the test of concomitant variations by comparing the specie valué of the currency with its rela- tivo purchasing power over commodities. To put the data in convenient form for making this test, the average monthly valué of gold in currency, and the average relativo pnces of commodities at wholesale by quarters are platted on the accompanying diagram. Most valué seems to attach to the median of the relative prices, but a Une representing the arithmetic mean is added for purposes of comparison.
Examination of this chart shows that there is a general correspondence between the relative prices of specie and of commodities in greenbacks. Agreement in detail is pre- cluded by the nature of the data; for prices are given but once a quarter, and the intermedíate monthly fluctuations answering to those of gold can only be surmised. But in general direction and to a lesa extent in degree of movement the gold and commodity lines harmonize well. There are, however, two noticeable differences. First, the fluctuations of prices are more sluggish than those of gold, partly, no doubt, because the lines for commodity prices represent averages, and partly because the market for gold was more highly organizad, and therefore more immediately sensitivo to all changes in conditions of supply and demand, than even wholesale markets for commodities. Second, the advance of commodities does not halt at any time until it has consider- ably outstripped the advance of gold. In this excess of prices above the premium we see the effect of varióos
!7H
HlSTOKY OP Tü
currency? By procesa of i-v reached that these fluctuati except in small mensure, 011 n su^gcsled; but it remains t< evidence can be adduced for conditíons prepondera trd nv determinant. The most f*tf this problem is to apply 11 by compnring the s'ieuie vn'i tive purchasing puwer nvi— in uonvenient fonu for mati ■ valué of gold in curreni-y, ■ commodities at whuli-ftnl" ' accompanying dingram. ,1 median of the relative ]• ' arithmetic mean is iiddfl r Kxamination of this < ' convspoudonce betwvi-n t1 commodities in gri-i-nlm"' cluded by the natnre of once a quarter, and tli. auswvrmg tu tlmse •■( general dirvctinri aud f" the gold and cnnimud" however. two notiivatti< ot pnces are mure sin doubt. beeause the- ¡i- averages. and paniy )•■■ hi^rhlv ortfanizi'tl, üik) t.' s.1! ciaiígt-s in i-jiiiíl"- *'r.. I-sa'.v :nark>ta i"r
. ~m. ■ — oaríicnlarly "* _ _ ^r rxebange. *"**■- - j. j jjí snown by *
;r pnces ana
,U
■ tml '
a; y .::::- ,p¡^,l ib* ^^ pnce* alvve the prf, '
Tention will _ _■? ¿ritiimetic meau- ,ir gni practically ce*" .. _-.„-*eni business deprfc^""^ ...jasPiie decline. In tí* ..^juBcwhiit and immen^^ .. f-y ácJening in the pric^ ^jjfcwo. however, was no»* .^[Mt. s**» merely a retnrn tc7 . Jt» -.í jp«tfie payments anJ _, j ^ítin ^jld had no appre- _. .:■*** months; but when ^ ^mty ifter the failure o! _^ iaia»aA pnces followed. ^ ..«MÚerably faater, so that .^ar ««» 1-45 against a median . ^* » advance of gold had » ocrwBt turned sharpty is _ -jMmtaed to rise for threc ,. _««. *■' that by July pnces
^ .iKiiwd from the middle of ■w» «a» a rapid rosh upward
^ *tf btfhind; then gold fe».
_>; joíii they had outstripped
».W üference between the
.«wttf *ca> of the rlnotuations.
n**.* -*' th«* premium wa¡s not wtp íairly t'ven pace witíi it.
M -nw pwnñum advanced at a
P rices 279
pace that made the progresa of pnces seem slow, and it was not until October, when the premium had been f alling rapidly for three months, while pnces continued to rise at a scarcely diminished rate, that the two were on even terms agaín. Another sudden advance of gold in November gave it a momentary advantage, but after its great fall began prices passed it once more, and, declining with less precipitance after January, remained for the rest of the year considerably higher.
In all these movements from 1862 to 1865 the lines repre- senting the premium and the median of relative prices cor- respond so well that one cannot resist the conclusión that these changes are mainly due to a common cause, which can hardly be other than the_varying esteem in which the notes of the government that constituted the standard money of the country were held. If this conclusión be accepted, it followB that the suspensión of specie payments and the legal- tender acta must be held alm^st entireljr responsable for all the far-reaching economic disturbances following from the price upheaval which it is the task of the following chapters to trace in detail.
CHAPTER V
WAGES
I. Falkner's Table of Eelative Wages:
Defecto of Falkner's Table— A New Table Necessary. II. Scope of the Data Concerning Wages in the Aldrich Report: Rinda of Work— Industries— Geographical Range.
III. New Tableé of Relative Wages Based upon the Aldrich Report: Method— Weighting— Range of Fluctuations — Actual Wagea— Wages in Nine Industries — Constant and Variable Weights— Various Occupations — Men and Women — Relative Wages and Earnings before Suspensión — Actual and Relative Wages— Relative Wages of All Employees— New Tablea and Falkner's Resulte.
IV. Relative Wagea in Cool, Iron, Glosa, and Pottery Industrie*: Weekn's Data — Coal Minera — Iron-Ore Minera — Iron Workers — Potters — Glasa Blowers.
V. Relative Salaries of School Teachers:
Character of the Data — Earnings of Profeaaional Men. VI. Relative Wages of Farm Laborers :
Character of the Data — Resulte of Computations. VII. Tablea of Relative Money Wages Based on Tenth Censúa:
Character and Scope of Data — Average Relative Wagea — Range of Fluctuations — East and West — Relative Wagea and l<Urníiig« before Suspensión. VIII. Pay of Government Employees:
Clerical Employees in Washington — Prívate Soldiera. IX. Increase of Living Expenses:
Difficulty of Weighting the Price Tablee— Wholesale and Retail Tablea— Median and Arithmetic Mean. X. Relative Real Wages:
Character of Series — Real Wagea of Various Groups — East and West XI. Conclusión.
I. FALKNEH'8 TABLE OF RELATIVE WAGE8
Fob the study of money wages, as for the study of pricea, the most important source of material is the Aldrich Report Part I contains a table — No. 37 — prepared under the direc-
280
Wagbs 281
tion of Professor Falkner, showing the relative wages of working people in twenty-one industries from 1860 to 1891. But this table, like the corresponding table of pnces, is f ound on cióse examination to be constructed in snch a man- ner as to be nnfit for the purposes of the present investiga- tion. From the point of view of statistical method, its chief defects are as follows:
1. Only one index-number is given for each year. This index-number is usually computed from the wages paid in January; but in some cases — what cases is not specifically stated — from the wages paid in July or October. For the present parpóse more than one index-number per year is highly desirable, and the indiscriminate use of returns for different months is to be deprecated. An average into which enter figures for several different months cannot be taken to represent the condition of affairs at any specific time, and therefore is of little valué for comparisons with the data regarding prices.
2. No attempt is made to distinguish between the wages of men and women, or between the wages of groups of workers possessing different degrees of skill and receiving unlike remuneration. As will be shown later, the paper standard did not produce the same effect upon the wages of the different sexes or the different groups, and a table must be had which will permit an investigation of these diver- gences.
3. The 543 wage series included in this table are classi- fied by industries, but not by occupations. It is as impor- tant, e. g., to know the variations in the wages of carpenters, machinists, etc., wherever employed, as it is to know the variations in wages paid in the building and metallic indus- tries as a whole.
4. In computing the average variations of wages in each industry Professor Falkner treated all wage series as if they
282 HlSTORY OF THE GbEENBAOKS
possessed precisely the same importance, quite irrespective of whether they representad the pay of a single man or that of several hundreds. But if the table is to be employed as an índex of the probable average variation in the wages of the great mass of workers, a retara which shows the pay of many men is of much greater importance than one which shows the pay of bnt few. Every series, that is, should be given a weight in the computations, proportioned to the num- ber of persons whose pay it representa
Recognition of these defects has the unhappy oonse- quence that Professor Falkner's table of relativo wages mnst be discarded altogether and a fresh table of relativo wages, like the fresh table of relativo pnces, laborionsly compiled from the data pnblished in the "exhibits" of the Aldrick Report.1
i More extended criticisms of the wage-tables of the Aldrick Report may be foond in sereral places. In 1884 F. C. Watts pnblished in Washington a pamplüet entitled Price» and Wages: A Di$$ection ofthe Señóte Finante CommiUee*§ Oreai Report, This was a rather acrid eritieism of the methods employed by Falkner in analyxing the wage-data and of the oonclnsions drawn from his resulta, In 1805 an artiele by A. L. Bowlkt appeared in the Economic Journal ( VoL V, pp. 909-83) onder the title " Comparison of the Bates of Increase of Wages in the United States and in Great Britain, 1860-91." Bowley took exeeption to Falkner*s methods. His ehief objections were (1) that there was no guarantee that the establishments from whieh returns were obtained were ty pical of the industries to whieh they belonged; (2) that no aooonnt was taken of the nnmber of men repreaented by the different series; (S) that the relativo importance of the series was nnwarrantedly assomed to hay© remained constan t throughout the whole period ; and (4) that the tablee showed, not the changa in average wages, but the average chango in wages. Bowley, however, like Waite, pnt a high Taino apon the material published in the " exhibits '* of the Report. Again, C. B. Spahr, in his E—ay on the Prewent Distribution of Wealtk in the United State» (New York, 1886), decía red that it is " necessary to throw away the work done by the oommittee's experts." He did not hesitate to charge that the Aldrich Report was *% prepared by men who wished to show the highest possible lerel of wages,'* and that the statisticians " employed to snmmarise the returns were to a hurtful extent in sympathy with the political aim of the inrestigation " (pp* 108, 106). Finally Pbofessoe C. J. Bdllock in his " Contributions to the Stody of Wage Statistics" (Publicationa of the American Economic Astociation^ Yol. VI, pp. 187-218) subjected Falkner's tables once more to a searching eritieism. which, how- eTer, added little to the points developed by his predecessors. It seems to haré beeo this systematic critique of Bullock's that led Falkner to publish his artiele opon 44 Wage Statistics, in Theory and Practico " { Public at ion* of the American 8tatietíeal Auociation, Yol. VI, pp. 27S-S9). To the detailed criticisms of the methods whieh fas had followed, howovor, he foond no efleetive answor.
Wages 288
ii. scope of the data concern i ng wages in tablb xii
of the aldrich repobt
These data, which are all brought together in Table XII, were collected by the Department of Labor from actual pay- rolls and show the daily wages paid in January and Jnly — or, in a few cases, October — of each year to the different classes of employees in twenty-one industries, together with the num- ber and sex of the employees and the length of the working- day. Some 1,268 pages are covered by this exhibit.
Though the material thus supplied is much more compre- hensivo than that from which most wage tablea have been constructed, it suffers from serions limitations.
1. The data are confíned almost entirely to mannal laborera engaged in manufactures or transportation. Pro- fessional earnings are representad only by a scant supple- mentary report upon the salaries of school-teachers. Clerical work is omitted entirely, while three wage series from two New Hampshire stores give the only data for the large body of sales-people. No account is taken of domestic servants, ñor of fishermen, while minera again are treated in a supple- mentary report for which the data were collected in a differ- ent fashion.1 Last and most important, agricultural laborera —the most numerous group of workingmen in the United States of the Civil War — are entirely unrepresented.
2. The exhibit is incompleto even for manufactures and transportation. Nominally there are returns for eighteen manuf acturing industries ; but of these industries three are of slight importance, viz., sidewalks, spice, and white lead. On the other hand, certain very important branches are rep- resented only in the supplementary reports — as is the case with the iron, glass, and pottery industries; or else are not represen ted at all — as is the case with the boot and shoe, the milling and baking, dressmaking and millinery, tailoring,
iAldrich Report, Part I, p. 180, and Part IV, Table XIII.
284
HI8TOBY OF THE GbEENBAOKS
ship-building, tobáceo, and bríck industries. Furthermore, the data for some of the important industries inclnded are very meager. This may best be seen from the following table, which shows for each of the twenty-one industries the number of establishments from which returns were obtained covering the war period, the number of wage series, and the number of employees whose pay is reported.
TABLE xx
OON8PBCTUB OF WAOK DATA FOR THE TRAES 1860 TO 1806 OIYXV IN TARLB XII OF
THB ALDRICH RXFORT
Industries
Agricultural implemento.
Ale, beer,and porter
Books and newspapers. . .
Builcüng trades
Carriage8 and wagons
City publie works
Cotton goods
Dry eoods
Ginghams
Groceries
Illuminating gas
Leather
Lumber
Metals and metallic goods
Paper
Raüways
Sidewalks
Spice
Stone
Whitelead
Woolen goods
Total
Number of Establish- ments
1 1 3
21 1 4 3 1 1 1 4 2 2
19 1 1 1 1 6 1 3
78
Namber of Wage Series
5
5 17 42
4
22
106
3 30
2 22 16
5 138
7 11
4
4 19
4 62
527
Number of
Emplorees
JanM 1800
9 40 76
216
14
1,966
639 10
568 3
460 46 35
803 41
263
31
8
227 20
177
5,641
If it be thought that returns for 100 employees is as nar- row a basis as can well be accepted in computing the probable wage fluctuations in any industry, ten of the eighteen branches of manufacture would have to be excluded.
3. Of the seventy-eight establishments included in the above table, all but tive were situated in the North Atlantic
Waoes 285
states, and of these five four were in Maryland and one — a gas plant — was in Ohio.1 Thus the material shows the course of wages in but one section of the country.
4. While the material of Table XII seems to have been collected and published with scrupulous care, it nevertheless suffers from a defect characteristic of wage statistics in generaL It frequently occurs that when several men are employed in an establishment to do substantially similar work they are paid different ratea of wages, which vary as their efficiency, the length of time they have been connected with the firm, etc. In this case, when the several men are not distinguished in the reports, it is necessary to take the average wage as the basis of calculation. Bnt at any time some of these hands may be discharged. If the ones sent away are the recipients of the lower wages, the average pay rises; on the other hand, if the better-paid men are dis- missed, the average falls. A similar change is effected by taking on new men at wages differing from the pay of the oíd employees. Thus the table may show a fluctuation in wages, though no change whatever has taken place in the pay of the men who have had steady employment.8 Of course, a fall in average wages caused by the employment of more men is not an injury to wage-earners, and a rise caused by the discharge of the lower-paid portion of a forcé is a purely fictitious gain. But while the effect of such adventi- tious changes cannot be wholly eliminated by any manipula- tion of the material, it may be expected that in a large number of cases the depressing influence of some such changes upon the general average will be counterbalanced more or less completely by the opposite influence of others. It may seem that the imperfections of the material to
i The distribution of the establishments by states was as follows : New Hamp- shire, 4; Massachusetts, 21; Rhode Island, 1; Connecticut, 9; New York, 25; New Jersey, 2 ; Pennsylyania, 11 ; Maryland, 4 ; Ohio, 1.
2 For examples see the " Exhibits," pp. 947, 973, 982, 1518, and 1510.
286 HlSTORY OF THE GrEENBACKS
which attention has been called are so serióos as to invalí- date any oonclusions regarding the general trend of wagee that may be based apon it. But, after all has been said, the fact remains that Table XII of the Aldrich Report shows the actual wages paid to more than 5,000 men and women throoghont the war periocL Of conree, the whole number of wage-earners, even in the North Atlantic States alone, was many times 5,000 ; bnt if there be any considerable degree of trnth in the common assumption regarding the effect of competition upon the price paid for similar services there seems to be sufficient reason for believing that a range of observation so considerable as the table affords may be accepted as fairly typicaL The assumption involved in the use of such material as the basis for generalizations is that a common cause — the rise of prices — which is shown to have had a certain average effect upon the remuneration of 5,000 persons had a substantially similar effect upon the remunera- tion of the thousands doing similar work whose pay is not recorded.
III. NEW TABLE8 OF RELATIVE MONEY WAGES BASED UPON THE DATA IN TABLE XII OF THE ALDRICH REPORT
In order to get the material of these elabórate " exhibí ts" into usable shape the series of actual wages were reduced to seríes of relativo wages on the " index-number plan," Every series in Table XII that gave tolerably complete returns twice a year from 1860 to 1866 was transcribed upon a card. The industry, number, and location of the establishment, and the number and se* of the workers were recorded as well as the ratos of pay. Then the relativo wages in January and July of each year were computed as percentages of the wage in Janu- ary, 1860. Next, in order to secure to the most importan t occupations a weight proportionate to their numbers, the seríes of relative wages were multiplied by the number of
Waoes 287
persone whose pay they represented. Finally, these producís were added together, and the resulting sums divided by the whole number of persona employed. Thus the results show in all cases the arithmetical average change in the pay of all the persone included in any group. By arranging the cards in different ways it was possible to classify the wage-earners by industries, occupations, sex, establishments, per diem wages, etc., and to compute the average changes inpay for the vary- ing groups thus formed.
In carrying out this general plan the most serious prob- lem that presented itself was in what manner the weighting of the several series according to number of employees should be performed. The choice lay between multiplying the relative wage shown by each series for each succes- sive January and July by the average number of persona employed during the whole period under investigation, and multiplying by the number actually employed at different dates. In the many cases of series which show no change in number of employees the results of the two methods — which for convenience may be called the methods of u constan t " and of " variable weights" — are identical. But there are many and important series that show considerable variations in number of employees, and it is accordingly necessary to canvass the relative merits of the rival methods.
The distinctive advantage of the method of variable weights is that it shows the average change in the money wages of a división of the industrial army as it was actually constituted. Changes in number of employees are a con- stant and important feature of the industrial situation and one of peculiar significance for the wage-earning classes, whose interests are at present the subject of investigation. To adopt a scheme of weighting which takes no account of such changes would be to elimínate this important element in the situation. If an increase in the numbers employed in
*¿SH HlHTOBY OF THE GSEESBACKS
Mtrthín kítul* oí work as compared with the nnmbers employed ín fÁher kínd* causee a cfaange in the average relatíve wage Un th# whok* body of working men tfaat change is as real ín it* «ffcct upon the well-being of laborera as if it had been dtvt U> Momu other canse. Accordingly, it may be argued, no whwm* of analysis can be trnsted that will exclnde the effect tA chañan in number of employees.
Orí the other hand, one who examines the wage -series and notos how frequent and how considerable are the fluctu- atiorm in nnmbers employed, is not unlikely to distrnst an avurage made up of such shifting elemente. The total num- Iwr of employees represented by the series inclnded in the íollowing tahles as working in January, 1860, is 5,641. In •luly tho number rose to 6,444. Then followed a gradual dimlino to 4,009 in January, 1863, and afterward a ríse to 11,1576 in July, 1866. If these changes in aggregate num- ero were produced by uniform changes of corresponding dt*groo in all the series, variable weights would make no difforenco in the resulta, because, while the number of men representad by any series would vary absolutely, it would Imar a constan t proportion to the numbers in all other series. Hut, of oourse, the variations of numbers in the different m*rit<M are not thus uniform, and the weights therefore fluc- tunto rolntively ns well as absolutely. To take the most t*xtrmno oxamplo — common laborera employed by some city in tho ntnto of New York — the number of employees varíes from 1,500 in July. 1860, to 420 in January, 1866, and the pro|Nirtion of these numbers to the aggregate number of all tmiployeo* varíes from 2$ per cent at the first date to 8 per eotit, at the aocotul. Now, it may be argued, if the object is to anoortain the oflfoet of the paper currency upon money Wiitfw, it wonUl W* improper to compute the average of ohantiwi in a íashion that would expose the results to the illtUlottco of tuch tíuctuations in the constitution of the WM|(t»-«t*ritiittt cU** as thoee represented by the Aldrich data.
Wages 289
In deciding, on the basis of the preceding argumenta, what conree to pnrsne in regard to weighting, the question seems to turn upon the character of the changes in numbers. If these changes are largely due to particular causes— such for example, as the completion of an elabórate plan for paving streets that would reduce the number of men employed by a city, or the sale of a factory followed by a new policy of rapid expansión that would increase the work- ing forcé — they cannot properly be allowed consideration. In this -case the method of constant weights is to be pre- ferred. But if the changes in numbers are not mainly due to causes that may from the present point of view be regarded as accidental; if, on the contrary, they should prove to be largely an indirect consequence of the monetary situation itself , then careful account should be taken of them and variable weights used for this purpose. Inasmuch as it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine in advance whether the changes are of the one kind or the other, the best course to pursue is to employ both methods of weighting, see what differences exist between the two sets of resalís, and try to form some conclusión regarding the significance of these differences.
All of the series used in the following computations are published in the Appendix, where they are arranged accord- ing to industries, establishments, sex, and occupation. To save space, the initial wage, number of employees, and rela- tivo wages alone are given, but to show more clearly how the computations have been made, a specimen of the card actu- ally used in making the tables is placed here.
It will be noticed that on this specimen card the series is extended through 1866. This last year is included in all the following wage-tables in order to supply data for deter- mining whether or not the withdrawal of wage-earners from the labor market into the army was a chief cause of the
290
HlSTORY OF THE GkEENBAOKS
SPECDÍEN CAED
|
Metals Blacksmitbb E8TABU8HMBZTT 57 MALES MaBYLAICD |
|||||
|
Date |
Wages |
Nom- ber |
Relatare Wages |
Products |
|
|
Variable Weights |
Constan* WeighU |
||||
|
July |
$1.566 1.606 1.655 1.50 1.48 1.48 1.706 1.83 2.106 2.666 2.75 2.71 2.875 2.78 |
8 8 3 2 4 4 6 6 7 8 7 6 6 8 5.9 |
100 103 |
800 814 |
560.0 607.7 584.1 566.4 560.5 560.5 643.1 600.3 796.5 1/M3.0 1,088.4 lfiOD.l 1J085.6 1/150.2 |
|
July |
99 ! 297 96 192 95 I 380 95 aao |
||||
|
July |
|||||
|
July |
109 1 117 136 170 176 173 184 178 |
664 702 945 1,380 1¿32 1,038 1404 1,424 |
|||
|
July |
|||||
|
July |
|||||
|
1866, January July |
|||||
advance in money wages. If it appears that when the volunteers were disbanded and returned to their usual occu- pations wages did not f all, there will be a strong preeumption that some other cause than enlistments was a more powerful factor in determining wages.
A study of the individual seríes of relativo wages, as given in the Appendix, shows that during the war the range of fluctuations was considerably narrower in the pnce of labor than in the príce of commodities. For a comparison it is best to take the changes between January, 1860, and Jan- uary, 1865 — the culminating point of prices. The greateet relative advance in príce shown by the quarterly table between theee dates was 991 per cent, (ootton), and the greatest fall 11 points (raw Italian silk). On the other hand. the greatest advance in wages was 220 per cent (álate and metal roofers), and the greatest fall 37 per cent, (steam-
Wages
291
and gas-fitters' helpers). Thns while the pnces of the com- modities included in the table covered a range of 1,002 points, the pnces of labor covered but 257. Of the 135 articles for which relative pnces are given in 1865 some 67 per cent had doubled or more than doubled in price ; bnt this was trae of only 3 per cent of the wage-series and of an even smaller proportion of the wage-earners.
Within this comparatively restricted range, however, no great degree of uniformity is observable in the fluctuations of wages. This may best be seen from the subjoined table, in which the wage-earners for whom reporta are given in January, 1865, are classifíed according to the degree in which their wages had changed since 1860 :
TABLE XXI
WAGE-BABNEBS IN JANUABY, 1885, CLA88IJTED ACOOBDZNO TO BEXATXYB CHANOS ZM
WAOK8 BINCB 1860
|
Batió of Wages in Januaby, 1865, to |
NUMBEE OF EMFLOTEES IN THE BeSPBCTIYE QbOCPS |
PbBCBNT AGE OF WhOLB NUM- BEK OF EmPLOTEBS IN THE Bbspbotivb Geocps |
||
|
Wages m 1860 |
Males |
Females |
Males |
Females |
|
00- 69* |
4 3 16 30 72 183 444 414 459 787 370 385 379 539 30 2 4 2 |
■ » • • • • 6 12 52 144 54 206 130 10 1 2 5 5 1 • • • • • • • • • |
0.10* 0.07 0.39 0.73 1.74 4.44 10.77 10.04 11.13 19.09 8.97 9.34 9.19 13.07 0.73 0.05 0.10 0.05 |
|
|
70-79 |
||||
|
80- 89 |
0.96* |
|||
|
90-99 |
1.91 |
|||
|
100-109 |
8.28 |
|||
|
110-119 |
22.94 |
|||
|
120-129 |
8.60 |
|||
|
130-139 |
32.80 |
|||
|
140-149 |
20.70 |
|||
|
150-159 |
1.59 |
|||
|
180-169 |
0.16 |
|||
|
170-179 |
0.32 |
|||
|
18CM89 |
0.79 |
|||
|
190 199 |
0.79 |
|||
|
200-224 |
0.16 |
|||
|
225-249 |
||||
|
250-299 |
||||
|
Totals |
4,123 |
628 |
100.00* |
100.00* |
292 HlSTOBY OF THE ORBSNBACK8
This table shows that over nine-tenths of the men had leeehred an increase of between 20 and 100 per cent, and neariy nine-tenths of the women an increaae of between 10 and 50 per cent. Bnt there is no Yery striking concentra- tkm on any one point in the scale of Lacrease, except that nesrlj one-third of the women had gained abont one-third, and neariy one-fifth of the men had gained between 50 and 5# per cent in pey.
The absence of cases of extreme varíatkm in the wage- «mes makes it nnnecessary to work oot averages in two ways, as was done in the chapter on pnces, The reason giren for using the median there was that the few commodi- tíes whích showed an extraordinary adrance in price aíFected the arithmetic mean mnch more powerfnlly than the few f?jtnnxjditieB which were just as extraordinary in not rising ax alL Accordingly, the median which is not aíFected by th*r degree of dirergenoe from the aTerage shown by any Mrrks gare resolts considerably lower than the arithmetic w&mn- With the wage daüu howexer, the two methods of areraging give almost the same resolts» In the aboTO table Úyt nH"" point is foond in the groop 50-54 per cent Cor ■Ktk* and 30-34 per cent for femaks. The corresponding srxthmetíc me*ns an? 55 and 2S p?r cenL Soch differences *s*z Lardly sofficient to jnstify the laboróos compota tiotí of %mo &4* of resolts.1
More coocre te ideas regarding the change in *ag€s are grrea by ftody of the actual amoonts of mooey receired per 4mf ú» Vsfif) and 1Ñ>5. An aTerage wage coaapoted far soch «fer**** kínda of labor as those inclwfed in the material ■Kan little, and cooseqoentiy a ~-dassifiad~ table fc**n arrmnged for the poriKtse of the ccaaparisttaL
Tb^ s¿£&iikant fact brooght oot by thxs exkihit is the
Wíoi Clabses
10.36 0.4
0.50 0.7 0.75-0.9 1.001. 2 1.25 -1.4 1.50 1.7 1.75 1.9 3.00-2.2 2.25 2.4 2 '.0-2.7 2. 7.V 3 9 íí 00-3.2 3.2.'. 3.4 3.50+..
I 2.41
■ 11.72
I 42.77
' 10. 61
7 77 4.41 0.31
5,1114,105100 l)0í 100. 0T«7 032 591 ÍOO.OOJ 100.00*
decrease in the ntimber of persona of both sexos in tho lüwer wage classes and the íncrease in the higher. Among males the largeet gronp of wage earners in 1860 was the $1 $1.24 claas, and in 1865 the Sl.75-tl.99 class ; among females, the $0.50-10.74 class in 1860, and the $0.75-$0.99 class in 1865. The median wage for malee was $1.05£ in 1860 and $1.90 in 1865. For females it was $0.56 in 1860 and $0.80 in 1865.
Greater significan ce «Maches to the resulte obtained when the numerous wage- series are classified according to
i The to tais of Tnbles XXI and XXII do not agres, becaose In a few casas the AldricK lirpurt síyoh plece-rate wages inslead of time «ases, and in a few otber cásea gires wages with board furnished. As these series show changas id relativa par, tber are Incloded in Table XXI, bot as ther do not show net camines, tijuy are eiclnded Irom Table XXII and all aubsequeat compatatlons In which- actual, instead of relativo, wages ¡s rsgardod.
294 HlSTOBY OF T<HE GbEENBACKS
the varióos economio groups to which the wage-earners belonged. One such classífication — that according to industries — is made in the next table. No industry is included in which retnrns are not given for an average of at least 200 employees. The resnlts are presentad according to both the systems of weighting described above.
Comparison of these industries shows that the slightest advance of relativo wages occurred in the textile trades which employ numerous women and children. At the other extreme, with the greatest advance are city public works and the manufacture of gas in which the employees represented by the data are all men and mostly men who rank as unskilled laborers.
It will be noticed that the two systems of weighting pro- duce resulta that vary but little. What difference exists, however, is, on the whole, on the side of higher figures for the constant weights. If one compares the two sets of index-numbers for each of the nine industries from January, 1864, when the full effects of the paper currency began to be felt, to July, 1866, one finds that in ten cases the con- stant weights give the same figure as the variable weights, in twelve cases a lower figure, and in thirty-two cases a higher figure. Observation of these differences raises again the problem that was mentioned in discussing the two sys- tems of weighting: What is the cause of the differences — are they accidental results due to the imperfections of the data, or are they indicative of some general feature of the wage situation which has so f ar been overlooked ?
In answer to these questions a hypothetical explanation may be suggested. In organizing the labor forcé of a fac- tory, a railway, or a commercial house, it is of ten possible to secure substantially similar results at about the same cost from several different combinations of laborera belonging to different trades or possessing different degrees of skilL For
8SSS8:¡8S8SHB8S
ESSíísiSfi-i?;
= 3S££$:5:;3?^253
5TÍÍÍIÍ5!í=S3Sü
l2al§§S§SS3S3s
S33 = »E = íí.:5
aS=SSS2i55«SSB
:íi! = íi¿;2 = í::^
SSSSSSüüSSSSSSS
ssssssassasess
¡Si
iH
Sil
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ss-s
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i!i
= ;?,sii = 25í:!-fj;s
III 1}J
fli
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P3
lili
?J|1 {]!
¿lee
" s 3 III
296 Histoby op the Gbeenbacks
example, in different factories producing the same producto one is likely to find more f oremen employed by one manager, more Bkilled mechanics by another, more unskilled laborera by a third Now, any change in the relative ratea of pay given to these various classes of workingmen may make it profítable to alter the constitution of a given forcé by hiring relatively fewer of those persona whose wages have risen moet and more of those whose wages have risen least Of coarse, the use of constant weighte conceals any effect that such sub- stitutions of one kind of labor for other kinds may have opon the resulta, for in multiplying the relative wages of each seríes always by the same number one introduces the arbi- trary assumption that no changes take place in the propor- tional numbers of workingmen of different sorts employed. The variable weights, on the contrary, representing the actual number of men of various trades employed at each successive period, allow any changes of the sort described to have their due influence upon the averages.
To test whether the observed differences may be explained in the manner indicated, it is necessary to make a new classi- fication of the wage-series according to ratio of increase in relative wages, and then to ascertain whether there was in fact a change in the constitution of the labor forcé in the direction of relatively larger employment of men whose wages had increased little, and relatively smaller employ- ment of men whose wages had increased much. With this object in view, the wage-series belonging to each of the nine industries included in the last table were divided into two equal groups, one containing all series that show an increase in relative wages between January, 1860, and Janu- ary, 1865, lesa than the median increase, and the other all series that show an increase greater than the median. Then the proportionate number of the total employees belonging to these two groups at the two dates was computed for each
WAGE8
297
of the industries, generally with the result of finding that the group of series showing an increase less than the median had a larger percentage of the whole number of employees in 1865 than in 1860. The figures for the several industries are as follows:
TABLE XXIV
PBOFOBTION OF TOTAL NUKBEB OF SMPLOTEB8 IN NINB INDU8TBIB8 IN JANUABY OF 1H60 AND 1865, BXLONOINO TO WAOK-8BBIBS BHOWINO AN INCBBA8B IN RKLA- TIVE WAOB8
Indnstry
City public works
Illuminating gas
Stone
Building trades
Metals and metallic goods
Railways
Cotton textiles
Ginghams
Woolen textiles
|
Less than the Median for AU Seríes in the Indnstry |
Oreater than the Median for All Series in the Indnstry |
||
|
1800 |
1865 |
1860 |
1865 |
|
7* 9 |
22* 8 |
93* 91 |
78* 92 |
|
8 |
11 |
92 |
89 |
|
41 |
52 |
59 |
48 |
|
48 |
46 |
52 |
54 |
|
43 |
42 |
57 |
58 |
|
39 |
47 |
61 |
53 |
|
16 |
18 |
84 |
82 |
|
39 |
39 |
61 |
61 |
Of course, it cannot be assumed that desire to substitute men whose wages had risen less for men whose wages had risen more for the performance of the same work, wherever f easible, was the solé cause of changes in the constitution of working forces. Numerous other causes in individual in- stances no doubt led to similar changes. In the case of city public works, for example, the change shown by the above figures is probably due in large part to some altera- tion in the kind of tasks that were being performed — a change that happened to créate a much greater proporción- ate demand for men belonging to those groups whose pay had increased less.1 But such changes as are due to
i As an indnstry city public works is rather nnsatisfactory becanse of the Ínter- tnittent charactcr of the work and the change in its nature from time to time. Dur- wff the war there seems to have been a decrease in the attention devoted to cirio undertakings — at least the figures from the Aldrich Report show a marked falling
298
HlSTORY OF THE GREENBACK8
accidental canses may be expected to counterbalance each other o ver a field of observation so wide as the preeent; and as tbe cases of increased relativo employment of men whoee pay had increased less than the median for all kinds prepon- derate decidedly over the cases of an opposite character, one is forced to the conclusión that the figures reflect the resulta of the obvious economic motive to reconstitnte forces of workingmen in such a fashion as to secure given results most cheaply. And, to return to the starting-point, it is olear that such substitutions of men whose labor had become relatively cheaper for others must produce diflferences of the kind observed between the averages of Table XXIII ob- tained by tbe use of constant and of variable weights.
A similar conspectus of changes in relative wages, but one based on a classification of wage-earners according to occupations instead of industries, is presented in the next table.
This table, though including a much larger number of groups, shows but a slightly greater range of fluctuations than Table XXIII. The máximum and mínimum relative wages in January, 1865, of the twenty-seven occupations jncluded are 173 (laborera) and 122 (machinists' helpers), as compared with 17C (illuminating gas) and 131 (ginghams)
*
off in tbe number of employees. As this falling off is particularly great in the case of the largest series — " Laborera, Establishment 35" — one which show* an vneommooly rapid increase in pay, the differenee in the oonstitntion of the* workinf forcé in WtiO and 1865 shown by the above table may be thought to be exacgerated ondnly. But if this series be omitted, the proportionate chango is found to be eren ¿reatar, a« the following figures show :
|
EHFLOYEES REPRE8EXTED BY SERIES 8HOWIXO AX INCUtASB IN RKLATTVK WAOB |
||||
|
Less than the Median |
Greater than the Median |
|||
|
1860 1965 |
1860 |
1865 |
||
|
City pnblic works after exclusión of "Laboran*. Et»tablishment No. 35". . |
18% |
»% |
82% |
42% |
iüjÚBm
¿^.;:;::,
¡¡MU
¡SSÍ
^niwi;
a¡s^
íS
8§ gg gg a3 %í gg Sg
i_8
«_SjLU_I3_so!
gg gs as as »s j|
31 i3 33 15 ¡a 88
as %i a; ss mi
sa 33 «| SS 65 vg
■ » -,,: |S gj 8S 8g
ll_üJi_3|_3 3_aa
1IÜÜJ5S5.E!
lyiMüüil 82ü3 8B aa aa ss
s§ =s =i 55 a? as
85 53 35 85 U 88
»» is 58 33 a; n
» 81 53 53 ti 38
»8 ia asas as aa
!§_§!_!= s.s_s3JLS
gg as ts aa as ís
«a «a aa aa «« 88
§1 18 85 sa y 58
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I» 88 55 SS y 28
lüüLIOiJ=.
88 81 53 S8 85 33 « » 88 33 83 53
■¡j j8 as 15 33 35 88 SE
liiíiiiít lililí
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I
I
300 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAOKS
among the nine industries. Since these groups are much more homogeneous than those of Table XXIII, which are composed of persone belonging to dissimilar trades but employed in the same industry, the question of the relative weights attached to different series is of less consequence, and I have not thought it necessary to work out new aver- ages by the use of constant weights. The only occupation in which inspection of the data makes it certain that differ- ent resulte would be obtained is the first — laborera. Here a somewhat greater advance would be shown by the applica- tion of constant weights.
Because of the large number of occnpations represented in Table XXV the detail is rather confusing. A simpler and clearer result may be obtained from the same data by grouping the occnpations according to the degree of skill and responsibility which they reqnire. For this purpose four groups may be constituted: (1) superin tendente, (2) skilled handicraftsmen, (3) assistants of artisans, (4) un- skilled laborera. The resnlts of this grouping are presented in Table XXVI.
This table shows clearly that men in the lower ranks of the industrial army received a relatively greater increase in pay during the war than men in the higher ranks.1
The two series in Table XXV representing wages of women are not included in the groups of Table XXVI. A glance at them shows that they indícate a relatively smaller increase in wages than was received by men in the majority of the occupations for which figures are given. The com- putation of median wages based on Table XXI, and also the relatively small advance found from Table XXIII to charac- terize the textile industries, point to a similar conclusión — that women on the whole succeeded less well than men in
i The reason for this difference, and the question whether the greater reía ti re increase in wages meant also a greater absolute addition to the pay received, will bediscnssed presently.
Wages
301
TABLE XXVI
BKLATIYB WAOEfl OF FOUB GRADES OF WAOB-EABNZB8, 1880-66 1
Number of seríes
A verage number of employees . . Average wages per day in 1860 .
1860, January
July
1861, January
July
1862, January
July
1863, January
July
1864, January
July
1865, January
July
1866, January
July
|
Unsküled Labora» |
Assistants of Handi- craftsmen |
Skffled Handi- craftsmen |
|
60 |
51 |
142 |
|
1,701 |
536 |
1,404 |
|
$1.00 |
$1.10 |
$1.66 |
|
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
100 |
102 |
100 |
|
103 |
101 |
101 |
|
093 |
103 |
101 |
|
100 |
103 |
104 |
|
099 |
108 |
106 |
|
121 |
116 |
112 |
|
121 |
127 |
116 |
|
143 |
137 |
125 |
|
157 |
144 |
139 |
|
169 |
151 |
151 |
|
167 |
155 |
153 |
|
176 |
161 |
156 |
|
169 |
163 |
162 |
Superin- tendente
69
140
$1.95
100 102 099 101 099 099 107 111 119 131 137 140 144 152
the struggle to readjust money wages to the increased cost of living. But all these indications are less accurate than a comparison that can readily be made by computing the rela- tivo wages of men and women in all industries in which the material shows the employment of persons of both sexes. Figures for this purpose are given in Table XXVII. To save space only one set of resulte is given under each industry — that obtained by the application of variable weights — but the totals for all the industries are presented in both forma. It will be noticed that the differences between the resulte produced by the two systems of weight- ing are slight.
i The occupations included in the several groups are as follows : (1) unskilled laborera — laborera, watchmcn, teamsters, quarrymen; (2) assistants of handicrafts- men — helpers of machinists, boilermakers, molders, masons, and blacksmiths, fl re- men, and apprenticcs; (S) skilled handicraftsmen — stonecutters, masons, painters, carpenters, machinists, engineers, blacksmiths, patternmakers, printers, weavers (males), molders, and boilermakers; (4) superintendente — foremen and overseers and second-hands.
HlSTOBI OP THE GbEENBACKS
TABLE XXVII
|
"""" |
íau-ui |
|||||||||||||||
|
— . |
ES |
Its- |
p„„ |
Boom N i-; w , |
— |
D*T |
ALL IsDCSTBTOt |
|||||||||
|
| |
V«r. |
__ |
||||||||||||||
|
Wt*. |
wu! |
|||||||||||||||
|
|
||||||||||||||||
|
1 |
1 |
tt |
F. |
X. |
F. |
|||||||||||
|
No.of |
||||||||||||||||
|
aT.So"' |
a |
a |
SI |
g |
l« |
11 |
S |
s |
11 |
L* |
' ' r |
1 |
n* |
ro |
n» |
■ |
|
,,f ,..«. |
||||||||||||||||
|
plojr's. |
su |
JOI |
in |
res |
171 |
*> |
n |
u |
a |
•i |
» • * |
• |
T*> |
m |
M |
|
|
..>..;.„,. |
1.1 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
■I) |
00 |
im iim |
HT I.H l.V 1-1, |
.„ |
■ |
NO |
ti |
|||
|
,,:!:;!? |
■ |
''i, |
",'. |
!■'] |
¡^ |
m |
Z |
','.',' í: |
M 1« IMi |
•sss |
: |
■.,: |
||||
|
* |
m |
M iat m i« |
. 1.» |
LU |
■ |
|||||||||||
|
■CJlB. |
KíHimU |
M |
||||||||||||||
|
Juir |
■->• |
«> |
-i |
raK *»W |
■ |
|||||||||||
|
■rVS.J;m. |
..i |
tu |
h>!m> mG |
■ |
||||||||||||
|
July |
<:• |
■■i |
«111 t» nt |
k» ii» |
||||||||||||
|
M.J«i. líí |
r. |
IttiU US |
||||||||||||||
|
Juljl» |
17 |
I? 1U QM IM M» V» |
■ i ■ |
|||||||||||||
|
CJ.n. WJ |
:n mi •* je jn ja |
a»!m |
||||||||||||||
|
Jnl» Itó 1* |
a |
.".I |
M .69 ,13 .1*1 |
a i* >» H= *h )«« |
1« ¡(1 'ic |
|||||||||||
|
•>: la*. Bi 1":' Jolj l«í 'i<o |
■•> |
■;i |
ijj |
u ,!» ,131 iu ic iw w k w » |
■ 5 i» |
|||||||||||
|
m |
n |
IV. |
IS 11. WIO IU W W K M N |
From this table it appears that in all ih* indastñes eicpí tbe manufacture of ginghams ibr1 «*£«*> of w>ii adwkced leas rapidly Ihan the wayvs of n*en. *ÜJ# iravs coattunied to lúe, bat that after prkws had tv^ca k> ww* ib* xviatiw wngvs of women caoíjht ap and ai si* así <■£ ü»? penad corertd bv the figurws "vw on i¿* wicoe «¡kísít i» tbe Le*<L It is also notKvaKi" tita* ia ¿«e* iaSKCña» h. «* k-a manj of tíw maje emploma «fr>f *X£viwc *.• •
Wages 303
other industries. It is true, however, that the number of returns for spice and dry goods are too slender to possess much significance, and the same remark applies in a less degree to paper and to books. Of the series in the table, those for the three textile industries alone are based upon fairly comprehensive material.
Table XXV, in which wage-earners are classified accord- ing to occupations, and still more clearly Table XXVI, in which these occupations are grouped according to degree of skill and responsibility, suggest that there may have been some connection between actual earnings before prices rose and the degree of advance in relativo wages during the war. / If the increased cost of living was the primary factor in pro- ducing the rise of money wages, the existence of some such relation between actual income and degree of increase seemsN not improbable. For increased cost of living would neces- sarily press more severely upon families barely able to make both ends meet before the war than upon families which had a comfortable margin above subsistence, and would there- fore forcé the breadwinners of families in the first class to be particularly strenuous in demanding higher pay. To discover whether such a connection actually existed, all of the wage-series have been reclassified according to the per diem wage received in 1860, and the relative increase of pay has been computed for the groups thus formed. The results obtained by the use of variable weights are presented in Table XXVIII A.
These figures indicate that there was an important nexus between the advance of wages and earnings before the sus- pensión of specie payments. In the case both of men and of women the higher grades of employees received a rela- tively less increase in pay than the lower grades. It will be observed, however, that among males the group that fared relatively best was not the lowest paid, but the fourth in
i
HlBTOBY OF THE GüEENBACKS
TABI.B XXVTII A
■ CLABBITOtD ACI 1SB0. (2&-CEHT GEOCFS)
|
i~ |
i il "™ |
ISfil |
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
18» |
» |
|||||||||||
|
Per 0m eoivedio 1*60 |
El |
lufi — |
| |
.1 |
| |
| |
4 '1 |
¿ |
a |
4 |
i |
i |
£ |
|||||
|
ol |
í ¿m |
"" |
*■ |
"^ |
_L_ |
~ |
* |
** |
* |
"* |
||||||||
|
íij'.i". i' 1!' |
19 |
IOS |
~ |
" |
m |
IOS |
113 |
J» |
US |
3S |
ir,2 |
w |
171 |
ua |
||||
|
0 |
vi i..~\. |
SB |
w |
103 |
9B |
mí |
103 |
mi) |
r. iim |
1» |
its |
45 |
IV, |
ltl |
||||
|
( |
v. [i :n |
101 |
IOS |
101 |
12 lUi |
II |
MI |
i-, |
||||||||||
|
] |
¡iis |
1,979 |
100 |
IOS |
121 |
ra |
11 |
:.:, |
ir.', |
65 |
K'.M |
|||||||
|
-.--¡.I:' |
69 |
351 |
100 |
Kll |
ii" |
is, |
:.-; |
:.( |
l.-,.'i |
l.VI |
||||||||
|
■ai--\H. |
SO |
«SI |
loo |
lili |
toa |
101 |
107 |
11S |
127 |
1.72 |
Vi |
IDO |
l>il |
|||||
|
1 |
'.-. I.W.. |
n-> |
w |
lllL, |
117 |
i¡-. |
ua |
111 |
144 |
117 |
l'il |
|||||||
|
(«1-2.21. |
43 |
SI» |
)i.> |
100 |
BB |
IOS |
ios |
121" |
K> |
-.1 |
155 |
UB |
||||||
|
i |
2.-. 'i 4C. |
■ |
Km |
100 |
US |
IT, |
\A |
131 |
i:-3 |
|||||||||
|
í |
13 |
II" |
101 |
un |
97 |
IOS |
21 |
1S7 |
l:ü |
|||||||||
|
3 |
i.«t .1 19.. |
b |
1» |
97 |
97 |
97 |
101 |
101 |
121 |
121 |
121 |
|||||||
|
8 |
S0+ |
■ |
a |
100 |
100 |
U7 |
117 |
125 |
i:« |
131 |
ñ:> |
se |
ua |
137 |
||||
|
Femslm: |
||||||||||||||||||
|
íii •:, -0 ID. |
1U |
lili |
lili |
100 |
IOS |
IOS |
I2:t |
isn iw |
131 |
na |
170 |
|||||||
|
MI 11.51 . |
as |
426 |
h" |
11 : |
ll'i |
1» |
130 |
IOS |
113 |
17 lili |
¡a |
|||||||
|
7.-. (i 9(1 |
i.v. ii; |
|||||||||||||||||
|
1.1. . |
3 |
a |
100 |
IT. |
'"'' |
71 |
79 |
«7 |
■ :-. |
US |
105 | 93 |
M |
116 ,154 |
rank — persona receiving from $1 to $1.24 per day. And it wilt aleo be uoticed that tbe decline in relative increase does not hold perfectly of each euccessive groap. For instance, in January, 1865, the groap $1.50 — $1.74 shows a slightly greater gain than the group $1.25 — $1.49, and the very small higbest group, that includeB but tliree one-man series, shows among its irregnlarities some very considerable increaaes. To facilítate tbe study o£ the connection in a broader way by reducing tbe detn.il, and to get series that are more aignifi- cant and regular because larger, it is convenient to regroup the male employees in the manner suggested by the bracea on the margin. The resulta of auch a regrouping are pre- aented in Table XXVIII B.
This Bummary exhibits a higher degree of regnlarity than Table XXVIII A. It shows that from the time wben the increased coat of living began to be an important factor
i Jnly, 1800. to Jnly, 1986. IucIdiIto.
TABLE XXVIÍI B
|
Prr diem \\.u:- |{..- coiied iniStíO «).!5-0.MH.... 1.00-1.49 1.JO I.Mt 2.U0-2.4Ú.... 2.50+ |
I-i 1 BÜ 94 sis it; :,',.-« y¿\. s;:i l*.'1 si |
1880 |
1W1 |
«. |
1803 i || 11 ¡t 121 111'. 11! 111! 10« |
m |
1865 |
1888 |
|||
|
100 ia |
TÍ ice 10C 1CK 10 |
in w |
ios w 103 |
1 1(K M ICO |
IOS 101 li- li |
ltl' m IOS |
■ti IX 113 |
111 18 141 la |
i -'.í IB |
181 IBM lSl 150 US |
US ug US m |
|
n.i i.r.i |
— about th»3 cióse of 1862 — to the end of the períod cov- ered by the figures, the ulerease in relativa wages varied in a rough way inversely aa per diem wages ii. 1860, with the important exception that men earniug lesa than $1 per day received a leas proportional increase in pay t lan mea in the second class. It also shows that when the rapid fall of prices began early in 1865 these differences between the relativo ratea of increase in money wages became lesa. If we take men paid less than $2.50 per day in 1860 — over 98 per cent, of the whole number — we find that the differeuce between the increase in the relativo wages of the various groups declined from 23 pointB in Jannary, 1864, to 19 points in Jannary, 1865, and to 8 points in Joly, 1866. l Ae already snggeBted, the general fact of a connectionl betweert the relative increase of wages and the amonnt
1 Jaly. 1800, to Jnly, 1886, incloaiv».
dIojbos Inclnded wlth mí le, the flrat tiro «rio* Ib tbo abo™
|
- ,E |
,m |
1861 |
1882 |
186S |
1864 |
1885 |
1868 |
|||||
|
ID 1900 |
m |
!8 |
104 W |
411 ira 107 11)1 101 |
US no |
13J |
15S 150 |
US 181 |
1SJ |
187 |
£ |
|
|
saas-o.» |
1,1K |
KSK |
||||||||||
306 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS
< — ^~
earned before the sudden ádvance in cost of living is readily explainable on the hypotHesis that the rise of pnces rather than the withdrawal of men into the army or any other cause was the chief reason for the higher pay. Though it may not seem so clear at first, both the exception to this general rule in the case of men earaing less than $1 per day before the war, and the decreasing divergence between the series after prices had begnn to fall, can be accounted for on similar grounds. It is probable that most of the men repre- sentad in the table who received less than $1 a day before the war were unmarried, or at least that a considerably larger proportion of them than of men earning from $1 to $1.49 were without family responsibilities. On the average, a single man is better off, from the material point of view, on a wage of, say, 75 cents a day than a man with a family on a wage of, say, ?1.25 a day. If this be so, there is the same reason why men in the first of our groups should receive a less average increase in money wages because of the increased cost of living that there is why men in the third gronp should receive a less average advance than men in the ; second, men in the fourth less than men in the third, and \ men in the fif th group less than men in the fourth. 1 As for the decreasing divergencies between the series of ¡ relative wages, a study of the table shows its cause to be \ that after prices began to fall in January, 1865, the rate of ' increase in wages became distinctly smaller in the case of the group that had been most affected by the increased cost of living, but not in the case of the other groups. As the changes in the pay of men earning from $1-$1.49 per day conformed more closely to the changes in cost of living wben the cost was advancing than did the changes in the pay of other men earning either more or less, so also, when the cost of living declined, this group was the first to show the effect of the change.
Wages
307
Similar considerations explain why on tbe whole the wages of women increased less tban the wages of men. One of the reasons commonly given for the fact that female employees are paid less than men for similar work ifl that they have smaller family responsibilities. ! If such is the case, an increase in the cost of living would presa on the average less severely upon working women than upon working men, just as it would press less severely on men receiving high, than upon men receiving low, wages.
It would be an error, however, not to note that this connection between earnings and cbange in relative wages holds true only in a broad and general way. Tbe contrast between the first and second forms of Table XXVIII shows that the rule does not hold uniformly in the smaller wage- groups. Similarly, reference to Table XXV will show that, while the better-paid occupations on the whole exhibit a less considerable increase in relative wages than the poorer- paid occupations, this is not true in every individual case For example, the average increase in the pay of 440 machin- ists who received an average wage of $1.62 per day in 1860 was 52 per cent, by January, 1865, as compared with 22 per cent, in the case of 69 of their helpers, who got but &J.16 a day in 1860. This qualifícation means nothing more, however, than that the general law of statistics applies to these figures — uniformities are discovered only when large groups are taken.
Another misapprehension may be guarded against by call-
i A rongh illustration of this fact is fnrnished by the following classifloation of male and female breadwinners in the United States in 1890 according to conjugal condition — compnted from Eleventh Cenws, " Population," Part II, p. cxxvi.
Divoroed
Males. . . Females
|
Total |
Single |
Married |
Widowed |
|
100* 10Q* |
39.2* 69.8% |
57.1* 13.2* |
3.4* 16.1* |
0.3* 0.9*
808
HlSTOBT OP THE GhEEXBACKS
ing a t ten ti on to tbe fact that the above discuaskm i only to the relative — not to the abeolnte — increasi wages. The fact that men earning from $1 to $1.49 per daj in 18(10 received a relatively greater advance in paj than any other class <loes not mean that the extra soma giren them W(!r<» as large as the snms added to the paj of employees of higlior grade. As a matter of fact, the actual Lacrease was grontor in the pay of men receiving bigher wagea at the OiitaoL To bríng out thia fact, Table XXIX has been pre- pimwl by compating the average actual ulerease of pay ropr«Mmt«d by the average relative increase for each of the groiip of Tnble XXVIII B. A wage midwaj between the gronti'Mt nnd the least included in each groap has been taken aa tito Iiiihím for the computations. table im
i*
|
IMO |
m |
ISO |
m, |
i» |
las |
m |
|||||||
|
1 jl |
| i >>i |
|ID |
•5 .06 |
i • 01 .tu |
i |
\ |
i |
S |
A |
i ... .a |
"H |
i |
■5 |
|
1-04 M M |
M .s -Oí |
1.11 .at .a .18 .01 |
■■n .a ■ .15 |
.i J |
Laj M I.W ■■-'■• |
t w .M 1 ■ 1 11 .Ti |
*<1 H 1 » i a |
AiHHirding to thÍB table the most considerable average Iiiiwhw In actual wages was that of men earning from $2 to IU.IV |hh' ilny in IHHO; but the relative increase was greater In Un» i'rdk of men earning leas, becanse the smaller actual niliHHniio Imrt» a higber proportion to the lower initial wages. Mf llin twtt forma of presentation — relative and actual liirnw"' Mío formur seems to poséese more Bignincance wlit'ii mi» In cimcuniod witb the economic well being of
Wages 309
wage-earners, for the reason that the importance of a given sum added to an income dependa upon the amount of that income before the addition is made. An increase of 75 cents to the daily wage of an unskilled laborer who formerly received $1.25 means more to him than an increase of $1 to the daily wage of a carpenter who had been paid $2.25. Consequently a better idea of the alteration in the circum- stances of the two men is afforded by saying that the day- laborer's pay had been increased 60 per cent, and the car- penter's 44 per cent., than by saying that the former's pay had been increased 75 cents and the latter's $1.
As has been said, an average wage computed from the returns of employees of such diverse character as the persona for whom the Aldrich Report gives returns means compara- tively little ; but there is no valid objection to a compntation of the average variation in the pay of men in unlike occupa- tions. While a series of such averages does not present the facts concerning the changes in the wages of any specific individuáis or groups, it is nevertheless the only means by which a general notion regarding the circumstances of the whole class of workingmen can be arrived at. Consequently it seems worth while to present a summary of the average relative wages of all employees for whom we have data and to compare it with tjie results obtained by Professor Falkner from practically the same material. This is the purpose of Table XXX.
Between the two forms of the semiannual table it is found again that the differences are slight, but that the constant weights give slightly higher figures. In order to test once again the explanation given above for this difference, all of the wage-series have been divided into two nearly equal groups, one containing the 255 series that show an advance by January, 18G5, of 42 per cent, or less, and the other the 257 series that show an advance of 43 per cent, or more. The
310
HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS
AVSBAOB EKLATTVB
1860, 1861,
1862, 1863, 1864, 1865, 1866,
January
July
January
July
January
July
January
July -
January
July -
January
July -
January
July -
TABLE XXX
WAOB8 OF ALL EM P LO Y EES FOB WHOM DATA ARE OIYKM IV XII OF THE ALDRICH REPORT
Semiannoal Table
/ * X
Variable Constant Weights Weights
100 100
100 102
99 102 104 116 119 131 142 152 155 161 164
99 102
99 102 103 114 119 132 144 156 159 165 166
i i
! I
|
Falkner's Table» |
|
|
Simple Arenga |
Weighted Arenge |
|
100.0 |
100.0 |
|
100.8 |
100.7 |
|
102.9 |
103.7 |
|
110.5 |
118.8 |
|
125.6 |
134.0 |
|
143.1 |
148.6 |
|
152.4 |
155.6 |
former group includes 27 per cent, of the whole nnmber of employees in 1860 and 38 per cent in 1865; convereely, the latter group includes 73 per cent, of the whole nnmber in 1S60 and 62 per cent in 1865. Lest it be thonght that this difference is due to the prominence of the one very large series — laborera employed by establishment 35 — the figures ha ve been recomputed af ter excluding it Then the result ifl that the group of series showing an increase less than the median include 35 per cent of the employees in 1860 and 42 per cent, of the employees in 1S65, while the corresponding figures for the other group are 65 and 58 per cent The data thus show unmistakably the tendency to substituto? employees whose pay had increased relatively less for employees whose pay had increased relatiTely more, wher- ever such a change was feasible.
■ Aldrtrh ReporL Part I. pp. 174. 176.
Wages 311
The discrepancies between both the columna of tbe aemi- annual table and the two seis of resulta obtained by Falkner are much greater than the differencea produced by variable and constant weights. Theae discrepancies deaerve care- ful attention, becauae they show clearly the effects produced by di88imilar methoda of analyzing aubatantially the same data.
The fírat of the Falkner aummariea was obtained by striking a simple arithmetic average of the 500 or more wage-aeriea, all of which were treated aa having preciaely the same importance. In the semiannual table, on the con- tra ry, each series was weighted by the number of persona whoae pay it repreaented. That thia difference in the method of striking the averages must produce somewhat divergent results may be seen from Table XXVIII A or B. Not only are the wage-groups in this table that show the greatest increase in pay represented by a larger number of series than the groups that show a smaller increase, but, more than this, their series include on the average a larger number of employees. Falkner's method of preparing a general aver- age of variations would allow to each of these groups an influence upon the result in proportion to the number of series included in it; but the method adopted in construct- ing the semiannual table would give each group an impor- tance in proportion to the number of employees. For example, in computing the index number for January, 1865, the group $1-$1.49, which shows the greatest advance in money wages, would have a weight of 35 per cent., accord- ing to Professor Falkner's method, because 179 of the 505 series fall within it, and a weight of 50 per cent, according to the second method, because 2,325 of the 4,696 employees fall within it. It is further true that the average index num- ber for this group is higher when calculated according to the second method, because the large series as a rule show a
312 " HlSTOBY OF THE GBEENBACKS
somewhat greater increase than the small series. This last fact may perhaps mean that establishments requiring the services of many hands found it necessary in order to secare full quotas to offer wages rather higher than a small employer was compelled to pay to secure two or three men.
The second of the Falkner series in Table XXX, like the semiannual series, is a " weighted " average. But the meth- ods of weighting adopted in the two cases are very different Instead of multiplying each relative wage by the nnmber of employees whose pay it represented, Professor Falkner struck a simple average of the relative wages in each indos- try and then multiplied the series for each industry by the number of persons engaged in it according to the fed- eral census reports. As several of his critics have pointed out, there are grave objections to this procedure. First, the censas does not purport to show the number of persons engaged in industries — like the manufacture of agricultural implements, for example ; but the number of persons engaged in various occupations — like painting, bricklaying, tailoring, carpentering, and the like. Ñor is it poesible to ascertain from these returns for occupations the nnmbers employed in industries. To take one example, the first of Falkner's industries — " Agricultural Implements n — is weighted for the years 1880-91 by the number of persona reported in the occupation tables of the Tenth Census under the caption " Agricultural Implement Makers " — viz., 4,891.! But that this number does not include by any means all the persons engaged in this industry is indicated by the follow- ing footnote appended to the caption in the census table: " Generally reported as * iron founders,' 'carpentere,' ' machín- ists,' 'painters and varnishers,' etc."
Second, if the weights used are erratic, some of the seríes for the industries to which they are applied are not lees so.
i Tenth Ceruw, Vol. I, " Population," p. 746; cf. Aldrich Report, Part I, p. 173.
Wages 313
It has been pointed out above that the number of wage- series in several of the " industries" of the Aldrich Report is altogether insufficient to give a reliable indication of the general trend of wages.1 To take the most extreme cases, there are but two series for "Groceries" and three for " Dry Goods."2 Of course this is an altogether inadequate basis for conclusions about the wages of salesmen, yet " Dry Goods " receives, in Professor Falkner's table, a weight sec- ond only to that of " Btdlding Trades."
In considering which of the four series of relative wages in Table XXX has the best claim to acceptance, therefore, Falkner's weighted series must be discarded. Curiously enough it approaches the resulta of the semiannual tablea more closely than its companion series of simple averages. But in view of the faulty method by which the weights were obtained and the recklessnesa with which they were applied, this cloaer approach must be regarded as an acci- dental virtue.
Of the three remaining series, Professor Falkner's simple average will be preferred only by those, if any such there be, who believe that in computing average variations in wages no attention should be paid to the number of persona employed at different rates of pay. On the other hand, the semiannual table will be preferred by those in whose eyes the numbers are important Perhaps the difference between the two tablea can best be expressed by saying that Falkner's simple average shows the average change in the price paid for various kinds of work, allowing to each kind an importance in proportion to the number of reporting eatabliah menta in which it ia performed, while the semi- annual table shows the average change in the pay of all the icage-earners for whom returns are given.
i See sec. ii, above. 2 See Table XX, above.
314
HlSTORY OF THE GBEENBACKS
IV. BELATIVE MONET WAGES IN THE GOAL, IBÓN, OLA 88, AND
POTTEBY INDUSTBIE8
The preceding discussion has been confined to the material afforded by Table XII of the Aldrich Report. Before combining the figures for money wages with the tables of pnces it is in order to seek what additional wage- data may be found in other sources.
The task of collecting material for the Aldrich committee regarding wages in the coal, iron, glass, and pottery industries was intrusted to Mr. Joseph D. Weeks. His report presented the data in such a different form that they cannot readily be compared with the uniform returns for other industries secured by the Department of Labor. Not only do Mr. Weeks's tables fail to report number and eex of the workers, but they also do not give wages for the same
TABLE XXXI
RKLATIVK WAGES OF COAL MINERA 1
|
Anthracite Coal |
BlTUMTNOUS COAL |
Anthractte Coal |
BmnfmovB Coal |
||||
|
Date |
• - |
Relativo Wages |
Date |
Date |
h |
i! 2* |
Date |
|
1850, Nov 1860, March . . Dec. . 1861, May. Aug 1862, May. July.. .. Nov 1863, July.. .. Sep. , . , 1864, May July.. .. |
03 107 03 107 03 100 107 123 154 185 206 239 |
100 100 ¿0 75 88 88 100 150 200 250 • • • |
1850 1860 • • • • 1861 1861 1861 1862 1862 1863 1863 1864 • • • • |
1865, May July Sep Oct 1866, Jan Feb April Aug Dec |
206 162 185 206 160 181 166 185 206 166 |
850 • • • • • • • • • 200 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • |
1965 • • • • • • • • • • • • 1866 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • |
i In computing tho reía ti ve wages in the first of these series the average of the wage paid in Novena ber, 1859 ($6 per week), and March, 1800 ($6.98), wms taken as the basis. In the case of the secoud series the months of the year in whleh the specified wages were paid are not stated.
Wages
315
months in the year. As a glance at any of tbe previous tablea will show, this second lack of uniformity is particu- larly serious when one is studying tbe effects of tbe green- back issues, because wages cbanged so rapidly during tbe war. It is, therefore, necessary to take up Mr. Weeks's reports for the several industries separately. ^^1
Por the coal industry he gives two seríes, one presenting ] the weekly wages of a miner of anthracite coal doing / " company work " in Luzerne county, Pa., and the other / showing the price paid per bushel for mining bituminons 1 coal near Pittsburg. These seríes are shown in the preced- / ing table. ^^
Both these seríes show a somewhat greater relativo
TABLE XXXII
RKLATTVE WAGES OF IBON-ORB MINBBB
|
Nbw Jkbsbt |
Oxford , N. J. |
Cornwaxl, Pa. |
os *•* • PnWQZ |
||||
|
Blasters and Drillers |
Minera |
Un- skilled Laborera |
Skilled Laboren |
Minen |
|||
|
Per diem wage, 1860 1860 Oct. |
SI. 00 100 113 100 100 144 144 163 200 250 250 200 150 165 |
Per diem wage, 1800 1860 |
$1.00 100 ■ • • 90 100 125 • • • • • • • • • 175 • • * • • * 188 138 150 |
Per diem wage, 1860 1860 |
10.75 100 • • • 107 120 133 • • • • • • 207 • • • • • • 187 • • • 193 |
10.95 100 • • • 105 116 126 • • • • • • 179 • • • • • • 179 • • • 184 |
$1.25 100 |
|
1861 1862 1863 1864, Jan. |
1861, Oct. 1862,July 1863,July |
1861 1862 1863 |
100 106 112 |
||||
|
Feb. |
|||||||
|
Apr. |
1864 |
200 |
|||||
|
July |
1804, July |
||||||
|
1865, Jan. |
1865 |
||||||
|
Apr. July |
120 |
||||||
|
1865,July 1866,Jan. 1866,July |
|||||||
|
1866, Jan. |
1866 |
132 |
316
HlSTOBT OF THE GBEESBACKS
tncteeé* o£ pay t&aa aay oí the ocrnpations íiM^l^rfrf u Tabfe 33T. ba£ noc greaiet than some oí the indiridiial serano a* nmy l» seen by referring to Table \xi The andtw*:i&* minees beirog ia the $l-00-$L24 wage gronp, for thetr pay per áay befcce the war areraged $L©Í In w&ich ^reop tire btt^xminoos minéis beiong it is difficalt to sav. IHurimc tine niae ^«is, 1S52 to 1S60. ther had been pajal two eente & b*a¿heL and aocording to Mr. Weeks men ut ^-vxi minien vorking full time ceñid mine aboat 100 k bm>hx?h> a d*y. What average earnings per day had been, Wwever. ^re do not knov. % %Aotftc*^? men engaged in minmg iron ore Mr. Weeks's o^urw albo show not onl j a large increase in money wages, bul aW vkJent flnctnations from time to time. An attempt tv* compare the five señes relating to this industry is made iu Table XXXIL
Men employed in making pig iron, on the contrary, received an advanoe in pay belov the arenge, if the two **>n*N$ given by Mr. Weeks and repreeented in Table XXXIII giv* a correct impresión.
table rmn
V16CS T% TKM MG «Oí UHR»tEl
Catasao^cju Pa.
Year
Fillersat K
iVrdMrfliwageaS6a 11.37 ($1.85
lfc».
1861.
1862.
1863.
1861
1865
1886
100 106 91 101 153 141 142
!
100 103 91 103 146 135 130
at
Wages
317
TABLE XXXIV
RKLATIVE EABNINQ8 IN THE BAR IBÓN INDU8TRT
puddlino iron Etna, Pa.
Date
Perdiera wage,'60
1860
September 8
1861
1802, April 12. ... .
July 12
August 23. . .
September 1
September22
October
October 18. .
November 35 1863,April
AprU25
May 2
June
July
December . . 1864, January 30. .
AprU9
May
May 17
June
June 4
July..
August 27 . .
October 1 . . .
December . . 1865,February 4..
March
April
May 13.
July
September. .
September 9
September23
October 21 . . 1866
January 6. . .
January 27. .
March 31 . . .
December 22
»9
100
• • •
100
113 Í25
• • •
Í38
• • •
Í5Ó Í63
• • •
• • •
175
Í 88 2ÓÓ
• • •
225
• • •
200 150
144 200
200 225
e
i
$2.67 100
• • •
100
112
• • •
125
• • •
• • *
137
• • •
• • •
150
• * •
162
• • •
• • •
175
• * •
187
• • •
200
• • •
• • •
225
• • •
200 150
• • •
143 200
201 226
$1.33 100
• • •
100
113
• • •
126
• • •
• • •
138
• • •
• • •
150
• • •
163
• • •
• • •
175
• • •
188
• • •
201
• • •
• • •
226
• • •
201 150
• • •
144 201
202 227
Puddlino Ibón Duncannon, Pa.
§
3
*<3
¿
100
• • •
100
• • •
114 129
136 143
• • •
157
171 186
214
229
200
171
157 171 200 200
E
•o
$2.01 100
100
• • •
114 129
136 143
Í58
189
206 223
257
275 240
206
189 205 240 240
3# £*
$1.01 100
ióó
• • •
114 129
136 143
Í56
188
205 222
256
273 24Ó
205
188 205 240 240
Hollino Ibón
Duncannon,
Pa.
h
100 100 113
125
138
150 163
175 Í65
• • •
150
138 150 165
• • •
158 165
e
U9
£
$3.20
100 100 113
125
138
• • •
150
• • •
163
• ■ •
Í75
• • •
165
• • •
Í5Ó
138 150 165
• • •
158 165
81*
HlflTOBY OF THE GbEESBACKS
Fot tho bar iron indostry Mr. Weeks's reporta are not quito *o reatricted. They indícate a large increase in the |*y of puddlers and their helpers, cbecked by a brief reme- llón lu 1805, and for the better paid bar-roilers an increase not ¿(roatly in ad vanee of tbat of pig-iron workers.
Tho two nonos given by Mr. Weeks as representatire of Uto |*>ttory ¡ndustry are both for men making very high wnjfo*. Tho not earnings of the hollow-ware pressers from t.HRW to 18(UI an) ro[x>rted as $10 a day, and of the handlers Nt f U. Tho dollar a day added to their earnings in 1864 (HHHmUugly roprosonted a relatively slight increase.
TABLE XXXV
EKLATXVB EAKNIHOS OF FOTTOS
Y«*r
iw mo
IHHI
Hollow-Ware Pre!*8©rs
$10.00
100 100 100 100 110 110 110
Handlers
$9.00
100 100 100 100 111 111 111
fcHunllY* Mr, VVookn gives six series representing the aver- ^1^ vIhUy oaniiug* of glass-blowers engaged in making win- vtt»w ^U** hiuí ^rvon-glass bottles of varions sizes. These |hiutv« hiv for Yoam boginning in September and ending U XUy ov Jum\ for glass-blowing is generally suspended U^MUvg Iho «uuunor uionths. Table XXXVI shows that until M*>* I MUV llw avorago earnings of blowers had increased t^hUv U** thau wago* in the industries represented in
Wages
810
TABLE XXXVI
RELATIVE EARNINQ8 OF OLASS BLOWBB8
|
Blowers of Window- Olasa |
Blowers of |
Oreen Olass Bottlks |
||||
|
Y bar |
2 os. |
4 os. |
8 os. |
Pint |
Quart |
|
|
Av. earnings a day in 1859-60 |
$3.32 100 100 100 100 100 136 151 213 |
$2.25 100 93 100 100 100 149 149 233 |
$2.25 100 98 107 107 107 156 156 231 |
$2.40 100 96 110 110 110 156 156 225 |
$2.97 100 91 121 121 121 148 148 167 |
$3.06 100 |
|
1859-60 |
||||||
|
1860 61 |
94 |
|||||
|
1861-62 |
125 |
|||||
|
1862-63 |
125 |
|||||
|
1863 64 |
125 |
|||||
|
1864-65 |
155 |
|||||
|
1865-66 |
155 |
|||||
|
1866-67 |
159 |
|||||
V. BELATIVE SALABIES OF SOHOOL TEAOHEBS
The Aldrich committee found it impractical to collect data regarding the earnings of professional men, such as lawyers, physicians, or even clergymen ; but as in a measure representative of this whole class their statistician used a few carefully selected returns of the salaries of teachers in the public schools of four cities — Boston, Baltimore, Cincinnati, and St. Louis — and of two rural counties in Massachusetts — Franklin and Barnstable. These returns are presented in Table XXXVII.
On the whole, these resulte accord well with those of the preceding sections. The average increase in the salaries of male teachers is less than that shown by any of the twenty- seven occupations represented in Table XXV with two excep- tions. The discussion based on Table XXVIII suggests that the reason for this slight increase is found in the high initial earnings. On the other hand, a seeming contradiction of the rule is found in the fact that the advance in the sal- aries of women teachers is greater than in the case of men. But this exception is one in seeming only. In gathering
HlSTOBY OF THE GrBBENBACKS
TABLE XXXVII
|
».,.„ |
Biunm |
,„,„-„, |
Bt. LoOla |
CODSTBI Sr.iikil.- IKHAM. |
ill Simo |
||||||||
|
> |
». |
«. |
fnm |
F,., |
V |
Fam |
■on |
||||||
|
1 |
i |
3 |
í |
a |
i |
1 |
I |
1 |
11 |
■ |
|||
|
VHU |
tt» |
Í1.1TI |
rw |
n.tfs |
un |
ti »: |
i.,.! |
tu.o» |
tOM |
||||
|
VJt- |
»rirr. |
;.rm. |
|||||||||||
|
im |
|||||||||||||
|
MI |
13 |
1U |
US |
21» |
US |
117 |
1» |
1U |
M |
their data the agenta of the Aldrich committee found it pos- sible to include only the highest and the lowest grades of teachers; because the intermedíate grades are so rnatiy and show such variations in pay that no Batisfactory data conld be obtained regarding them.1 Since the highest grades of teachers in American schools are men and the lowest women, the figures of the report for women relate to teachers with very low salaries and the figures for men to well-paid teach- ers. The salaries of the women muge from $100 to $500 a year and those of the men from $900 to $2,800. Now, while it has been shown that in most industries in which boto sexes particípate the average increase in the pay of men wae greater, it does not follow that the increase in the wages of the best-paid men was greater than that in the wages of the worst-paid women. Indeed, a comparisoo oí the two parta of Table XXVIII A will show that the roen belongingin the wage-groups $2.25-$2.49 and above received on the whole a smaller average advance than the ti2S females for whom we have returns. Of conree, in Table XXXVII we are com-
Wages 321
paring with women men receiving on the average con- siderably more than $2.25 a day.
A leas definite, but nevertheless an important contribu- tion to knowledge of tbe economic situation of professional men during the war, Í8 supplied by an inquiry made in 1869 by David A. Wells, then special commissioner of the revenue. "The answers," he says in his fourth report, "to a large number of circulara sent out by the commissioner during the past year to clergymen, teachers and other professional men, lead to the conclusión that, while their salaries or incomes have, as a general rule, been advanced since 1861, the ^ advance has not been equal, by any means, in extent, to the / advance in the price of commodities."1 *h
Since prices fell after January, 1865, while money earn- I ings of such persons apparently continued to increase, it I follows that the case of these correspondents was probably j worse during the war than when their troubles were laid | before Mr. Wells in 1869. ""*
VI. BELATIVE WAGES OF FABM LABOREES
It is especially regretable that wages of farm laborera are not included in the exhibí ts of the Aldrich Report, because they formed in the United States of the Civil War the largest single class of wage-earners.2 Ñor can this gap be satisfactorily closed with material drawn from other sources. The Department of Agriculture has made several investigations into the wages of farm laborera, but the earliest of these was not undertaken until 1866, and no systematic
i H. R. Executive Documcnt No. 27, p. xlii, 41 st Cong., 2d Sess.
2 la the occupations table of the Censas of 1860 the number of " farm laborera " in the niae states representad ia the material of the Aldrich Report (see sec 2) is reportad as 335,246, while the number of " laborera " given is 512,481. But the pre- pondera neo of the latter class is probably due to the fact that ia rural distriets a farm hand is oftea reported simply as a " labore r " on the schedules filled in by the ennmerator and tabulatcd as such ia the Censas Office, when he shoaid have been reported as an " agricultnral laborer."
322
HlSTORY OP THE GBEBNBACKB
attempt was made then to aseertain what wages had been paid in former years. Mr. Dodgo, the statistician of the department, however, gavo it as his opinión that there bad been an increase of about 50 per cent, between 1861 and 1866.' But when the ninth of tbese investigations was made, in 1892, tbe department requested its correspondente to send it copies of any accessible wage-records relating to years before 1866. A considerable number of replies was received from different sections of the country and published by Mr. Dodge in his report.* Fragmentary as is this mate- rial, one cau glean from it a few series that may give some notion of tbe changes in the pay of farm banda during the • war. The resnlts of sach an attempt are presentad in Tabla XXXVIII.
TABLE XXXVIII
n.-r.tli, «iiii-ur l.,jii,¡. Mena
"i.nl h. wnli I-'. i:- . M .--.. Si.utli .mr
,..., il.. v,,u, l„..ir. . ■.!■,. .
n..[,th, »¡<h !■■ ■ i r. . Mi,—.. Krototi...
Mnütli. « :' h I,', i" . N..!.. f.ir .■ i,..-r
iumlli wiUi t».;ic , N.J.. f.irul,.:]..')
rniTilh. wilh boar, . Hb. ,
th.willi r...ir. I'l.nl.i.i. Hinl.T
imiith. with hHjiif. ,(>t1¡i..Lrit«..Ci. .. nrailli. wilh Ix.ur. . 111. , Cbnmpaigu
bV, *ltfa nnarcl. ccmmoQ labor. N.J
bd. (I), h.irren, U., Bullero iani 17] Oblo. BulIcrCo
Scanty as is this material, it seems to be the most authentic upon tbe subject, and some interest attaches,
■ Annuat Report, Department of Aoricutt urt, 1MA. p. SL
*Waga of Farm Labor inUeUnitoIStaU» (Depertment of Acrienltnre, Dirt- ■Iod of Statislics, Mise. Series, Report No. 4. 1S92), pp. H-».
Wages
323
therefore, to a comparison with the fuller retorna for other occupations. To facilítate such comparison the series for " farm laborera," " all employees," " laborera," and u unskilled laborera" are placed side by side in Table XXXIX.
TABLE XXXIX
COMPARISON OF RELATIYE WAGES OP FARM LABO&E&S AND OTHSR WAOB-BABNXB8
|
Date |
Farm Laborera Tab. XXXVIII |
All Employees Table XXX |
Laborera Table XXV |
Unskilled Laborera Table XXVI |
|
1860, January July 1861, January July |
• • • 100 • • • 99 • • • 107 • • • 126 • • • 145 • • • 158 |
100 100 102 99 102 104 116 119 131 142 152 155 |
100 100 100 93 100 101 123 125 143 167 173 176 |
100 100 103 93 |
|
1862, January July |
100 99 |
|||
|
July |
121 121 |
|||
|
July |
143 157 |
|||
|
1865, January July |
169 167 |
|||
From this comparison it appears that farm laborera received an ad vanee in money wages slightly greater than the average for the 5,000 employees for whom the Aldrich Report gives retnrns, but considerably less than the advance in the pay of the gronps with which they have most in common. This resnlt is what the previous analysis would lead one to anticípate. As the ríse of wages seems to have been due primarily to an increase in living expenses, one would expect to find that when part of this increased expense was assumed by the employer in furnishing board, the advance in money wages would be less than when the pereon had to find himself. Table XXXVIII shows that in the case of but one of the sixteen series is it positively stated that the pay was "without board." Second, there seems reason to believe that, as a rule, farm hands have smaller family responsibilities than unskilled laborera in towns.
324 HlSTOBY OF THB GbEENBACKS
The occnpation retaros of the census of 1860 are not classi- fied by conjugal condition, but it is improbable that there was a change in this respect in the next generation snfficient to invalídate the application of the ratioe shown by the oensns of 1890. According to the latter census, in the nine states covered by the Aldrich retorna, slightly more than one-half of the "unspecified laborera" were married as com- pared with bnt three-tenths of the " agricnltoral laborera." As man y who belong in the latter class are probably classi- fied erroneously in the former, the real difference would appear greater, could it be ascertained accorately.1 As has been suggested, a single man is less affected by a sudden increase in the cost of living than one with a family, and the previous discnssions seem to show that wage-earners received an increase in money wages ronghly proportioned to the dis- tress cansed them by the rise of prices.
TIL TABLES OF RELATIVE MOXET WAGES BASED UPON THS MATERIAL IX VOL. XX OF THE TEXTH CENSUS
The second of the great collections of data regarding wages in the United States covering the period of the Civil War is fonnd in Vol. XX of the Tentk Census (1880). Beginning in 1820. the Censos Office had made attempts to ascertain the rates of wages paid in the censos year; bnt in 1SS0 this investigation was extended to cover a long seríes of years. Blank schednles were sent to the proprietors of a large nomber of carefolly selected manufactnring establish- ments representing over fifty measnrably distinct industries and located in different sections of the conntrv, with the
i Tbe ¿cures eoMpüed from Table CXYI <rf tfce seeood votan* oo
«s folkre:
A^riealtarml Laboren Laborera üaspeciAed
Wfcoleaaaiber r»JC& 2044
Stade. aaaiber .... SU!» S3U2I
Sia*i*. per o?at. - €T 43
Married. &aab«r .... 1U«SU
MArrvT?d, per cent. .... JD
Wages 325
request that they report the wages paid to certain important classes of their employees f or as many years as their records allowed. When these schedules were received by the Censúa Office they were examined, and when necessary sent back to the manufacturera f or correction, completion, or explanation. "Not infrequently," it is stated in the report, "schedules were passed backward and forward several times before a final adjustment was reached."1
Owing to the care exercised in their compilation, the figures as finally published have borne a good reputation ;s but very little use has been made of them because of the inconvenient form of publication. Mr. Joseph D. Weeks, | the special agent in charge of the investigation, made no attempt to analyze or combine the data obtained, or to discuss their significance. He confined his efForts to collecting and verifying materials from many sources, and published the reports made to him by some 600 faetones i substantially as received. Consequently anyone who desired to make use of the material was under the hard necessity of working it into intelligible form for himself.
An examination of the figures as published, however, shows sufficient promise in them to warrant an attempt to discover how far they bear out the inferences drawn from the materials already dealt with. In particular, the Census figures have the great merit of being more comprehensive than the data of the Aldrich Report Nearly three times as many wage-series available for the present investigation can be collected from the former source as from the latter, and these series represent a larger number of branches of manufacture and a larger geographical área. A conspectus
i Tenth Census, Vol. XX, p. xt.
2 See, for ezample, the opinión expressed by C. J. Büllock in his paper upon "Wa^e Statistics and the Federal Census," in The Federal Cenau* ('* Pnblications American Economic Association," New Series, No. 2), pp. 351, 352, and the prefatory noto by General F. A. Walker in the report itself , p. z.
326
HlSTOBT OF THE GBEENBACKS
of the material derived from the census is afforded by Table XL.
In this exhibit twelve industries are marked by a star (*) to indícate that they are not representad in the wage-
TABLE XL
CLAB8ITICATION OF WAOE-SERIK8 PBOM THS TBMTH CBT8Ü8
I. ACOORDINQ TO INDUSTRIES
Agricultural implements
Boots and shoes*
Breweries.
Brick*
Carriages
Carpeta*
Clothing*
Cotton
Plint glasst
Flour milis*
Purniture*
Qas and coke
Hardware
Ice*
I ron blast furnacest
Iron miningt
Machinery
Marble
Paper
Pianos*
Pins*
Potteryt
Rolling millst
Saw milis
Ship carpentry*
Stove foundriest
Tanneries
Tin*
Tobacco*
Woolen
Total
es *»
A
*S2
Ia
M
1
3 1 3 9 1 3
14 4 5
13 2 7 1 8 2
11 2 7 3 1 4 1 7 2 4
•8 1 4
10
142
I*
5 17
4 32 73 18 17 258 62 28 117
4 47
9 76
3
98
11
103
26
3 38
6 61
8 46 63
7
16 173
1429
H. ACOOBDINO TO LiOCATXOV
East:
Maine
New Hampehire. MassachusettB. .
Connecticut
New York
New Jersey
Pennsylvania. . .
Delaware
Maryland
District of Col-
umbia
West Virginia..
West:
Ohio
Indiana. .. Illinois. . . Kentucky. Michigan Wisconsin
Iowa
Missouri.
Total East and West
3
I8
55-
3 8
16 8
26 7
12 2 2
1 1
86
13 13 7 6 3 6 2 6
56
142
21
8 "2
51 114 206 116 265
52
134
4
13
1 11
128 100 63 51 23 45 9 41
460
1429
Wages 327
tablea of the Aldrich Report, and six more by a dagger (f) to indícate that they are included only in the supple- mentary retorna discussed in sea iv aboye.1 Quite as important as the larger number of industries is the greater geographical range of the material. As was pointed out in sec. ii, all the establishments for which returns are insertad in the main wage-table of the Aldrich Report were situated in states east of Ohio, with the exception of a single gas plant. But of the seríes obtained from the Tenth Census nearly one-third are from the middle West. This makes it pos- sible to compare the fluctuations of money wages in different sections of the country.
On the other hand, the character of the Census series is in several respects distinctly inferior to that of the Aldrich series. (1) But one wage is reported for the different kinds of labor in each year, and it is not stated whether this quotation rep- resenta the average wages for the whole year, or the wages paid in some one month. This muat be regarded as a decided blemiah, particularly unfortunate for the atudy of money wagea during the war; for the preceding aummaries ahow diatinctly that from 1863 to 1865 wages were fluctuating so violently that there was on the average a considerable diflference between the ratea paid at the beginning, middle, and end of the year, and that the average for twelve months might differ from the wage at any specifíed date within the year. (2) The sex of the employees is not uniformly reported, so that it is impossible to sepárate the female from the male aeries. (3) The number of persona whoae pay is represented by the seriea ia not stated. Thua it becomea necea8ary in making up aummaries from these series to treat them in the way that Profesaor Falkner treated the Aldrich material — that ia, to diaregard the number of wage-earners
' This división cannot be made with entire confidence in erery case, because no precise statement is made of the natnre of the establishments included in the twonty-one " industries " of the Aldrich Report,
328
HI8TOBY OP THE GbEEXBACKS
belonging to the different groups altogether. (4) Tbe material is even more strictly confined to mamifactnring industries than that of the Aldrich Report.
Becanse of these limitations of the Census wage material — particnlarly the absence of information regarding the numbers employed at different wages — it seems advisable to confine the comparison between it and the series from the Aldrich Report to a few of the most general forma of presentation. We may begin by comparing the average variation in relative wages as computed from all the series derived from both sources.
TABLB ILI
O0HPASI8OM OP BZLATIYZ W AOJES OOMPUTKD FBOM THS TZWTH C'UIW AMD
ALDRICH KKPOKT
|
Cxhsus OF 1880 |
Falkaer1! Tabla |
Semi- animal |
|||
|
Total |
East |
West |
Tabla |
||
|
Number of series 1860 |
1,429 100 102 106 117 133 145 152 |
969 100 101 104 112 127 141 150 |
460 100 103 112 127 144 153 155 |
543 100 101 103 111 126 143 152 |
520 100 |
|
1861 |
102 99 |
||||
|
1862 |
102 104 |
||||
|
1863 |
116 119 |
||||
|
1864 |
131 142 |
||||
|
1865 |
152 155 |
||||
|
1866 |
161 164 |
||||
It will be observed that there is a remarkably cióse correspondence between the average variation in wages computed from the Census material for the eastern states and Professor Falkner's average for all industries. This correspondence enhances confidence in the approximate
Wa
329
accuracy of both sets of data. These are the two columns # that ought logically to agree, because they refer to prac- / tically the same district and the averages are obtained in the same way. On the other hand, the lack of correspondence between the resulta of the Censúa seríes and the semiannual table does not disturb faith in the latter, because of the unavoidable difference in the methods employed. As has1 just been explained, in the latter case each relativo wage was weighted by the number of persona whose pay it repre- sented, while in the case of the Censas series this could not be done for lack of data. Substantial agreement is here shown by differences nearly identical with those between the two seríes obtained from the Aldrich material by the two methods of compntation.
But while the general average variation in wages appears practically the same in the Censúa and the Falkner tablea, the fluctuationa of the individual series from the two sources are somewhat diff erent. This is best shown by Table XLII :
table xui
WAOE-8ERIE8 FROM THE TENTH CEN8US AND THE ALDRICH REPORT CLA88OTED ACOORDINO TO HELA TI VE CHANOE IN WAOES BETWEEN 1860 AND 1865
|
No. OF r |
Series in Each Group |
Percentaoe of Series in Each Qroup |
||||||
|
Ka tío of Wages in 1865 to Wages in 1860 |
Censas of 1880 |
Aldr'ch Report Series |
Censas of 1880 |
Aldr'ch Report Series |
||||
|
Total |
East |
West |
Total |
East |
West |
|||
|
60-99* |
21 182 164 349 268 208 75 112 41 7 2 |
19 111 128 273 185 144 35 50 19 5 • • • |
2 71 36 76 83 64 40 62 22 2 2 460~ |
19 13 71 132 148 80 33 10 3 1 1 |
1.5* 12.7 11.5 24.4 18.8 14. b 5.2 7.8 2.9 0.5 0.1 |
1.9* 11.5 13.2 28.2 19.1 14.9 3.6 5.2 1.9 0.5 • « . . |
0.4* 15.4 7.8 16.6 18.1 13.9 8.7 13.5 4.8 0.4 0.4 |
3.7* |
|
No change 101-119 JÉ 120-139 |
2.5 13.9 25.8 |
|||||||
|
140-159 |
29 0 |
|||||||
|
160-179 |
15.7 |
|||||||
|
180-199 |
6.5 |
|||||||
|
200-219 |
1.9 |
|||||||
|
220-259 |
0.6 |
|||||||
|
260-299 |
0.2 |
|||||||
|
300 and over |
0.2 |
|||||||
|
1429 |
969 |
511 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
830 HlSTOBT OF THE GBEENBACKS
As shown here, the grouping of the series from the Cen- sus is Bomewhat lees symmetricaL A relatively larger num- ber show no variation or a very considerable increase. Of the series used in the semiannual table 71 per cent, show an increase of from 20 to 79 per cent in wages, as compared with 62 per cent, of the eastern and 49 per cent of the western Censns series.
A second fact brought out by Table XLI is that the in- crease in relative wages seems to have been greater in the Mississippi valley than on the Atlantic slope. This differ- ence is due, in part at least, to the fact that the textile indas- tries that fnrnish over 30 per cent, of the Censns series (Table XL) had their chief seats in the East, and in them the relative increase of wages has been shown to have been least among the industries represented in Table XII of the Aldrich Report.1 But this fact cannot account for the whole difference, becanse among persons belonging to the same economic groups the average increase in pay was generally greater in the West. The following table has been arranged to bring out this relation. It shows the relative wages paid in the eastern and western states to men following the eight trades most fully represented in the Tenth Censos retama
It will be noticed that in six of these eight cases western workingmen received a larger average increase in pay than their fellows in the East. Why this should have been so is a question that can best be discussed after the conree of pnces in the two sections of the country has been investi- gated.2
There is one feature of this table that seems to contra- dict certain of the conclusions drawn from the Aldrich Report data. In Table XXV it appears that the poorest- paid occupations as a rule show the greatest relative gain in wages, but the same is not true of Table XLIII. This
i See Table XXIII, aboye. *See pp. 346, SI7, below.
|
i I |
5 |
3 S 8S8SS8S |
|
1 |
ffi s. sgggigg |
|
|
1 |
i |
19 n.07 100 106 113 135 158 161 160 |
|
1 |
si 2 SSS8SSS s 8 b aaaaj |
|
|
1 |
1 ie |
. B 8S38SS3 |
|
i |
o 3 8SK888S á |
|
|
[ a 5 |
1 |
» ^ §ISSISS |
|
1 |
a * sssssag 6» g rt -H—rtrH-í |
|
|
1 <9 |
¡í |
.- g ggssgsg |
|
i |
<= 3 8S83818S |
|
|
\ ; |
1 |
15 $1.71 100 102 112 131 155 170 174 |
|
1 |
3 a- §§§S3sg |
|
|
s |
1 |
- 2 ISsSISS |
|
1 |
g 8 838SSSS |
|
|
3 a I |
1 |
s S 8S8SSgS |
|
1 |
s S 8S3SR3S |
|
332
HlSTOBY OP THE GfiBBNBACKS
obsenration suggests that the connection between raüo a increase and earnings per day, of which so much has been made, may not be shown by the Censos materia). When, however, these series are all classified according to daily wages received in 1860 and the average ratee of increase oomputed for the several groupe, this inference is found to be mistaken. The figures for the comparison are given Table XLIV, A and B, which correeponds to Table XXVIII, A and B.
TAJBLEXXJV
WAO
THS TEXTO CKXSU8 CLASSXFTKD ¿COORDINO TO DAILT WAOl BECKIYKD IN 1800
|
Per Diem Wages Receired in 1800 |
Ncof Series |
1800 |
1861 |
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
1805 |
1806 |
|
10.15 0.49 |
63 |
100 |
101 |
103 |
116 |
126 |
146 |
162 |
|
0.50 0.74 |
126 |
100 |
103 |
108 |
114 |
128 |
144 |
158 |
|
0.75-0.99 |
169 |
100 |
101 |
107 |
119 |
140 |
158 |
167 |
|
1.00-1.24 |
262 |
100 |
101 |
106 |
118 |
138 |
149 |
156 |
|
1.25-1.49 |
191 |
100 |
103 |
109 |
123 |
138 |
149 |
156 |
|
1.50-1.74 |
254 |
100 |
101 |
106 |
116 |
134 |
143 |
149 |
|
1.75-1.99 |
108 |
100 |
102 |
107 |
118 |
132 |
143 |
145 |
|
2.00-2.24 |
120 |
100 |
101 |
106 |
114 |
126 |
136 |
140 |
|
2.25-2.49 |
28 |
100 |
99 |
101 |
105 |
117 |
120 |
124 |
|
89 |
100 |
101 |
106 |
113 |
120 |
127 |
131 |
|
|
4.00-6.99 |
19 |
100 |
102 |
102 |
105 |
112 |
126 |
127 |
B
|
Per Diem Wages Receired in 1800 |
No. of Seríes |
1800 |
1861 |
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
1865 |
1866 |
|
Under $1.00. $1.00 1.49 1.50-1.99 2.00-2.49 2.50+ |
358 453 362 148 106 |
100 100 100 100 100 |
102 102 101 101 101 |
107 107 106 105 106 |
117 120 117 112 112 |
133 1.38 133 124 119 |
151 149 143 133 126 |
163 156 148 137 131 |
While the general rule that there is a regular connection between the advance in pay under the stimulus of the price disturbances and the amount of wages earned before the war
Wages 333
is fully confírmed by this exhibit, it is noticeable that the most considerable gain is found, not among persons earning $1-$1.24 a day, but in the next lower group. When, how- ever, the fifty-cent groups are taken instead of the twenty- five, the second group — $1-$1.24 — shows the greatest gain in both tablea in the years 1863 and 1864, while by the end of the period the fírst group takes the lead. It is also true of both sets of data that, while employees in the lower groups received a greater relative increase in pay, the actual sums added to their wages were less than in the higher groups. The application of the method of Table XXTX to the figures for 1865 in Table XLIV B shows the average actual increase in the daily wages of the five groups to be 32, 61, 75, 74, and 78 cents, respectively.
VIII. PAY OP GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE8
An interesting side light is thrown upon the advance of wages during the war by the position of government employees as represented in the reports of officials. Of course, the war caused a vast increase in the amount of busi- ness to be transacted by most of the departments, and the clerical forcé employed in Washington was increased accord- ingly. The salaries paid for clerks were generally regarded as fairly liberal before the war, but as the cost of living rose after the issue of the greenbacks many employees, especially men with families, began to find themselves pinched for funds^ Congressional action was required to increase the rates of pay allowed, and in the face of the enormous expenditures for the military and naval service Congress was unwilling to pass any general act that would involve an increased outlay for clerks. Consequently many men resigned their positions in Washington to accept places with prívate employers. So general did this movement become that the heads of several bureaus found themselves seriously embar-
Hl3TO*Y OF TH» *xaZZ53ACIS
• •< . m -
raawed by tfae diffiraity rf «Tarín* and r*fzxniii£ akffled iméiTiiimi The report» rf L?«4 and 1*B «re fafl af sach cnmplamtHL General F. E. Spiniier. fiar esampfe. tfce* treasnrer af the TTaíted States, dedared in. k» report lar 1844 that ~ Bot fiar the empfaoyment af fernafr*,, wfcaae coas pensarían is Ldw. and ín most caaes too low. it wcmld haie been impcaable to have carrxed on the basness af the office with the compensation alLowed. Dnrini? the year manj cierks who were employed in tbis ónice hare been obtiged. in jnstice to themselves. to resign their positróos. in order to enter into bnsmess for themselves, or to take places with moneyed and other corporations. or in basmess hooses, where their tálente and services were better appreciated and rewarded/"1 Similar remarks can readÜT be foand in the reporta of General Spinner s coDeagnes. *
The rank and file of the annT fared aomewhat better
than the clerka in Washington. At the oatbreak of the
war the pay of prívate» was $11 per month.' One of the
first of the war mensures passed in Aogost, 1S61. increased
this pay to $13.* As the rise of prices proceeded, much was
heard in Congress of the distress cansed to the soldiers by
the decline in the porchasing power of their pay. Trae,
' 'the floldier himself was snpplied with food and clothing, so
that his position was leas serióos than that of a clerk who
t had to pay board and tailor bilis; bnt the soldiers family, if
• defx-ndent on his earningB, was no better ofF than the clerk's.
At lant ¡n Jane, 1804, when the specie valae of $13 in
greenbackfl had fallen to $6.18, Congress ondertook to
i Finante Report, 1864, p. 76.
* Por «x Ampio* *e« reporta of the secretar? of the nary, 1864, p. ilii, and 1866, p, 37; mr,T*tf\ry of the treaiiurjr, 1865, p. 42 ; comptroller of thecnrreocy, 1864, p. 55 of Finalice Kepiírt ; trniiNurer. ihid.. IWi, p. 96 ; second auditor of the treasurj, ibid.% 1864, p. 99, and 18»»!», p. 127; fonrth auditor, thid., 1864, p. 110; commi&siooer of internal reTtooe, ibid., lUfli, p. VL
»Art of Aturtuit 4, 18M, 10 StatuUaat Larye, p. 575.
« Art of AujrtiMtft, 1861, 12 Htatutt* at Large, p. 826.
Wages 835
relieve the army. Rejecting a proposition to pay the $13 a month in gold, or an amount of paper equivalent at the market rate to $13 in gold,1 Congress added $3 to the monthly pay.3 This act raised the stipend to $16 per month, at which figure it remained for the rest of the war. The ad vanee was but 23 per cent, on the oíd rate — an increase in relativo wages less, according to all onr tablea, than that received by the majority of workingmen. It mnst be remembered, however, that both the local and federal gov- ernments were paying lavish bounties for volunteers. Of course these extra sums mitigated somewhat the hardships suffered by soldiers' families.
IX. INCBEASE IN LIVING EXPENSES
Statistics of relativo money wages, no matter how elabó- rate, throw no light upon the relativo well-being of the working classes until they have been compared with figures that show the changes in cost of living. In the present case satisfactory figures of the latter sort are extremely difficult to obtain. Of course, the tablea of relative prices in the preceding chapter may be made to serve as a general guide of increased expenditure, but it will be remembered that in making up these tables, all commodities were treated as having the same importance. From the point of view ofl statistical theory this procedure was correct in the last chap-l ter, for there the object was simply to ascertain how far thel changes in the specie valué of the paper curreney werej reflected in the prices of commodities. But here, when an index of variation in the living expenses of workingmen's families is the desiderátum, another form of computation would be preferable. Theoretically, each commodity should
i This proposition was made by Senator Powell, of Kentucky.— Congrtuional Globe, 38th Cong., lst Sess.. p. 2306.
2 Act approred June 20, 1864 (\3Statutes at Large, p. 144). This act took effect from May 1, 1864. Privates in the caralry, artillery and infantry were all incloded.
336 HlSTOBT OF THE GBEENBACKS
now be weighted according to its importance as an item of expenditure to wage earners. Professor Falkner has per- formed this procesa upon his table of wholesale pnces by using weights for groups of expenditure obtained from an elabórate collection of American workingmen's budgets. The resulta of the weighting are lower index numbers for all the years of the war except 1865. ! Reasons have been given in the preceding chapter, however, for distrusting Falkner's table of prices, and it therefore seems unwise to accept the weighted series, which is but a modification of the un weighted, and open to all críticisms urged against the latter.
If Falkner's figures are not to be used, the question becomes serious whether it is not possible to weight the tables that have been preferred to his in such fashion as to take account of the relativo importance of various items of expenditure. The obstacle in the way is that the tables do not contain price series for many of the commodities that figure most prominently in family outlay. In the quarterly table of wholesale prices, there are no series for mens cloth- ing, tea, or house rent, and in many other cases it would be necessary to infer changes in the price of consumption goods from changes in the price of materials — e. </., shoes from harness leather. The same obstacle is even more serióos in the case of the table of retail prices, for it contains even fewer series than the quarterly table. Of course, an elabó- rate scheme of weights is of no advantage unless one has corresponding price series to which to apply the weights. Without such data the attempt at improving the character of the table by weighting is futile.
The fact that a satisfactory plan of allowing for the importance of the various price series is not attainable with the budgetary and price data at our disposal ought not, how-
1 Aldrich RcporU Part I, pp. 93, 94.
Wages 337
ever, to prejudice us in advance against the resalís that can be obtained from our unweighted tables. Statistical experi- ence has shown abundantly that where there is no biased error in the figures, the application of weights to a large number of series makes little change in the final averages. Even in a time of such remarkable fluctnations as that of the Civil War, Falkner's simple and weighted series are very similar, and there is no reason for assnming that an applica- tion of weights to the tables of the last chapter, were such an application possible, would seriously modify the character of the resulte.1 As has been said frequently before, the margin of error in all such computations as the present is wide, and the differences introduced by weighting would not be great in comparíson with differences that might be made by the possession of a wider range of data for prices or money wages.
If we are to content ourselves with the tables of the last chapter from a conviction that with the data at hand we cannot weight them satisfactorily, it remains only to decide what series shall be used as the índex of increase in living expenses. Both the wholesale and retail series have char- acteristic advantages. The former contains a larger number of articles and, moreover, gives índex numbers for January and July that can readily be applied to the figures for rela- tivo wages obtained from the Aldrich Beport. On the other hand, the latter table is better because based on retail- price returns. But a glance back at Table XVIII, where the two series are presented side by side, shows that it does
i It may be pointed out that the problem of weighting as affecting the wage tables is quite different from the problem as affecting the price tables. The reason for this difference is that there is a biased error in the wage statistics — that is, the wage-series representing the lower and most numerous grades of laborera show rather uniformly a more considerable advance in pay than tho series representing the higher and less numeróos grades. Therefore, weighting the series according to number of employees represented gives higher figures. But there is no reason for assnming that the articles of much importance as ítems of expenditure would show a uniformly higher or lower range of prices than the articles of slight importance.
HlSTOET OP THB GbEESBACKS
not matter greatly which seríes is nsed. The chief differ- enoe is that pnces at retail show a somewhat more sliig- gísh movement than príces at wholesale — not exhíbiting a fáll in 1861, rising lese rapidly from 1862 to 1864, and &U- ing lees promptly in 1865. Conseqnently it seems fair to use in any case the series that applies most conveniently to the wage statistics in hand, bat with the constant remem- brance that the wholesale figures probably show somewhat too large a pnrchasing power of wages in 1861 and again in 1865, and too small a pnrchasing power in the earlier years of the war.
One other qnestion remains: Shall the arithmetic mean or the median of the price tablea be employed ? In the last chapter it was argned that the latter is a more significant form of average for the years of the war, bat in the present chapter the arithmetic mean alone has been nsed in wmking the wage tablea The median was not nsed in the latter case, however, simply becanse the absence from among the wage- seríes in Tables XXI and XLII of snch cases of extreme advance as are found among the pnce-series, shows that the flnctnations of relativo wages were much more nniform than the flnctnations of relativo príces as exhibited in Table IX. Therefore, there can be no such divergence between the two forms of average for relative wages as for relativo príces. A trial of the semiannnal wage-table for the single date, Jannary, 1865, has shown that the median is a trille lower than the arithmetic mean for males and a trifle higher for females.1 Since the resulta of the two methods of averag- ing are so nearly identical, there is no valid objection against nsing the arithmetic mean of relative wages in the same way that the median would be used had two sets of averages been computed. In the tables of the following section, therefore, the median of the price-series will be employed, for the rea-
' S<-o. iii, p. 292, aboT©.
Wages 339
son that it was preferred in chap. iv. Computations based on the aríthmetic mean would show a lower range of real wages.
X. BELATIVE REAL WAOE8
It is now possible to combine the resulta of the investi- gations into money wages and into pnces with the par- póse of obtaining an idea of the manner in which the issue of greenbacks affected the material well-being of families dependent on wages. Despite all that has been said, it may not be superfluous to enter once again a cantion that the results obtained can be nothing more than rough approximationa The limitations of the wage data have been dwelt upon at length, and the tables have shown that the money incomes of some workingmen's families increased much more than those of others. No columna of "average variations" can give an adequate notion of these differences. If one set of figures shows fairly the changes in the pay of any one man or class of men, it must from that very fact be inaccnrate as applied to others. Limitations not less serions exist in the price- series that are to be used as indicativo of changes in the cost of living. Families living side by side in the same town have different scales of expenditnre, and therefore will be affected in different degrees by price fluctuationa And an examination of the retail-price series, as given in the Appendix, will show that the living expenses of men receiv- ing similar incomes did not vary in the same degree in dif- ferent towns. To bring this fact out more clearly a table has been compiled showing the average variations in the retail prices of thirty-six articles in the four towns for which the fullest reporta are found in the Censas volame.
If it is well to enter this caution, it is equally well to guard against an undervaluation of the results. Though the data both of wages and of prices leave much to be
340
HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAOKS
mxLAirvB bbtaxl raen
TABLE XLV
OF THIKTT-BIX COMMODITOS ZH FOUB TOWW1 (A' FUCÚ FOB KACH TKAR)
|
Year |
New Cumber- land, W. Va. |
Cantón, O. |
ZanesrUle, O. |
Lawraoee- burg, Ind. |
|
1860 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1861 |
155 |
03 |
115 |
99 |
|
1862 |
203 |
141 |
135 |
128 |
|
1863 |
236 |
210 |
176 |
165 |
|
1864 |
264 |
283 |
248 |
218 |
|
1865 |
265 |
246 |
221 |
183 |
|
1866 |
222 |
207 |
200 |
170 |
desired in fulness, they have been carefully collected from reliable sources and show the actual wages paid to thou- sands of employees for work of a diverse character per- formed in man y different places, and the actual prices paid at wholesale and at retail for man y articles of great impor- tance. So far as the material extends, there is little reason to doubt its substantial aecuracy. Confídence in its repre- sentative character is strongly supported by the uniformity in the resulta obtained regarding both wages and prices from the figures drawn from different sources. Finally, though there are man y deviations from the general averages, the trend of fluctuations is the same in almost all cásea Ii seems, then, that we may proceed to combine the two sets of tablea with a considerable degree of confídence in the sig- nificance of their resulta.
This combination may begin with Tables XXI and X1T. In Table XXI the wage-earners included in the seríes drawn from the main exhibí ts of the Aldrich Report are classified according to the relative change in wages between 1860 and January, 1865. The more conservative price- series of Table XIV indicates that prices had more than doubled within this period. But of the 4,751 employees accounted for in Table XXI the pay of but thirty-nine
Waoes 341 4
had increased as much as 100 per cent. — less than one in a hundred. The remaining ninety-nine wage-eamers in every hundred must have süffered in no inconsider- able degree from the paper standard of valué, because their money incomes had risen less rapidly than tj cost of commodities. Of the men, half had received an increase of less than 54 per cent, in pay, and of the women half less than 34 per cent. If money income increases but one-half, while living expenses double, real income is reduced a quarter; this, or worse than this, appears to have been the case with half the men and much more than half the women. It seems clear, then, that practically all wage- eamers found themselves in more straigh tened circumstances in 1865 than in 1860, and that in the majority of cases the inconvenience süffered was not slight.
This combination refere to a single year. Some notion of the rapidity of the changes that took place in the circum- stances of working-people may be gained by turning to the tablea that represent the fluctuations of money wages year by year. Table XXX gives the average relative wages of over 5,000 persons from 1860 to 1866. A series showing average changes in real wages to July, 1865, may be readily computed from these figures and the price index numbers of Table XIV. In making the computation both columns for relative wages and the lower column for relative prices — the median — have been employed.
According to these figures, the average relative purchas- ing power of money wages over the commodities included in our largest price table was at its lowest ebb from the middle of 1864 to the beginning of 1865 — although money wages at this time were nearly half again as great as they had been before the war. From this low point there was an extraordinary recovery owing to the very rapid fall of prices between January and July, 1865. It must not be forgotten,
3-tí
Bl*TO«T OF THB ObBBNBACKS
/
é
\v
»
TABLE XLYI
otkb S¿00
Date
|
t*Sií&Jauuwkí*. |
AJU |
|
1U> |
|
|
Kn*¿4, JiUAUAí». |
llü |
|
■ui> |
tOi |
|
VS**3* JíUlUAC*. |
rus |
|
*u¿¿. |
101 |
100
IOS 101 1» ICO
1963, Januarr. j! July....
1964, Jan uary. ! July. .
1965, January.j
I j«ij
|
Taríable |
a—*--* |
|
Weichto |
Waicfct» |
|
99 |
98 |
|
96 |
96 |
|
81 |
82 |
|
71 |
72 |
67 91
ho»cwi\ th*i tüLS fall was moch more sndden in whoieaale iluui tu r*taü tnarkefcs^ and therefore the figures gire an altv^cih^x too f&wnibie picture of the s¡toatk>n of the vw i^ui^iuau ^ fiamÜT in the middle of 1S65. Eren acoord- u^ v> thv >*ho¿e*sale prke table there was a sharp reaction < vf \k uvd ito tile latter pnrt of the year that wookl make the vvil \t<i£*Mude.& number for October considerablT leas than '. inu tox Julj% h*d we data for compating it.
\ i twuld lv tuíeraisiing to applj the retail-price table to t lu-cv ^oic i^urv** fbr relative wages and see hov diffiexent i Uc v*u*t* >wuiu be. But soch an applicaDon » scarcely ,uiusíU\ Ixvaius* the retail pnces are a^aages for the : i a vi ihv **$?** are the rates prerailing in bat two r;hí*. v>u thv whoíe* therefore, it seems betst to rest con- xwih the «UíH*r vague modincation of the preceding *u¿£v»U\i by the relation between whofosale and . ¡mvvc» Ixou^üt out in the last chapter. \\ut\ i1h/«c r%*aut» mar be oompared similar figures 4 . wl itvai uk» tablee of the Aldrick RrporL The . **n^ >; tho ^rk.v data in the last chapee r and of the Uv<\ u ac p¿%*fctftfc chapter has led to the conchason kk'nuv, h luoihodü of analjszg show too slight an . , u X'.a vOMjijk The qtxeetioa remains wheiher the - ■ v „w*%w U*o bul *¿Urat of the rnse in prkes a?
Wages 343
by the failnre to gauge the fnll extent of the rise oí money wages. To answer this question two seríes of relativo real wages have been computed from Falkner's tablee by using his weighted and his simple averages for both wages and pnces.
TABLE XLVn
OOMPAUBON OF BKLATTVB BBAL WAOB8 A8 8HOWK IN TABLB XLTX. WTTH RBLA1TVB
REAL WAOB8 COMPUTED FBOM FALXNBB'S TABLS8
Falkner's Tablea
Table XLVI
|
Simple ÁTeraces |
Weighted ÁTorages |
|
|
f • |
100 |
100 |
|
1 • |
- 100 |
107 |
|
1 ■ |
87 |
100 |
|
i • |
- 74 |
90 |
|
í • |
66 |
78 |
|
i • |
- 66 |
64 |
1860, January 100 July - 100
1861, January 102 July - 104
1862, January - 102 July - - 101
1863, January 89 July - 86
1864, January - 81 July - - 71
1865, January 67 July - - 97
On the whole, there is leas difference between these resulta for real wages than between the results of the tablea of prices or of money wages. The extreme depression of real wages in all three series is about the same, and except in 1865 the impression left by Falkner's weighted average agrees very closely with that left by the series from Table XLVI. The chief difference is that the semiannual figures show the recovery of real wages in the middle of the last year — a recovery that certainly took place, although its completeness is exaggerated by the enforced reliance upon wholesale instead of retail price data.
This examination of the decline in the real wages of all employees represented in Table XII of the Aldrich Report might be elaborated by making similar computations of real
844
HlSTOBT OF THE GBEENBACK8
wages in the several industries, occupations, and wage-groups of the preceding tablea. The reader who will compare the figures for money wages in these tables with the figures for pnces will find that in no case did the wage-earners escape a considerable loss in real income. By way of illustration, three tables based upon the most significant groupings of the wage-series are presented below. In examining them, one must remember that, like the preceding tables, they overstate real wages in July, 1865.
TABLB XLYIU
|
ATKBAQB CHANOS IN KKAI* ' |
WAGES 1 |
DI NINX INDC8TBIBS, COMPUTO |
> FBOH ' |
TAMLm |
|||||
|
xnixDxxmi |
|||||||||
|
Date |
City Public Works |
niumi- nating Gas |
Stooo |
Build- Tradas |
(Metals AndMo- ItaUie Goods |
Rail- ways |
Cotton Goods |
Gimr- hams |
Wolen Ooods |
|
1880, Jan.. |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
July. |
100 |
99 |
100 |
102 |
101 |
103 |
101 |
100 |
103 |
|
1861, Jan.. |
100 |
100 |
128 |
101 |
102 |
105 |
97 |
103 |
106 |
|
July. |
96 |
104 |
96 |
107 |
108 |
111 |
102 |
115 |
113 |
|
1862, Jan.. |
99 |
100 |
96 |
103 |
105 |
105 |
98 |
105 |
106 |
|
July. |
96 |
100 |
87 |
104 |
105 |
100 |
95 |
107 |
106 |
|
1863, Jan.. |
94 |
96 |
77 |
91 |
88 |
82 |
82 |
84 |
92 |
|
July. |
88 |
102 |
81 |
85 |
86 |
78 |
78 |
77 |
82 |
|
1864, Jan.. |
89 |
98 |
89 |
80 |
78 |
71 |
76 |
66 |
76 |
|
July. |
85 |
81 |
68 |
72 |
70 |
56 |
65 |
58 |
64 |
|
1865, Jan.. |
77 |
77 |
68 |
64 |
65 |
63 |
61 |
57 |
62 |
|
July. |
111 |
109 |
94 |
99 |
94 |
91 |
88 |
93 |
89 |
Extended comment upon these tables is superfluous. While the fluctuations of real wages are seen to have been by no means uniform in all cases, there is no industry or occupation in which the ad vanee in money wages kept pace with the advance in pnces. The differences represent merely greater or less degrees of inconvenience, not to say suffering. Perhaps the most interesting of the tables is the third, for it brings out once more the rule that the incomee of those families nearest the minimum of subsistence before
) Tbe rariable-wei*i>t wage-aeriea ara osad here.
Waobs
345
TABLE XLIX
AVBBAOB CHANOS IN BEAL WAOBS, IN NINB OCCT7PATION8, OOMPUTED FBOM TABLBB
XIV AND XXV
|
Date |
Labor- era |
Quar- rymen |
Masons |
Stone- cutters |
Car- penters |
Mold- en |
Machi- nists |
Fire- men |
WeaT- ers, Female |
|
1860, Jan.. |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
July. |
100 |
100 |
99 |
101 |
100 |
102 |
100 |
102 |
99 |
|
1861, Jan.. |
100 |
114 |
101 |
100 |
99 |
104 |
103 |
103 |
103 |
|
July. |
98 |
96 |
100 |
108 |
106 |
106 |
109 |
107 |
115 |
|
1862, Jan. . |
100 |
100 |
99 |
91 |
103 |
105 |
107 |
102 |
104 |
|
July. |
98 |
87 |
100 |
92 |
100 |
103 |
107 |
106 |
109 |
|
1863, Jan.. |
95 |
78 |
85 |
79 |
80 |
85 |
92 |
92 |
85 |
|
July. |
90 |
81 |
80 |
80 |
79 |
83 |
89 |
101 |
79 |
|
1861, Jan.. |
89 |
92 |
76 |
75 |
78 |
76 |
80 |
101 |
68 |
|
July. |
84 |
69 |
66 |
73 |
70 |
68 |
71 |
79 |
58 |
|
1865, Jan.. |
76 |
71 |
63 |
68 |
67 |
65 |
67 |
75 |
59 |
|
July. |
110 |
96 |
92 |
99 |
98 |
94 |
95 |
106 |
92 |
the war were reduced relatively lesa than the incomes of families in easier circumstances.
It does not seem worth while to multiply examples of decline in the purchasing power of the money incomes of wage-earners by computations based on the wage-series
TABLE L
AVBBAOB CHANOS IN REAL WAOES IN FIVB WAOB-GBOUP8 COM PÜTKD FBOM TABLBS
XIV AND XXVHI B
|
Date |
Males Earnings in 1860, Daily Wages of |
||||
|
$0.25-40.99 |
$1.00-|1.49 |
$1.50-$1.99 |
$2.00-$2.49 |
$2.50+ |
|
|
1860, January July |
100 102 100 107 102 103 88 85 79 69 65 94 |
100 100 102 100 101 98 92 87 87 76 71 101 |
100 100 102 107 105 105 89 86 79 69 66 95 |
100 100 100 103 99 97 79 78 73 68 62 93 |
100 100 |
|
1861, January July |
99 105 |
||||
|
July |
100 95 |
||||
|
1863, January July |
75 73 |
||||
|
1864, January July |
66 57 |
||||
|
1865, January July |
54 76 |
||||
346
HlSTOBT OT THE GiEEHBACI8
dnwn from the Tenth Censos. Were thia done, ■ aome- what h&isher state of affairs wonld be shown, for the mheenco of data regarding nambera employed produces a general arenga advance in wagea leas tfaan that computad from the completer data of the Aldrich ReporV Bnt there is one point brought oat by Table XLI that deserrea fnrther notice — \iz-, the düfereoce between the rise of wagea in the East and West It was fonnd that even if tbe comparison be oonfíned to memberB of the same trade, the average increase in wages seems to have been eomewhat greater in the north central than in tbe north Atlantic states. It is ínteresting to see whether thia difference can be accoonted for on onr general hypothesis, that the rise of wagea was dne ehiefly to the increased cost of living. If so, pnces mnst have adranced more rapidly in the West than in the East The Censos statistics of retail pnces maka it poasíble to discover whether or not this was the case, for there are 239 series from the East and 287 from the Weet An exhibit of the relative pnces of tbe fifty-
|
Dtt Oood* |
Hbd'i Ho»»t Boou |
-2s| afi |
Pmu'i |
Mr.l ud FUb |
Pnlct*. |
Fttal |
How |
||||||||||
|
B |
w |
B |
W |
í |
iv e ; v |
I |
w ; b |
■w |
■ |
w |
1 |
w |
"E |
» |
|||
|
Ho. oí ■VrtJC)-- |
fl |
» |
1 |
1 |
ii |
.. \. |
■ |
i! u |
1) |
1 |
1 |
■ |
1 |
i |
|||
|
No.nl Pt.Bw |
a |
• |
I |
■ |
X |
51 |
'' |
u |
ti |
ti i» |
II |
'* |
» |
S |
II |
■ |
* |
|
im |
T.l |
||||||||||||||||
|
111 K |
|||||||||||||||||
|
!'! |
|||||||||||||||||
|
la;, vm m ■x~- 'MI 1* |
|||||||||||||||||
|
m |
1M |
I.V |
'' |
ta |
WAOE8
847
eight articles arranged in nine groups is presented in Table LL
This table indicates that boots, flour and meal, meat and fish, and eggs and dairy products increased more in price in the West, while the opposite is trae of fuel, and the remain- ing groups — dry goods, groceries, rice, beans, and potatoes, and house rent — varied in about the same degree in both sectiona If the arithmetic mean be strnck of the relativo pnces of all the fifty-eight articles in the Censns list, the advance is f ound to be greater in the West, as the next table shows :
TABLE LH
AYWBAQM MSLATTV» PSICBS AT BBTAIL OF TOTT-KIGHT OOMMODITO ZH THB
BABT AND WS8T
|
Date |
East |
West |
|
1860 |
100 |
100 |
|
1861 |
116 |
105 |
|
1862 |
139 |
126 |
|
1863 |
164 |
169 |
|
186á |
200 |
216 |
|
1865 |
206 |
215 |
|
1866 |
196 |
207 |
These figures lend strong support to the view that the difference between the advance of relativo wages in the two sections of the North was in large measore due to the unlike changes in relativo cost of living.
XI. CONCLUSIÓN
All of the statistical evidence that has been presented in the preceding pages supports unequivocally the common theory that persona whose incomes are derivad from wages suffer seriously from a depreciation of the currency. The confirmation seems particnlarly striking when the conditions other than monetary affecting the labor market are taken into consideration. American workingmen are intelligent
348 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS
and keenly alive to their interests. There are probably few districts where custom playa a smaller and competition a larger role in determining wages than in the northern states. While labor organizations had not yet attained their preeent power, manual laborera did not fail to avail themselves of the help of concerted action in the attempt to secare more pay. Strikes were frequent.1 All these facts favored a speedy readjustment of money wages to correspond with changed prices. But more than all else, a very considerable part of the labor supply was withdrawn f rom the market into the army and navy. In 1864 and 1865 about one million of men seem to have been enrolled.2 What proportion this number forms of the wage-earners can be very roughly esti- mated from the Census statistics of occupations. Accord- ing to the Eighth Census, there were 6,791,844 persons engaged in gainful occupations in the loyal states in 1860.* If we assume that as large a proportion of wage-earners went to the war as of those who were working on their own account, it follows that about one-seventh of the labor supply withdrew from the market. But despite all these favoring circumstances, the men who stayed at home did not succeed in obtaining an advance in pay at all commensurate with the increase in living expenses.
It is sometimes argued that the withdrawal of laborera
i The Sprinafield Rcpublican of March 28, 1863, said : " . . . . the workmen of almost ©very branch of trade haré had their strike within the last few months. No less than six strikes are reported by the New York papers this week, of laboren on the Erie, Hudson River, and Camden and Amboy railroads, the joarneymen tailors of the city, and the employeesof two large manafactaringcompanies .... in almost erery instanoe .... the demands of the employed haré been acceded to. These strikes, which haré all been condacted Tery quietly, .... have led to the formatioo of numeróos trade leagnes or nnions."
2 The Report of the 8ecretary of War for 1865 states tho number of men enrolled as 970,710, May 1, 1864 ; 965,591, March 1, 1865; and 1,000,516, May 1, 1865.— Pp. 1, 5, and 1&. The Report of the Secretary of the Navy for the same year states that the nnmber of men in service in the navy increased from 7,600 at the commencement of the war to 51,500 at its cióse. Tho number of men employed in the navy yards inoreased in th* same period from 3,844 to 16,880.— P. xiii.
* Compiled from the table on p. 680 of the Yolume on Population.
Wages 349
from industrial Ufe was the chief canse of the price dis- tnrbances of the war períod. This withdrawal^ it is said, cansed the advance of wages, and greater cost of labor led to the rise of prices. The baselessnesg^J^ thia riew Ja ahown by two facts, established by the preceding tables — first, that ¡ / the advance ofwages w&9.1ftter than the advance of prices, and second, that wages continned to rise in 1866 after the volnnteer armies had been disbanded and the men gone back to work.
Thongh the figures developed in the foregoing analysis, show a slightly smaller decline in real wages than those heretofore accepted on the anthority of the Aldrich Reporta it is probable that even the new figures overstate rather than nnderstate the actual injury suffered by wage-earners. The tables used as an índex of the change in cost of living really show what would have been the relativo cost of the articles included in the price lista had people continued to purchase them in the same proportions as before the war. But, of course, the character of the consumption of most families did not remain unchanged. In man y cases it was possible to substituto some other article for one which had risen more than common in price. Thus woolen, linen, and other fabrica were largely made to take the place of cotton goods, and cheaper beverages took the place of tea and eoffee. In so far as the substitutos were less agreeable as articles of consumption, the change represents a loss of eco- nomicsatisfaction. But the degree of this loss of satisfac- tion is exaggerated somewhat by a table that shows the increase in cost of the less-used article ; for the motive for buying other things is found precisely in the possibility of thus avoiding a portion of the inconvenience caused by the high prices.
As the price tables probably exaggerate the increase in relativo living expenses, so the wage tables probably under-
HlFTTlT c? tü Guzseacks
of wockmg-people. Tke seem to hava than in oommoo ám» c£ pr?K«c±T «X «ctcse. si* eafistaaeiit of so many
iame fcal it dühcolt to secare i¿>* nz*r crcrrnrT rtself tended to obtain fcsZ «nx¿:-TmaL2 £:r ts* ücc^ir. far the reír reason that it cÍ3s±zí£¿k<í ri* rsal iracaz*.. In the distribation of what )jwa" La? tersueá lie ~3Alx»al drridend" a diminu- ta» of xhr propor&:o reterwi by the laborar most have been aocoaipanied by an lacrease in the abare of someone éter- Ñor e it diScoh to determine who this peraon was. Tke benedciarr wa> the actre enployer, who foond that the amonej vages, interese and rent he had to paj increased leas rapidlj than the monej prkes of his prodoets. The differ- ence betoeen the increase of receipts and the increase of expenses swelled his profits. Of coarse, the possibility of ma king high profcts provided an incentÍTe for employing as manj hands as pasable. Bnt here ve are trenching apon the snbject of a later chapter.
The importance of these factor» — the changes in the character of consnmption and the foller emplojment — as affecting the material well-being of wage-earners is inca- pable of statistical measorement with the materíals at hancL Bot while they most be recognized as modifying in consider- able measnre the inferences to be drawn from the seríes of *• changes in real wages" giren above, it can hardly be that they sufficed to compénsate many families for the increased money cost of living. Most families were donbtless forced to practice economies of a very oncomfortable character to make both ends meet.
After such an examination of the cbange in the condition of the great mass of wage-earners, it may seem surprising that
Wages 351
few complaints were heard from them oí unusual prívations.1 This silence may be due in part to the f act that a conúder- able increase of money income produces in the minds oí many a f atuqu& feeling of prosperity, even though it be more than offset by an increase of prices. But doubtless the chief reason is to be found in the absorption of public interest in the events of the war. The people both of the South and North were so vitally concerned with the struggle that they bore without murmuring the hardships it entailed of what- ever kincL Government taxation that under other circum- stances might have been felt to be intolerable was submitted to with cheerfulness. The ^a^rjcun^cy_imposed upon wage-earners a Jheavier_ tax — amounting to confiscation of perhaps a fif th or a sixth of real incomes. But the working- men of the North were receiving considerably more than a bare subsistence minimum before the war, and reduction of consumption was possible without producing serious want. Accordingly the currency tax, like the tariff and the internal revenue duties, was accepted as a necessary sacrifice to the common cause and paid without protest by severe retrench- ment.
i Compare D. A. Wells, Recent Financial, Industrial, and Commercial t ence» of the United State» (New York, 1872), p. 22.
V
v
CHAPTER VI
REXT
I. Urban Rents:
Use of Temí *Rent~— Long and Short Leases— Wells's InYeetiga- tions into House Rents — Statistical Data f rom the Tenth CensuM — Rents in Eastern and Western States — In Cities and Towns — Nar- row Range of the Data.
II. Farm Rente:
Famas Let for Money Rents — Farms Let "on Shares."
I. URBAN RENTS
In studying the influence of depreciation upon rent, it is necessary to use that term in its popular rather than in its scien tifie sense. The distinction, so dear to the economista between payment for situation and retnrn on capital invested in improvements, cannot be maintained in a discussion based on figures which show simply the soms paid for the use of real property. This fact is less to be lamented, because the theorist himself admits that the distinction becomes sadly blurred when he attempts to deal with short intervals of time. Capital once invested in improvements can seldom be withdrawn rapidly. In "the short run," therefore, it Í8j practically a part of the land, and the return to it followB I the analogy of rent rather than of interest.1 I
Like the lending capitalist, the renting landlord fonno^ that the degree in which he was affected by the fluctuations in the valué of the paper money depended largely upon the terms of the contract into which he had entered. It is clear from the preceding chapters that the landlord who before 8U8j>onsion had leased his property for a considerable period without opportunity for revaluation must have suffered
» Compare Marshall, Principia of Economice Book V, chapo, yüí, ix.
352
Rent 353
severely if paid in greenbacks. The number of "dollars" received as rental might be the same in 1865 as in 1860, bnt their pnrchasing power was less than one-half as great.
Somewhat less hard was the situation of the landlord who had let his property for but one or two years. At the expiration of the leases he had opportunities to make new contracta with the tenants. To ascertain accurately how far he sncceeded in recouping himself for the rise of pnces by increasing rentáis, elabórate statistics of the sums paid for the use of different classes of real estáte would be necessary. Unfortnnately, such figures are scanty, and such as are avail- able refer entirely to urban property.
In his capacity as special commissioner of the revenue, Mr. David A. Wells devoted some attention to the rise of rent. His report for December, 1866, says:
The average advance in the rents of houses occupied by mechan- ics and laborera in the great manufacturing centers of the country is estimated to ha ve been about 90 per cent.; in some sections, however, a much greater advance has been experienced, as, for example, at Fittsburg, where 200 per cent, and upward is reported. In many of the rural districts, ón the other hand, the advance has been much less.1
In his third annual report, dated January, 1869, Mr. Wells modified this estímate somewhat. Edward Young had prepared for him " tables showing the comparativo cost of provisions, groceries, domestic dry goods, house rent, etc., in the manufacturing towns of the United States in the respective years 1860-61 and 1867-68." These tables made out an average increase of about 65 per cent, in rents. Mr. Wells remarked, however, that
this .... average is . . . . largely affected by the circumstance that in New England, where manufacturing companies .... very generally own the tenements occupied by the operativos, rents ha ve
i Señale Executive DocumerU No. 2, 39th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 14.
"> 7
354
HlSTOBT OF THE GbEESBACKS
not been adranced to any considerable exteut, Exdulinaj New England from tbe calculation, the arerage adrance in rente for 1867, as oompared with 1860-61, must be estimated ai a higher figure. Tiras in the smaller maniifacturing towns of sylvania the average increase in the renta of hornea occupied by operatives i» believed to have been aboat 81 per cenL, and in New Jersey 111 per cent. In the cities oí New York, Philadelptiia, Newark, and Pittsburg the increase has been from 90 to 100 per cent.1
Young's figures, on which these conclusions are as follows:
TABLBLUI
■OCSB *JDfT IM UAXVTACTUmXSO TOWYS 1880-61 AMD 1867-66 '
|
Foum-RooM TKsnoixsr» |
Sek-Roos Tmam |
|||||
|
Statb |
1880-61 |
1867-68 |
Per oent.of In- crease |
1880-61 |
1881-68 |
Per txmtLat I»- |
|
Maine |
$3.25 2.42 5.86 5.93 4.04 4.20 5.60 4.67 4.00 |
$5.67 3.68 10.28 9.63 5.77 " 6.85 9.60 10.00 5.00 |
74 52 75 62 43 51 71 114 25 |
$467 3.17 6.54 9.11 4.56 5.78 8.00 7.17 5.17 |
$8.17 5.75 10.14 11.69 6.81 9.37 15.20 15.00 6.33 |
75 |
|
N. Hamp., Vermont Maftftachusette Rhode Island Connecticut Delaware |
81 55 28 49 62 90 109 22 |
|||||
|
General average . . |
$444 |
$7.39 |
66 |
$6.02 |
$9.83 |
63 |
These figures become more significant for the preeent parpóse when interpreted in the light of the similar data already presented in part in the chapter on pnces.* The latter figures are taken from Mr. Weeks's report in the Tentk Censu8 and show the relativo renta paid for four- and six-
i H. R. Exccutixc Docwncnt No. Jf, 40th CongM8d Seas., p. 11
* Ibid., Appendix D, pp. 118-21.
>8ee Part II, chap. ít, sec. ít, Table ZYU.
Rent
355
or seven-room houses in twenty towns scattered over eleven states from Massachusetts to Missouri. Comparison with Young's figures, however, should be confined to eastern towns, and of these re turna are given but for five.1 In these five towns the average increase in rents between 1860 and 1868 was somewhat less than Young makes out for four- room tenements — viz., 56 instead of 66 per cent. — and slightly greater in the case of six-room tenements — viz., 68 as compared with 63 per cent
But though it be inf erred, as both these sets of data indi- cate, that rents of workingmen's houses in eastern towns were on the average some 60 or 65 per cent, higher in 1868 than they had been before the war, it does not at all follow that rents had advanced so much as this in 1864 and 1865. In fact, the Censas figures that cover the intervening years indícate that in most towns rents rose during the war more slowly than prices, but that, like wages, they continued to rise for some time after prices had fallen. Table LIV com-
TABLE LTV
REXATTVE RENTS IN FIVE EASTERN TOWNS AND RELATTVB PRICES •
(Arithmetic means)
|
Year |
Rents |
Prices |
|
|
Retail |
Wholesale |
||
|
1860. |
100 100 101 101 120 132 138 141 163 |
100 116 139 164 200 206 196 |
100 |
|
1861 |
101 |
||
|
1862. |
118 |
||
|
1863 |
149 |
||
|
1864 |
191 |
||
|
1865 |
217 |
||
|
1866 |
191 |
||
|
1867 |
172 |
||
|
1868 |
161 |
||
i Boston; Jewett City, Conn. ; Camden, N. J. : Philadelphia and Hokendauqua, Pa. New Cumberland, W. Va., which is includcd in the East in the table of the pre- ceding chapter, is excloded here because Young gires no figures for West Virginia.
*The figures for rent are simple averages of the ten series for the five towns; the retail prices are from Table Lil of chap. t, and the wholesale prices are from the Aldrich Report% Part I, p. 91.
356 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS
paree the fluctuations of rent in the five eastern towns with the índex numbers for retail pnces in the East, as far as they extend, and with Falkner's nnweighted average of the relativo pnces of all articles.
According to this table, though owners of small houses in these towns may have f ound themselves approximately as well off in 1868 as before the war, they had not escaped severo injury from the depreciation of the corrency doring the interim. Elsewhere landlords seem to have been in a rather worse plight. In the fifteen western towns for which the Tenth Census gave retaras the increase in renta of similar property seems to have been somewhat leas, as Table LV shows:
TABLE LV
KKLATTVB BKVT8 IN NJTUX WBHTEK3T TOWX8 *
1860 100 1865 - 138
1861 .-- - 99 1866 - 139
1862 - - - 108 1867 - 137
1863 121 1868 136 186á 135
This contrast between renta in the East and West is vitiated to a certain extent by the fact that a much larger propor- tion of the western towns were small places. More signifi- cant is the comparíson between renta in the five cities for which figures are given — Boston, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, Louisville, and 8t. Lonis — and the fifteen leeeer towns.1 Table LVI presenta the data in snccinct form.
The conclusión, supported by these figures, that the ad- vance in renta was greater in cities than in minor towns, is not difficult to accept In two of the cities — Cincinnati and Louisville — owners of workingmen's tenements appear
» The fi*ures are simple arithmetic meen* of the twenty-eicht serias. Nei berland, W. V».. is incloded.
* Loaisrüle, with £MH3 inhabitants in 1M0, is the ftnalWl of the cities, aad Indiana poli*, with 1A£U inhabitanta, the largest of the
Rent
357
TABLE LYI
RRLATIYB RBNTS IN CITIE8 AND TOWNB
|
Year |
Boston |
Phila- del- phia |
Cincin- nati |
Louis- ville |
St. Loáis |
A verane for Preceding Cities |
AYeragefor Fifteen Lesser Towns |
|
1860 |
100 100 100 100 138 138 138 138 196 |
100 100 100 100 133 167 200 200 200 |
100 84 84 117 207 207 207 167 167 |
100 129 129 167 221 221 221 167 167 |
100 90 90 131 131 131 157 157 157 |
100 101 101 123 166 173 185 166 177 |
100 |
|
1861 1862 |
99 110 |
||||||
|
1863 |
115 |
||||||
|
1864 |
120 |
||||||
|
1865 |
124 |
||||||
|
1866 |
122 |
||||||
|
1867 |
128 |
||||||
|
1868 |
128 |
||||||
to have been able to increase their mone y incomes rather more rapidly than pnces advanced, but in Boston, Phila- delphia, St. Loáis, and in all the smaller towns on the list, with the possible exception of Terre Haute, their money incomes appear to have increased more slowly than living expenses.1
It must be remembered that these conclusions rest on a narrow statistical basis. No figures for house rent can be altogether satisfactory becanse of the change in the charac- ter of accommodation from time to time. What figures are available refer to one class of property alone — such tene- ments as are occupied by working people in manufacturing towns. For houses of other classes and for business prop- erty of all kinds no reliable data are known to me. And even for the workingmen's tenements the Tenth Censúa gives . but two or three series for each town. But though all thisr be true, the fact remains that the figures seem to be worthy of credence for one class of urban property at least, and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, establish sumption that relatively few owners of urban real other descriptions escapedjnjury iroro .the greenback
i The figures for aü the towns are gfren in detail in the Appendix,
ast, and, in ish a pre- / il estáte of / >ack iBSugg/
358 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACES
Eren in those cases where renta advanced more rmpidly than commodity pnces it is probable that the greenbacka deprived the landlords of a portion of the gains thmt they would otherwise have made.
IL FASM RENT8
All the foregoing refere to the rent of nrban property. For agricnitural rente Wells and Weeks give no data. Inas- much, however, as cnstom seems to play a larger role in deter- ^íiníng the price paid per acre for fanns than the price paid per month for city houses, it is probable that much the same difference existed between the advance of renta in the oonn- try and in the small towns that Table LVT indicatee as having existed between the advance in towns and in cities. If this conjectnre be just, it follows that the rural landowner suffered serious injury from the paper currency when he let his land for a money rent
But renting fanns for a fixed sum of money has always been leas common in the United States than renting for a definite share of the prodncta Prior to 1880 the Censos Office made no attempt to ascertain the tenore on which fanns were held. In that year, however, 30 per cent of the fanns not occnpied by their owners are reported as " rented for a fixed money valué" in the northern and western states, and 70 per cent, as " rented for a share of the products." Since the enumeration of 1890 showed that the practice of accept- ing money rent was increasing, so that the above percentages had become 35 and 65 respectively,1 it is probable that at the time of the Civil War more than three-qnarters of the rented farms were let "on shares." Inasmuch as no money pay monta ente red into auch arrangementa, the pecnniary relations of landlord and tenant were not directly affected
% ' > Percentajes compatod from Table S of th© Report on the Statistic* o/ AgricuL ture aí the Elevcnth Cen***, pp. 116, 117.
\V
Rent y 359
by the change in the monetary standard. Farm owners who had let their places on these conditions escaped the direct losses that weighed so heavily on the recipients of money rents. But even they did not avoid all losa For, as will be shown at length in chap. viü, the price of agricultural prod- ucts for the greater part of the war períod lagged consid- erably behind the price of other goods. This difference, of course, meant loes to men whose incomes were paid in bush- els of grain.
CHAPTER VH
INTEREST AND LOAN CAPITAL
I. The Probiem of Lenders and Borrowers of Capital:
Two Elements in the Probiem : Rate of Interest and Purchasiiig Power of Principal — Differences in Relatire Importanoe of These Elements to Different Lenders and Borrowers.
II. Purchasing Power of the Principal of Loans:
Table IUustrating Variations in Purchasing Power of Loans and Consequent Lose or Gain of Lenders.
III. The Rate of Interest:
Interest on Long-Term Loans — On Short-Term Loans — Detective Character of Statistics Regarding Interest — Slight I ncrease in Rates on Short Loans — Failure of Lenders and Borrowers to Foresee the Future Course of Pnces — Inability of Lenders to Recoup Them- selves for Losses Due to Such Failures— Effect of Government Loans and Profítableness of Business on the Rate of Interest — Contraction of Credit Operations During the War — Galns of Lend- ers after January, 1865 — Positura of Capitalists Who Invested in Federal Bonds.
I. THE PBOBLEM OF LENDERS AND BOBBOWEBS OF CAPITAL
The task of ascertaining the effect of the greenback issnes apon the Bituation of lenders and borrowers of capital Lb in one respect more simple and in another reepect more complex than the task of dealing with wage-earners. It is simpler in that there are not different grades of capital to be considered like the different grades of labor. But it is more complex in that the capitalist mnst be considered not only as the recipient of a money income, as is the laborer, but also as the possessor of certain property that may be affected by changos in the standard money.
The probiem is forther complicated by the fact that the relative importance of these two Ítems — rate of interest and
360
Intebest and Loan Capital 361
valué of principal — is not the same in all cases. Whether a lender is affected more by the one item or the other dependa apon what he intends to do with his property at the expiration of existing contracta. A widow left in 1860 with an estáte of say $10,000, who expected to keep this sum constantly at interest and to find new borrowers as soon as the oíd loans were paid, could neglect everything but the net rate of interest received. On the other hand, if this estáte had been left to a youth of twenty who intended to invest his property in some bnsiness after a few years, the rate of interest would be of relatively less importance to him than the purchasing power of the principal when the time carne to set up for himself .
Of course, the same difference exista, mutatis mutandis, in the case of different borrowers. Those borrowers who expected to renew oíd loans on maturity would have to con- sider little beyond the interest demanded by lenders, while borrowers who expected to pay off the loans out of the pro- ceeds of their ventures would be interested primarily in the amount of goods that would sell for sufficient money to make up the principal.
Although these two classes of cases are by no means independent of each other, the following discussion will be rendered clearer by observing the broad diflFerence between them. Accordingly, attention will first be directed to the effect of the príce fluctuations apon the purchasing power of the principal of loans, and afterward to changes in the rate of interest.
II. PÜBCHASING POWEB OP THE PRINCIPAL OP LOANS
It follows directly from the chapter upon prices that most persona who made loans in the earlier part of the Civil War and were repaid in greenbacks must have suffered heavy loases from the smaller purchasing power of the
362 HlSTOBY OF THB GbEENBAOKS
principal when it was returned to them. But while this general fact is clear, it is difficult to make a qnantitatíve statement of the degree of the loss that will be even tolerably satisfactory. Indeed, no single seríes of percentages can represent the loss of all lenders, any more than any single series can represent the decline in the real wages of all laborera, for the reason that the loss depends both npon the time of lending and repayment, and npon the particular commodities which the capitalist wishes to pnrchase. Prob- ably the best conree to pnrsne is to take the median of relative pnces at wholesale as the most reliable índex of general price movements, and work out a table based npon it which shall show the relative rise or fall in the pnrchasing power of money from qnarter to qnarter. Snch a table is given on the next page.
The first Une of figures across the top of this table, showing the relative purchasing power of money, is obtained by computing the reciprocáis of the corresponding index nnmbers for pnces as given in Table XIV. To see how the variations shown by this series of figures affected the interests of lenders, a number of loans is supposed to be made each quarter, one of which matures and is repaid each subsequent quarter. The second to the twenty-fourth lines of figures across the table show what was the percent- age of loss or gain in the purchasing power of the prin- cipal in the months of repayment as compared with the months when the loans were made. To obtain these series, the figure representing the relative purchasing power of money each quarter is taken as the starting-point, and the conesponding figures for each subsequent quarter are treated as percentages of the first. For example, the loss on a loan made in January, 1863, and repaid in January, 1865, is stated as 43 per cent., because 44, which representa the relative power of money at the later date, is only 57
Intebest and Loan Capital
|
i |
i |
1 |
JjJí;ssj |
|
|
% |
• |
-ScsBsasK |
í f í í ' ; 7 7 ". ; i J Tí i |
|
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1 |
5SSS15-3S |
||
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llffMff |
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7 7 * 7 ? ! í f |
í=s ; . , ■• , j -ti |
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f |
s |
llllllll |
?7?77«7777!! |
|
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1 |
< |
f HHH1 |
= 7777777,1* |
|
|
, |
t |
; « ■ ■ í * t ; |
;77Í7777ÍS |
|
|
7 |
1 |
■ |
■ 7 í ■ : ; ■ i » |
|
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i |
I- |
v : • f ? ? 5 í |
f « 7 -- ; ■ i i |
|
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l |
> |
tftiititii |
7 ' 1 7 " 1 * |
|
|
I |
t: |
aaaaeaaa |
»!17|l |
|
|
1 |
1 |
a |
7 7 " 7 ( T Í " |
7 7 7 14 |
|
;, |
t |
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| |
! |
■ í ? |
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| |
••■";:• |
!} í |
||
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| |
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3 |
• • • ' ' 7 7 i |
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|
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7.7 77771 Í |
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1 |
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■ |
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• -ti |
l |
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_ |
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§ |
■ • . ! 4 |
i |
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¡ |
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i |
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: |
7 |
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i i |
364 HlSTOBY OF THE GBEEKBACK8
per cent of 77, which representa its purchasing power al the earlier date.1
The conclusión to be drawn from the taUe ia so dear aa hardly to reqnire formal statement In the case of *li»nffi all loans made before the middle of 1864 and repaid at any snbseqnent time embraced by the table, the creditor found that the snm retorned to him had a purchasing power mnch less than the porchasing power that had been transferred to the borrower when the loan was made. According to the figures, this decline varied from 1 to more than 50 per cent On loans made in the middle of 1864 or later, on the contrary, the creditor gained as a role. In the case of loans made in January, 1865, and repaid six months later, the increase in pnrchasing power was over 40 per cent. It may not be unwise, however, to enter once again a caation against taking such figures too literally.*
III. THE BATE OF INTE BEST
In turaing to study the fortunes of men who have no thought of employing their capital for themselves, but expect to seek neW borrowers as rapidly as oíd loans are repaid, one finds it necessary to distinguish between
i A more strictly aecurate method of estimating the reía ti re lo» or gain wonld be to compute the average relatire priees of sil the seríes anew on the basis of the actual prices at each suocessire period. But this would be a heavy taak, and it is thought that the inaccuracy of the simple method employed is not greater than the inaccuracy of the material apoo which the whole compatatioo resta, To pretend to great refinement in the method of analysis for the porposes of so rough a statement as the present would be pedantic
2 Loans made before the passage of the flrst legal-tender act, February S, 186, are treated in the table as if they were all repaid in greenbacks. Soma electora, bow- ever, are said to haré repaid such obligations in gold. (See letter of Jodge Hoar to E. J. James in PubUcatton* of the American Economtc AsMOCiatum* Yol. III, p. 51.) But so nice a sense of business honor was not unirersal, and the courts were callad apoo to adjudícate the question involred. In Hepburn os. Giiswold (8 Wallace, p. 608; 1860) the federal Supremo Court held that Cnited States notes were not a legal tender for debts contracted before Febroary 25, 1862; but within a year the court reversed this decisión ("The Legal Tender Cases,*' 12 Wallace, p. 457). But the table indicates that loases on loans made in April, 1862, were not less heery than ou loans made in 1860.
Intbbest and Loan Capital 365
cases where loans have been made for short and for long terms ; between the cases, that is, where there is and where there is not an opportunity to make a new contract regarding the rate of interest. The latter cases may be dismissed with a word. The capitalist who lent $10,000 for five years in April, 1862, at 6 per cent, interest wonld be in relatively the same position as the workingman who received no ad vanee in money wages; while his money income remained the same, the rise of pnces wonld decrease his real income in 1864 and 1865 by about one-half. Of conree, this loss to the creditor is a gain to the debtor; for to the bnsiness man nsing borrowed capital the advance of prices means that he can raise his interest money by selling a smaller proportion of his output.
More interesting is the case of loans maturing and made afresh during the períod nnder examination. The impor- tant question is : How f ar did the lender secnre compensa- tion for the diminished pnrehasing power of the money in which he was paid by contracting for a higher rate of interest? To answer this question adeqnately abnndant statistics of the rate of interest received on loans of differ- ent kinds during the war are necessary. Unfortnnately, however, it is extremely difficult to find such figures. To my knowledge there are no systematic records of rafes of interest on long-time business loans, and the data for short-time loans are nnusually meager and doubtfnl. In 1860 Hunfs Merchante Magazine and the Bankers1 Maga- zine — the most prominent business periodicals of the day — were pnblishing each month tables showing the ratee of interest paid in New York for loans of several different kinds. Bnt during the war they ceased these systematic reporte and one can glean from them bnt occasional scatter- ing statements. Professor Irving Fisher, however, in his Appreciation and Interest gives a table which purports to
366 HlSTOBY OF THB GbEENBACKS
show the rate on "cali" loans, "60 day" loans and "prime, two ñame, 60 day" loans for a period of years including 1860 to 1865. The third of these series was obtained, he states, from a diagram prepared by one of his stndents showing "the highest and lowest monthly ratea " — though from what sonrce the data were taken he does not say. The other two seríes were obtained from a table compiled by Mr. E. B. Elliott. Elliott made this table for a paper upon "The Periodicity of Ratea of Interest," read before the American Association for the Advancement of Science in 1874. The paper was not published in the pro- ceedings of the association, and the only record which I have been able to find of it is a bríef abstract published in the Bankers* Magazine.1 It is here said regarding the source of information upon which Elliott drew: "Being asked whence the data were obtained, Professor Elliott replied that they were collated from The Bankers* Maga- zine, The Financial Chronicle and HunVs Merchante* Magazine." I have no doubt that this statement is correct for most of the years included in the table (1849 to 1874), but since the Commercial and Financial Chronicle was not established until July, 1865, and the other journals men- tioned did not maintain these tablea of interest regularly, it follows that Mr. Elliott must have had irregular data for the years of the war, or else that he went to some unknown source for his figures.
Under these circumstances it seems justifiable to attempt constructing a new table from the re¡>ort8 of the daily news- papers. On examination, however, one finds that this course also is open to objection. In the first place, regular state- ments can be found only for one kind of transactions — loans on calL In the second place, whenever the ratea for cali loans rise above 7 per cent, the repórter is apt to say
i Vol. XXII, p. 220.
Intebest and Loan Capital
867
merely that the rtding rate is uthe legal máximum plus a small commission." In the third place, one is justified in f eeling some suspicions of the accuracy of newspaper reports. However, I have compiled a table from the financial columna of the newspapers of the rate for cali loans every Saturday from 1862 to 1865. In doing so I have been compelled to supplement one paper by another, for no one gives the reports with perfect regularity for the whole period.1
Since none of these series have an unquestioned title t<f acceptance, they are all presented in the next table. The
TABLE LVIII
INTEBB8T BATB8 IN THB NEW YOBK MONBT MABKBT 1800 TO 1865
I. AVEBAGB BATB8 PBB YBAB
|
Tbab |
Call |
SlXTT DAT8 |
Pbikb two NambOODatb |
|
|
Elliott |
Newspapers |
Elliott |
Fisher |
|
|
1860 |
6.1* 5.4 5.6 5.0 7.2 6.1 |
• • • • • • 5.2* 6.2 6.6 6.2 |
8.4* 9.0 6.8 6.7 9.3 10.2 |
7.7* |
|
1861 |
6.6 |
|||
|
1862 |
5.4 |
|||
|
1863 |
5.8 |
|||
|
1864 |
8.0 |
|||
|
1865 |
8.2 |
|||
|
II. AVERAOB BATB8 1 |
PBB MONTH POl |
i CALL LOANS |
||
|
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
1865 |
|
|
January |
6.52 6.0 5.5 5.5 4.6 4.1 5.4 4.0 4.3 4.6 6.3 6.0 |
6.1* 6.3 6.1 5.2 5.3 6.1 6.1 6.0 6.6 6.5 7.0 7.0 |
7.0* 6.1 5.9 6.8 5.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 7.0 6.8 6.9 6.6 |
7.0* 6.1 • |
|
February |
||||
|
March |
7.0 |
|||
|
April |
5.6 |
|||
|
May |
5.4 |
|||
|
June |
4.9 |
|||
|
July |
5.5 |
|||
|
August |
5.9 |
|||
|
September |
6.0 |
|||
|
October |
7.0 |
|||
|
November |
6.8 |
|||
|
December |
6.8 |
|||
i The Herald, Tribuna, Evening Exprés*, and World haré all been drawn apon.
368
HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS
exhibit of average annual rates is f ollowed by a statement of the average rate each month based upon the newspaper reporta.
/\Whíle the different seríes showing annual average ratee
/of interest do not agree with each other perfectly, they all
/ indícate that the advance in the rate of interest was com-
/ paratively small — much too small to compénsate persone
^ whose income was derived from such sources íor the increased
l?ost of living. To bring this f act out clearíy the next table
shows the relative increase in the rates of interest side by
side with the relative increase in prices and in money wages:
TABLE LIX
KKLATXYB INCBBA8B IN INTKBKBT, PMCK8, AND WAOl
TBAB
1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865
Ratbs op Intekest
|
Call |
eoDATA |
|
|
Elliott |
Nows- papers |
Elliott |
|
100 |
100 |
|
|
89 |
• • • |
107 |
|
92 |
100 |
81 |
|
82 |
119 |
80 |
|
118 |
127 |
111 |
|
100 |
100 |
121 |
TWO
Namb
OODayb
Fisher
100
86
70
75
104
106
PRICB8
es
s
"o
0
100 98 105 138 186 188
100 103 115 144 172 181
Waoi
5
« •c
cS >
100 101 103 118 137 154
a
s
S
100 101 103 117 138 158
I The conclusión from these figures is not only that per-
\ sons who derived their income from capital lent at interest
\ for short terms were injured by the issues of the greenbacks,
\ but also that their injuries were more serious than those
\ suffered by wage-earners.
\^ To explain this state of affairs is not easy. The first reason that suggests itself to the mind considering the problem is that both lenders and borrowers failed to foresee
Intebest and Loan Capital 869
the changes that would take place in the purchasing power of money between the dates when loans were made and repaid. No doubt there is mnch forcé in this explanation. If , for instance, men arranging for loans in April, 1862, to be repaid a year later, had known that in the meantime the purchasing power of money would decline 30 per cent., they would have agreed upon a very high rate of interest. On the assumption that, monetary conditions aside, the rate would have been 6 per cent., the lender gifted with second sight would have demandad 50.52 per cent; i. e., 6 per cent, plus 42 per cent, of both capital and interest to offset the decline of 30 per cent, in the purchasing power of the dollars received in repayment as compared with that of the dollars lent. According to the table of relativo pnces, any interest rate less than this would have deprived capitalists of a portion of their ordinary returns; and, on the other hand, since the pnces of producís increased on the average 42 per cent, between April, 1862, and April, 1863, borrowers could afford to pay on the average 50.52 per cent, for loans quite as well as they could afford to pay 6 per cent in years of atable pnces. Men able to discern the futuro course of pnces would not have lent money at the ordinary rates, and if, as the table indicates, the rates prevailing in the New Tork market throughout all 1862 and 1863 were less than 7 per cent., it must have been because the eztraordinary rise of prices was not f oreseen by borrowers and tendera.
Ñor, if the argumenta of the preceding chapters are valid, is it surprising that business men failed to see what was coming; for the course of prices depended chiefly upon the valuation set upon the greenbacks, and this valuation in turn depended chiefly upon the state of the fínances and the fortunes of war — matters that no one could foresee with cer- tainty. Indeed, there was much of the time a very general disposition to take an unwarrantedly optimistic view of the
370 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEEXBACKS
mflitary situation and tbe chances of an early members of the bnsiness communitj seem to haré Celt ttat the premium on gold was artificial and nnist soon drap, tkflt pnces were inflated and mnst collapee. To the extent ttat rach riews prevailed borrowere would be cantío» aboot making engagements to repay money in a fatnre thmt might well present a iower range of pnces, and lende» woold expect a gain instead of a loes from the changes in the por* chasing power of money.
Bat the fall explanation of the slight adrance in intorest cannot be foond in this inability to foresee the futnre — al least not without further analysis of what consequences soch inability entailed. Workingmen are coniinonly credited with less foresight than capitalista, and neverthelees they seem, according to the figures, to have succeeded better in making bargains with employers of labor than did lendera with employers of capitaL The explanation of this leas sncce88 seems to be foond in the difference between the way in which depreciation affected what the capitalist and the laborer had to offer in return for interest and wages. There is no reason for assnming that an artisan who changed employers dnring the war wonld render less efficient serrice in his new than in his oíd position, or that a landlord who changed tenants had less advantages to put at the disposal of the incoming lessee. In both these cases the good offered to the active bnsiness man remained Bubstantially the same, and it may safely be assnmed that, other things being equal, this bnsiness man could afford to give quite as much for the labor and the land after as before suspensión. From the business man's point of view, therefore, there seems to have been room for a doubling of money wages and rent when the purchasing power of money had fallen one-half. But in the case of the borrower of capital the like was not true. The thousand dollars which Mr. A. offered him in 1865 was not,
Intebest and Loan Capital 371
like the labor of John Smith or the farm of Mr. B., as effi- cient f or his purpoees as it wonld have been five years beftre For, with the thousand dollars he conld not parchase anythi like the same amount of machinery, material, or labor. And since the same nominal amount of capital was of less efficiency / in the hands of the borrower, he could not without loss to him- / self increase the interest which he paid for new loans in pro- i portion to the decline in the purchasing power of money, aqr he conld increase the wages of laborera or the rent for lancL From the point of view of the lender this remark means simply that the expiration of oíd contracta and the making of fresh onea gave him no opportunity to remedy the mis- takea of jndgment once committed. If a farm hand in April, 1862, contracting to work a year, failed to foresee the advance of pnces that would occur, and agreed to accept his usual wage of $15 a month and board, he would suffer during the year from having to pay more for clothing, etc. ; but when he carne to renew his bargain in April, 1863, he would be in a strong position to demand an increase of wages sufficient to offset the depreciation in the purchasing power of money. But if a capitalist with no more power of divination than the farm hand lent $1,000 in April, 1862, for a year at 6 per cent, interest, he would not only suffer during this time from the rise of pnces, but he would also have no ground for ask- ing from a new borrower compensation, in the f orm of higher interest, for the advance that had already taken place ini pnces. If both lender and borrower in April, 1863, antici- pated that the rise of prices would continué during the next year, they might attempt to adjust the rate of interest so as to counterbalance the expected changes, but the bor- rower could give no compensation for the changes that had already taken place, inasmuch as these changes diminished the efficiency of the thousand dollars which the lender trans- f erred to his control
372 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAOKS
Thus ground once lost by a lender thtough monetaij depreciaron could not be recovered so long as prioes con- tínued to ad vanee; the ntmost that the lender could hope to accomplish was to keep f rom f alling f arther behind by obtain- ing a rate of interest sufficiently high to offset the further advances of the future. As has been shown, the capitalist who lent $1,000 in April, 1862, for a year shonld have charged 50.52 per cent for interest After deducting his income of 6 per cent, plus 42 per cent, of itself, he would have had left at the end of the year a nominal principal of $1,420, which in April, 1863, had the same purchasing power as $1,000 in April, 1862. With this nomber of paper dollars to put at the disposal of borrowers, the capitalist could prevent a decline in his real income if he were able to foresee that the purchasing power of money would deprecíate 19 per cent more during the next year and to persuade bor- rowers of the same fact The rate charged should be 30.9 per cent — i. e., 6 per cent, plus 23.4 per cent, of capital and interest to offset the diminution of 19 per cent in purchasing power. This rate would give the usual real income to the capitalist and leave him in April, 1864, a nominal capital of $1,752, or the equivalent in purchasing power of $1,000 in April, 1862. For the next year the rate should be 11.61 per cent, which on $1,750 would give the usual real income and a principal of $1,841 in April, 1865, which again is equal to $1,000 in April, 1862. Failure to obtain these exceedingly high rates of interest in making the loan for any year would subject the lender to a heavy loss of real income not only for Ithat year, but also for the years to come, beause it would not provide for an increase in the nominal amount of the prin- cipal sufficient to sustain its purchasing power undiminished. 1 The failure of the rate of interest to attain anything like the extraordinary rates which alone could have saved lenders from loss seems at first sight more remarkable when the
Intebest and Loan Capital 373
government demand for loans and the high profits made by business men are taken into account. But neither of these factors had quite so much influence as one at fírst imagines. Just as the government's demand for food and clothing was not a new demand snperadded to that formerly exist- ing, but rather a part of the oíd demand making itself felt through a new channel, so in a measure the government demand for capital was a substituto for prívate demanda rather than an increase in the whole sum required by the community. The government had become the employer of a considerable fraction of the working population, and it needed large sums of money to provide for these employees, in the same way that a Corporation that increased the number of its hands would need a larger working capital to pay wages and purchase supplies. But after all there is a radical difference between the effect of war loans and industrial loans upon the rate of interest. The Corporation would hope to direct the labor in such fashion that it would more than replace the capital consumed in providing for it; while the majority of the men employed by the federal government during the Civil War were not engaged* in productivo operations. Since the soldiers enlisted in 1862 did not produce an equivalent in commodities for the food they ate and the clothes they wore, the government had to borrow new sums of capital to maintain them in 1863, and new sums again in 1864 and 1865. Through the war loans the community was voluntarily devoting a not inconsiderable proportion of its labor and capital each year to employments that from the strictly economic point of view must be called unproductive, and so f ar as this was the case the procesa of accumulation was retardad. It seems therefore safe to say that though the government demand for loans was in considerable degree a substituía for prívate demanda, the difference in the use made of the
374 HlSTOET OF THB GfiBBNBACKS
borrowed funds tended to raise the rate of interest for fotme years.
The modification required by the proposition that the high profits of trade were a factor of great importante in the loan market is more serióos. That profits were uncommonly large during the war is not doabted; indeed, the next chapter will be devoted primarily to showing that such was the fact. Ñor is it doabted that under ordinary circomstances high profits will tend powerfolly to produce high rates of interest ; both by making business men anxious to borrow capital with which to extend the scope of their existing operations or to nndertake new Tentares, and by making capitalista who have the choice between employing their means themselves and lending them to others prefer ^theformer conrse. But dnring the Civil War this usoal conseqnence of high profits conflicted with anofher conse- quence of the monetary sitnation — namely, the nncertainty labout the fu tare coarse of pnces. Men were at any given Itime " making money," but they recognized that their nnu- Bual profits were in a large measure the product of monetary aepreciation. If the premium on gold should drop snddenly, as it might at almost any time in conseqnence of a favorable change in the military situation, pnces would probably fol- low, and the trend of affairs might set as strongly against the realization of high profits as it had set formerly in its favor. Under sueh circumstances prudence forbade men to enter into contracts that would cali for the repayment of large sums of money in a future that might bring a low level of pnces and make it necessary for the debtor to sell an unexpectedly large part of his product to obtain sufficient money to meet his obligations. A man would be in a safer position if he kept free of debt and confined his operations as closely as possible to business that he could manage with his own capital. In other words, men realized their inability
Intebest and Loan Capital 375
to foresee the future and, knowing that it might bring great príce fluctuations in either direction, sought protection against these changes by limiting their future pecuniary obligations as narrowly as possible.
That considerations of this character were carefully weighed by business men is clearly shown by the remarkable contraction of credit operations that took place during the war. When no one could foresee with confídence what would be the relative purchasing power of a dollar three months in advance, it was obviously risky for a merchant to accept a note due in ninety days for goods sold, or togive such a note for goods bought. Consequently, cash business increased in importance and credit operations diminished — a condition of affairs that was remarked in mercantile circles as early as August, 1862. ! In proportion as the fluctuations of prices became more marked, credits were more strictly curtailed. "Even the West," said the New York Times of November * 28, 1863, " which has long been wont to strain credit to its utmost, is now buying and selling for cash to an unprece- dented degree." The circular published in 1864 by Dun's Mercantile Agency ascribed the small number of bankrupt- cies in large part " to that rigid caution which has obtained in our business community in dispensing credits."2 Mr. McCulloch in his report as secretary of the treasury, Decem- ber, 1865, said that u it is undoubtedly true that trade is carried on much more largely for cash than was ever the case previous to 1861." * In the autumn of the same year the Commercial and Financial Chronicle made a careful inquiry into the credits being granted to the South and West, and reached the following conclusions: "The great bulk of jobbing sales now being made are on short time, say from sixty days to four months Half of the buyere
i Compare Hunfa MerchanU' MttoaMine^í oh KLVII. p. 333, and the " Commercial Chronicle and Review " of later issues.
a Ibid., Vol. LII, p. 146. » P. 11.
376 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS
pay in cash, and a large portion oí the remainder average lees than three months in their credits, while bat a very féw obtain aix or eight months/' !
Of conree, the increase in cash bnsiness meant that the demand for commercial loans was less, and this diminution in the quajitity of commercial paper on the market may not improbably have offset the great increase in pnblic securities offered to investors. It mnst be noticed, however, that in explaining the canse of the contraction of credit. one finds himself bronght back again to men's conscions inability to foresee the future conree of pnces as the controlling factor in the loan market Ordinarily men treat the valué of money as a constant and arrange their transactions with little conscions reference to its fluctuations. A paper stand- ard, however, the valué of which depends apon the varying credit of a government passing throngh a serions crisis, forces upon everyone a realization of the fact that the pur- chasing power of money is snbject to great variations. Bnt the realization of this fact is of little practical use in arran- ging bnsiness affairs unless men can foresee the character of the impending changes. During the Civil War the uncer- tainty was so great that snch foresight was hardly poesible. As a conseqnence it seems probable from what information is available that men made their bargains for borrowing and lending money upon terms not very nnlike the terms pre-
failing in less nnquiet times. The chief difference appears have been that, so far as poesible, everyone refrained from luming obligations to receive or to pay money at future
lates, because everyone realized that the sum which he would ^e called upon to give or take might well possess much less ¿urchasing power than the sum which he had received or gdven — particularly when the time that would elapee between tie making and rej>ayment of the loan would be considerable.
* » Vol. I, p. 325.
«*
Intebest and Loan Capital 377
Lest too strong an impression be given of the losses of creditors during the war, it is well to cali attention to the f act that against the losses during the period of rising pnces, eztending broadly from 1862 to January, 1865, were set similar gains during the period of falling prices, extending broadly from January, j.865, to the resumptioft of specie i¿ payments in 1879, If Falkner's índex numíber of 100 for the latter year can be accepted, it follows that a man who had kept a sum of money at interest for the whole period from suspensión to resumption would find its pur^ chasing power at the end of the paper-money róginre \ subetantially the same as it had been at the beginning. In the meantime, however, he would have suffered a heavy loas of real income from 1862 to 1865, and on the other hand would have enjoyed an increase of real income from the latter date to 1879.
It should also be pointed out that on one important class of loans capitalista suffered comparatively little even during the war. Jnterest on many forms of government bonds was paid in gold. Capitalista who invested their means in thése securities consequently received an income of unvarying specie valué. But even these investors did not escape all the evil consequences of the paper-money system ; because, as has been shown, prices rose in the end to a gneater height than the premium upon gold. To illustrate the situation of such investors, suppose the case of a man who in 1860 had $10,000 of the fifteen-year 5 per cent, federal bonds of the loan of 1858. The following table shows what would be his income in gold and paper money, and how its purchasing power would fluctuate in consequence of the advance in prices.
While persona who had purchased bonds as an investment before the war suffered no great loss of income, persona who had aufficient faith in the stability of the federal government
tf¿«A
;
378
HlSTOBT OF THE Gb#ENBAOKS
TABLELX
MONEY AND REAL INCOME YIELDED BT $10,000 OF BONOS OF LOAN OF
|
Year |
Income in Gold Coin |
Average Valué of $100 of Gold Coin in Currency |
Equiva- lent of Gold In- come in Currency |
Relativo Prices at Retail |
Purchae- injf Power of Money Income |
Relativo Real Income |
|
1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 |
$500 500 500 500 500 500 |
$100.0 100.0 113.3 145.2 203.3 157.3 |
$500.0 500.0 566.5 726.0 1,016.5 786.5 |
100 103 115 144 172 181 |
500 485 493 504 591 435 |
100 97 99 101 118 87 |
to purchase its securities at the low prices that prevailed during the war realized a very high rate of interest. By 9 way of rough illustration, consider the case of a foreigner who sent $1,000 in gold to New York every January and directed his broker to purchase 6 per cent, twenty-year bonds of the loan of 1861. The following table shows the amount of bonds which this sum would buy and the interest which the investment would yield:
TABLE LXI
INTERBST YIELDED BT AN INVESTMENT OF $1,000 IN GOLD IN UNITED STATES SI OF 1881, HADE IN JANUARY OP EACH YEAR FROM 1862 TO 1866
|
Date |
Average Valué in Currency of $1,000 in Gold |
! A veratro Price of U. S. 6's of 1881 |
Amount of Bonds Which $1.000 in . Gold Would Buy |
Gold Interest at 6 per cent. on Bonds Bought |
Rateof Interest Realised |
|
1862, January 1863, January 1864, January 1865, January |
$1,025 1,451 1,555 2,162 |
89.6 95.4 105.5 110.9 |
$1.143 1,521 1,474 1,950 |
$68.58 91.26 88.44 117.00 |
6.9* 9.1 8.8 11.7 |
If the person who made these investments were an American, he would be able to sell his gold-interest money at a high premium, but he would also have to pay corre-
Intebest and Loan Capital 379
spondingly high pnces for commodities, so that apon the whole his position would not be greatly different from that of the foreign investor. That such opportunities for invest- ment as these securities offered shonld exist when men were most of the time loaning money for short terms at 7 per cent or lesa, is perhaps the most emphatic proof that could be offered of the inability of the public to foresee what the futnre had in store. Had men been able to make clearer forecasts, the rate of interest would have risen much more than it did, and had they not feared for the solvency of the ~ federal government, its bonds would not have fallen so lowr \ But, for that matter, this same distrust of the government's soívencj^ajrifling from the darkness of the future, may be said to have been fundamentally responsible for all the economic disturbances of the war times, because to it was due the varying depreciation of the greenbacks. I
CHAPTEK VIH
PROFITS
L Profits as a Skare i* ike Distributúm of fke Product:
Use of the Tenns -Proñts" and "Residual daimants w— Gains of Residual Chumante at the Expense of Laborera, Landlorda, and Lending Capitalists — Other ThingB being eqnal, PrafitB Varíed Inverselr as ATerage Wages Paid to Employees and Directly as the Complexity of Bolineas Organixation.
II. Profits i» Difenmt Industries:
IVpendence of Profits on Relatire Ádranos in Pnces of Different Products — Profits of Farmers as an Illustration.
111. Statistictd Erideuce Regarding Profits:
Meageraess of the Eridence — Statistics of Failures.
1. PROFITS AS A SHARB IN THE DI8TBIBUTION OF THE PBODUOT
Is the three preceding chapters an attempt has been niade to show in what mannér the depreciation of the paper standard afFected the real incomes of laborera, landlords, and lending capitalista. These classes are all alike in that the aniount of the remuneration received by them for the *aid which they render to production is commonly fixed in advanee by agreement, and is not immediately AfFected by the profitableness or nnprofítableness of the nndertaking. It reinains to examine the economic fortunes of those men whoae money incomes are made np by the snms left over in any businees after all the stipnlated expenses have been mot.
For the pnrposes of the discnssion it is convenient to cali these men "residual claimants," and to use the term *' profits" to denote the snms which they receiva It will be olwerved that neither of these terms is nsed in the sense froquently assigned it in economic treatises. When one is
380
Pbopits 881
investigating the consequences of monetary depreciation or appreciation, particularly within a limited period of time, one finds that the economic functions that men perform in the process of production are f acta of leas significance than the legal positions in which they stand with reference to the payment of their incomes. The residual claimant of the present chapter is likely to be that man in any business organization whom Marshall wonld cali the nndertaker ; bnt the factor of importance in determining whether the rise of prices injures or benefíts him is not the work that he per- forms in initiating and superintending operations, bnt the fact that, instead of having entered into a contract to accept a certain sum for his services, he has as his share whatever funds are left after paying all fíxed charges and operating expenses. The residual claimant in this sense may be either . manager, capitalist, landlord, or laborer, or any two or three, or all of these persona in one. Which man in any establish- ment of those who contribute services or property to aid the process of production is in the legal position of residual • claimant depends upon the organization of the busines^/ Many cases can be differentiated, varying in complexity from that of the farmer who works his own land without # assistance of hired labor or borrowed capital, to that of the great Corporation which leases its land, borrows most of its capital, hires its laborera, and pays fíxed salaries to its officials. In the last case the residual claimants are the shareholders among whom the profíts are divided in the form of dividends, and these shareholders may include among their number persona who are officials, or laborera, or bondholders, or landlords of the corporation, or who have no other connection with it than that of owning stock. But widely different as these reaidual claimants may be ^ from other points of view, they are all alike in that the J amount of their incomes depends upon the difference between
V
382 HlSTOBY OF THE GBEEKBACK8
the total receipts of the business and the soma paid lo aD the other co-operators in production who haré oommnted their claims to share in the product for a stipulated pay- ment The problem of the presen t chapter is: How did the depreciation of the greenbacks affect theee differences between total receipts and the total of payments to other co-operators?
When the problem of profits is conceived of in this fashion, it becomes clear that a very important part of the solntion has already been contribnted by the preceding studies of wages, rent, and interest. The evidence has been r*fonnd to snpport the conclusión that in almost all cases the sums of money wages, rent, and interest received by labor- ero, landlords and capitalists increased much leas rapidly
Lttian did the general price leveL If the wording of this conclusión be reversed — the pnces of products rose more rapidly than wages, rent, or interest — we come at once to the proposition that as a rule profits must have increased more rapidly than prices. For, if the sums paid to all the other co-operating parties were increased in just the same ratio as the prices of the articles sold, it would follow that other things remaining the same, money profits also would increase in the same ratio. But if , while prices doubled, the payments to laborera, landlords, and capitalists increased in any ratio less than 100 per cent., the sums of money left for the residual claimants must have more than doubled. In other words, the effect of the depreciation of the paper currency upon the distribution of wealth may be summed up in the proposition: The shares of wage-earners, landowners, and lenders in the national dividend were diminished and the share of residual claimants was increased.
Real profits were unusually large during the Civil War,
I therefore, but large because real wages, rent, and interest were low. It must not be assumed, however, that the residual
PBOFIT8 883
claimant necessarily gained as much as the other parties in distríbution lost. In the chapter npon wages, for example, it was suggested that the efficiency of labor probably decreased somewhat during the Civil War, because a large number of the most efficient laborera had enlisted in the armies and their places had to be filled with less skilful hands. So far as this was the case, the volume of ontput most have diminished, and, of conrse, such diminntion would decrease the difference between total income and total outgo that figures with as as profits. But if this was an im portan t consideration, it was one due, not to the paper standard, but to the fact that the country was involved in a great war. With regard to the relations between residual claimant and lending capitalist it must be said that the capital bor- rowed during the war decreased very much more in efficiency than the labor hirecL When prices had doubled, $1,000 of capital was the equivalent of only $500 on the oíd level of prices, and if the borrower had to pay 8 instead of 6 per cent, interest, he seems to have been worse instead of better off in consequence of the depreciation of money. And, of conree, the residual claimant is, in fact, worse off because of even a slight increase in the rate of interest which he has to pay — unless further depreciation takes place between the time that he invests the funds lent him and repays them to the lender. But if such depreciation does take place, he is likely to make a larger gain at the expense of the lender than he makes at the expense of the laborer, because the contract which he makes with the former is likely to run for a longer time than the contract with the latter, and conse- quently the person who finds himself injured by the conree of events cannot seek relief so promptly by insisting upon making new terms. Moreover, the borrower gains not only by continuing to pay the same money income to the lender for a considerable period, as he may perhape do with the
384 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAOKS
laborar, but also by returning the principal snm lent in dol- lars of much less purchasing power than the dollars received On the other hand, the borrower of capital feelfl the effect of a downward turn of prices much more quickly than the employer of labor. The wage-tables indícate that, thongh money wages continued to rise for some time after prices had begun to fall, they had nevertheless not caught up with prices by the end of the war. Therefore, while employere were making less extra gain at the expense of their hands at the cióse of 1865 than they had been making in 1863 and 1864, they were nevertheless receiving an extra profit as compared with the situation before the suspensión of specie payments. The extra gain of the borrower, however, was turned into a positivo loss as soon as the purchasing power of the dollars in which his obligations were repaid became greater than the purchasing power of dollars which had been lent to him.
As for the relations between the tenant and landlord, they were like those between employer and employee in that the efficiency of the good transferred was not affected by monetary conditions, and like those between borrower and lender in that the contract was likely to run for a con- siderable term. From the tables of chap. vi which indícate that money rents increased less rapidly than money wages, it follows that the gain of the residual claimant at the expense of his landlord was probably greater in degree than the gain at the expense of laborera.
Two other general propositions respecting profits are sug- gested by the results of preceding investigations. First, other things being equal, profits varied inversely as the average wage per day paid to employees. This conclusión follows directly from the demonstra tion in chap. v that the money wages of men earning $1-$1.49 per day before the perturbation of prices increased in higher ratio than those
Pbopits 885
of men earning $1.50-$1.99; that the wages of the latter class increased more than the wages of men in the next higher wage class, etc. Second, other things being equal, profits varied directly as the complexity of the business organization. By this proposition is meant, for example, that a farmer who paid money rent, used borrowed capital, and employed hired laborera, made a higher percentage of profits than a farmer of whom any one of these suppositions did not hold trae. If, as has been argned, the increase of profits was made at the expense of laborero, landlords, and capitalista, it follows that that residual claimant fared best whose contracta enabled him to exploit the largest nomber of these other persons.
II. PBOFIT8 IN DIFFEBENT INDÜ8TBIES
The effect of monetary depreciation apon profits resnlting from the increase in the share of the residual claimant in the prodnct at the expense of the shares of laborera, landlords, and capitalista, was felt more or less alike in all industries. Of course, the average advance of money wages was not uni- form in all branches of production: there were probably similar differences in the increase of the sums paid as rent for locations of varióos sorts, and there may have been dif- ferences in the fluctuation of rates of interest charged to borrowers in dissimilar Unes of business. But, despite these differences in degree of diminution in the shares of these three classes of participants in distribution, as compared with the share of residual claimants, the general character of this effect of depreciation was substantially the same in all industries.
There was another and hardly less important effect of depreciation upon profits, however, that was by no means nniform. In chap. iv emphasis was put upon the dissimi- laríty in the price fluctuations of different commodities.
386 HlSTOBT OF THE OBEEKBACK8
These dissimilaríties produced corresponding variations in the profits realized by producers. The residual claimant whose profits carne from the production of commodities that advanced in príce more rapidly than the majority of other commodities derived a second gain in addition to the gain made at the expense of his laborera, landlord, and crédito». Not only did such a residual claimant have a relatively larger share in the product, but the money valué of that product was relatively larger as compared with the money valué of other things that he might wish to buy. When the advance of the product in príce was nearly the same as the advance of the articles which the residual claimant purchased, he enjoyed no such second gain — the only way in which he was benefited by the depreciation was through his ability to satisfy contracts with the proceeds of a smaller portion of the output Finally, in the case of products that advanced in valué less than the average the residual claimant not only made no second gain, but he even suffered a losa through the diminshed relative purchasing power of his product — a loss that might or might not be offset by the gains made at the expense of the other participante in distribution.
The statistical material is not complete enough to make possible an elabórate investigation of these differences in the profitableness of industries due to the dissimilar príce fluctuations. But there is one case that merits attention, not only because of the relative f ulness of the statistical record, but also because of the great importance of the industry. It will be remembered that thirteen agrícultural products are in- cluded in the tablea of relative prices at wholesale. Since this list comprises all the most important farm products of the northern states, it affords a fair basis for estimating how the farmer's money income was affected by price changes in comparison with that of other producers. Table LXII pre- senta the data regarding the prices of farm products in two
Pbofits
887
TABLE LXII
RKL.ATTY1S WHOLBBAJJB PRICR8 OF FARM PBODUOT8 AJCD OF OTHEB OOMMODZTIS8
|
AftlTHlCETIC Mi |
||
|
Thirteen |
Seven |
|
|
Date |
Farm |
Farm |
|
Products — |
Products— |
|
|
Simple |
Weighted |
|
|
Average |
Average |
|
|
1860, Jan . . . |
103 |
108 |
|
April . . |
106 |
103 |
|
July .. |
96 |
94 |
|
Oct . . . |
96 |
96 |
|
1861, Jan . . . |
92 |
91 |
|
April.. |
94 |
87 |
|
July . . |
74 |
66 |
|
Oct... |
76 |
71 |
|
1862, Jan . . . |
83 |
78 |
|
April.. |
92 |
81 |
|
July . . |
87 |
77 |
|
Oct . . . |
97 |
85 |
|
1863, Jan... |
119 |
100 |
|
April. . |
144 |
129 |
|
July . . |
129 |
110 |
|
Oct . . . |
133 |
125 |
|
1864, Jan . . . |
159 |
157 |
|
April.. |
171 |
171 |
|
July . . |
189 |
192 |
|
Oct... |
194 |
194 |
|
1865, Jan . . . |
223 |
216 |
|
April.. |
186 |
177 |
|
July .. |
143 |
129 |
|
Oct... |
166 |
154 |
Median
All
Articles
Included
TableXIV
102 102 100 104 97 96 93 100 111 110 113 124 142 162 156 154 176 194 233 234 247 207 184 199
|
Thirteen Farm Producto- Simple Average |
Seven Farm Producto— Weighted Average |
|
101 |
102 |
|
106 |
106 |
|
96 |
92 |
|
94 |
97 |
|
94 |
90 |
|
90 |
92 |
|
66 |
66 |
|
71 |
72 |
|
84 |
79 |
|
87 |
85 |
|
86 |
74 |
|
96 |
82 |
|
100 |
94 |
|
130 |
120 |
|
115 |
103 |
|
127 |
122 |
|
152 |
153 |
|
161 |
160 |
|
185 |
206 |
|
194 |
174 |
|
224 |
212 |
|
179 |
169 |
|
139 |
117 |
|
149 |
149 |
All Articles Included
in Table XIV
100 100 100 100 100 97 96 100 100 100 103 117 130 142 139 140 161 175 200 208 228 184 160 180
ways. The fírst column gives the simple arithmetic means of the relative pnces of the thirteen agricultural producís included in the general price tables ; the second column gives a similar average of the relative prices of barley, corn, meats, oats, rye, tobáceo, and wheat weighted according to the esti- mated money valué of these produets in the northern and western states in 1860 ;! the third column gives the arith-
i These weights are as follows in percentajes : Corn, 39.4 ; meats, 32.2 ; wheat, 17.4 ; oats, 6.9; rye, 1.7 ; barley, 1.6; tobáceo, 0.8. They are derived from the table of quan- tities and valúes preparad by the statistician of the Department of Agricultura for Senator Aldrich's committee and published in its report, Part I, p. 106. In order to exelude the south Atlantic and south central states, recourse was had to the censos reports of farm yields in 1660, as giren in the Elcvcnth Centu»* " Beport upon Agri- cultor©," Table 2.
388 H18T0BT OF THE GREENBA0K8
metic mean of the relative pnces of all articles incladed in the wholesale príce-tables of chap. iv. A second set of aver- ages is added in which the median is substituted for the aríthmetic mean. j^slt seems safe to conclude from these figures that the I farmers of the loyal states were among the unfortunate pro- I ducers whose products rose in price less than the majority of I other articles, and that from this standpoint they were losere I rather than gainers by the paper currency. Of course, it is ^possible that the farmer's loss from this ineqoality of price fluctuations might be more than offset by his gains at the expense of laborero, landlord, and lending capitalist. But there is good reason for believing that the increase of the residual claimant's profits in the latter fashion was lees in farming than in any other importan t industry. This conclu- sión seems to follow from the proposition that, other things being equal, profits varied directly as the complexity of business organization. The American farmers of the Civil War were in a large proportion of cases their own landlords, capitalista, and laborera. So far as this was true, they had few important pecuniary contracts with other persone of which they could take advantage by paying in depreciated dollars. Of those farmers who hired labor very many paid wages partly in board and lodging — an arrangement which threw a considerable part of the increased cost of living upon them instead of upon their employeea Finally, the renting farmer probably gained less on the average from the contract with his landlord than tenante of any other class, because in a majority of cases the rent was not a sum of money, but a share of the produce. While, then, the general effect of the paper standard was in the direction of increasing profits, it seems very doubtful whether farmers as a whole did not lose more than they gained because of the price disturbances.
Pbopits
889
III. STATISTICAL EVIDENCE REGARDING PBOFITS
So f ar the conclusión that profits were on the whole much increased duríng the Civil War has been based mainly on the resulta of preceding chapters. It would be highly desirable to test these conclusions by means of direct information regarding profits made in various branches of trade, but the data available for such a purpose are more meager even than the data concerning rent or interest. What scraps of informa- tion are available, however, support the view that profits were uncommonly large. Mr. David A. Wells, for example, in his reports as special commissioner of the revenue, has storíes of "most anomalous and extraordinary" profits that were realized in the paper, wqolen, pig-iron, and saltindus- tries.1 A more general indication of the profitableness of business is afforded by the remark in the annual circular of Dun's Mercantile Agency for 1864, that "it is generally conceded that the average profits on trade range from 12^ to 15 per cent."9 •
But the most important piece of evidence is found in the statistics of failures compiled by the same agency. The fol- lowing table shows Dun's report of the number of bank- ruptcies and the amount of liabilities in the loyal states from the panic year 1857 to the end of the war:
TABLE LXIII
STATISTICS OF FAILÜBBS IN THE LOYAL STATES FEOM 1857 TO 1885 ACCORDINO TO *
DUN'S MERCANTILE AOENCT '
|
' Tear |
Number |
Liabilities |
Year |
Number |
Liabilities |
|
1857 1858 1859 1860 |
4,257 3,113 2,959 2,733 |
$265,500,000 73,600,000 51,300,000 61,700,000 |
1861 .... 1862.... 1863.... Ioo4 .... 1865.... |
5,935 1,652 495 510 500 |
$178,600,000 23,000,000 7,900,000 8,600,000 17,600,000 |
¡ExectUive Document No. 77, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. lxxxi, xciii, cvi; Executive Document No. 16, 40th Cong., Sd Sess., pp. 42, 46; Houte of Representativa Report No. 72, 41 st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 73, 74. Cf. also Commerciol and Financial Chronicle, Vol. II, p. 227; C. B. Conant in Hunt'i Merchante' Magazine* Yol. LH, p, 859.
*Hunt's Merchante* Magazine, Vol. LII, p. 146.
* Commercial and Financial ChronicU, Yol. II, p. 84.
**<
HlSTOBT OF TIC GBKKSBACKS
TVr rery gmct Ai»:k»! bott ía tfae
twf of firma that faúkd ts tfat bes* proof
Fmm one poínt of wt tiie email nmher oí IsQbrs ii Mtrprmng. An matable cmiettcy k geocraHy heM to mmbt barínea* noMfe. and seldom has the fftamlard ■oaei of a m*rcantíle commnnity [«oren so unstabte. nndeigone smck ríolent flnetaaikfflts in so ghort a time, as in the United States of tbe Círíl War. Yet, ínstfd of being extremely hazaid- oon, bosíneas «rema {rom the statistica of faihires to haré be*m more than nsoally safe.
The explanation of the anomalj seems to be that thexery extremíty of tbe danger prored a safegnard. Basnesa mea realízed that tbe inflatíon of príees was dne to the deprecia- tíon of the currency, and that wben the war was orer gold wonld fall and pnces follow. The y realized rery deaiiy the necesaíty of taking precantions against being canght in a
^position where a sndden decline of príees wonld rain them. How tbey did this by enrtailing credits has been shown in the preceding chapter. So long as príees contümed to rise such precantions were really not needed by the man in active businefis except, in so far as he was a creditor of other men;
I but when príees commenced to fall pnidence had its reward.
UWch a sudden and violent drop of príees as ocenrred between January and Joly, 1865, would nave bronght a fínancial revulsión of a most serióos character opon a bnsiness com- munity onder ordinary circomstances. Bot so well had the chaoge been prepared for, that the nnmber of failnres was actoally less than it had been in the preceding year of rap- idly rising príees.
The whole sitoation can hardly be explained better than it was by a New York bnsiness man writing in Harper^s Monthly Magazine: "When the war ended," he said, "we all knew we should have a panic Some of os, like Mr. Hoar,
Pbofits 391
expected that greenbacks and volunteers would be disbanded iogether. Others expected gold to fall to 101 or 102 in a few days. Others saw a collapse of mannfacturing industry, owing to the cessation of government parchases. But we all knew a 'crisis9 was coming, and having set our houses in order accordingly, the 'crisis9 of course never carne." '
iVoLXLsp.747.
CHAPTER IX
THE PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OP WEAI/TH
I. Production:
Attempt of Publicista to Demónstrate Prosperity of the North During the War — Contemporary Criticisms — Effect of the Paper Currency on Production — Influence of High Profíts on Industrial Enterprises Counterbalanced by Uncertainty of the Futuro — And by Attractiveness of Speculative Lines of Trade.
II. Consumption:
Contemporary Complaints of Extravagance — Increased Consump- tion of Articles of Luxury — Decreased Consumption of NeceasitieB and Comforts.
I. PBODUCTION
Dubing the Civil War the qnestion whether or not the loyal states were really " prosperóos " was debated with mnch zeal. Supporters of the Greenback policy, like Spaulding and Hooper, were in the habit of claiming that the paper currency " operated very beneficially upon the business of the country" and promoted the general well-being of the people.1 "It is an indisputable fact," said Hooper in Jan- uary, 1863, "that the material interests of the North were never more prosperous than at present."2
From Congress such assertions passed on to newspapers and pamphleteers. Publicists of the prominenoe of Dr. Wil- liam Eider, D. A. Wells, and Lorin Blodget employed their pens in drawing most cheerful pictures of the condition and prospects of the country. A brief citation from the first writer will suffice to indícate the general character of the conclusions at which these optimistic patriots arrived: "The knowledge of an immensely enhanced activity in all branches
i Spauldinff, Congreaaional Globey 37th Cong., 9d SessM p. 288. 3 Ibid., p. 386.
392
Pboduction and Consumption op Wealth 393
of industry," said Dr. Eider, "is brought home to everybody in the free states by the almost perfect distribution of ite A benefits. One class, and one clase only, of the people, aifaj that a class which the general prosperity always injures, / suffers something — the class of annuitants, salaried officers, / and people living upon accumulated capital."1
The general tone of all these pamphlets suggests that the primary object of the writers who prepared them was to encourage the poblic to accept heavy taxation without grumbling, and to invest their savings in government bonds without hesitation. Laudable as soch a design may have been, it was not conducive to impartial selection of data or to successful analysis, and sober-minded critica had no diffi- culty in showing to such as would listen that the boasted prosperity was not so real as it seemed. The little pamphlet, 41 Are We Prosperóos?" by "A Boston Merchant" is a good example of the protests against accepting the specious appearances of activity in business as sufficient evidence of actual increase in well-being. The booklet begins by admit- ting that "labor is fully employed, .... trade is active, . . . . money plenty," and that everywhere "are heard rejoicings over our prosperity." But, runs the argument, if true prosperity consiste "in the productivo employment of labor," there is no great ground for congratularon. Por nearly a million of men are engaged in the service of the government and nearly a million more are making materials of war. So far as the work of supplying the wants of the community is concerned, all these persona are unot only non-producers, but are destroyers and consumera of the cap- ital of the country." The "enhanced activity" of trade and
i Debt and Resources of the United State» (Philadelphia, Jone, 1863), pp. 21, 23, 24; cf. Wkus, Our Burden and Our S treno th, Troy, N. Y., 1864; Blodokt, The Commer- cial and Financial Strength of the United States, Philadelphia, 1864. Al so see the señes of letters published in London by Robbkt J. Walkbe, under the title AmerU can F i nances and Resources, 1863 and 1864.
3¿M HlüTOBT OF THE GBEESBACKS
tb*? foll employment of labor mean only tfaai the people leh at home are working more than oanaüy hazd m the *4Fort to snpply these non-produoers as well as thciuthes iríth the reqoisites of life. The producéis who aell lo the government are receiving in exchange not prodncta that aze wealth, but evidences of debt. This nnprodnctÍTe employ- ment of labor, consnmption of capital withont replacement, and rapíd accnmalation of debt. mar qaicken the pace of boáínese. bat it does not make trne proaperitr.1
From the present point of view it wonld be improper to enter at length apon the queation in what degree the pro- daction and accnmalation of wealth were retarded in the years from 1%61 to 1S65. Snch a discussion wonld invehe an attempt to gaoge the relaiive importance of sereral inde- terminate elementa, snch as the degree in which the labor forcé of the North was weakened by enlistments, how far the withdrawal of laborera into the army was oompensated by the increased exertions of those who stayed at home, how far the introdaction of labor-saving machinery in agricnltnre and other industries was promoted by the lack of hands, whether indostry snffered from lack of capital becanse of the hage snms lent the government, etc. All these problems lie beyond the scope of the present inqniry. Bnt it is pertinent to ask here : what influence did the greenback currency have as one of the many factors that affected the productíon of wealth? On this problem the preceding investigations throw some light.
In the fírst place, the paper standard was responsible in largo measure for the feeling of "prosperity" that seems from all the evidence to have characterized the pnblic's frame of mind. Almost every owner of property found that the price of his possessions had increased, and almost every
» Ii (hir Prmperity a Dclurionf Our National Debt and Currency. by a Bostoo Merchant ( A. W. Stbtsom f ), Boston, 1864. The title on the oover is The Age o/ Q% Oacks.
Pboduotion and Consümption of Wealth 895
wage-earner found that his pay was advanced. Strive as people may to emancípate themselves from the feeling that a dollar representa a fixed quantity of desirable things, it is very difficult for them to resist a pleasurable sensation when the money valué of their property rises or their incomes increase. They are almost certain to feel cheerful over the larger suma that they can spend, even though the amount of commodities the larger sums will buy ia decreased. Habit is too strong for arithmetic.
^Bufpnore than this, "husmeas" in the common meaning of the word was unusually profítable doring the war. The "residual claimant" of the last chapter is in moet enterprises the active business man, and, as has been shown, his money income did as a rule rise more rapidly than the cost of living. Only in those cases where the advance of the product with which the given individual was concerned lagged so far behind the advance of those things that he wished to buy as to neutralize the gain which he made at the expense of his employees and creditors, was the business man actually worse off. In other words, "business" was, in reality as well as in appearance, rendered more profítable by the greenbacks. There is therefore no error in saying that the business of the country enjoyed unwonted proeperity during the war. And it may be added that the active business man is probably a more potent factor in determining the community's feeling about "good times'9 and "bad times" than is the working- man, the landlord, or the lending capitalist
The effect of high profíts, however, is not limited to pro- ducing a cheerful frame of mind among business men. Under ordinary circumstances one would say that when the great majority of men already in business are "making money" with more than usual rapidity they will be inclined to enlarge their operations, that others will be inclined to enter the fíeld, and that thus the production of wealth will
396 HlSTORY OF THB GbEENBAOKS
be stimulated. But the circumstances of the war period were not ordinary and this conclusión cannot be aooepted without serióos modifícations.
1. It has been shown that business men realizad the pie- cariousness of all operations that depended for their succees upon the futnre course of prices — and nearly all operations that involved any considerable time for their consummation were thus dependent. So far did this disposition prevail that it prodnced a marked curtailment in the use of credit. The prudent man might be willing to pnsh his business as far as poesible with the means at his own disposal, but he showed a disinclination to borrow for the pnrpose. Thus the uncertainty which all men felt about the futnre in a large measnre counteracted the influence of high profits in increasing production.
2. The foregoing consideration of course weighed most heavily in the minds of cautious men. Bnt not all business men are cautious. Among many the chance of winning large profits in case of success is sufficient to induce them to undertake heavy risks of loss. On the whole, Americana seem to display a decided propensity toward speculative ventures and are not easily deterred by having to take chances. To men of this type it seems that the business opportunities oflfered by the fluctuating currency would make a strong appeal. But, while the forcé of this observation may be admitted, it does not necessitate a reconsideration of the conclusión that the instability of prices tended to diminish the production of wealth. For in a time of great price fluctuations the possibilities of making fortunes rapidly are much greater in trade than in agricultura, mining, or manufactures. Every rise and fall in quotations holds out an alluring promise of quick gain to the man who believes in his shrewdness and good fortune, and who does not hesitate to take chances. The probable profits of productivo industry
Prodüction and Consumption op Wealth 397
in the narrower sense might be larger than common, but this would not attract investors in large numbers if the probable profits of trading were larger jet; and such seems clearly to have been the case during the war when the paper currency offered such brílliant possibilities to fortúnate speculators in gold, in stocks, or in commodities. Instead, then, of the greenbacks being credited with stimolating the prodnction of wealth, they must be charged with offering inducements to abandon agriculture and manufactures for the more speculative forms of trade.
This tendency of the times did not escape observation. On the contrary, it was often remarked and lamented in terms that seem exaggerated. Hugh McCulloch, for instance, in his report as secretary of the treasury for 1865, said:
There are no indications of real and permanent prosperíty . . . . in the splendid fortunes reportad to be made by skilf ul manipu- lations at the gold room or the stock board; no evidences of increas- ing wealth in the facts that railroads and steamboats are crowded with passengers, and hotels with guests; that cities are full to overflowing, and rents and the necessities of lif e, as well as luxuríes, are daily advancing. All these things prove rather .... that the number of non-producers is increasing, and that productivo indus- try is being diminished. There is no fact more manifest than that the plethora of paper money is not only undermining the moráis of the people by encouraging waste and extravagance, but is strik- ing at the root of our material prosperíty by diminishing labor.1
More explicit was Mr. Wells's statement of the movement away from industry and toward speculative trading. In one of his reports as special commissioner of the revenue he said :
During the last few years large numbers of our population, under the influence and example of high profits realized in trading during the períod of monetary expansión, have abandoned employ- ments directly productivo of national wealth, and sought employ- ments connected with commerce, trading, or speculation. As a
ip.».
HlSTORY OF THE trHEE.-.
_:: "E trading and specu- - ¿ncingniHhed faro the
--*. aen, it eeems verv ; ai. their usual effect of . i» materials or to au . aiwnt man hesitated lo . l :he inatability of the . .ui ;» tum for speculati ve ^¿tiiaities in trade.
be stimulated. But the circunist&iittM-svm) to the populaban were not ordínary and thia concias* - - unber and cost of the without serióos modincations.
1. It has been shown that bnmv cariouBness of all operations thnt ' apon the fnture conree of pnces that involved any considerable 1i- were thus dependent. So far -1 thnt it prodnced a marked cüt* The prudent man might be wil1' far as possible with tbe mean* Bhowed a diainclination to b< the uncertainty which all m**- large measore counteracteil ^^,^¡1
mcreasing prodnction. ^^ eminente on Amenau,
2. The foregoing comí.1 _^ : ^ TO ^ttoul ^ .¿MMHCünoe made against the iL— •** uní pnlpits veré at one jíwí iiac they declared, was
, -»se. The "shoddy aris-
"ÜT í **?"! a dfciri' -"-«* ****? o£ wealth becanw •
... ^^ ^ aoni*, and earned a well-
vk»> tbroad. So common are
^.gm* -.Óat no specific references
o ■.■xamine the files of newB-
, >*i -.'ubtished sermone or let-
v . dwrvers were impressed by
■Tiuditupe.
heavily in tbe minds of enu** men are cautious. Amrmv large pronto in case of sa- to undertake heavy rískp *■
ventares and are not chances. To men of fV opportnnities offered by ' a Btrong appeaL But. ! may be admitted, it dot- ' the conclusión that tf* diminish the produclir"* " pnce fluctuatit are much greí manufactures, iilluriii" pro mi his shrL'wdnesf to take chañe»
a A. Muc eabark party were fnnd of puint>
■m 1«0 «iid 1870 than brtwwo
110» AKD OOHSÜMPTION OF WEALTH 399
• account for thia unpleasant phase of social osually laid the blame upon the paper i pnces were aaid to make everyone feel r and so to tempt everyone to adopt a more a of living than his former wont Thus the view J credence that the greenbacka were ultimately t for a great increase in the consumption of wealth. i conclusions reaclied in the preceding ehapters j the changes in tbe distribution of wealth caused fs paper money are sound, however, auch a view regarding ^ consumption of wealth can be but partially trae. The 9 profita of " residual claimants " made possible the 1 accumulatíon of an unusual number of fortunes, and i familiea thus lifted tuto suddeu afiluence enjoyed epend- p their money in the osteutatiuus fashion characteristic of 9 newly ricb. It ia therefore trae that the mouetary situ- ation was largely responsíble for the appearance of a con- siderable clasa of persona — of wbom the fortúnate apecnlator and the army contractor are typical — who plunged into the recklessly extravagant habita that called down upon their henda the condemnation of tbe popular moraltst.
But if the greenbacks were in the last reaort a cbief cause of the increased conaumption of articles of luxnry by familieB whom they had aided in enriching, they were not less tnüy a cauae of reatricted conaumption by a much larger clase of hombler folk. The laboring man whose money wages increased but one-half, while the cost of living donbled, could not continué to provide for his family's wauts so fully as before. He was forced to practice economies — to wear bis oíd clothing longer, to use leas coffee and less sngar, to substituto cbeaper for better qualities in every Une of expenditure where possible. Similar retrenchment of liv- ing expenses muat have been practiced by the familiea of roany owners of land and lenders of capital. In otber words,
¿i ■■? T5E &3EEXBACKS
. ~-*c3> >>->Uiteii ja a T**J large measure from
^. .. véanla rrt>m i wide cúnele of persona to
-K_^* uimoer Á residual claimants to the
>*_ . ao CLA^rprisersu The enlarged consumption
„ ..- . . aper :iirr»?ncy made po&sible for the
us» .ienrioní .roatrasted with a diminished
~ . «Ai vi :he xxnfortnnate man? on whose
- -^^ubacks Ievied contríbatioas for the
* ■
:....?».tü •.oiisumption of wealth by l&rge num-
. t ., >^it^á general notice, while the extrara-
iu ittrmrted so much attention. need not
cavt» u :he validity of these conclusiona,
* . í>í *rocting-horse by a government con-
..s.\>iítieu«» of his wife's gowns and jewelry,
-^•icuous faots than the petty economice
> .¿^-lOVfes* The same trait that leads for-
a^íií *.iit?ir material prosperity in the eves
.»^> jt aiirorttinate to conceal their small
r. .. .¿i utentive observer may fail to notice
. «wi-kiu^oien are still wearing their last
.v :iat 'lie children are running barefoot
v v *&t*d(.vr$ were not full of comments on
.^ ^*c> o£ rlie mass of the population, whole-
..*t *.■ .u*¿vves of food and clothing noticed a
^ •■: * » ».ewing the trade situation in Sep-
.^ . \«i wa^vs were near their lo west ebb,
...x 't-.«;*;^¡.ie remarked that 4*the rise inthe
, . ■*> i,4s> .... outrun the power of con-
íi! -.rnde has been almost at a stand.
*. ,viFe*\ silgar, low grade goods, which
.vx.uvís of the great mass of the people in
.o .%.ik\-cs. iias [*'c] reached such high rates
Prodüction and Consümption op Wealth 401
that the decline in consümption is very marked, amounting almost to a stagnation of the fall trade." !
It would be of exceeding interest to trace the temporary change in the character of the consümption of the people that resulted from the artificial alteration of the distribution of wealth by the greenback currency — to see, for example, how the consümption of tobáceo and liqnors was affected as compared with the consümption of sugar, coffee, flour, and woolen fabrics. But unfortunately there are no reliable data to serve as the basis of such an investigation. The Revenue Commission of 1865-66 made an attempt to estí- mate the decline in the consümption of cotton, tea, coffee, sugar, and molasses, bnt its figures are too largely the resulte of guesswork to possess much significance. ' All that can be said with assurance is that the consümption of many articles of luxury increased very greatly, while the con- sümption of many staple articles declined. It is probable that in the first year or two of the war a spirit of economy pervaded nearly all classes of the people.* As the charac- teristic effeets of the greenback standard began to make themselves felt, still more careful supervisión of expendí- tures was forced upon wage-earners and small owners of land and lenders of capital, while residual claimants began to find their profits uncommonly great. The great fall of pnces in the first half of 1865, combined with the continued advance of money wages, alleviated the situation of the first class of persona, though it did not quite restore them to the situation that existed before the war. To residual claimants it brought a reduction in profits that was in part merely nominal — the expression of their fortunes in fewer figures,
l VoL LI, p. 243; cf. also pp. 870, 447.
*tf. R. Executive Document No. 84, 89th Cong., lst Sess., Special Reporta Nos. 1-4.
* Qf.% e. g.y remarles of T. M. Parker, Congrc$$timal Olote* S7tb Cong., 2d Sess^ p. 885; ** Report of the Bank Commissioners of the State of M&ine," Deoember, 1882, in Executive Document No. 20% 88th Cong., lst Sess., p. 8.
402 HlSTORY OF THE &BEENBA0K8
but with a denominator of enhanced valué — and in part real — the relativo Lacrease in the shares of the product that went to other co-operators in production and the increased valué of the dollars in which whatever pecuniary obligations they had contracted must be paicL But, on the other hand, the fact that they had survived the sharp fall of pnces that they had foreseen would come with the end of the war relieved their minds of a great source of anxiety, and put them in a position to enjoy the gains that they had saved. Consequently in 1865, consumption of goods of ail kinds prob- ably increased over that of 1864; of staple articles, because money wages had risen, while pnces had fallen; of luxuries, because, though profits were lesa enormous, fortunes were felt to be less precarious.
CHAPTER X
THE GREENBACKS AND THE COST OP THE CIVIL WAR
I. The Problem and the Method of Solution: Financial vs. Economic Consequences of the Legal -Tender Acta — Various Estima tes of Increase in Debt Caused by Greenbacks — Method by which Estímate Should Proceed.
II. The Greenbacks and Expenditures:
Difference Between Increase of Expenditures for Commodities and for Services — Difficulty of Distinguishing Between the two Classes in Government Accounts — Estímate of Increase in Ordinary Expenditures.
III. The Oreenbacks and Receipts:
Effect of Depreciation on Various ítems of Revenue — Indirect Financial Consequences of the Legal-tender Acts.
IV. The Oreenbacks and the Public Debt:
Danger of Double Computation of Loes by Greenbacks — Terms on Which Bonds were Sold — Saving and Loes of Interest.
V. Conclusión:
Net Effect of Greenbacks on Amount of Debt Incurred During War — Financial Consequences af ter Return of Peace.
I. THE PBOBLEM AND THE METHOD OF SOLUTION
Discüssion of the consequences of the legal-tender acts has so far been confined to the economic relations between individúala There is, however, another phase of the sub- ject to be considered. The reader who turns back to the account of the debates npon the legal-tender bilis will find that most of the unfortunate consequences that followed their enactment were foretold in Congress — the decline of real wages, the injury done creditors, the uncertainty of pnces that hampered legitímate business and fostered specu- lation. But a majority of this Congress were ready to sub- ject the community to such ills because they believed that
403
404 HiSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAOKS
the relief of the treasury from its embarrassments was oí more importance than the maintenance of a relatively stabfe monetary standard. There was little of that confusión between economic and fiscal considerations that has fie- quently been held responsible for the attempts of govern- ment to use its power over the currency as a financia resource. Rather, there was a conscious subordination of the interest of the community in a atable monetary standard to the interest of the government in obtaining funds to carry on the war. It is therefore incumbent npon one who would judge the policy from the standpoint of its sponsors to inquire into the financial effects which to them seemed most important as well as into the effeots on the distribu- tion of wealth.
This topic has two aspects — one of which has already been discussed. Power to issue greenbacks formed a quickly available financial resource from which the treasury was able to meet large amounts of indebtednees already accumulated when the legal-tender acta were passed. But while such issues relieved immediate needs, their nltimate effect was to increase the future demands on the treasnrr. The first of theee eonsequences has been dealt with in the historical chapters of Part I. where an attempt was made to show how much immediate help the greenbacks aflbrded Mr. Chase. It remains for the present chapter to treat th^J largor question: What effect had the greenbacks upon #>e I amount of expenditures incurred? I
Few questions raised by the legal-tender acts have attracted more attention than this last Even while the first legal-tender bilí was being considered its critics declared that if made a law it would increase the oost of wa^uig the wnr by oausing an ad vanee in the pnces of articles that the governnient had to buy.1 As the war went
Part I. chapt ii. p» 5?.
Greenbacks and Cost of the Civil Wab 405
on the soundness of this view became apparent. Simón Newcomb, writing early in 1865, estimated that by the end of 1864 the greenbacks had increased the amount of indebted- ness incurred by the federal govemment $180,000,000 beyond the amount that would have been incurred had the specie standard been maintained. Even if the war should end in 1865, he prophesied, $300,000,000 more would be added to this needless augmentation of the debt.1
When the war was over and the divers reasons that had detened many men from criticising the financial policy of the govemment were removed, competent writers began to express similar views with freedom. For example, Mr. H. R. Hulburd, comptroller of the currency, said in his report for 1867: "Probably not lesa than 33 per cent, of the present indebtedness of the United States is owing to the high pnces paid by the govemment while its disbursements were heaviest."2 Mr. O. P. Williams put the increase of debt at one-third to two-fifths ; C. A. Mann, at one-fourth ; S. T. Spear, at a billion dollars ; L. H. Courtney, an English crític, at nearly $900,000,000.* Of later discussions that of Professor H. C. Adama has attracted the most attention. He estimated that of the groes receipts from debts created between January 1, 1862, and September 30, 1865, amount- ing to $2,565,000,000 the gold valué was but $1,695,000,- 000— a difference of $870,000,000 between valué received and obligations incurted.4
All of these estimates seem to rest either upon guesses or upon reduction of sums borrowed in currency to specie valué. The former method of arriving at the result inspires little
i Critical Examination ofour Financial Policy (New York, 1885), pp. 171, 172.
*Finance Report, 1867, p. 15.
JSee A Revieto of the Financial Situation of Our Country (Albany, 1868), p. 7; Paper Money (New York, 1873), p. 184; The Legal-Tender AeU (New York, 1875), p. 78; Journal of the Boyal StatUtical Society, Vol. XXXI, p. 204.
* Public DebU, p.1».
406 HI8TOBY OF THE 6REENBAGK8
oonfidenoe even when the guesses are made by men inti- mately familiar with the federal finances, and the latter method assumes that all govemment expenditnree rose in proportion to the decline in the specie valué of the green- back dollar, and that all revenues remained what they woold have been on a special basis — assumptions subject to impor- tant exceptions.1 The problem of ascertaining the financial consequences of the greenback issues is much too complex to be solved by methods so crude. Some branches of ex- penditure were much affected by the depreciatíon of the cnrrency, other branches but little. The effect of the paper currency on the receipts of the govemment is quite as important a part of the problem as the effect on expendí- tures, and examination shows that here as there different items were affected in very different degrees. Finally, the greenbacks were themselves a "loan without intereat" though, on the other hand, they increased the volóme of the interest-bearing debt by augmenting expenditurea Theee three topics, then — the influence of the paper-money standard on ordinary expenditures and receipts, and on interest — must all be examined by anyone who hopea to frame an adequate estímate of the net effect of the greenbacks on the cost of the war. As will appear, however, examination of these topics is beset by serious difficulties.
II. GREENBACKS AND EXPENDITÜBES
It is a familiar remark of writers on public finance that all things required by govemment fall into one of two categories — commodities and services. If the conclusions of the preceding chapters on pnces and wages are well founded, it follows that this elementary distinction regard-
1 Professor Adams is f roe from this reproach, for he is carefol not to saj that bis figures represent the di ffe renco made by the greenback policy in the oost of tkt war. This latter interpretaron, however, has been commonly put opon tk* passage. E. g., see H. White, Moncy and Banking % lst ed., p. 182.
Gbeenbacks and Cost of thb Civil Wab 407
ing the objects of govemment expenditure is of very great importance for the present probl'em. For, since pnces advanced in much greater ratio than wages, it is clear that the greenback issues must have increased the sums paid for commodities more than the snms paid for labor. Indeed, this diff erence between increase in cost of commodities and of labor seems to have been much wider in the case of the govem- ment than in the case of prívate persona; for, as was shown in sea viii of chap. v, the wages of federal employees were advanced on the average considerably less than the wages of other persona. Clearly, then, the first step in any estímate of the effect of the legal-tender act apon the expenditures incurred by govemment during the war shoold be a carefnl separation of expenditures for commodities from expenditures for services.
Accordingly, it is a very serious obstacle that one encounters in finding that such a separation cannot readily be made. A statement of the expenditures of the preceding fiscal year is published in each annual report of the sec- retary of the treasury. But in these statements the items are arranged rather according to the department of govem- ment through or for which the specified sums were spent, than according to the object of expenditure. For example, the first general división of expenditures is placed under the caption "Civil," and under this caption the first three items are "For Congress, including books," "Forexecutive," "For judiciary." It is obvious that each of these items must include payments for both commodities and services; but there is no way of separating the two classes of payments.
A more detailed statement is given in the annual Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of the United States rendered by the register of the treasury. But even these bulky documenta do not make possible such a división of expenditures as is desired. A careful examination of the
408 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAOKS
register's accounts for the fiscal years 1863-65 shows that about one-third of the total expenditures each year con- sista of items which appear to inclnde payments for both labor and commodities in unknown proportions. Such, for example, are expenditures upon fortifications, armones, and hospitals, repairs of shipe, construction of buildings, inci- dental expenses of various bureaus, and the like. The best that can be done with these accounts is to divide the items into three classes: (1) expenditures for salaries and the like, most of which appear to have been little affected by the paper currency; (2) expenditures for commodities; (3) ex- penditures that inclnde payments for both commodities and labor. Even with such a scheme of classification it is some- timos difficult to decide where certain items shoúld be placed.
If this división of expenditures be accepted, the next step is to determine in what ratio the expenditures falling within each of the three classes shall be assumed to have been increased. In the first class the largest items are the pay of the regular and volunteer armies. As was shown in sec. viii of chap. v the wages of prívate soldiers was increased from $13 to $16 per month after May 1, 1864. Since this increase was made with the avowed object of compensating soldiers in some measure for the decline in the purchasing power of the paper money, one must con- sider three-sixteenths of the pay of the army after that time as an addition to the money cost of the war. It is not im- probable also that, had the specie standard been maintained, it would have been unnecessary to grant such lavish bountiee to sti muíate enlistments. If so, a part at least of the large sums reported as paid in bounties should be added to the increase in the cost of the war. To be on the safe side, however, this item will be neglected. As for other employees of the government besides the soldiers, it appears that in
Gbeenbaoks and C08T op thb Civil Wab 409
few cases were the money salaries íncreased beyond the scale prevailing before suspensión. No doubt it was largely from motives of patriotism that so many men in humble qs well as in conspicuons positions remained in the service of the government at wages they would have accepted from no prívate employer. Their self-sacrifice lessened the effect of \ the greenbacks apon the cost of the war in dollars and cents. But from any other than the narrowest fiscal point of view it was one of the most nnfortnnate consequences of the paper-money régime that the men who were serving the country faithfolly were compelled to submit to a great decrease in their real incomes.
With respect to the second of the above described classes of expenditures, the question of interest is whether the depreciation of the cxirrency aflfected the prices paid by the government for commodities as much as it did prices paid by prívate purchasers at wholesale. Reference to the tables in sec. iii of chap. iv will show that the statistical material gleaned from the Aldrich Report indicates that pnblic con- tracto» did not advance their prices quite as rapidly as other dealers. But it must be remembered that the two series there brought into comparison are not constructed in the same fashion — one series gives the averages of four relative prices each year; the other gives the relative average prices of twelve months in some cases and of prices for unstated dates in others. Moreover, many of the government series are based on prices for 1861 instead of for 1860, and in the former year the government seems to have been paying rather higher prices than in the latter. Still f urther the whole number of articles included in the government list is not great, and about half belong to a single and financially unimportant group — drugs and chemicals. Finally, it is not improbable that there were changes in the qualities of some articles accepted from contractors that account for a relatively slight
V
410 HlSTOBY OF THB GBEENBAOK8
increase in price. For these various reasons the divergen» between the two series possesses little significance. |S^ Mnch greater weight should be attached to the general I conclusión drawn in chap. iv — that the dominant factor in i determining pnces during the war was the fluctuating vaina* ttion of the currency. There is no reason why knowledge ) Ifl&t he would be paid in greenbacks should affect in diflfer- ent degrees the prices that a dealer would ask from the gov- ernment and from prívate men. Since, then, the fairly satisfactory wholesale-price data show a rather cióse paral- lelism between prices of commodities and of gold, it seems fair to infer that the sums asked of the government for identical goods also rose and fell in rough agreement with the premium. True, prices seem not to have advanced so quickly as did the gold quotation, but neither did they fall so quickly. Everything considered, then, the moet trust- worthy índex of the increase in the sums expended by the government upon commodities is probably found in the aver- age premium upon gold in the several fiscal yeara.
An even larger element of conjecture enters into the estí- mate of the increase in the expenditures of the third class, which includes payments for both commodities and labor. So far as commodities are concerned it is as fair here as in Class II to apply the average premium upon gold as an índex of the increase. But with reference to labor a new problem arises. The salaries of most persona in the regalar service of the government, aside from soldiers, were not in* creased at alL But the titles of the ítems grouped in Class III as they appear in the register's accounts seem to indícate that the great mass of the labor was not that of officials, but that of workmen employed on a strictly commercial basis. In constructing fortifications, erecting and repairing public buildings, etc., it is probable that the government or its contractors paid as much for the labor hired as a prívate
Gbeenbaoes and Cost op the Civil Wab 411
employer would have done. If so, it followB that the beet índex of the increased expenditnre on the labor inclnded in this clase is found in the tablea of chap. y, particularly Table XXX, which shows the averave relative wages for all em-
TABLELXIV
BSTIMATRD IXCRBA8B IN THB ORDINABT EXPKKDITUUE8 OP THB
MXNT CADBKD BT THB GBSBBBACKB
(In millions of dollars)
FBDBBAL OOTOM-
Expendí tu res:1
Clase I, salaries, etc
Class II, commodities
Class III, both labor and
commodities
Assumed ratio of increase:
Class II*
ClassIII»
Estimated actual increase:
Class I, increase in pay of soldiers *
Class II
Class III
Total estimated increase each
year
FlBCAIi Yeabb
1862
Siz
Months
92 82
89
3* 3*
2
3
1863
242
214
238
37*
27*
68 51
109
1864
259 258
294
56* 44*
6 93 90
189
1865
406 402
406
102*
77*
62 203 176
441
1866
Two
Months
45 43
44
4*
49*
20 13 14
47
i The figures for the fiscal years 1863-65 ara obtained from the animal reporto on " Reoeipto and Expendí tures." For the aeoond half of the fiscal year 1862 the ordinary ezpenditnres were estimated on the basis of the "Treasnrer's Aooonnte'* (H. B. Ex. Doc. No. 4y S8th Cong., lst Sess. ), and these ezpenditnres were dirided amona; the three classes aooording to the proportions giren by the eompntations for 1863. Similarly, the ezpenditnres for the months July and August, 1865, are assumed to be two-thirda of the total for the qnarter July to September and are dirided amona* the three elasses in the same ratio as the ezpenditnres for the fiscal year 1865.
3 Arerage preminm npon gold as giren in Appendiz A below.
* Arerage of preminm on gold and increase in money wages aooording to syttem of ▼ariable weights, as shown by Table XXX añore. For wages in eaeh fiscal year I haré taken the indez nnmber for Jannary of the oorresponding calendar year.
*Three-sizteenths of pay of army (ezcept bonnties) after May 1, 1864, as the pay is reported in "Reoeipto and Ezpenditnres." For the months July and August, 1865, the increase is oompnted on one-half the snm stated by the paymaster-general as paid to the army between June 80 and Ootober SI. (Ex. Doc. No. 1, Part II, p, 806, SBChCong., lst Sess.)
412 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAOKS
ployees for whom data are given in Table XII of the Aldrieh Report. Assuming so much, we have two ratioa of increase in expenditure for this class — one applicable to the prices of oommodities, the other to the wages of labor. Since there is no way of distinguishing between expenditure for goods and labor it is necessary to make some purely arbitrary assumption regarding their relative amoants. The simplest assumption is that the increase in the total expenditnres of Class III was midway between the average premiam apon gold and the average increase in money wages. Perhape this assxunption may be accepted as well as any other, for, if no definite reason can be assigned for it, neither can any reason be assigned in favor of any rival assumption.
In accordance with the preceding plan, Table LXTV has been constructed to show the probable increase in the ex- penditure of the government caused by the issues of paper money between the date of suspensión and August 31, 1865, when the public debt reached its máximum amount.1 The total increase for the whole period is $791,000,000. After all that has been said of the elementa that enter into the problem it is hardly necessary to insist strenuously that this total is but a very rough estímate.
III. THE GBEENBACKS AND BECEIPTS
Almost all the writers who have discussed the ñnancial consequences of the legal -tender acta have conñned their attention to the increase of expenditnres. This procedure is perhape natural for ardent critics of the paper-money policy, but a little consideration shows that it is unfair. The reports of the secretary of the treasury give the govern- ment revenue under five heads — customs, sales of public lands, direct tax, miscellaneous sources, and internal revenue. Of these receipts some were and some were not affected by
iRepori of the Secretar? of the Treasury, 1M6, p. &
Gbeenbaoks and Cost op the Civil Wab 413
the greenback issues. In accordance with the provisions of the first legal-tender act customs duties were paid in gold, and the ad valorem duties were assessed on the foreign specie valuation of goods. The receipts from this source therefore remained on substantially the same footing as if specie payments had been maintained. Dnring the war receipts from the sales of public lands were an item of little importance — less than $1,000,000 per year — despite the decline in the valué of the currency that might be paid by the purchaser of lands. The receipts from direct taxes were all collected under one law passed six months before suspensión. This law fixed the total amount of the tax at $20,000,000 and determined the precise amount to be raised by each state.1 Accordingly the legal-tender acts had no effect upon this item — except that the states were enabled to pay their quotas in greenbacks instead of in gold. The revenue derived from miscellaneous sources includes a con- siderable number of small ítems. Of these, some were doubt- less increased by depreciation, e. g.9 proceeds of sales of captured and abandoned property. Other Ítems were unaffected, e. g., receipts of fees by American consuls abroacL Premiums on sales of gold coin among these miscellaneous receipts may be set down from the present point of view as clear gain.
The last of the enumerated government receipts remains, the internal-revenue duties. This system of taxation was inaugurated by an elabórate law passed July 1, 1862, which imposed certain duties, partly ad valorem, partly specific, upon a great variety of manuf actured articles ; imposed a tax upon the gross receipts of cañáis, railroads, theaters, etc.; taxed auction and brokers' sales; required licenses for prac- ticing professions; levied an income and a legácy tax, and placed certain taxes upon articles of luxury, such as carriages,
i Act of Augnst 6, 1881; 12 Statutet at Large, p. 294.
414 HlSTOBY OF THE GBEENBAOK8
pianos and píate.1 This law was saperseded two years Ínter by another internal-revenue act which raised the rates of taxation, and increased the nnmber of articles made to pay es.2
At the time the first law was passed the depreciation of the carrency was not great, and probably the rates of taxa- tion imposed do not differ much from what they would have been apon a specie basis. But withont any modification of the terms of the law, the progressive rise of prices most have cansed an increase of the reverme from ad valorem duties, and from taxes on gross receipts and upon incomes. Receipts from specifíc duties, licenses, etc., however, prob- ably did not increase except as changes were made in the law or in its administration. While, then, the yield of this most important of the sonrces of federal revenue was materi- ally affected by the legal-tender acts, it would be too much to argüe, as was done with reference to expenditures for commodities, that it was increased in the ratio indicated by the premium on gold. Some arbitrary assumption, however, must be made regarding the ratio of increase if any estímate is to be had. Again, it is perhaps best to adopt the simplest expedienta and count the increase of receipts from internal taxes at the full amount indicated by the premium, but, on the other hand, take no account of the increase of receipts from miscellaneous sources. Since the latter sums are relatively small, it is probable that an estímate thus made will err rather on the side of over, than of understating the increase of revenue.
The total increase of receipts shown by this method as applied in Table LXV is $174,000,000. Again the caution
i 12 Statutea at Large, pp. 432-89. The amendments to this act were not such as to increase the total revenue derived from it. See acta of July 1?, 1862 (12 Statutm^ p. 827) ; March 3, 1863 (ib id., pp. 713-31), aod March 7, 1864 (13 Statutea, p. 14).
2 Act of Jane 30. 1864, 13 Statutea at Larga, pp. 223-306; mmended by act of Marea 3, 1865, {ibid., pp. 46©-87).
Gbeenbaoks and Cost op the Civil Wab 415
TABLE LXV
B8TIKATSD INCBBASB IN THB ORDINART RECEIPTS OF THB
CAUSEO BY THB ORBBHBACXB
(In millions of dallara)
FBDBBAL OOVBBMMBBT
|
Fiscal Year 1862 (Six Months) |
Fiscal Year 1863 |
Fiscal Year 1864 |
Fiscal Year 1865 |
Fiscal Year 1866 (Two Months) |
|
|
Current receipts: l Prom customs |
33.5 .1 1.8 .5 • • • • • |
69.1 .2 1.5 3.0 37.6 |
102.3 .6 .5 47.5 109.7 260.6 56* 39 |
84.9 1.0 1.2 33.0 209.5 |
31.3 |
|
From sales of public lands. Prom direct taz |
.1 .0 |
||||
|
From miscellaneous sources From internal revenue |
12.3 64.4 |
||||
|
Assumed ratio of increase . . . Estimated actual increase . . . |
35.9 3* 0 |
111.4 37* 10 |
329.6 102* 106 |
108.1 43* 19 |
is hardly necessary that the result is to be accepted subject to a wide margin of error.
So far the discussion of the increase both of expenditnres and of revenues has proceeded as if the paper currency had exerted none but simple and direct effects. There wereother financial consequences of the shift from the specie to the paper_Btandard, however, that were not animportant, though they were indirect and difficult to gauge. Three of the most prominent most be indicated.
1. It is probable that not a little of the lavishness with which pnblic fnnds were appropriated by Congress dnring the war can be traced to the paper-money policy. At least snch was the opinión of a man so well placed to observe the opera tions of the treasury as Hugh McCulloch. In his report of 1867 he said: uAs long as notes could be issned and bonds could be sold at a premium or at par, for what the
i As giren by the animal statements of the register of the treasury (see Finante Reporto, 1862, p. 37 ; 1863, pp. 34, 35 ; 1864, p. 33 ; 1865, pp. 44, 45, 48) . For 1862 the receipts of the last two quarters of the year are giren; for 1866 two-thirds of the receipts for the flrat quarter.
416 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAOKS
statute made money, there was a constant temptation to liberal, íf not unnecessary, expenditures. Had the specie standard been maintained and bonds been sold at a discount for real money, there would have been an economy in all branches of the pnblic service which unfortunately was not witnessed." l
2. If the paper currency tempted the government to reck- less expenditures, it also predisposed the people to submit more willingly to heavy taxation. It has been remarked several times that the advahee of money wages and of money prices made most people feel wealthier, and, feeling wealthier, they were less inclined to grumble over the taxes.
3. But while the feeling of prosperity may have been instrumental in procuring a cheerf ul acceptance of war taxes, it is very doubtful whether the net effect of the paper-money system was favorable to revenue^. It was pointed out in the last chapter that the lagging of money wages behind money prices necessarily diminished the consumption of wealth among wage-earners. In so far as this diminution affected the consumption of articles that paid either an import or an excise duty — and there were but few articles exempt from taxation by one of these methods — the fall of real wages must have lessened the tax receipts. Much the same must have been true, although in less degree, of the indirect taxes collected from the consumption of the great agricultural class, if the conclusión of chap. viii is true, that farmers were injured rather than benefited by the price fluctuations. On the other hand, the extravagance of the fortúnate familiee enriched by the receipt of high profits tended to increase the revenue for the time being ; but it is improbable that the increase of receipts from the enlarged consumption of this limited class offset the decrease of receipts from the enforced economies of wage-earners and farmers.
i Report of the Secretar? of the Treasury, NoTember 30, 1867, p. xi.
Gbeenbaoks and Cost op the Civil Wab 417
While, then, these indirect effects of the paper currency on expenditures and receipts could not by any system of bookkeeping be brought to definite quantitative statement, it Í8 probable that their net result was unfavorable to the
IV. THE GBEENBACKS AND THE PUBLIO DEBT
It may seem that in a discussion of the financial conse- quences of the legal-tender acta account should be taken of the effect of the desertion of the specie standard npon the terms on which the government conld borrow. The resort to a legal-tender paper currency, one may argüe, is a con- fession of acate financial distress and as such must depress the market for bonds. Therefore, to the financial loes caused by the increase of expenditures should be added a second loss from the unfavorable terms to which the government had to submit in selling its securities.
Of course, it is true that the secretarles of the treasury in their efforts to borrow money were obliged to agree to some very hard bargains. There was little ground for exultation over the sale at par of bonds bearing interest at 5 or 6 per cent, in gold when the currency received from purchasers was worth in specie but 50 per cent, of its face valué. But this loss arising from the difference in valué between the paper dollars received by the treasury for bonds and the specie dollars which the treasury contracted to pay bond- holders after a term of years is not a further loss in addition to the loases discussed in the preceding sections, but rather these same loases looked at from another point of view. For, the estímate of the increase of expenditures above receipts, and therefore of debt contracted, rests precisely upon the decline in the valué of the paper dollar from the specie standard. One may arrive at an estímate of the loss either by computing the increase in the number of dollars that had
418 HlSTOBY OF THE GBEENBACK8
to be borrowed in paper money to be repaid in gold, or by estimating the decline in the specie valué of the paper money raised by the sale of bonds; but to make estimates by both of these methods would be to include two gueeses at the same item.
It is, of course, true that, had gold bonds been sold largely at less than par for paper money, a second loss would have been incurred from the discount in addition to the loss from the smaller purchasing power of the currency received. But, as a matter of fact, the deviations from par in the subecrip- tion pnces for bonds were not of great importance. The prices of government securities did not fluctuate very widely during the war, for the very good reason that these pnces showed merely the valué of one set of government promises to pay, viz., bonds — in terms of another set — viz., green- backs. Most f actors that affected the credit of the govern- ment would affect the specie valué of all its promises in much the same manner, and therefore would not alter materially the ratio of one to another.
It remains only to say a word about the effect of the legal-tender acta upon the interest charge borne by the gov- ernment The great financial argument in favor of the greenbacks has always been that they constitute a "loan without interest." However many millionsthe depreciation of this currency added to the principal of the public debt, the greenbacks should be credited with whatever sum was really saved in this fashion. But against the saving of interest effected by issuing greenbacks instead of selling bonds should be put down the loss of interest on the increase of debt arising from the augmentation of expendí- tures. If the rate of interest be taken at 6 per cent., a simple calculation shows that the interest saved by the greenbacks up to August 31, 1865, was but $28,000,000 greater than the interest loet through the exoess of increase
Gbeenbacks and Cost op the Civil Wab 419
of expenditures over the increase of receipts as shown by Tablea LXIV and LXV. By the end of this period the augmentation of debt caused by the greenbacks had appar- ently become greater than the volume of greenbacks in cir- culation, bo that from this time forward the annnal losa of interest probably exceeded the gain.
v. CONCLUSIÓN
The public debt reached its máximum amount Augnst 31, 1365, when it stood at $2^846,000,000. * Of this immense debt the preceding estimates indícate that some $589,000,000, or rather more than a fif th of the whole amount, was due to the substitution of United States notes foj metallic money. Little as these estimates can pretend to accuracy, it seems safe at least to accept the conclusión that the greenbacks increased the debt incurred during the war by a sum run- ning into the hundreds of millions. If so, it follows that, even from thü JiaxrQwly financia! point of view of their spon- sors, the legal-tender acts had singularly unfortunate con- sequences.
The present chapter, to agree with its predecessors, must end with the Civil War. But it may be pointed out that the financial effects of the legal-tender acts, like the eco- nomic effects» did not cease with the return of peace. No additional discussion is required to show that the varying depreciation of the currency continued to affect the volume of both receipts and expenditures until resumption of specie payments in January, 1879, restored the greenbacks to equality with gold. It is equally clear that the United States notes continued to be a " loan without interest/' and that, on the other hand, the government continued to pay interest on the unnecessary debt created during the war. But there is another phase of the subject that deserves spe-
» Report of the Secretary of the Treeuury, 1806, p. 6.
1
420 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS
cial remark, because it is frequently overlooked. A consid- erable portion of the immense public debt in existence August 31, 1865, consisted of obligations expressly payable in " lawful money." In so far as the government was able to pay these debts out of revenue before the greenbacks had appreciated to par, it effected a saving.1 But all such tóp- ica— the continued effect of depreciation on governinent expenditures and revenue, the annnal loss or jjain o£_inier- est, the cost at which the "lawful money" debt was paid, the expense at which specie payments were resumed, and the difficulties encountered in maintaining the convertibility of the paper money into specie — belong to a later period in the history of the greenbacks. It is probable^ howeyerj that were a careful study made of these topics the indictmeut brought against the greenbacks on fínancial gronnds wonld be rendered yet more serious.
0
lOf oourse, when the lawful money debt was paid by refnnding operations— that is, out of the prooeeds of new loans themselyes payable in gold — no sach sa rings resultad, nnless the new bonds were sold at a premium. An estímate of the saying actual ly effected may be found in the Journal of róUtical Economy* Yol. Y, pp. 148-4. The total arriyed at is $72,000,000. If this sum be deducted from the a boro estímate of the inerease in debt, the net loss to the goyernment caused by the greeabacks doring the war wül still appear to haye been over half a billion in gold.
STATISTICAL APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
Gold Valüe op the Paper Cürrenct, 1862-65
Explanatobt Note.— There are two well-authenticated tablea that show the ayerage monthlyand yearly yalueof currency in gold during the Ciyil War: (1) a table published by the American Almanac (see, e. g.% issne of 1889, p. 341) ; (2) a table prepared by the Burea a of Statistics (Finance, Commerce and Immigration of the United States^ Series of 1896-96, No. 4, p. 518). For the years 1862-45 these tables are idéntica! ; the figures giren below are taken from the second. This table was pre- pared by Mr. £. B. Elliott, actuary of the treasury, in the following manner : fonr daily qnotations of the rates of gold at New York, via., the openJng, highest, lowest, and closing prices, were reeorded ; from them a daily ayerage was made, and from these ayerage daily prices waa prepared the ayerage rate for each month.
The table of daily highest and lowest prices is based, for the reasons assigned in the text (Part II, chap. iii, sec. i), opon the table g¡ ven in the Reporto/ the Cham- ber of Commerce of the State of New York for 1865-66, Part II, pp. 130-33. The figures for the first eleven days of January, 1862, however, are supplied from the daily reporta of the premium on gold in the New York Commercial AdvertUer.
TABLE 1
MONTHLT HIGHEST, A VER AGE, AND LOWEST OOLD PBICB OP $100 OF PAPE* MONBT
IN THE NEW TORK MABKET
1862
|
Month |
Date of Highest Price |
Highest i |
Ayerage |
Lowest1 |
Dateof Lowest Pr. |
|
1 |
$99.50 |
$97.60 |
$96.24 |
10 |
|
|
February . . . |
27,28 |
97.92 |
96.60 |
95.47 |
15 |
|
25 |
98.77 |
98.20 |
97.56 |
1 |
|
|
8,18,19,24,25,26 |
98.52 |
98.50 |
97.68 |
2 |
|
|
1 |
97.92 |
96.80 |
96.04 |
27 |
|
|
11 |
96.74 |
93.90 |
91.32 |
27 |
|
|
July |
1 |
91.95 |
86.60 |
83.25 |
22 |
|
August |
9,11 |
88.89 |
87.30 |
86.02 |
29 |
|
September . . |
1, 2, 16, 17, 18 |
85.84 |
84.40 |
80.65 |
30 |
|
1 |
81.97 |
77.80 |
74.91 |
22 |
|
|
November. . . |
29 |
77.52 |
76.30 |
75.05 |
10 |
|
December. . . |
1 |
77.82 |
75.60 |
74.63 |
4 |
' The highest and lowest prices are taken from the following tables of daily prices.
423
424
HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS
TABLE l - Continued
MOMTHLT HIOHB8T, A V ERAOS, AND LOWE9T OOLD PRICB OF $100 OF P1PBB
IN THE NEW YORK MARKET
1863
Month
January
February . . .
March
April
May
June
July
August
September. .
October
November. . . December.. .
Date of Highest Price
2 10,11
26
8 26,28
10
20
25
1
1
27
1
|
Highest» |
Ayerage |
Lowesti |
|
$74.84 |
$68.90 |
$62.21 |
|
65.57 |
62.30 |
57.97 |
|
71.94 |
64.70 |
58.22 |
|
68.73 |
66.00 |
63.34 |
|
69.69 |
67.20 |
64.62 |
|
71.17 |
69.20 |
67.40 |
|
81.14 |
76.60 |
68.97 |
|
81.88 |
79.50 |
77.07 |
|
78.82 |
74.50 |
69.87 |
|
71.24 |
67.70 |
63.80 |
|
69.93 |
67.60 |
64.94 |
|
67.51 |
66.20 |
65.47 |
Dateof LowestPr.
31 26,28 1.2
1
7 16
1
1 29 15
21,23 4,29
1864
January — February . .
March
April
May
June
July
August
September.
October
November. . December..
6 27 1 4
10 2 1
30 30 3 18 19
|
$66.01 |
$64.30 |
$62.75 |
|
63.64 |
63.10 |
62.11 |
|
62.89 |
61.40 |
58.91 |
|
60.15 |
57.90 |
54.13 |
|
59.52 |
56.70 |
52.63 |
|
53.05 |
47.50 |
40.00 |
|
45.05 |
38.70 |
35.09 |
|
43.20 |
39.40 |
38.20 |
|
52.36 |
44.90 |
39.29 |
|
52.91 |
48.30 |
43.91 |
|
47.62 |
42.80 |
38.46 |
|
47.00 |
44.00 |
41.15 |
19 16 26 26 31 29,30 11
6
2 31
9
7
1865
|
January. . . . |
21 |
$50.70 |
$46.30 |
$42.67 |
4 |
|
February . . |
21 |
50.92 |
48.70 |
46.14 |
7 |
|
March |
24 |
67.51 |
57.50 |
49.75 |
1 |
|
April May |
10 |
69.69 |
67.30 |
64.73 |
5 |
|
11 |
77.82 |
73.70 |
68.91 |
1 |
|
|
June |
5 |
73.94 |
71.40 |
67.74 |
15 |
|
July |
3 |
72.14 |
70.40 |
68.43 |
28 |
|
August .... |
11.15 |
71.30 |
69.70 |
68.73 |
2 |
|
September . |
15 |
70.11 |
69.50 |
68.97 |
1 |
|
October . . . |
2,3 |
69.38 |
68.70 |
67.11 |
6 |
|
Novemlier . |
1 |
68.73 |
68.00 |
67.23 |
29 |
|
December . |
9 |
69.20 |
68.40 |
67.34 |
1,4.5 |
• The húrhest and lowest prioes are taken from the following tablea of dail) príees.
Appendix A
|
Ja™ 17 |
Fobmurr |
Harch |
April |
Uar |
jm |
||
|
|H.flHS.a |
(07 W-97.56 |
fl:v m :n ni |
197.92-97.80 |
8. |
|||
|
"lv.,1 9-r77 |
8. |
8. |
11» Ol 1,7 liS |
91.80-91 |
VI |
J>¡ 112 1.1 VI |
|
|
i |
9.. uI-98.71 |
98.71-98.62 |
96.04-91 68 |
98. 2» 98. 18 |
97.78 10" |
:r> |
;.-, :.' ..1 ,,2 |
|
W.3-W.M |
06.02 1-i 50 |
98 irtüK.irt |
'■■s 2B IW.lri |
8. |
btl(¡2-!« VI |
||
|
«.80-m.sa |
(«11 1-1 112 |
•Bill 91 92 |
8. |
97.11 I»' |
;h |
!•-. 17 (17 9J |
|
|
■ |
96.82 |
i-i.ti-: hí.m |
W.28-98.W |
'.- 72 (r7 ir.1 |
97.a :■; |
:< |
a |
|
m.k |
B. |
8. |
98 tt 98 18 |
98 97 !. |
17 |
97. 92 97 SI |
|
|
i.;..!'. 9.7 21 |
96 50-96.11 |
98. 04-98. M |
US 2S 98 1H |
98 (v7-l. |
74 |
97 112 97 SI |
|
|
96 .¡i 90.1.7 |
«-i.:; '-i ir. |
98 40 98 2» |
<H 11.1 1» ,. |
8. |
96. 71-90. 09 |
||
|
12 |
8. |
!.:.r,'.ii)i |
98.4o 98.40 |
08.28-98 04 |
50 |
95 47-C5 01 |
|
|
11 |
97.oe-oi.oe |
it, n: i'i si |
',*.:•■> i» .-.: |
8. |
\-V\-. 1. |
74 |
117 01 91 MI, |
|
91 :;.' *; y", |
97 si ;■:, :.i |
98.52 98 III |
98 28-118 18 |
11 S.7 1- |
87 |
94 61-94 58 |
|
|
98 s.7 1. |
SO |
||||||
|
1S |
■■■7 !«l !« 56 |
B. |
8. |
tt |
!■.'!. >t 11-161 |
||
|
9N.li> US. 01 |
98 .St-M.CT |
.,.■ -.; .. ;-, |
•ib 72 I." 91 |
97 II' 1. |
SI |
91 114 mi 1-1 |
|
|
i* > 11 DI |
(■1.11 1*1 39 |
98.64 91.72 |
B. |
||||
|
8. |
H7 ".' 90*5 |
•11.72 51 10 |
Vi .-.2 1.1 III |
'-. ü-, ■..- |
IB |
in'iii-ia'lii |
|
|
20 |
91. 80-9!. H |
I-I.B5 '..-,.71 |
8. |
||||
|
'-.' |
97.80 97 VI |
96.111 '«,'.'7 |
fH 17 <*'.:¿ |
98.40 m 10 |
I«i.s7 '.. |
•12 |
91.01 l'l¡ 111 |
|
'.i7.li '.17.: i |
91.09-ai.09 |
9g.71-98.B4 |
(IB 10 98 11] |
■..i 82 ;» |
SO |
S. |
|
|
~£\ |
(•',.74-96 mi |
8. |
98 40 1" '28 |
98.H-98 |
.12 |
«1 6s-:i; 79 |
|
|
90 ti 96.82 |
H7 no 1.5.15 |
98.17-98 84 |
11.72 1" 40 |
98.71 •« |
92 iw 10 ..:, |
||
|
97.09 96. B5 |
■,>7 IF.l 90 (ll |
i«.bii •» n |
98 72 91 72 |
8. |
92 ,'ls 10 '.'"i |
||
|
8. |
117. -1 ¡ti (17 |
98.11-98. 84 |
98. ,r¿ -BB 40 |
(.1 17 '..- |
ir» |
91 Vi ni 7:i |
|
|
97. 09 1. i. s.7 |
n7 te ni so |
68 77-98 28 |
8. |
98 1.7-9. |
91 11 10 112 |
||
|
2" |
W. 14- 98. 74 |
91.H2-91.SO |
111 77 ■.'.. 61 |
98.(0-98.28 |
'.■I 27 1« |
1-7 |
91. 74-91.04 |
|
98.K7 96 71 |
98.52;98.52 |
9*. '28-98. 28 |
'.., :-.< 1- |
||||
|
!"1 87 96.02 |
98.04-98.04 |
"8 :ji 11 |
60 |
91 .85-01. U |
|||
|
96.82 :.:..VI |
98.64-98.28 |
||||||
|
Jolr |
Aiwue |
Spiíli-mb-if |
Ocliibor |
Notímbet |
Deoember |
||
|
n-.ll.lt.-, (11. -VI |
M H ■ ■ |
•-I 117 SO SI |
.=17.17 76 19 |
l77.83-76.il-, |
|||
|
!"i H.vm.13 |
86.06 80 71 |
V..S1 s.7 ii-, |
si. 17-11. 11) |
s. |
ni <i ;r. o-, |
||
|
ni ;:_' m.ríi |
8. |
M [13 84.75 |
7,1 83 7'-. 0.7 |
70.81-7.-, 18 |
|||
|
Ht.li.Li» |
Bl.il «5 '>i |
81. 1)3 Bl «1 |
8L68-ÍI'» |
71 22-18. iW |
1-, 19 71 81 |
||
|
i.l 52 m .01 |
si. ai »i . i.-. |
B. |
76 O", 77 61 |
76 0-,:-, 17 |
|||
|
8. |
87.21 81.15 |
-i ':¡ m.M |
8I.S8-80.58 |
76 i:.-, -,:, y, |
7fl.8S-1S.T8 |
||
|
!„>.-! ..,0.7o |
«i 72 -:.«-: |
8. |
«l.» SO 72 |
76 85-17 711 |
8. |
||
|
Hs.llt 17.72 |
«1 21 83 0* |
80. 18 i.. (B |
75 76 1.7 17 |
78.1187.05 |
|||
|
Vi 11 S5 .si |
».Bn sü..vj |
-i no B4 i: |
I!. 81 79 IC |
8. |
17.(0 7.-, 19 |
||
|
so ic r. ii |
6. |
SI lll-BI 21 |
11. 71H7 52 |
TS 81-75.06 |
75.09-17 11 |
||
|
si 15-88 21 |
ss.M-su.ai |
M 21 84 12 |
75 12 ;i m |
76 .14-!--, 111 |
75.69-77 61 |
||
|
ni tí »:.:« |
™.h-s;.,-k1 |
14.311-81 21 |
8. |
78 9.7 77.76 |
78.05-73 '.II |
||
|
13 |
8. |
S7 111 17.51 |
KL.77-M :,', |
77 -,-_• " r. |
78 "7-17 16 |
78. H 7.7 76 |
|
|
8.1.VS-.15 9.1 |
-i 77 -~i :*> |
8. |
>1 M 7.7 19 |
78 :U 77 76 |
8. |
||
|
1S |
»■■. ta M.4J |
(.;.].-, •.-..--■*■ |
B.7.11-S4 M |
77.18 77 M |
7!.;.|.,7 ;,', |
77 s,-i 77 ,11 |
|
|
ia |
N-..-17 ;-, -i |
»; ni B7.21 |
77 7.1-77 47 |
B. |
T,. 78-17 26 |
||
|
n |
st.in «i.i-j |
8. |
B.-.^l-.s.-, 11 |
77 1.1 7.7.41 |
77. 76-7-, 81 |
75.61 77 19 |
|
|
18 |
M iti.-.-i *s |
■JfrM.11 |
7-1 92-78 7S |
TU IJ 17 76 |
7.7. oí. 1.7 :a |
||
|
m ■..-, u w |
-7 I.", 8H.H0 |
s.7 ;.*m- i-',.. 11 |
8. |
7H 92-78.81 |
77 61 77 33 |
||
|
so |
S. |
88.96 ~1.77 |
B7.il.-, h--,.:« |
77 77 77 22 |
TU 78 76. 0.1 |
73.16 7,7.28 |
|
|
vn -,i ia.s) |
1-6.11 Ktl ¡M |
8. |
77.97 11 .oí |
78 71 76. .VI |
a |
||
|
k.1 ts so ir; |
li-i.Sü ^-..ll |
77 19 74 »1 |
78.8.1 76.18 |
7~, 61 77.10 |
|||
|
2S |
M ili s¡ w |
so sobo :u |
M .93-84 .21 |
77 11 17 19 |
& |
7.7 89 17 61 |
|
|
!* |
*.-> 17-1 341 |
B. |
Ki.ao >-i "-i |
7,-. 1(1-77 78 |
78S,V18 4S |
77 76 75.18 |
|
|
B |
81.51 87.84 |
M.n-ss.» |
B-l ffi -2 SI |
76.92 lii.lH |
1. ..i >. 1'2 |
XmutD«j |
|
|
91 |
85.47-85.11 |
86 17 "i .17 |
B71 111 B2 99 |
8. |
17 .17-77.22 |
||
|
27 |
8. |
Wl 77 H6.51 |
>..: :;-.i -: ..' |
18 92-78 19 |
;; ■■■; ;■ 2: |
77 M 77 io |
|
|
» |
s-,71 "--. 02 |
80.5886 111 |
8. |
77.97 77.11 |
8. |
||
|
a |
-.; r»j k.m |
SU L- J H6 02 |
BS 14-80.91 |
W.19 i:, !■) |
77.» 77.37 |
15 83-15 SS |
|
|
u |
b; wbií.hi |
88.I9Ü6.39 |
82.S0-8O.O5 |
78 71 76 18 |
8. |
77 40 77 11. |
|
|
s; :¡t si .-,7 |
8. |
77.21-76 K |
|||||
HlPTOBT OF THE GbEEXBACIB
TABLE : - Comiivted
|
Jaoturr |
Febrauy |
Jludí |
April |
«-j |
Jo™ |
|
|
s. |
í-, :-••-■ :-.< |
WKM-II |
«•m «0-47» |
|||
|
FiM-;i» |
B.*¡C» |
í> ii-> - |
K ^-K3 W |
4BTV-U6 U |
e» i4-4n« |
|
|
H.-ilK |
« 7S-M M |
-V > -~ |
« >:-v..i- |
BL |
*» I4-4HM |
|
|
B. |
n .:■-■ ■ |
».*i-* a |
«.<:-« u |
n B-<B -^ |
•B.49-0JB.3B |
|
|
-4 3*73!* |
H.N ■■; B |
TT.-Í/ ;.—'., :* |
8- |
67 14-6» OÍ |
as. «MBS |
|
|
74 «3-74.S |
.:; :■,<..■■ ni |
i/,..;lt-..| ■-( |
0B.S-4S.41 |
«S.M-4MM |
6B.H-0J) » |
|
|
mnim |
«.Í.--Ü M |
ií4.i¡í-«4 51 |
>^ KWÍ4 -2 |
a |
||
|
73»0-7».W |
8. |
a |
«.a-osa |
H.B4H 73 |
««-«a |
|
|
w.»-í:.a» |
M 73-*3 90 |
64. 31 -63 59 |
(S3MT7 S7 |
67.U-6SM |
Til »-7u Vi |
|
|
-, ■. ■■. :.' 07 |
IB S7^J W |
■■V r.j-.:.¡ y, |
as.as-K: ii |
a |
TI 17-70 m |
|
|
s. |
K. "f.-.-Ü |
... íi--.i m |
M IV-Si.iT |
«7.St-«7.lf |
70.M-70.Ct |
|
|
71 11-70.30 |
U BN« .73 |
ií¡.i.«-«.'.r. |
B. |
67.M-07.W |
70 Mr- 70 7» |
|
|
'■i IJ'í-.ll |
M 46-« 10 |
(Í.W-ÍJ 1C |
S6.7M4Í TV |
TOJO-Tii 11 |
||
|
II |
68 1(-«7.5J |
M 41 -«.10 |
«a.»-«.» |
«!«-« 36 |
BB.3MB -7 |
a |
|
1', |
n ji n.n |
8. |
s. |
(l7.TS-ri4.v4 |
■ t. ..i n |
6B2D-6» ■> |
|
64.1.7-03 49 |
B4. 73-64 SI |
0l7.7n-.7O4 |
<B.n-«.M |
Í7.««T 10 |
||
|
11 |
,--. ''*. '.-, /,'l |
■.:i.tí-..J 71 |
« 67-« 41 |
>", TT.'Vt LT |
a |
t> 7 ■)-... '1 |
|
8. |
«3.31-61 73 |
eso-*», a |
uu.r---i7.av |
,* 7^.7 177 |
0». í! '•' 11 |
|
|
«!.»«a |
IIM» |
.T4 ".7-^1 15 |
8. |
«7 .M T. 06 |
BBta-su |
|
|
(l.ll-Cl 07 |
61.73-64 M |
67.3-«.S4 |
G7.iv <r. ii |
BB .«BMH.a |
||
|
VI |
-!; » ■'■; -m |
61 .73-61 1* |
« 99-64 57 |
■^ ■:■■• .¿ iu |
S7.SHJÍ 'TT |
a |
|
•■; •■! .- ;\ |
S. |
a |
ñ* .a-."* iíl |
6T.71.,; T. |
BB.Ti-a.a |
|
|
«i iiwii.as |
«6 13-65 15 |
«7. «-«.«7 |
S7.M-tt.a> |
6B.71-6»« |
||
|
i,-, v ■>; ■;■ |
-■,'. 11-V 31 |
■ :•. TS-.íJ.f i |
.-i ,.i .;-. 7> |
a |
«.M-* 11 |
|
|
M 31 -M 01 |
TI i- T-i :.-. |
«Á.Tv-tH.H |
■ n a.M |
a.os-«a |
||
|
-,'. i.l 77 '.17 |
7i m-:i si |
8. |
W«MNS7 |
a.uB-a.rt |
||
|
11 |
W.E7-M.» |
,N .,-. ..■.. ir |
•IMI |
|||
|
síla-57'w |
7-r un.'- "T |
./..f.-1-.K ÍC |
«a 9fi-.ii -ji |
a |
||
|
8. |
M. 67-66» |
«4).30-*.M |
« ;,-. -■.- H |
|||
|
B9.33-4I7 91 |
•-, BMi H |
a.is-a.ii |
||||
|
n |
S.8ME.U |
67.s4-«i.tr: |
a |
|||
|
Mr |
Ad«i»i |
Ssptember |
Oclolrr |
Notember |
Deernbrr |
|
|
m. 31-77.07 |
■:■■ m-t* M |
iTl V) 71 VI |
a |
•47 ■■!-..: 4,. T7 M .,: > |
||
|
B. |
'..• 1H 7- ]_■ |
■;,, l...:...M ■T-, 11 -",'.'. í7 |
WM-4JM |
|||
|
«I II ri'J.JC |
TB.IS-1PS» |
77 37-74.19 |
... U ■ ;i. |
•s.n-«:>37 |
||
|
Holidar |
7; .j; 77 •■'■ |
71 9) 71 -17 |
6. |
,'^ W-ftS .4.1 |
•77 ÜJ-* 17 |
|
|
7ti.ufi :;;■! |
6V ll-IB.OS |
«S»-67.« |
«S.SO-65 7» |
|||
|
r¿ m 7i «i |
a. |
li. I'..T7.WI |
67S7-«7 23 |
a |
||
|
7H.71 7» VH |
77.13-7-, ÍC. |
,.- iw-tVt.a: |
i.l ,i. .17 >-. |
-V) H B 7t |
||
|
7U VI Tu l.'i |
7, .70 ", ..■.-. |
.., .",-. fj. lu |
a |
.,:.-;-•.; v |
||
|
8. |
77. 54-7.7 l" |
M.1I-66.K1 |
íw ai-tvn l-vi |
,-•7 si-s; v> |
||
|
m |
71' 2!' 7* SO |
7.1.3-, tu i; |
«7 !'>-;;. si |
,.* s .i- .■; |
«7.73* a |
|
|
ti |
islán, a |
;>.i.vi-",'' «■> |
8. |
■ Tu -.-.-.I |
M.ts-aoi |
|
|
7M :".< tu 1:1 |
77 0> 77 r.j |
IM ..'ilrt 01 |
«w-a» |
|||
|
7K irr 7- 71 |
8. |
i'.", "IM.-7V |
■ -*',,;: ■.! |
a |
||
|
7V.M 7M Id |
7.; u 7-, <i7 |
.17 77 .'.7. 01 |
«S.-JH'#.(.0 |
,-.; S4JJ ■ |
||
|
711 7>J i'- 1* |
7*;:w 7T, >;:> |
64 10-63-80 |
a |
« ;'J «-. ■ |
||
|
8. |
7rt 1V-77. Hl |
lil.SNfil M |
6Í "., .17 97 . |
07 1.1 V. T« |
||
|
ii |
Hl U NI n |
79. «> TU ".- |
77-71-;:. IT |
67.00-66.67 |
h7.iv.-.;: ni |
i,l :.: (.'. 47 |
|
7u. Hi IB M |
ii.i.-.i 7'i ito |
7.7 l!t 77 id |
a. |
...i s-..^.,i; |
,i-, Bf-4l [I |
|
|
10 1! 71' !'¿ |
71 77-71.8.1 |
«i.a»-« n |
W V3--V, 17 |
san ■ m |
||
|
3> |
m ii TUTO |
S. |
m n ■ ■ ¡i |
as sms s |
a |
|
|
-¡ |
7V.M-7W.Hi |
71 .94-71 n |
,,'.. -.; ... i: |
65.1&-«94 |
.7-, 71 '.-..77 |
|
|
«0.14 Wl 08 |
TV Ni- 73 '.11 |
-,,,,,-, .:-. ;;: |
a |
.-.-. n-nM |
||
|
a |
.■.i ■ ,'i :-i |
8. |
7? 73-7V Tf.1 |
.:• (ua iv. |
<r>.M-M-M |
6S.79-ffi.J7 |
|
Ni iVi »> ir. |
TI 1:1 77! Hl |
■i^ 11 i'.s 111 |
iü*. ir. -.'/>. TJ |
«.•fr4B.fl |
||
|
:■-, |
79 .77.' 7944 |
H.ÍMH.M |
B. |
fJ7.í3-fi7.11 |
Xmu P'J «cn-aa |
|
|
H. |
Sl.ftVHl 11 |
7l!ít» 7l.nl |
flo.SSHJ8.7K |
T.„,k._ "^ |
||
|
MI .Ti-K" "H |
S. |
,'.i 1liii7 '..1 |
a |
|||
|
:i |
m«i-*i m |
71 NI 71.77 |
fiSi.it -IVÍ -v» |
,:■;, ;;;,;■.. ¡1 |
a.Bo-a.a |
|
|
«0-l6-«U US |
711 1«-.J. S7 |
,l. .vi ..: ■■.-. |
a |
«5 .S3-4&.47 |
||
|
s |
i. ..', ,.■> :■■» |
a |
7o. so- 70. a |
,...!■, .1- ;;V |
H.Í14T.S |
«VW-CíM |
|
,<i |
1H flft77.¡12 |
TS.74-71.97 |
B8.71MIS 7Í |
SS4-SH |
||
Appbndix A
TABLE ?.- CoiKttnued
|
í,™, |
Februnry |
Mnrch |
April |
Mar |
.1,119. |
|
|
1 |
-2,. 9.7-8.7. 7 o |
jot; i-' t;i.:-íi |
(Oí. 89-02 30 |
Wi.'ü •■■.mi |
8. |
Í52.8--; 52. Si |
|
2 |
02 li.-. ..VJ i.", |
«t..">i 39 97 |
■,y. ■■: :.; ::■ |
5! ir. 52 83 |
||
|
3 |
rm..vi-v..n'i |
52.05-52. M |
||||
|
83 '.-.i-t'.l n |
1:2 c. 81 o2 |
80. 15 80.02 |
55.71-51 71 |
52 V-.52.I9 |
||
|
8. |
||||||
|
fio. til -88 til |
03.39 o.;. 19 |
8. |
:■, ,1 .,- ,;i |
5; 17 r.l 51 |
51. 53-31. 77 |
|
|
!-.-, si ir. m |
8. |
61. 8201. S2 |
•Vi.rtl-W.líi |
57 un 5; i! |
51 Sl-51 :.", |
|
|
es.MMU.n |
82.99 02 79 |
01 ("01 2V, |
'>-,:• i>i |
8. |
M.M-51.75 |
|
|
-a 'i-. 02 "' 02 79-02 7;. |
.-,!! >.S---Itil riO 70 00 70 |
-,:i ni -,'.1 ni 8. |
W.ÍH-58.4S 51 i ■■■ ■■■■ |
|||
|
B. |
50.38-50.31 |
|||||
|
ii- 0.1-85. 57 |
82 7.', 02.70 |
80 71-00 7H |
59 1» .-,■.1.110 |
57. -w .Vi 71 |
5tl.ll- vi. :it |
|
|
r.v-, m-oi.-s?. |
>'.-_' VI tÜ 79 |
«2.31-01.73 |
57 SO- 57.:» |
s. |
||
|
13 |
83. 01 01.99 |
t¡:.' 70 02.05 |
8. |
V. 91 58.90 |
5K..-2 57.31 |
51 09-51 09 |
|
r.'.t 7:i oí .",7 |
EL |
ti-i-.1l 02 21 |
.V1.S2-V,. l: |
58.ll-5s.ti8 |
51.13-Vn>¡ |
|
|
a |
01 41 -tM 11 |
02.55 02 35 |
til t«til II |
37.81 57 V, |
EL |
VI 57-50 57 |
|
ni |
oí 21 03» |
ie 1002.11 |
t;i s;-m 7:1 |
>.l8-rji.a» |
57 81-57 53 |
50 70 Vi. 30 |
|
17 |
8. |
02. 53-02. -.o |
■i2.o-.iii '.'■; |
8. |
H v, -.1 || |
VI S.J-VI.79 |
|
62. 70-62. 79 |
IVJ 55 02.55 |
81. 35 til .3.1 |
\H 83 -.l.i'J, |
57 25 -55 17 |
51.22 51 15 |
|
|
Ii2. 79-02.75 |
03.290:1.04 |
81.73-01 7:i |
59. "39 52 |
55 19 55 ili |
EL |
|
|
20 |
«1 19 «2 tu |
82 si 02.70 |
8. |
59 —■ 59 70 |
-.3 27-33.2-3 |
-■Jl 71.30 .u |
|
r',1 m.:;i.r,:i |
B. |
81.73-81.73 |
59. '.,-1-59. 70 |
55 10-55.10 |
[■0.25-4S.Í* |
|
|
173 ~l-i-l.ll |
«.SIMJ2.H9 |
57.1-.1-.-.7 B |
8. |
i;.l-.i-(5 !•■ |
||
|
5 |
81 imi3.W |
03 59-05 :.-. |
iüi 11-00 42 |
57 43-58.34 |
54.91 54.01 |
4H.7S-H XI |
|
24 |
8. |
83 39-03 i'.i |
oo.t.i 00.06 |
r.i s'.-5i.í2i |
48'lfi-*! '►. |
|
|
rki.(i-<w.s4 |
8.1.19-0:1 ii |
55. '7-51. 7.' |
51 1.1 51.110 |
>'-. ..:-!. 15 |
||
|
oh :>,t na -i |
(Vi 1903 II |
59. Ou 3S.91 |
5-1.17-31. 13 |
,1 ,.l 51 J. |
8. |
|
|
O.-|0'.l-02l.8ü |
03.S4HU.4e |
8. |
■::. 35 ;: |
u k n ■ |
1S.25-4187 |
|
|
03.81 G3 .VI |
3. |
50 22 55 lü |
vi ;,. 5:1 ;.i |
12 i:: «1 8, |
||
|
2B |
03 «l-03.ll |
82.80-62.70 |
60. S3 60.29 |
w.avv, 1. |
8. |
12.53 19.00 |
|
83 S.M2I 01 |
1,1 12-00 .. |
«. 71-55 38 |
53.78-3S 78 |
«0 82-40 00 |
||
|
31 |
3. |
52.8.1:22 83 |
||||
|
Jnly |
Wu-t |
BaptonlHf |
Octoh^r |
H««bfr |
Dwmber |
|
|
Y |
«15 (ivin.in |
S» M-3* 61 |
tU 15-40 24 |
ÍT.2.BS-51.61 |
US 48-11 41 |
H4 10-13 87 |
|
4-1.4S 10 ID |
Tf.i.oo :«.iw |
(11.21 59. 211 |
13.12 12 38 |
|||
|
8. |
30.08- 3». «t |
12.37 11.07 |
52 91 52 15 |
14 i" 1-12 21 |
13.81-13.2» |
|
|
KulidaF |
8. |
52 8-1 72 "i |
13 17 11.91 |
8. |
||
|
S |
12. -.:.- ni id |
3KXt-38 2.S |
12.55-41 07 |
52 SI 52 29 |
12 18 MI •*! |
14 05-43 53 |
|
tu '■■■■1 38.21 |
.19. -".7 :iS..1) |
41. MU .\Ü |
32 V: 3,1 70 |
8. |
13 4.-42 M |
|
|
3- 17 38.0:1 |
8. |
11 52 11 19 |
511 51 19.02 |
41.03-10.67 |
II 1.1 1! 15 |
|
|
:ij i'.KKi.n |
ss 97 :«..-,! |
12.12-11.19 |
VI -'1-111.29 |
40.73 40* |
41.81 11 19 |
|
|
,W. 16-36. 36 |
38 80-39.14 |
12 71 42 37 |
s. |
Hl.8i-S8.48 |
41 75 41 28 |
|
|
10 |
J. |
39 ai ;m 1 1 |
13 -S7-13 7ii |
51 02-50 25 |
.1 r. :;> .',:( |
12 84-11 80 |
|
».23-«.09 |
pi 89 3- i'-. |
8. |
50 1119 17 |
12 22-10 9.1 |
8. |
|
|
:!1 01 Si (ti |
;m.ai ;v> vi |
41184-44 44 |
19 9I-1S S-l |
11.21 10.32 |
||
|
:i7 íi-:«.(í.i |
39.3s-39.02 |
1.7 lis |;i -'i |
19 (X5-47 0* |
12 •; 12 18 |
||
|
:.- 7o-37.:ii |
8. |
44 71-4.1 «i |
«A 08-48. 03 |
11.15-40 15 |
12 83 12 48 |
|
|
40.08-39 OS |
39. 10-38. KJ |
43 -1 43 57 |
48.KM5.45 |
II 91 1" (K |
42 8|-42 08 |
|
|
lo. Til íj.L'K |
-:• 12 ■- '.i-, |
44.i72-IH.S8 |
8. |
43.78 41.67 |
42.7H-42 OH |
|
|
1T |
8. |
39.10-3* ->l |
15.27-11 72 |
4--..N2-1I.!'! |
13 82 11 10 |
44 12-13 22 |
|
30 33-.1g.24 |
v-oi-v- 7.'. |
EL |
IN 1S K. 51 |
17 82 1-5. 80 |
S. |
|
|
1» |
i 0-3.- n |
.'i- iU-hm.78 |
«.87-41.10 |
4-1 19-17 28 |
46 30-41.35 |
47 00-16 03 |
|
20 |
'.i 3i-rn m |
:w n'-> «9 |
it.M-n m |
4-.I8 47.31 |
a. |
45.35-41.05 |
|
:.l |
W 1" :■.- di |
8. |
13 ir, 13 ir. |
■i.s Í2-47.1Ü |
13.08-15 15 |
11 in 11 27 |
|
.(1 C' .IR NI |
38 m > s7 |
4tl.:n I3.-2I) |
47.73-18.84 |
14.84-43 87 |
l. 2511.51 |
|
|
jTi |
39.41-30.08 |
.i. v.i-x, 7í |
n.ams.m |
B. |
15 35 II 71 |
1.7 ,15-11 -9 |
|
-_'! |
89.Ti7--.3s 91 |
■-1.00-17 17 |
17.11 -48 11 |
16*14-45 20 |
15.38-45 05 |
|
|
a |
ffi.M-W.A5 |
89 l-. si.iíi |
8. |
19 .7; -15. 31 |
a |
|
|
si |
:i-..si.l sí 31 |
30 17-39 08 |
51.27 VI. 47 |
47.00-48.08 |
15 5ii-41.il |
tlolitlaj |
|
Í7 |
ao.sT-M.n |
40.82-30.53 |
.7.1 02-51 27 |
48 34-48.18 |
a, |
48.38-45 87 |
|
--. |
10ÍK-J0 6X |
S. |
31 '.> 48.7* |
«i 18-15.02 |
11 20-1! 73 |
1.7 21- 41 84 |
|
40.0U-3U.45 |
C'.r.S 40*2 |
i.l.lH-l» 50 |
45 '.'2 17.29 |
(3 10 12.:.-. |
45 05-44 41 |
|
|
■"" |
.Ti 57Í-H.-.7Ü |
13.11) til 37 |
32 :«i 31 M |
a |
44. 00-12.02 |
44.3-43 37 |
|
8. |
12.73-41 15 |
15 15 13 «11 |
||||
HlSTOBY OF THE GbEEXBACKS
TABLE 2 Coníinued
|
JntiuBiy |
Febrtwry |
March |
Apríl |
Mor |
Jnn» |
||
|
1 |
8. |
#■0 12 19.15 |
|SS. 23-65. 70 |
Fa*td.j S72 75-72 21 |
|||
|
2 |
49Í08- 48^54 |
50.99-50 |
8. |
71 05-70JS |
|||
|
> |
.•ii 2.5-15 -.7 |
13. 72-17 -18 |
50 17 -V |
■2-7 |
68. 73-67. S7 |
7.1. .80-70.18 |
"3.28-73.» |
|
i.i. a» 12 •■-. |
47.93-ta.62 |
-50 25 54 |
00 |
.18.32 07 2.1 |
70 12--19.73 |
8, |
|
|
41.17-13.57 |
8. |
8. |
07. 57- 01.73 |
71). 18-09. .50 |
75.91 73.15 |
||
|
fl |
44. 00-43.81 |
47.17-41!. 83 |
7.i) 51 .5. |
00 .3.1--55 57 |
70.05-69 63 |
73 -59. 72 ■.:- |
|
|
44.17-43.98 |
17.08-40.11 |
a |
07 91 00.1.5 |
8. |
72 99-72 ■•• |
||
|
B |
8. |
17 31 4<i 92 |
51.05 5. |
ST |
01 Sl-.il. 3( |
72 33-89 93 |
72 OH .2 |
|
S |
44. 22-44. 00 |
n 31-10 t:í |
51.71-50 |
•1 |
B. |
73 00 72 80 |
72.93-72 46 |
|
10 |
44 Hl 13 oh |
47 51-17 20 |
53 51 5. |
K |
6fl.BB-6S.fl7 |
70 20 75 (51 |
72.93-72 80 |
|
45 i:.-(.|.nsi |
48.87-47.85 |
53 12 55 |
a |
.18 II) .58 (11 |
77.82 75. HO |
8. |
|
|
11 |
40 IH ir, r.i |
8. |
8. |
0.8.1-1 .Vi l!l |
70 58 75 05 |
72 33-7H. H2 |
|
|
43 77-1 ó ir, |
48.73-48.31 |
53 98 52 |
a |
68 19 07 97 |
77.37 10. 7» |
71 U-OH.1'5 |
|
|
43 :C 15.25 |
IS 2* 17 '..1 |
.5.1 '.'O- .51 |
os |
8. |
7H0I-OH 93 |
||
|
13 |
8. |
18 81-18 13 |
57 39 íY |
so |
77 '17 -70 155 |
89.09-87 74 |
|
|
10 |
j-, «.-, r, 22 |
li- 21.1-13. 73 |
.38 TI- 50 |
70.70 7.'.. 18 |
On .19-> v, |
||
|
n |
40. 02-1.1 i« |
H2 .50 K |
07. 51 -.55.. '.i |
77 15-75 97 |
09 57 Os Hl |
||
|
18 |
IH.5I-1H ÍJS |
I1UJ21S 00 |
01. 20 i' |
13 |
118 3. .¡7 68 |
77 15-70 31 |
8. |
|
19 |
48 118-10 31 |
8. |
a. |
ll.lii.lllT |
7.1 58 7.1 05 |
71.49-aP.7S |
|
|
SO |
41.57-18.13 |
30.44-49 94 |
112 10 3Í |
31 |
Hnli.lar |
7Ú. 78-70.. 14 |
72 8.1-71 .12 |
|
a |
311 7..-13 31 |
y> ■.'.' 30. oí |
-11.73-03 |
117 91-H.1.33 |
B. |
71. 03- 70. H |
|
|
22 |
s. |
Ht.li.tay 50.28-1H.1H |
-11.10 1:5 |
M |
07 00- 08. 15 |
70 56-70 19 |
71 17-7(1. 37 |
|
23 |
50 51 -tu 32 |
00.31-151 |
N |
8. |
711 20-73 .74 |
70. 81-70. 30 |
|
|
24 |
-Mi 51-49 I1S |
50.28-19 '.44 |
07.51 .5" |
71 07-73 "0 |
70.61-70.18 |
||
|
O |
48.9.1-18.19 |
511 51-51.1. .13 |
05.15-0.1 |
o |
73. 53-72. 1> |
8. |
|
|
11. 5.1-18.31 |
8. |
a |
.'.1.51. .15.79 |
73 00- 72 10 |
71.13-70 81 |
||
|
n |
n !"i-n..3i |
5H 12-19 57 |
05 50-01 |
n |
73.60-73.06 |
70 80-70 42 |
|
|
a |
40.95-15. 45 |
49.81-49, 14 |
03 0l-.il |
07 |
08 || -.17 57 |
71.81-71, n> |
|
|
29 |
3. |
.1.1 23 .5- |
88.49-68.28 |
73.53-72 9» |
72 40-71 81 |
||
|
» |
47.: 19-46.57 |
'10 17 '2 |
81 |
8. |
72 ~i 72 07 |
7 1. 91-70 80 |
|
|
1'. 50-47 m |
73 211-72 73 |
||||||
|
Jolr |
Aiunist |
BtpttobM |
Octobtr |
Notpmber |
lv..-,„Vr |
||
|
¿■71.73 7(1 ¡C |
i-íi 3» -1- ni |
S69 26-68 97 |
8. |
807. 57-07 31 |
|||
|
B. |
riH 32-111.11 |
.>5l 38 .5. J12 |
"'O- in..l..2ll |
tiT. 80-07 15 |
|||
|
3 |
7? 11-71 17 |
lio :w iíi i i |
s. |
OH 31 .5.1. .* |
s. |
||
|
H..|i.:li,j |
.19. 75 -.111 32 |
6.8.1I-0M.7 |
67 82-67.31 |
||||
|
71 (1.1-71. 24 |
(iil.n; fin 57 |
.'.'.i 38 on 1 1 |
OS '20-07 ni |
8. |
07 51-07 34 |
||
|
6 |
71. '.14-71 ll> |
s. |
08 .53 07 8-5 |
88 14-67 57 |
|||
|
71 151-71 56 |
H9.li.l-01> 11 |
«1.11 01 |
03 |
,18.1', ,1, ,1. |
158 tu 07 91 |
.1-01 !'.. 20 |
|
|
8 |
71 56 71 36 |
un 32 twi.n |
..51 2.1 .¡I |
8. |
fu 2.3-07 71 |
||
|
a. |
..'.i.ii ■;■. |
08 |
.58 01 wt.lt |
.'.i 13.(18 11 |
69 .20-08 91 |
||
|
10 |
71.83-71 3(1 |
711 5.1 un 153 |
a. |
OH .13 08 79 |
01 L-.3---S.-J> |
& |
|
|
71 73-71.43 |
151 >„'. |
011 <h ,11 111 |
.5..2I1-.8 in |
89.08-8* 85 |
|||
|
12 |
7I."3-7(1 42 |
70 SiS-711 12 |
.51 57 .5 |
20 |
.58 97 08 79 |
8. |
89 ll-li 91 |
|
7fl IS 7D.42 |
8. |
83. 14-07 97 |
|||||
|
7n Is-tiñ i5l |
7.1. :«.-<:■. >. w |
.5.1 17 0: |
37 |
01UI 09.03 |
08 05- 07 91 |
■íi.8.3 til ¡5 |
|
|
7'.l ¡2-7(1. IB |
71.30-711 73 |
71) 1 1 0'. |
81 |
S. |
(17 '.'1 .17 8.5 |
.11 .538 :> H |
|
|
10 |
s. |
7H «1-70 3'.i |
70.115 .5 |
81 |
111-97 -.1.5:1 |
08.19-88.38 |
|
|
11 |
711 1- .111 '.fl |
70 3V7d.ll |
8. |
OH 07 0-. 32 |
■V-, i i .3Í.I3 |
||
|
IH |
.!■.> 'i 1 On 73 |
70.13 (19.57 |
I5I.75 .5 |
.58 1" .58.38 |
lis in-üi .i3 |
88 13-88 M |
|
|
IB |
7'i 30-09 37 |
(¡'...'51 iln.52 |
,5> .13 .5 |
.38.LM-08.I.3 |
Oí 20-.1. ■.,, |
||
|
s. |
44 |
03 11, 158.. -18 |
,18 211, i- .,3 |
||||
|
21 |
7" :.1-7(II13 |
09 .MUÍ). 08 |
.51 311.5 |
32 |
•5j 01 ..38.52 |
ti8.2" 158 (18 |
-í. *.i-tí. 5. |
|
2! |
7» 13 7" 1.13 |
119 31 .111.14 |
09 -1 15 |
s. |
til m 01 113 |
111 V. 0.8 13 |
|
|
ES |
s. |
IÍ9 ti! >-».< .30 |
H'i.M .5 |
08 llt-0.8 32 |
118 ll-t-68 .[I |
01 70 .1" .11 |
|
|
21 |
70 (1 '¡H SI |
.19 .51 -'.!■ .VI |
151 111 .18 ;w |
.18 1 1 -til l.M |
8. |
||
|
a |
lili M-ifll lll' |
.18 75 158.31 |
88.148-07.97 |
Xm,- r>> |
|||
|
as |
ijti mi iíi on |
09.11 O'.- 26 |
110 37 ,5. |
||||
|
09 81-.33.S5 |
32 |
til 73 151 i 55 |
67.97-87.74 |
.18 v-, .i. 5_l |
|||
|
28 |
fin n-m i:i |
fifi Vi-i9.;i» |
,51 5,1-01 |
08 85 Oí 1,7 |
.11 V. 07 01 |
||
|
il'i 31 .51 .'-.I |
lili. 56. 51 |
38 |
8. |
07 37-07 221 |
Oí 9Í-0- 5.1 |
||
|
E |
ií.i II .5> ifl |
09 11-01 |
32 |
.58 117 -"I 02 |
07 91-87.40 |
69. 03-61. 97 |
|
|
31 |
G9.S7H» 38 |
'.V.i 2iVl».!1 |
«a B -08 .18 |
||||
APPENDIX B
R el ati ve Pkices of Cokhodities
1860, January . .
Jul". ".".! October . .
1861, January . .
October ..
1862, January . .
j&r. '.'.'.Y. October . .
1863, January . .
July. '.'.'.'.'. October . .
1864, January . .
July.;.'"! October . .
1865, January . .
jift".:;::;
October . .
1866, January . .
July..ü'.; October ..
430
HlSTOBY OF THE GBEENBACK8
TABLE 1 — Continued
RELATTVE PRICE8 OF FAJtM PRODUCTS
Datb
1860» January .
April
July
October . . 1801, January .
April —
July
CXítober . . • 1862* January .
April
July
IX'tober . . l8Kk January .
April
July
ÍVtob* r . . lüm> January .
April ....
July
i V>U»b*r . . lí*A January .
April —
July
(Vtv»h*r. . IMk January .
April ....
July
íVMhmt .
|
Flax Seed |
||
|
New |
Cin- |
Cin- |
|
York |
cinnati |
cinnati |
|
98 |
100 |
100 |
|
102 |
100 |
107 |
|
101 |
100 |
107 |
|
99 |
100 |
65 |
|
101 |
100 |
93 |
|
91 |
100 |
93 |
|
• • • |
91 |
63 |
|
96 |
91 |
65 |
|
116 |
114 |
78 |
|
140 |
136 |
100 |
|
129 |
• • • |
100 |
|
125 |
114 |
100 |
|
193 |
162 |
126 |
|
162 |
295 |
130 |
|
165 |
• • • |
137 |
|
165 |
162 |
137 |
|
207 |
227 |
148 |
|
223 |
236 |
141 |
|
231 |
255 |
174 |
|
200 |
255 |
159 |
|
233 |
259 |
156 |
|
176 |
162 |
156 |
|
142 |
136 |
96 |
|
190 |
245 |
119 |
|
W |
227 |
133 |
|
160 |
205 |
141 |
|
21X1 |
264 |
133 |
|
200 |
255 |
133 * |
HlDKS
Mkat: Botb
Chi- cago
91
100
106
103
69
82
58
69
72
86
79
103
106
120
113
141
132
156
161
120
139
100
91
122
93
76
93
120
New York
100
103
103
94
66
75
61
86
83
75
83
94
99
94
94
103
125
139
161
133
153
104
83
128
139
133
125
139
Cin- cinnati
103
117
90
90
97
110
76
90
83
90
97
76
90
131
124
97
131
179
166
193
221
262
193
166
172
193
207
193
New York
103
108
92
97
103
90
90
90
103
97
87
87
97
118
110
103
118
144
162
178
164
215
159
190
174
150
172
169
Chi-
97
113
105
85
105
105
110
77
73
97
90
85
92
145
110
101
105
141
177
153
169
242
145
222
179
155
210
185
Uvttt
tMKJatt Api.
|
XUvr; |
Meat: Pork |
|||
|
Ww |
Chi- |
Cin- |
New |
|
|
Wk |
el mi ti ti |
cago 91 |
cinnati |
York |
|
101 |
110 |
121 |
90 |
|
|
uo |
138 |
100 |
101 |
97 |
|
W |
83 |
101 |
62 |
107 |
|
VK |
W |
106 |
116 |
106 |
|
UU |
138 |
87 |
115 |
86 |
|
w |
124 |
67 |
98 |
82 |
|
w |
55 |
53 |
63 |
66 |
|
*t |
55 |
51 |
61 |
63 |
Oats
Rtr
|
New |
Cin- |
Cin- |
|
York |
cinnati |
AÍnmiti |
|
111 |
119 |
113 |
|
103 |
106 |
119 |
|
95 |
101 |
87 |
|
92 |
74 |
81 |
|
90 |
64 |
70 |
|
80 |
64 |
63 |
|
72 |
57 |
52 |
|
83 |
59 |
41 |
New
York
107
100
99
94
• •
77
Appendix B
431
TABLE l—Cordtnued
RELATTVE PRICES OF FARM PRODCCT8
|
Meat: |
Sheep |
Meat: Pork |
Oats |
Rye |
|||||
|
Date |
|||||||||
|
New |
Cincin- |
Chi- |
Cincin- |
New |
New |
Cincin- |
Cincin- |
New |
|
|
York |
nati |
cago |
nati |
York |
York |
nati |
nati |
York |
|
|
1862, Jan . . |
106 |
90 |
48 |
65 |
60 |
99 |
69 |
49 |
101 |
|
April |
110 |
110 |
52 |
65 |
74 |
93 |
72 |
63 |
94 |
|
July. |
97 |
72 |
45 |
47 |
57 |
103 |
84 |
56 |
87 |
|
Oct.. |
101 |
103 |
57 |
63 |
67 |
138 |
99 |
66 |
75 |
|
1863, Jan.. |
110 |
83 |
69 |
94 |
75 |
166 |
128 |
69 |
107 |
|
April |
138 |
179 |
84 |
76 |
88 |
200 |
173 |
113 |
126 |
|
July. |
87 |
114 |
76 |
74 |
88 |
178 |
156 |
85 |
121 |
|
Oct.. |
97 |
121 |
79 |
57 |
79 |
168 |
173 |
113 |
130 |
|
1864, Jan . . |
136 |
145 |
92 |
141 |
113 |
224 |
205 |
153 |
152 |
|
April |
179 |
200 |
144 |
151 |
139 |
214 |
195 |
149 |
151 |
|
July. |
117 |
110 |
184 |
151 |
176 |
238 |
200 |
175 |
236 |
|
Oct.. |
147 |
166 |
142 |
237 |
179 |
208 |
185 |
158 |
173 |
|
1865, Jan.. |
175 |
207 |
227 |
314 |
219 |
261 |
212 |
164 |
203 |
|
April |
211 |
276 |
197 |
227 |
191 |
212 |
148 |
113 |
145 |
|
July . |
101 |
117 |
147 |
174 |
169 |
177 |
153 |
70 |
101 |
|
Oct.. |
124 |
152 |
235 |
257 |
229 |
144 |
111 |
88 |
119 |
|
1866, Jan . . |
161 |
166 |
176 |
244 |
165 |
122 |
96 |
85 |
121 |
|
April |
140 |
179 |
175 |
189 |
171 |
115 |
101 |
73 |
101 |
|
July. |
113 |
138 |
176 |
188 |
165 |
147 |
111 |
107 |
143 |
|
Oct.. |
106 |
131 |
183 |
196 |
173 |
137 |
111 |
127 |
149 |
|
TlMOTHY SEED |
Tobacco |
||||||||
|
Leaf |
Leaf |
Wrap's |
Wrap's |
Wrap's |
Leaf |
||||
|
Date |
Aver'ge |
Fine |
Ohio |
Penn. |
Conn. |
Ky. |
|||
|
Cincin- |
Chi- |
New |
Cincin- |
Cincin- |
New |
New |
New |
New |
|
|
nati |
cago |
York |
nati |
nati |
York |
York |
York |
York |
|
|
1800, Jan . . |
87 |
83 |
94 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
126 |
112 |
|
April |
121 |
113 |
110 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
91 |
98 |
|
July. |
• • • |
116 |
• * • |
• • • |
• • • |
100 |
100 |
91 |
89 |
|
Oct.. |
92 |
87 |
96 |
• * • |
• • • |
100 |
100 |
91 |
101 |
|
1861, Jan.. |
• ■ • |
89 |
98 |
• • a |
• • • |
100 |
100 |
91 |
104 |
|
April |
107 |
85 |
120 |
• • • |
• • • |
100 |
100 |
91 |
98 |
|
July . |
• • • |
• • • |
101 |
• ■ ■ |
• • • |
88 |
88 |
74 |
110 |
|
Oct.. |
58 |
57 |
72 |
84 |
118 |
88 |
88 |
74 |
125 |
|
1862, Jan . . |
58 |
64 |
77 |
145 |
123 |
88 |
88 |
74 |
146 |
|
April |
66 |
65 |
82 |
116 |
105 |
104 |
104 |
94 |
152 |
|
July. |
• • * |
• • • |
67 |
148 |
127 |
104 |
104 |
94 |
153 |
|
Oct. |
64 |
60 |
74 |
222 |
182 |
131 |
131 |
118 |
223 |
432
HlSTOBY OF THB GBEENBACK8
TABLK 1-ConUnucd
KXLATTYB PSICB8 OF FABM PBODÜCTS
Datb
TlMOTHT SKKD
Ciacin- nati
1363» Jan.. 68
ApriL 78
JuIt . ...
Oct.. 99
13S*,Jan.. 130
ApriL1 110 July. Oct..
l^SxJan. ni
ApriL 174
July . ...
Oct.. 155
l£&Jan.. 110
Apri) 136
July. 178
iVt 12$
Chi- cago
New York
Tobacco
Leaf Aver'ge
Leaf
Fine
Wrap's Ohio
Cincin- ! Clncin- New nati nati I York
lUrm
A|*ü. AwrU
Al**
Wrap's Penn.
New York
WrapV Leaf Conn. I Kjr.
|
72 |
110 |
241 |
218 |
|
, 59 |
82 |
284 |
236 |
|
i • • • |
94 |
284 |
236 |
|
91 |
91 |
220 |
205 |
|
110 |
101 |
255 |
218 |
|
101 |
106 |
253 |
218 |
|
• • « |
120 |
220 |
218 |
|
1G2 |
192 |
216 |
205 |
|
218 |
220 |
261 |
295 |
|
152 |
211 |
247 |
318 |
|
181 |
134 |
273 |
341 |
|
144 |
182 |
240 |
3ál |
|
1 129 |
163 |
237 |
250 |
|
147 |
163 |
216 |
205 |
|
* * * |
259 |
216 |
205 |
|
114 |
127 |
212 |
205 |
131 173 173 173 173 231 269 269 269 135 96 115 115 115 115 115
131 173 173 173 173 231 269 269 269 135 96 115 115 115 115 115
New New York ' York
118 191 191 191 191 235 265 265 265 176 135 162 169 169 169 169
259 312 238 213 262 262 253 318 333 387 226 297 297 297 297 232
Wheat
Winter Sprint Prime
New
York
New York
Cincin nati
No. 2 Winter
Chi- cago
No. 2 Sprin*
Chi- cago
102 105 102 91 98 99 78 95 i 103 97 86
as
107
125
108
98
I
|
105 |
103 |
|
98 |
110 |
|
103 |
&3 |
|
91 |
95 |
|
97 |
84 |
|
102 |
83 |
|
65 |
63 |
|
94 |
66 |
|
103 |
72 |
|
102 |
78 |
|
85 |
69 |
|
92 |
72 |
|
103 |
83 |
|
99 |
106 |
|
102 |
89 |
|
103 |
93 |
99 105 105
91
• • •
96
• • •
76 71 73 76 85 93 112 100 95
99
105
108
88
82
81
57
74
70
74
75
83
86
110
97
104
Appendix B
433
TABLB 1-Continucd
EKLATTYB PSICK8 OF FAJUf PBODÜCTt
DáTB
1864, January, April . . . July.... October,
1865, January A pril . . . July.... October.
1866, January. April . . . July.... October,
Whbat
Winter
New York
116 126 190 143 185 134 107 166 148 141 177 199
Spring
New York
118 131 193 149 184 137 103 141 139 112 155 177
Prime
Cincin na ti
110 110 169 143 173 127 105 181 165 196 228 236
No. 2 Winter
No. 2 Spring
Chi- cago
106 123 176 129 144
• • •
111 132
191
Chi- cago
115
114
199
149
160
101
92
126
96
93
119
195
B. AVKBAOES fOB TBM SSVXRAL P*ODüCTS
Date
1860, January April . . .
July
October
1861, January April . . . July. . . . October
1862, January April... July . . . October
1863, January April . . .
July
October
1864, January April... July . . . October
|
Barley |
Clover Seed |
Cora |
Flax Seed |
Hides |
|
96 |
101 |
115 |
99 |
97 |
|
109 |
91 |
96 |
101 |
103 |
|
96 |
99 |
92 |
101 |
105 |
|
98 |
109 |
98 |
100 |
94 |
|
82 |
103 |
84 |
101 |
77 |
|
79 |
90 |
78 |
96 |
83 |
|
62 |
90 |
61 |
91 |
61 |
|
64 |
92 |
66 |
95 |
80 |
|
70 |
85 |
73 |
115 |
78 |
|
91 |
102 |
74 |
138 |
87 |
|
91 |
86 |
74 |
129 |
87 |
|
107 |
96 |
82 |
120 |
99 |
|
161 |
125 |
100 |
188 |
110 |
|
187 |
112 |
•130 |
239 |
115 |
|
195 |
120 |
109 |
165 |
115 |
|
172 |
135 |
151 |
174 |
127 |
|
191 |
152 |
193 |
217 |
135 |
|
184 |
161 |
195 |
230 |
145 |
|
233 |
161 |
218 |
243 |
165 |
|
235 |
222 |
230 |
228 |
137 |
Meat: BeeTes
101
113
96
91
102
102
92
86
86
95
91
83
93
131
115
100
118
155
168
175
A |.i .ful II, l.
If"ll. -I MI.
Jnli
l». l. riihl l,|
*\
' «^ •« \»
t .
» I
V
Appendix B
435
TABLE 2
BKLATIYB P RICES OF VARIOÜ8 COMMODITIES AT WHOLESALE
|
Beans |
Bread |
Bütter |
||||
|
Date |
Bostón |
Boston |
Boston |
Chsese |
||
|
Crackors : |
Crackers : |
Crackers : |
||||
|
1 |
2 |
Ex. Grade |
||||
|
1860, Jan.... |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
|
April. . |
93.3 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
81.0 |
110.0 |
|
July . . |
93.3 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
81.0 |
75.0 |
|
Oct... |
120.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
96.2 |
100.0 |
|
1861, Jan. . . . |
100.0 |
107.1 |
117.6 |
116.7 |
81.0 |
100.0 |
|
April.. |
103.2 |
107 1 |
123.5 |
116.7 |
85.7 |
90.0 |
|
July . . |
120.0 |
100.0 |
129.4 |
116.7 |
61.9 |
60.0 |
|
Oct ... |
120.0 |
100 0 |
129.5 |
116.7 |
64.3 |
60.0 |
|
1862, Jan.... |
136.5 |
107.1 |
135.3 |
116.7 |
90.5 |
70.0 |
|
April. . |
116.6 |
107.1 |
141.2 |
120.8 |
97.6 |
75.0 |
|
July . . |
173.3 |
100.0 |
147.1 |
120.8 |
73.8 |
65.0 |
|
Oct ... |
153.3 |
100.0 |
147.1 |
120.8 |
90.5 |
80.0 |
|
1863, Jan... |
145.9 |
107.1 |
164.7 |
141.7 |
116.7 |
110.0 |
|
April . . |
153.3 |
107.1 |
152.9 |
133.3 |
119.1 |
145.0 |
|
July . . |
180.0 |
107.1 |
147.1 |
133.3 |
92.9 |
106.0 |
|
Oct. . |
129.9 |
107.1 |
147.1 |
129.2 |
114.3 |
120.0 |
|
1864, Jan . . . |
160.5 |
185.7 |
152.9 |
133.3 |
145.2 |
140.0 |
|
April . . |
146.7 |
185.7 |
158.8 |
137.5 |
230.9 |
170.0 |
|
July . . |
146.7 |
185.7 |
158.8 |
137.5 |
157.1 |
150.0 |
|
Oct ... |
146.7 |
185.7 |
158.8 |
137.5 |
202.4 |
206.0 |
|
1865, Jan . . . |
173.3 |
185.7 |
117.6 |
116.7 |
250.0 |
225.0 |
|
April. . |
142.7 |
185.7 |
129.4 |
116.7 |
150.0 |
210.0 |
|
July . . |
106.7 |
157.1 |
129.4 |
116.7 |
142.9 |
125.0 |
|
Oct . . . |
120.0 |
157.1 |
117.6 |
116 7 |
204.8 |
150.0 |
|
Corros : Rio, Fair |
Eggs |
Flour : Rye |
Fbuxt |
Fish: |
||
|
Date |
Apples : Dried |
Currants: Zante |
Cod |
|||
|
1860, Jan . . . April . . July .. Oct.. . 1861, Jan . . . April.. July . . Oct 1862, Jan ... April . . July . . kJCI. ... |
100.0 115.2 117.4 121.7 100.0 104.3 104.3 134.8 156.5 178.2 182.6 196.7 |
149.1 88.9 78.8 83.2 103.2 88.9 64.5 74.5 13á.8 74.5 68.8 83.2 |
100.0 100.0 95.0 100.0 92.5 96.0 75.0 87.5 100.0 100.0 87.5 106.3 |
100.0 90.3 87.1 77.4 77.4 51.6 103.2 77.4 96.8 90.3 71.0 71.0 |
100.0 104.2 91.7 79.2 75.0 75.0 66.7 158.3 150.0 158.3 166.7 179.2 |
Feb. 100.0 May 100.0 Ang. 112.5 Nov. 125.0 Feb. 125.0 May 125.0 Au«. 125.0 Nov. 125.0 Fob. 125.0 May 125.0 Au*. 300.0 Nov. 125.0 |
436
HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS
TABLE 2 — Continued
BKLATTVB PBXCE8 OF VARIOD8 COMMODITTB8 AT WHOLBBA&B
|
Coffee: Rio, Fair |
Egos |
FiiOum: Rye |
Feuit |
Frmir * |
||
|
Datb |
Anples: Dried |
Currante: Zante |
Cod |
|||
|
1863, Jan... April.. July .. Oct 1864, Jan ... April . . July . . Oct . . . 1865, Jan . . . April . . July . . Oct ... |
243.5 269.6 252.2 265.2 293.5 339.1 373.9 317.4 378.3 279.6 243.7 243.1 |
114.7 134.8 111.8 114.7 166.3 120.9 146.2 166.3 252.3 106.1 152.0 163.4 |
118.8 112.5 106.3 125.0 137.5 137.5 181.3 187.5 212.5 143.8 127.5 168.8 |
83.9 87.1 90.3 83.9 122.6 125.8 148.4 167.7 200.0 177.4 132.3 167.7 |
175.0 233.3 250.0 241.7 239.6 275.0 308.3 283.3 341.7 216.7 206.3 233.3 |
Feb. 150.0 May 125.0 Ao«. 150.0 Not. 150.0 Feb. 200.0 May 175.0 Ao*. 200.0 Ñor. . Feb. 387. 5 May 225.0 Ang. 450.0 Not. 200.0 |
Datb
1860, Jan . . April. July . Oct..
1861, Jan . . April. July . Oct.. .
1862, Jan . . April. July . Oct ..
1863, Jan . . April . July . Oct.. .
1864, Jan . . April. July . Oct ..
1865, Jan . . April . July . Oct ..
Fkuit: Baisins
100.0 103.3 106.5 123.9 89.1 68.5 50.0 102.2 139.1 139.1 135.9 154.3 152.2 173.9 184.8 180.4 173.9 178.3 184.8 173.9 254.3 215.2 250.0 204.3
Lard
100.0
97.6
114.3
116.7
95.2
85.7
76.2
76.2
76.2
73.8
73.8
73.8
88.1
100.0
89.3
102.4
114.3
126.2
157.1
185.7
195.2
147.6
152.4
233.3
Mbal:
Coro,
Yellow.
Kiln-Dried
100.0
96.4
89.2
92.8
84.3
90.4
72.5
73.5
78.3
75.9
71.1
94.0
106.4
112.0
106.0
115.7
144.6
148.2
192.8
189.2
212.0
156.6
124.1
122.9
Meat
Beef: SaltMess
100.0
91.3
87.0
82.6
91.3
91.3
82.6
95.7
104.3
100.0
104.3
113.0
108.7
113.0
100.0
104.3
106.5
95.7
217.4
130.4
165.2
191.3
113.0
139.1
Beef: Loins
Feb. 100.0 May 100.0 Au«. 100.0 Not. 94.4 Feb. 88.9 May 88.9 Atiff. 83.3 Not. 83.3 Feb. 83.3 May 83.3 Atiff. 83.3 Not. 83.3 Feb. 94.4 May 100.0 Au«. 100.0 Not. 100.0 Feb. 105.6 May 138.9 Au«. 155.6 Not.150.0 Feb. 194.4 May 194.4 Au«. 177.8 Not. 166.7
Beef: Riba
100.0
93.3
933
93 3
93.3
100.0
93.3
86.7
86.7
86.7
86.7
86.7
93 3
100.0
100.0
100.0
106.7
146.7
153.3
146.7
186.7
213 3
186.7
166.7
Appendix B
437
TABLE 2 - Continucd
BKLATIVB PBXCB8 OF VABIOU8 0OMMODITTB8 AT WHOLS8ALX
|
Molas8E8 |
Salt |
MSAT |
||||
|
Date |
P'rtoRico: Best |
N. Oleaos : Prime |
Ashton's |
Ashton's Lít., fine |
Pork: SaltMeas |
Mntton |
|
1860, Jan . . . April . . July . . Oct ... 1861, Jan ... April . . July .. Oct .. 1862, Jan ... April. . July . . Oct ... 1863, Jan . . . April . . July . . Oct ... 1864, Jan . . . April. . July . . Oct ... 1865, Jan ... April. . July . . Oct ... |
100.0 107.9 100.0 105.3 92.1 86.8 71.2 118.4 105.3 100.0 97.4 131.6 126.3 118.4 139.5 164.5 171.1 223.7 289.5 223.7 289.5 184.2 184.2 250.0 |
100.0 90.6 90.6 94.3 69.8 70.8 67.9 103.8 103.8 84.9 90.6 105.7 105.7 94.3 113.2 132.1 160.4 217.0 311.3 283.0 207.5 217.0 |
100.0 76.9 89.7 82.1 82.1 82.1 82.1 84.6 87.2 92.3 92.3 106.1 110.3 143.6 138.5 130.8 143.6 174.0 230.8 256.4 243.6 161.5 166.7 212.8 |
100.0 77.9 90.9 83.1 83.1 83.1 83.1 85.7 88.3 93.5 93.5 106.5 111.7 145.5 140.2 132.5 145.5 176.6 233.8 259.7 246.8 163.6 168.8 223.1 |
100.0 109.1 109.8 116.7 101.5 109.1 97.0 90.9 75.0 76.5 65.2 71.2 86.4 98.5 84.8 86.4 118.2 145.5 275.8 254.5 212.1 162.1 163.6 213.6 |
Feb. 100.0 May 120.0 Aug. 100.0 Not. 100.0 Feb. 110.0 May 110.0 Ang. 100.0 Not. 90.0 Feb. 100.0 May 100.0 Aug. 90.0 Not. 100.0 Feb. 100.0 May 125.0 Ang. 120.0 Not. 125.0 Feb. 120.0 May 140.0 Aug. 160.0 Not. 150.0 Feb. 190.0 May 190.0 Aug. 170.0 Not. 170.0 |
|
Salt: Turk's Ialand |
Ship Biscdit |
Spices |
Stabch: Cora |
SüOAR • |
||
|
Datb |
Nutmegs |
Pepper : Whole, Sumatra |
Fair, Reflning |
|||
|
1860, Jan... April . . July . . Oct... 1861, Jan... April. . July . . Oct... 1862, Jan... April. . July . . Oct . . . |
100.0 90.0 97.5 100.0 85.0 95.0 100.0 120.0 100.0 1200 150.0 155.0 |
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 112.5 112.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 |
100.0 102.4 101.2 100.0 90.5 95.2 97.6 113.1 142.9 160.7 154.8 161.7 |
100.0 98.5 98.5 101.5 95.5 101.5 98.5 134.3 185.1 191.0 209.0 238.8 |
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 94.1 94.1 94.1 94.1 100.0 |
100.0 93.1 91.4 86.2 74.1 65.5 63.8 106.9 106.9 101.7 101.7 120.7 |
438
HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS
Date
1863, Jan.. April. July . Oct . .
1864, Jan.. April. Jaly . Oct..
1865, Jan . . April. July . Oct ..
TABLE Z-Ctmtixned tite raen ow tauocs coraoDrnxs at
8 ALT:
Tork's Island
150.0 185.0 210.0 220.0 2400 250.0 300.0 500.0 330.0 250.0 255.0 275.0
Ship Bucüit
125.0 125.0 125.0 125.0 193.8 193.8 193.8 193.8 187.5 187.5 137.5 137.5
Sftceb
190.5 208.3 190.5 184.5 214.3 327.4 428.6 381 0 428.6 297.6 273.8 342.7
274.6 322 4 316.4 304.5 346.3 489.6 549.3 417.9 537.3 358.2 346.3 2
9r.
111 8 117.6 111.8 111.8 129 4 141.2 1529 164.7 176.5 176.5 152.9 152.9
131 134 141 158
0 5 4 6 5 9 0
244 8
141 4 158 6 188.6
|
SUOAR |
Tai i n v • |
Vegetable» |
||||
|
Date |
Havana : Brown |
Reftned, C'roshed, and Granalat'd |
Prime.City in hhds. |
Fresh Pota toes: Whit* (1) |
Fresh Pota toes: WhiteCZ) |
Cauco |
|
1800, Jan . . . April. . July . . Oct . . . 1801, Jan ... April. . July . . Oct . . . 1862, Jan ... April. . July . . Oct . . . 1803, Jan ... April. . July . . Oct . . . 1864, Jan ... April. . July . . Oct .. 1066, Jan ... April.. July . . Oct... |
100.0 96.9 93.0 91.4 72.7 67.2 64.1 100.0 97.7 96.9 96.9 118.8 121 . 1 126.6 134.4 145.3 160.9 196.3 271.9 231.3 239.1 150.0 154.7 176.6 |
100.0 97.5 100.0 93.8 83.8 80.0 77.5 108.8 110.0 102.5 106.0 128.8 132.5 145.0 147.5 146.3 168.8 178.8 300.0 255.0 285.0 180.0 195.0 202.5 |
100.0 102.4 97.6 97.6 82.9 96.1 78.0 82.9 92.7 87.8 92.7 109.8 101.2 112.2 109 8 109.8 125.6 124.4 165.8 143.2 175.6 107.3 102.4 141.4 |
Fcb. 100.0 May 100.0 Ao«. 128.6 Nov. 100.0 Feb. 100.0 May 128.6 Aoff.114.3 Nov. H4.3 Feb. 128.6 May 128.6 Aa«. 100.0 Nov. 128.6 Feb. 121. 4 May 107 . 1 Aa«. 1'28.6 Nov. 142.9 Feb. 128.6 May 214.3 Ao«.342.8 Nov. 171. 4 Feb. 242. 8 May 142.9 Aag. 142.9 Nov. 157.1 |
Jan. 143.8 April 137.5 Jaly 112.5 Oct. 100.0 Jan. 112.5 April 118.8 Jaly 143.8 Oct. 106.3 Jan. 112.5 April 125.0 Jaly 106.3 Oct. 106.3 Jan. 112.5 AprU 131.3 Jaly 131.3 Oct. 1?5.0 Jan. 156.3 April 231. 3 Jaly 287.5 Oct. 200.0 Jan. 237.5 AprU 212.5 Jaly 112.5 Oct. 193.8 |
100.0 105.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 94.7 91.7 105.3 131.6 126.3 131.6 179.0 210.5 252.6 263.2 421.1 357.9 389.5 210.5 289.5 315.8 |
Appendix B
439
TABLE 2 — Coniinued
BELATIVB PRICK8 OF VABIODS COMMODITUS AT WHOLXSALI
Date
1860, Jan . April July Oct.
1861, Jan . April July Oct.
1862, Jan . April July Oct.
1863, Jan . April July Oct.
1864, Jan . April July Oct .
1865, Jan . April July Oct.
|
Carpkts |
Cottoh: |
|||
|
Upland |
Drama |
|||
|
Breaseis |
Ingrata |
Wilton |
Middling |
|
|
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
|
|
96.2 |
100.3 |
100.0 |
101.1 |
103.5 |
|
92.3 |
99.3 |
97.3 |
97.7 |
103.5 |
|
92.3 |
98.0 |
97.3 |
97.7 |
103.5 |
|
92.3 |
101.4 |
97.3 |
109.1 |
1035 |
|
96.2 |
95.0 |
100.0 |
117.0 |
103.5 |
|
96.2 |
95.1 |
100.0 |
134.1 |
1035 |
|
96.2 |
92.6 |
100.0 |
195.5 |
105.2 |
|
100.0 |
106.6 |
105.4 |
327.3 |
124.1 |
|
100.0 |
109.1 |
105.4 |
250.0 |
136.2 |
|
107.7 |
119.3 |
108.1 |
336.4 |
137.9 |
|
115.4 |
123.4 |
116.2 |
509.1 |
210.3 |
|
134.6 |
149.5 |
132.4 |
613.6 |
258.6 |
|
165.4 |
174.5 |
151.4 |
663.6 |
|
|
153.8 |
166.0 |
151.4 |
627.3 |
|
|
146.2 |
154.9 |
143.2 |
768.2 |
|
|
165.4 |
179.4 |
162.2 |
736.4 |
379.3 |
|
173.1 |
196.7 |
173.0 |
690.9 |
396.6 |
|
269.2 |
299.3 |
270.3 |
1400.0 |
425.8 |
|
269.2 |
250.9 |
270.3 |
1090.9 |
606.9 |
|
269.2 |
260.6 |
270.3 |
1090.9 |
463.8 |
|
192.3 |
206.2 |
202.7 |
318.2 |
412.1 |
|
192.3 |
219.9 |
202.7 |
454.6 |
424.1 |
|
211.5 |
241.2 |
216.2 |
400.0 |
455.2 |
Dkil- lihos:
90-inch Pepperell
100.0 97.2 100.0 100.0 97.2 97.2 97.2 116.8 1460 146.0 157.2 292.0 308.8 393.0 308.8 404.3 449.2 449.2 701.8 729.9 673 8 336.9 336.9 404.3
|
Leathbr : Harness |
Print Cloths |
Shkkt- nros: Brown, Atlantic A |
Shirt- zmos: Bleached, 4-4. N. Y. Milla |
SlLK : |
||
|
Date |
26-inch, 7 yds. to Ib. Standard |
28-inch, 64X64. Metaoomet |
Raw Italian |
|||
|
1860, Jan . . . April. . July . . Oct ... 1861, Jan . . . April.. July .. Oct ... 1862, Jan... April . . July . . Oct... |
100.0 100.0 102.9 100.0 94.3 88.6 85.7 100.0 94.3 94.3 91.4 102.9 |
100.0 97.8 100.0 97.8 84.4 77.8 80.0 106.7 160.0 128.9 153.3 220.0 |
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 86.0 79.1 76.7 104.7 107.0 125.6 155.8 251.1 |
100.0 102.9 102.9 102.9 102.9 102.9 105.8 135.1 164.5 164.5 188.0 296.9 |
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 96.8 96.8 96.8 103.2 109.7 116.1 129.0 167.5 |
100.0 100.0 105 6 100.0 100.0 83.3 77.8 72.2 72 2 72.2 83.3 80.6 |
440
HlSTOBY OF THE GBEENBACK8
TABLE 2 — Continued
RELATIVE PEICBS OF VABIOÜ3 COXMODITIBS AT WHOLESALE
|
Leather : Harness |
Pbint Clothb |
Shket- utos: Brown, 4-4, Atlantic A |
Shtkt- inos: Bleached, 4-4 N. Y. Mills |
8elk: |
||
|
Date |
28 inch. 7 yds. to Ib., standard. |
28 inch, 64X64, Metacomet |
Raw I talian |
|||
|
1863, Jan. . . April. . July . . Oct... 1864, Jan... April. . July . . Oct... 1865, Jan... April.. July . . Oct... |
108.6 128.6 128.6 131.4 142.9 154 3 165.7 171.4 171.4 165.7 137.1 151.4 |
253.3 257.8 257.8 280.0 302.2 288.9 524.4 568.9 480.0 177.8 337.8 484.4 |
279.1 297.7 260.2 295.3 316.3 300.0 593.0 480.0 537.2 188.4 360.5 453.5 |
356.3 445.4 415.6 445.4 504.6 475.0 831.3 682.8 712.5 463.1 386.0 397.8 |
209.7 209.7 232.3 237.1 266.6 283.8 467.7 307.3 411.3 270.9 290.3 354.8 |
75.0 72.2 66.7 66.7 69.4 75.0 88.9 94 4 88.9 100.0 111.1 100.0 |
|
Date |
Tickings |
Alcohol |
Aluna |
Bichrom. of Potash |
Bine Vitriol |
Brimstoae |
|
1860, Jan . . |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
|
April . |
100.0 |
85.2 |
105.6 |
95.2 |
97.4 |
100.0 |
|
July. . |
100.0 |
81.5 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
97.4 |
122.2 |
|
Oct. . . |
100.0 |
85.2 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
91.7 |
128 9 |
|
1861, Jan. . . |
95.6 |
74.1 |
94.4 |
100.0 |
94.7 |
133.3 |
|
April . |
95.6 |
66.7 |
94.4 |
100.0 |
86.8 |
95.6 |
|
July. . |
98.5 |
63.0 |
94.4 |
100.0 |
89.5 |
88.9 |
|
Oct. . . |
101.5 |
74.1 |
94.4 |
95.2 |
94.7 |
88.9 |
|
1862, Jan. . . |
122.1 |
74.1 |
94.4 |
100.0 |
91.7 |
133.3 |
|
April . |
150.0 |
88.9 |
100.0 |
95.2 |
94.7 |
95.6 |
|
July. . |
136.8 |
107.4 |
1000 |
97.6 |
94.7 |
97 8 |
|
Oct. . . |
211.8 |
122.2 |
133.3 |
95.2 |
100.0 |
106.7 |
|
1863, Jan... |
266.2 |
142.6 |
155.6 |
104.8 |
121.1 |
111.1 |
|
April . |
174.1 |
166.7 |
114.3 |
157.9 |
122.2 |
|
|
July. . |
161.1 |
166.7 |
114 3 |
134.2 |
111.1 |
|
|
Oct. . . |
192.6 |
133.3 |
107.1 |
142.1 |
116.7 |
|
|
1864, Jan... |
416.2 |
342.6 |
161.1 |
114.3 |
142 1 |
127.8 |
|
April . |
379.6 |
161.1 |
119.0 |
168.4 |
131 . 1 |
|
|
July.. |
413.2 |
657.4 |
200.0 |
133.3 |
189.5 |
188 9 |
|
Oct. . . |
617.6 |
638.9 |
266.7 |
133.3 |
221.1 |
166.7 |
|
1865, Jan. . . |
451.5 |
814.8 |
255.6 |
142.9 |
192.1 ! |
222.2 |
|
April . |
411.8 |
796.3 |
222.2 |
133.3 |
178.9 |
200.0 |
|
July. . |
469.2 |
759.3 |
188.9 |
104.8 |
147.4 |
1389 |
|
%JCh» • . |
472.1 |
833.3 |
183.3 |
104.8 |
142.1 |
133.3 |
Appendix B
441
TABLE 2—Continued
BJELATIVB PRICBB OF YABIOD8 OOM MODITO» AT WHOLB8ALB
|
Date |
Castor OU |
Copperas |
FlaxSeed |
Lioseed Oil |
Mercury |
Muriatic Acid |
|
1860, Jan... |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
|
April.. |
101.8 |
125.0 |
98.2 |
105.3 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
|
July . . |
100.0 |
125.0 |
103.1 |
103.5 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
|
Oct... |
104.8 |
125.0 |
101.2 |
101.8 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
|
1861, Jan... |
95.2 |
125.0 |
89.0 |
187.7 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
|
April.. |
85.7 |
125.0 |
85.8 |
105.3 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
|
July . . |
85.7 |
125.0 |
92.0 |
94.7 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
|
Oct... |
102.9 |
112.5 |
92.0 |
103.5 |
81.8 |
100.0 |
|
1862, Jan... |
119.1 |
150.0 |
110.4 |
149.1 |
81.8 |
116.7 |
|
April.. |
152.4 |
125.0 |
135.0 |
149.1 |
81.8 |
116.7 |
|
July . . |
150.5 |
125.0 |
107.4 |
150.9 |
81.8 |
116.7 |
|
Oct... |
145.7 |
150.0 |
116.6 |
150.9 |
109.1 |
116.7 |
|
1863, Jan... |
190.5 |
200.0 |
171.8 |
219.3 |
127.3 |
100.0 |
|
April.. |
214.3 |
200.0 |
245.4 |
298.2 |
127.3 |
100.0 |
|
July . . |
190.5 |
175.0 |
147.3 |
210.5 |
127.3 |
100.0 |
|
Oct. . . |
176.2 |
150.0 |
147.3 |
236.8 |
141.8 |
100.0 |
|
1861, Jan . . . |
190.5 |
175.0 |
184.0 |
250.9 |
150.9 |
133.3 |
|
April.. |
195.2 |
175.0 |
214.7 |
280.7 |
200.0 |
133.3 |
|
July . . |
261.9 |
187.5 |
220.9 |
296.2 |
281.8 |
133.3 |
|
V/Ct. . . |
333.3 |
250.0 |
199.4 |
245.6 |
345.5 |
133.3 |
|
1865, Jan. .. |
319.1 |
237.5 |
230.1 |
271.9 |
250.9 |
150.0 |
|
April.. |
342.9 |
200.0 |
168.7 |
245.6 |
181.8 |
150.0 |
|
July . . |
323.8 |
150.0 |
116.6 |
207.O |
96.4 |
150.0 |
|
Oct... |
314.3 |
250.0 |
177.9 |
271.9 |
96.4 |
150.0 |
Date
1860, Jan . . April. July . Oct..
1861, Jan.. April. July . Oct..
1862, Jan . . April. July . Oct..
|
Opium 100.0 |
Oxide of Zinc 111.1 |
QuicksüVr 100.0 |
Quinine |
|
100.0 |
|||
|
121.7 |
111.1 |
112.3 |
122.7 |
|
95.7 |
100.0 |
113.3 |
136.4 |
|
104.3 |
100.0 |
113.8 |
159.1 |
|
82.6 |
100.0 |
113.3 |
154.5 |
|
91.3 |
100.0 |
108.7 |
172.7 |
|
95.7 |
100.0 |
98.5 |
|
|
100.0 |
100.0 |
96.4 |
190.9 |
|
87.0 |
100.0 |
96.4 |
227.3 |
|
87.0 |
100.0 |
88.2 |
204.5 |
|
108.7 |
100.0 |
114.8 |
236.4 |
|
125.2 |
100.0 |
129.2 |
259.1 |
Soda Ash
100.0
100.0
94.7
89.5
89.5
89.5
78.9
105.5
121.1
111.1
105.5
115.8
Sopar of £ead: Brown
100.0
93.3
93.3
100.0
100.0
93.3
93.3
93.3
126.7
113.3
113.3
126.7
442
HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS
TABLE 2—Continued
SELATIYB PRICE8 OP VABIOÜ8 OOMMODITZB8 AT WHO
|
Date |
Opium |
Oxide of Zinc |
QuicksüVr |
Qninine |
Soda Asa |
Sacar of Lead: Hrowa |
|
1863, Jan... |
146.1 |
100.0 |
139.5 |
254.5 |
126.3 |
166.7 |
|
April. . |
173.9 |
144.4 |
164.1 |
286.4 |
142.1 |
200.0 |
|
July . . |
147.8 |
144.4 |
164.1 |
263.6 |
142.1 |
200 0 |
|
Oct... |
169.6 |
138.9 |
160.0 |
227.3 |
142.1 |
120.0 |
|
1864, Jan . . . |
169.6 |
144.4 |
184.6 |
231.8 |
152.6 |
186.7 |
|
April.. |
204.3 |
155.6 |
256.4 |
272.7 |
168.4 |
213.3 |
|
July . . |
243.5 |
188.9 |
389.7 |
295.5 |
221.1 |
213 3 |
|
Oct... |
300.0 |
200.0 |
307.7 |
304.6 |
205.2 |
640.0 |
|
1865. Jan... |
121.7 |
200.0 |
256.4 |
295.5 |
273.7 |
533 3 |
|
April.. |
116.5 |
2000 |
194.9 |
231.8 |
110.5 |
533.3 |
|
July . . |
102.6 |
177.8 |
153.8 |
200.0 |
89.5 |
493.3 |
|
Oct... |
126.1 |
200.0 |
174.4 |
268.2 |
136.8 |
|
SVGAR OF Lead; |
SüL- PHUBIC |
Candles |
COAX. |
|||
|
Date |
I |
|||||
|
White |
Acid |
Anthracite |
Anthracite |
Anthracite |
||
|
Chestnut |
Egg |
Grate |
||||
|
1860, Jan . . . |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
|
April. . |
95.7 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
|
|
July . . |
95.7 |
100.0 |
96.3 |
92.1 |
97.4 |
97.3 |
|
Oct... |
95.7 |
100.0 |
96.3 |
107.9 |
111.8 |
112.2 |
|
1861, Jan... |
100.0 |
109.1 |
96.3 |
98.4 |
105.3 |
116.2 |
|
April. . |
100.0 |
109.1 |
96.3 |
103.2 |
93 4 |
1108 |
|
July . . |
100.0 |
109.1 |
96.3 |
95.2 |
97.4 |
97.3 |
|
Oct . . . |
100.0 |
109.1 |
96.3 |
107.9 |
97.4 |
102.7 |
|
1862, Jan... |
104.3 |
127.3 |
92.6 |
95.2 |
97 4 |
108.1 |
|
April.. |
100.0 |
127.3 |
88.9 |
85.7 |
92.1 |
91.9 |
|
July . . |
104.3 |
127.3 |
88.9 |
82.5 |
93 4 |
90.5 |
|
Oct . . . |
139.1 |
127.3 |
88.9 |
85.7 |
94.7 |
86.5 |
|
1863, Jan... |
156.5 |
109.1 |
96 3 |
92.1 |
98.7 |
102.7 |
|
April. . |
226.1 |
109.1 |
100.0 |
187.3 |
155.3 |
159.5 |
|
July . . |
173.9 |
109.1 |
100.0 |
190.5 |
168.4 |
168.9 |
|
Oct . . . |
139.0 |
109.1 |
100.0 |
190.5 |
203.9 |
196.0 |
|
1864, Jan... |
191.3 |
109.1 |
100.0 |
198.4 |
230.3 |
216.2 |
|
April. . |
208.7 |
109.1 |
100.0 |
|||
|
July . . |
287.0 |
145.5 |
103.7 |
293.7 |
263.1 |
263.5 |
|
Oct . . . |
478.3 |
172 . 7 |
148.1 |
230 2 |
223.7 |
2297 |
|
1865, Jan . . . |
413.0 |
172 . 7 |
148.1 |
269.8 |
250.0 |
243.2 |
|
April.. |
391.3 |
181.8 |
148.1 |
|||
|
July.. . |
347.8 |
181.8 |
111.1 |
198.4 |
184.2 |
186.5 |
|
Oct . . . |
434.8 |
181.8 |
111.1 |
309.5 |
276.3 |
283.8 |
Appendix B
448
TABLE 2-Continucd
KXLATIYB PBICB8 OP VARIOÜ8 OOMMODITZB8 AT
|
Coal |
||||||
|
Matches |
Buck |
Cbmzht: |
CflSBTNUT |
|||
|
Datb |
Lamber, |
|||||
|
Anthracite |
Bitami- |
Roeendale |
intheLog |
|||
|
Stove |
noufl |
|||||
|
1860, Jan . . . |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
114.3 |
80.0 |
100.0 |
|
April. . |
105.0 |
100.0 |
97.1 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
|
|
July . . |
98.7 |
102.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
|
Oct. . . |
102.6 |
105.0 |
100.0 |
102.8 |
100.0 |
104.2 |
|
1861, Jan... |
116.7 |
106.0 |
100.0 |
102.8 |
100.0 |
104.2 |
|
April. . |
94.9 |
96.0 |
100.0 |
91.4 |
90.0 |
108.3 |
|
July . . |
98.7 |
92.0 |
100.0 |
80.0 |
900 |
108.3 |
|
Oct... |
97.4 |
97.0 |
100.0 |
85.7 |
90.0 |
108.3 |
|
1862, Jan... |
98.7 |
97.0 |
100.0 |
85.7 |
90.0 |
116.7 |
|
April . . |
92.3 |
135.0 |
100.0 |
91.4 |
90.0 |
125.0 |
|
ti uly . . |
93.6 |
122.0 |
100.0 |
91.4 |
90.0 |
133.3 |
|
Oct |
94.9 |
180.0 |
100.0 |
94.3 |
90.0 |
133.3 |
|
1863, Jan... |
100.0 |
160.0 |
100.0 |
137.1 |
90.0 |
133.3 |
|
April.. |
151.3 |
150.0 |
100.0 |
140.0 |
120.0 |
133.3 |
|
July . . |
166.7 |
150.0 |
100.0 |
137.1 |
120.0 |
133.3 |
|
Oct . . . |
201.3 |
160.0 |
100.0 |
148.6 |
120.0 |
133.3 |
|
1864, Jan... |
243.6 |
173.0 |
100.0 |
205.7 |
120.0 |
133.3 |
|
April . . |
180.0 |
100.0 |
171.4 |
140.0 |
133.3 |
|
|
July . . |
262.8 |
199.3 |
208.3 |
1600 |
150.0 |
133.3 |
|
Oct... |
224.4 |
233.2 |
208.3 |
217.1 |
160.0 |
133.3 |
|
1865, Jan... |
243.6 |
256.2 |
208.3 |
211.4 |
160.0 |
133.3 |
|
April. . |
250.0 |
395.8 |
217.1 |
160.0 |
133.3 |
|
|
July . . |
179.5 |
165.0 |
395.8 |
171.4 |
150.0 |
133.3 |
|
Oct. . . |
275.6 |
200.0 |
395.8 |
262.9 |
175.0 |
133.3 |
|
Date |
Hemlock : Lamber, in the Log |
Lime: Rockland |
Pine: Lumber, intheLog |
Pine Boards: B'rds,lin. |
Pntty |
Rabber : Para |
|
1860, Jan... |
100.0 |
133.3 |
100.0 |
106.4 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
|
April. . |
100.0 |
141.7 |
100.0 |
106.4 |
100.0 |
109.1 |
|
July . . |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
122.7 |
|
Oct... |
133.3 |
125.0 |
125.0 |
106.4 |
100.0 |
118.2 |
|
1861, Jan... |
133.3 |
133.3 |
125.0 |
106.4 |
116.7 |
100.0 |
|
April.. |
133.3 |
133.3 |
125.0 |
106.4 |
116.7 |
68.2 |
|
July . . |
133.3 |
133.3 |
125.0 |
106.4 |
116.7 |
81.8 |
|
Oct... |
133.3 |
133.3 |
125.0 |
106.4 |
116.7 |
77.3 |
|
1862, Jan... |
166.7 |
187.5 |
106.4 |
133.3 |
87.3 |
|
|
April. . |
166.7 |
137.5 |
187.5 |
109.6 |
133.3 |
90.9 |
|
July . . |
183.3 |
91.7 |
187.5 |
106.4 |
133.3 |
104.5 |
|
Oct... |
191.7 |
116.7 |
193.8 |
109.6 |
133.3 |
121.8 |
444
HlSTOBY OF THE ObBEXBACKS
TABLB Z-Ckmtimmed
AT
|
Hemloek: |
Pine: |
Pine |
i |
|||
|
Date |
Lamber. intheLog |
Rocklanri |
Lamber, intheLag |
Boards: B>d&,lin. |
Pnt&jr |
Fum |
|
1883. Jan... |
200.0 |
141.7 |
200 0 |
100.6 |
150 0 |
159.1 |
|
Apríl.. |
200. 0 |
141.7 |
200 0 |
132 0 |
150 0 |
154.5 |
|
July . . |
300.0 |
186.7 |
200.0 |
132.0 |
150 0 |
131.8 |
|
Oct... |
200. 0 |
191.7 |
200 0 |
148.0 |
150 0 |
136 4 |
|
1864, Jan . . . |
200.0 |
175.0 |
200 0 |
148.0 |
166.7 |
145.5 |
|
ApríL. |
200.0 |
225.0 |
200 0 |
164.0 |
166.7 |
150.9 |
|
July . . |
200. 0 |
166.7 |
200 0 |
196.0 |
166.7 |
172.7 |
|
Oct... |
200. 0 |
208.3 |
200.0 |
196.0 |
166.7 |
218.2 |
|
1865, Jan . . . |
200 0 |
250.0 |
200. 0 |
196.0 |
183.3 |
218 2 |
|
ApríL. |
200.0 |
266.7 |
200.0 |
196.0 |
183.3 |
154.5 |
|
July . |
200. 0 |
200 0 |
200.0 |
196.0 |
183.3 |
127.3 |
|
Oct... |
200. 0 |
300.0 |
200.0 |
228.0 |
183.3 |
136.4 |
|
Spbcce: |
TüBFEN- |
Wixdow Olabs |
||||
|
Date |
1 |
|||||
|
Boards |
TIXE |
American, |
American, |
Frenen, |
Frenen, |
|
|
10X14, |
10X14, |
10X14 |
10x14, |
|||
|
firsts |
thirds |
firsts |
tixirds |
|||
|
1860. Jan... |
91.7 |
110.0 |
91.7 |
105.8 |
85.1 |
106.3 |
|
April. . |
91.7 |
115.0 |
91.7 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
106.3 |
|
July. . |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
|
\JCZt ... |
100.0 |
106.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
|
1861, Jan... |
100.0 |
87.5 |
100.0 |
94.0 |
93 8 |
1000 |
|
April. . |
100.0 |
90.0 |
100.0 |
95.6 |
108.9 |
97 7 |
|
July. . |
87.5 |
205.0 |
1000 |
103.4 |
96.1 |
97.7 |
|
Oct . . . |
&3.3 |
362.5 |
100.0 |
111.2 |
96.1 |
109.1 |
|
1862, Jan... |
&3.3 |
350.0 |
1000 |
118.5 |
96.1 |
118.9 |
|
April. . |
&3.3 |
245 0 |
100.0 |
159.3 |
96.1 |
140.7 |
|
July. . |
79.2 |
325.0 |
100.0 |
159.3 |
96.1 |
156.3 |
|
Oct... |
97.9 |
562.5 |
100.0 |
159.3 |
96.1 |
146.6 |
|
1863. Jan . . . |
97.9 |
625 0 |
133.3 |
159.3 |
115.3 |
140.7 |
|
April. . |
97.9 |
675.0 |
133.3 |
171.5 |
140.6 |
156.3 |
|
July. . |
131.3 |
895.0 |
153.1 |
159.3 |
132.8 |
156.3 |
|
Oct... |
127.1 |
687.5 |
131.3 |
159.3 |
117.2 |
156.3 |
|
1864, Jan... |
127.1 |
750.0 |
131.3 |
220.5 |
125.0 |
185.3 |
|
April.. |
177.1 |
800.0 |
256.9 |
205.8 |
146.4 |
185 3 |
|
July. . |
202.1 |
900.0 |
208.3 |
245.0 |
223.4 |
224.7 |
|
Oct... |
191.7 |
607.5 |
250.0 |
254.8 |
205.9 |
2540 |
|
1865, Jan. . . |
191.7 |
512.5 |
242.2 |
274.4 |
232.0 |
259.9 |
|
April.. |
168.8 |
500.0 |
209.9 |
240.1 |
193.4 |
218.9 |
|
July . . |
168.8 |
337.5 |
177.6 |
161.7 |
154.7 |
150.5 |
|
Oct... |
168.8 |
262.5 |
226.0 |
212.3 |
180.5 |
177.8 |
Appendix B
445
TABLE 2— Oontinued
RELATIVE PRICBS OP VARIOÜ8 COMMODITIIS AT WHOLE8AUI
|
Bütts: |
Coppex: |
Lead: |
||||
|
Loose- joint, castSXSin. |
Ibón: |
|||||
|
DATE |
Ingot |
Sheet |
Wire |
Drop-shot |
Pi* |
|
|
1860, Jan... |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
|
|
April.. |
100.0 |
97.9 |
100.0 |
119.1 |
101.7 |
|
|
July . . |
93.0 |
89.4 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
114.9 |
98.0 |
|
Oct... |
89.5 |
90.4 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
110.6 |
97.8 |
|
1861, Jan... |
89.5 |
80.9 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
110.6 |
95.2 |
|
April.. |
89.5 |
80.9 |
93.2 |
100.0 |
110.6 |
95.2 |
|
July . . |
89.5 |
76.6 |
93.2 |
100.0 |
110.6 |
84.8 |
|
Oct... |
89.5 |
87.2 |
93.2 |
100.0 |
119.1 |
100.4 |
|
1862, Jan . . . |
89.5 |
112.8 |
93.2 |
100.0 |
144.7 |
121.2 |
|
April.. |
89.5 |
93.6 |
103.4 |
100.0 |
144.7 |
116.9 |
|
July . . |
112.3 |
97.9 |
103.4 |
100.0 |
144.7 |
116.9 |
|
Oct... |
133.3 |
119.1 |
103.4 |
100.0 |
148.9 |
123.4 |
|
1863, Jan . . . |
133.3 |
131.9 |
128.8 |
105.8 |
170.2 |
138.5 |
|
April.. |
133.3 |
129.8 |
144.1 |
232.7 |
204.3 |
155.8 |
|
July . . |
140.4 |
129.8 |
135.6 |
169.2 |
204.3 |
145.0 |
|
Oct... |
140.4 |
138.3 |
128.8 |
137.5 |
187.2 |
147.2 |
|
1864, Jan... |
178.9 |
160.6 |
162.7 |
211.5 |
229.8 |
186.1 |
|
April.. |
207.0 |
172.3 |
178.0 |
211.5 |
263.8 |
201.2 |
|
July . . |
266.7 |
197.9 |
194.9 |
211.5 |
357.6 |
251.1 |
|
Oct... |
«xJo.o |
200.0 |
237.3 |
285.6 |
340.4 |
251.1 |
|
1865, Jan... |
308.8 |
208.5 |
220.3 |
264.4 |
340.4 |
259.7 |
|
April. . |
«xJo.o |
144.7 |
169.5 |
211.5 |
272.4 |
|
|
July . . |
277.2 |
121.3 |
152.5 |
148.1 |
238.3 |
173.1 |
|
Oct. . . |
277.2 |
138.3 |
169.5 |
169.2 |
255.4 |
Date
1860, Jan . . . April.. July . . Oct. . .
1861, Jan... April.. July . . Oct...
1862, Jan . . . April. . July . . Oct. . .
|
Wood Scraws: |
||||
|
Lead: Pipe |
Shovels |
Spelter : Importad |
Tin Platos : I. C. Coke |
I-inca, Ho. 10, Pía» H«d, I ron |
|
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
|
116.7 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
101.7 |
100.0 |
|
112.5 |
100.0 |
99.0 |
101.7 |
80.5 |
|
104.2 |
100.0 |
95.2 |
96.5 |
116.7 |
|
104.2 |
100.0 |
90.5 |
94.7 |
116.7 |
|
108.3 |
100.0 |
90.5 |
98.2 |
116.7 |
|
108.3 |
100.0 |
81.0 |
98.2 |
116.7 |
|
116.7 |
100.0 |
85.7 |
89.5 |
116.7 |
|
141.7 |
94.7 |
109.5 |
108.9 |
116.7 |
|
141.7 |
94.7 |
95.2 |
105.3 |
116.7 |
|
141.7 |
98.7 |
114.3 |
105.3 |
116.7 |
|
145.8 |
98.7 |
83.3 |
122.8 |
116.7 |
Zinc: Importad
upo Sbc
eet
100.0 100.0 101.8 96.4 92.9 100.0 100.0 103.6 103.6 103.6 103.6 128.6
u»
HlSTOBY OF THE GftEESBACKS
or tajsocs <>wiMua at
|
1063, Jan. .. |
105.7 |
KB.6 |
142 9 |
129.8 |
< 135.0 |
146 4 |
|
ApriL. |
106.7 |
161.9 |
154 4 |
158.3 |
17» 6 |
|
|
July. |
XKI.O |
147 6 |
136.8 |
158.3 |
161 3 |
|
|
Oct ... |
i 1833 |
122.8 |
161 9 |
135 8 |
118 8 |
157 1 |
|
UWL, Jan.. |
¡ 225.0 |
135.9 |
, 176.2 |
154 4 |
158.3 |
in.4 |
|
ApriL. |
2563 |
161.0 |
¡ 238.1 |
196.5 |
158.3 |
214 3 |
|
July.. |
3500 |
9004 |
i 333.3 |
308 8 |
215.7 |
357 1 |
|
Oct... |
3333 |
mi |
! 257 1 |
210 5 |
215 7 |
257.1 |
|
1065, Jan .. |
3333 |
184.2 |
1 285.7 |
2386 |
215.7 |
285.7 |
|
ApriL. |
966.7 |
184.2 |
171.4 |
147 4 |
! 215.7 |
185.7 |
|
July.. |
233.3 |
134.2 |
171 4 |
143 8 |
1 215.7 |
171.4 |
|
Oct... |
216.7 |
134.2 |
XG 4 |
154 4 |
| 215.7 |
307.1 |
|
Frinrru |
i |
Paila: Wocxn |
||||
|
Datb |
■ |
1 i |
. |
|||
|
j Ch&irs. |
Chairs, 1 |
Tabk^. |
2Hoops ! |
2Hoops |
3Hoop< |
|
|
•Bed-Boom |
' Kitchen |
linchen |
il» |
Kt) |
||
|
1860, Jan... |
1 1000 |
100.0 |
100 0 , |
100.0 |
100 0 |
100.0 |
|
ApriL. |
1 100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 ' |
100.0 |
100.0 |
IODO |
|
July.. |
! 100.0 |
. 100.0 |
100.0 Í |
100.0 |
ÍOU.O |
100.0 |
|
Oct... |
80.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100 0 |
100 0 |
100.0 |
|
1861. Jan... |
80.0 |
! 100.0 |
1000 . |
98.2 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
|
ApriL. |
80.0 |
100 0 |
100.0 |
98 2 |
100.0 |
100 0 |
|
July. . |
1 80.0 |
i 100.0 |
100.0 . |
98.2 |
1000 |
1000 |
|
Oct... |
! 80.0 |
1 100.0 |
100.0 |
96.2 |
98.1 |
96 9 |
|
1862. Jan. . |
80.0 |
100.0 |
100 0 |
92 9 |
92.6 |
93.8 |
|
ApriL. |
80.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 , |
92.9 |
92.6 |
93.8 |
|
July. . |
80.0 |
100.0 |
1000 . |
107.1 |
107.4 |
106.3 |
|
Oct... |
80.0 |
100.0 |
100 0 |
121 4 |
119.3 |
118.8 |
|
1863, Jan... |
« 85.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
121.4 |
122 2 |
1250 |
|
ApriL . |
105.0 |
100.0 |
112.5 |
150.0 |
151 9 |
146.9 |
|
July. . |
105 0 |
100.0 |
112.5 |
139.3 |
138.5 |
137.5 |
|
Oct... |
110.0 |
111.1 |
112.5 |
139.3 |
138.5 |
140.6 |
|
1864, Jan ... |
125.0 |
122.2 |
1 112.5 |
160.7 |
163.0 |
156 3 |
|
ApriL . |
125.0 |
122.2 |
125.0 |
178 6 |
1830 |
176.3 |
|
July. . |
145.0 |
133.3 |
137.5 |
178.6 |
' 181.5 , |
176.9 |
|
Oct... |
180.0 |
166.7 |
162.5 |
178.6 |
183.0 ! |
178.1 |
|
1865, Jan . . |
180.0 |
166.7 |
162.5 |
178.6 |
, 183.0 |
178.1 |
|
ApriL. |
150.0 |
155 6 |
150.0 |
178.6 |
181.5 |
178 1 |
|
July.. |
1450 |
144.4 |
150.0 |
142.9 |
: 146.7 |
140.6 |
|
Oct... |
145.0 |
144.4 |
1 150.0 |
214.3 |
. 218.5 * |
203.1 |
Appendix B
447
TABLE Z-Continucd
RELATTVE PBICK8 OP VASIOD8 COMMODITXX8 AT WHOLESALE
|
Tura: Woodem |
||||||
|
Date |
JüTE |
Powder: |
||||
|
Rifle |
||||||
|
(i) |
(2) |
(3) |
(4) |
|||
|
1860, Jan . . . |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
|
April. . |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
97.8 |
106.6 |
100 0 |
|
July.. |
100.0 |
1000 |
96.6 |
93.3 |
105.7 |
100.0 |
|
Oct... |
100.0 |
100.0 |
89.7 |
88 9 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
|
1861, Jan... |
90.0 |
93.8 |
89.7 |
88 9 |
114.3 |
100.0 |
|
April. . |
90.0 |
93.8 |
89.7 |
88.9 |
91.4 |
1000 |
|
July. . |
90.0 |
93.8 |
89.7 |
88.9 |
91.4 |
120.0 |
|
Oct... |
90.0 |
93.8 |
86.2 |
86.7 |
102.9 |
120.0 |
|
1862, Jan . . . |
90.0 |
83 8 |
81.4 |
80.0 |
146.3 |
140.0 |
|
April. . |
100.0 |
100.0 |
89.7 |
98.7 |
125.7 |
120.0 |
|
July. . |
110.0 |
100.0 |
96.6 |
95.6 |
108.6 |
130.0 |
|
Oct... |
120.0 |
112.5 |
105.2 |
104.4 |
148.0 |
130.0 |
|
1863, Jan... |
140.0 |
137.5 |
124.1 |
124.4 |
205.7 |
130.0 |
|
April. . |
148.0 |
142.5 |
127.7 |
126.7 |
257.1 |
135.0 |
|
July. . |
148 0 |
142.5 |
131.0 |
128.9 |
194.3 |
135.0 |
|
Oct. . . |
152.0 |
150.0 |
131.0 |
128.9 |
182.8 |
147.0 |
|
1864, Jan... |
170.0 |
162.5 |
148.3 |
144.4 |
251.4 |
145.0 |
|
April. . |
189 6 |
168.5 |
165.5 |
151.1 |
320.0 |
152.0 |
|
July. . |
200.0 |
175.0 |
175.9 |
157.8 |
354.3 |
174.0 |
|
Oct... |
170.0 |
168.8 |
148.3 |
148.9 |
314.3 |
172.0 |
|
1865, Jan... |
180.0 |
150.0 |
170.3 |
154.2 |
320.0 |
180.0 |
|
April. . |
140.0 |
193.8 |
124.1 |
126.7 |
302.8 |
175.0 |
|
July . . |
160.0 |
156.3 |
144.8 |
140.0 |
200.0 |
170.0 |
|
Oct... |
170.0 |
162.5 |
148.3 |
144.4 |
171.4 |
170.0 |
|
Rope |
Soap: Castüe |
Staich |
||||
|
Date |
Manilla |
Tarred, American |
Ontario |
Pearl |
Puro |
|
|
18G0, Jan . . . April.. July. . Oct... 1861. Jan . . . April.. July. . Oct... 1862, Jan . . . April. . July. . Oct... |
100.0 100.0 97.0 97.0 97.0 106.1 93.9 90.9 121.2 130.3 124.2 145.4 |
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 108.1 105.1 118.9 118.9 113.5 129.7 |
100.0 114.7 117.6 106.8 114.7 111.8 117.6 141.2 152.9 158.8 155.9 164.7 |
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 0 1000 100.0 100.0 110.0 |
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 91.7 91.7 91.7 91.7 100.0 |
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 92.3 92.3 92.3 92.3 100.0 |
U8
HlSTOBY OF THE GBEENBACK8
TABLE 2 — Continued
RELATIVE P RICES OF VARIOÜ8 COMMODITIE8 AT WHOLESALE
|
Ropk |
Soap: Castile |
Stabch |
||||
|
Date |
Manilla |
Tarred, American |
Ontario |
Pearl |
Pare |
|
|
1863, Jan... April.. July. . Oct... 1864, Jan. . . April. . July.. Oct... 1865, Jan... ApriL. July.. Oct... |
151.5 218 2 172.7 184.8 197.0 2303 254.5 303.0 284.8 242.4 242.4 272.7 |
143.2 164.9 162.2 154.1 164.9 164.9 167.6 205.4 200.0 194.6 194.6 194.6 |
170.6 202.9 200.0 194.0 217.6 205.9 282.4 247.1 294.1 247.1 194.0 252.9 |
130.0 140.0 130.0 130.0 160.0 180.0 200.0 244.2 240.0 240.0 200.0 200.0 |
116.7 125.0 116.7 116.7 141.7 158.3 175.0 191.7 208.3 208.3 175.0 175.0 |
115.4 123.1 115.4 115.4 138.5 153.8 169.2 184.6 200.0 200.0 169.2 169.2 |
|
Stabch |
Date |
Stabch |
|||
|
Date |
Reflned |
Silver Gloss |
Refiucd |
Silver Gloss |
|
|
1860, January. July October . . 1861, January. . April July October . . 1862, January. . April July October . . |
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 92.9 92 9 92.9 92.9 100.0 |
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 93.5 93.5 93.5 93.5 100.0 |
1863, January . April. . . . July. . October . 1864, January. April. . . . July.. October . 1865, January. . April July October . . |
. 114.3 121.4 114.3 . 114.3 135.7 150.0 164.3 178.6 192.9 l 192.9 1 164.3 1 164.3 |
112.9 119.4 112.9 112.9 132.3 145.2 158.1 171.0 las. 9 183.9 158.1 158.1 |
Appendix B
449
TABLE 3
RJtLATIVE PBICK8 PAID BT FBDB&AI* OOVKRNMKNT FOR BUFPLIB8, 1M0-65 >
1. Relativo Prioes Paid by the Qnartermaster General (War Department). Pp. 1596,
1597. Date within Year Not Specifled
Caps, forage
Hats, uniform
Great coats
Coate, blue flannel, sack
Coats, blue flannel, sack, lined.
Trousere
Shirts, flannel
StockingB
|
1860 |
1861 |
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
|
100 |
111 |
98 |
102 |
114 |
|
100 |
66 |
69 |
70 |
77 |
|
100 |
113 |
148 |
117 |
133 |
|
100 |
102 |
114 |
112 |
126 |
|
100 |
103 |
123 |
122 |
127 |
|
100 |
107 |
126 |
89 |
110 |
|
100 |
98 |
162 |
170 |
174 |
|
100 |
106 |
133 |
133 |
146 |
1865
175 96 188 191 188 168 258 200
2. Relativo Prioes Paid by the Office of the Commissary General of Subsistence (War Department). Pp. 1806-9. Average Prices for Year
Pork
Bacon
Ham
Beef cattle
Presh beef
Salt beef
Flour
Soft bread
Hard bread
Corn meal
Beans
Peas
Rice
Hominy
Desiccated potatoes
Mixed vegetables
Green coffee
R. and R and G. coffee .
Tea
Brown sugar
White sugar
Vinegar
Canales
Soap
Salt
|
100 |
89 |
||
|
100 |
100 |
||
|
100 |
90 |
||
|
100 |
100 |
||
|
100 |
100 |
||
|
100 |
96 |
||
|
100 |
111 |
||
|
100 |
100 |
||
|
100 |
100 |
||
|
100 |
200 |
||
|
100 |
133 |
||
|
100 |
100 |
||
|
100 |
86 |
||
|
100 |
100 |
||
|
100 |
110 |
||
|
100 |
109 |
||
|
100 |
153 |
||
|
100 |
145 |
||
|
100 |
129 |
||
|
100 |
111 |
||
|
100 |
120 |
||
|
100 |
91 |
||
|
100 |
106 |
||
|
100 |
120 |
||
|
100 |
117 |
|
110 |
217 |
|
100 |
229 |
|
130 |
190 |
|
124 |
200 |
|
100 |
167 |
|
94 |
147 |
|
130 |
175 |
|
100 |
133 |
|
100 |
150 |
|
300 |
300 |
|
167 |
167 |
|
150 |
150 |
|
114 |
157 |
|
150 |
200 |
|
100 |
110 |
|
87 |
78 |
|
213 |
293 |
|
190 |
250 |
|
167 |
239 |
|
133 |
211 |
|
160 |
250 |
|
146 |
264 |
|
122 |
172 |
|
140 |
220 |
|
119 |
119 |
238 300 250 232 183 144 170 133 175 400 133 300 143 200 140 109 247 160 280 167 260 318 167 220 119
' The data from which the following series of reía ti ve» prioes haré been oom- pated are fonnd in the "exhibits" of the Aldrich Report on the pagos indioated under the serera! dirisions of the table.
450
HlSTOBY OP THE GbEENBACKS
TABLE 3—Continued
BEIiATIYS PBICBS PAID BT FBDKEAL OOVEKNMBNT FOR 8UPPLHC8, 1860-65
3. Relativo Pnces Paid by Burean of Proviskms and Clothing (Nary Department).
Pp. 1586-93. Date within Year Not Specified
Beans
Beef, fresh
Sugar
Vegetables
Blankets
Flannel
Overshirts, flannel ....
Satinet
Trousers, canvas duck
Trousers, cloth
Shoes, calí skin
Socks, woolen
Mattresses
Linseed oil, boiled .... Turpén tine
|
1860 |
1861 |
1862 |
1863 |
|
100 |
86 |
100 |
150 |
|
100 |
101 |
91 |
86 |
|
100 |
94 |
74 |
100 |
|
100 |
92 |
123 |
84 |
|
• • • |
100 |
99 |
132 |
|
• • • |
100 |
92 |
124 |
|
100 |
96 |
92 |
103 |
|
• • • |
100 |
94 |
99 |
|
100 |
98 |
97 |
105 |
|
100 |
71 |
68 |
75 |
|
100 |
86 |
74 |
83 |
|
100 |
109 |
102 |
113 |
|
100 |
97 |
94 |
97 |
|
• • • |
100 |
64 |
123 |
|
100 |
117 |
319 |
576 |
1864
215 125
281 77 232 232 201 180 194 132 124 208 244 190 488
215 153 275 163 329 276 267 238 350 207 149 234 265 227 836
4. Relativo Prices for Drugs and Chemicals Paid by Surgeon General (War Depart- ment). Pp. 1620-24. Average Prices for Year
Aconite
Aloes
Alum
Ammonia
Árnica
Calomel
Camphor
Castor oil
Chalk
Chloroform
Cod liver oil
Ether
Extract of ginger
Extract of wild cherry bark . . .
Gum Arabic
Ipecac
Laudanum
Magnesia
Nitric acid
Olive oil
Opium
Pilis, cathartic
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
107 129
87 100 115 100 119
88 100
99
71 150 113 100 131 104 100
89
93
100
101
75
107 167
91 100 133
92 222
90 100 100
71
54 114 128 134 116 100
as
75 100 102
75
|
107 |
200 |
|
147 |
160 |
|
66 |
103 |
|
100 |
160 |
|
133 |
167 |
|
112 |
223 |
|
237 |
423 |
|
123 |
133 |
|
100 |
120 |
|
100 |
128 |
|
71 |
77 |
|
G0 |
126 |
|
114 |
120 |
|
112 |
200 |
|
134 |
213 |
|
117 |
223 |
|
100 |
300 |
|
93 |
208 |
|
G0 |
68 |
|
100 |
147 |
|
115 |
185 |
|
75 |
100 |
200 160 103
leo
167 214 420 106 120 164
77 131 120 263 213 265 300 283
95 147 185 100
Appbndix B
TABLE S- Continua!
|
,m |
1SM |
«, |
i» |
m |
IMS |
|
|
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
10* 100 123 100 111 81 90 124 100 |
104 100 149 100 131 87 83 163 100 |
104 100 187 100 100 78 120 283 100 |
200 126 198 118 100 111 120 200 267 |
||
m oomtODiTtu ai bitah.1
|
State |
Towd |
Initlal Frío» ¡■■r V.l |
un |
ISO |
i-;: |
ían |
UH |
M |
UH |
|
Maes. |
9.13 .15 .1% .14 .136 .125 .126 .10 .08V .125 .10 .126 |
100 Mi 100 100 100 100 100 11. 1 100 lil) 100 100 |
131 loo 120 179 120 « 150 :jm 100 125 120 |
331 113 300 ase am :im 100 200 300 300 350 900 |
399 350 360 357 :>•' 400 lio 920 300 360 400 330 |
386 ;tti no 439 600 600 300 350 300 720 500 520 |
396 387 400 430 4*1 530 ate 370 300 6U0 400 730 |
||
|
P*...\... W. Va. . . W. Va. . . |
Jewett < ' 1 1 v- New Castle New Cuutberland Wheeling |
330 ■¿ni :i:,t 400 |
|||||||
|
Ohio .... Ohio ... Ind. lnd Ind W. |
Zanesvillc JetTorsonville Lawreneeburg . . . Nnw Albany |
3X1 ■js.i 300 600 300 630 |
■ The sourco of the following; seriss of relati™ priees at ratail U the report pre- parad hj Mr. J. D. Weeks in 18S0-8I and poblished ai Yol. XX of thaTenth Ceosos. Not all of the material aupplied by Mr. Weelrs, faowe*er, has beca ased, for he «i Te* ■orne series of prisas at onspecifled times of the jear and cithern "on or about June 1." Those series " sbowing atorase for the year " alóos were nsed aa the bnsis for the oompntatíons In the teit, and thor alone are siim here. The «ene ral di vi- síons of the nerin-1 — drj goods, groceries, proTisions, etc. — are the aame aa in the Censos report; but nnder these heada a classifleatioaaooordingtoarticleswnafonnd more coDTenlent than the one according to towna vhlch Mr. Weeks adoptad. Mus- arer, aa the átate and tovn from whieb ovory serles comea are carefnllj stated, there peed be no difflcoltj In traaing en? series toltssonree. In tbecasaof re nt figures are «¡ven for lSfff and 1860 for the pnrpoaes of Part II, ehap. vi.
HlSTOBT OP THE GbebNBACKS
TABLE i -Continua!
|
State |
Town |
perYd |
1M |
||||||
|
Maas |
0.33 .25 |
100 ion |
100 |
91 ion |
ei 150 |
100 250 |
115 9fiR |
||
|
Conn |
Jewett City |
||||||||
|
Pa |
NewCastle |
.25 |
li» |
11» |
rii |
140 |
IHO |
IHO |
140 |
|
W. Va.. . |
New Cura be ría ni: |
.15 |
100 |
mn |
mi |
«NI |
«n |
«tí |
m |
|
W. Va... |
Wheeling |
.25 |
un) |
1?4 |
IhO |
uxi |
240 |
VI» |
I»! |
|
.25 .25 |
100 ion |
1UÜ 1110 |
lau UN) |
100 i so |
900 IflO |
150 ion |
|||
|
Ohio .... |
Cincinnati |
lfiO |
|||||||
|
Ohío .... |
.15 |
loo |
v;« |
ym |
:■*») |
vr¡ |
W7 |
xfl |
|
|
Ind |
.'JO |
lim |
m |
175 |
150 |
KVI |
**) |
||
|
Ind |
.20 |
UN) |
|V5 |
HA |
175 |
17b |
175 |
17.Í |
|
|
Ind |
.25 |
I(N) |
1(N) |
140 |
1H0 |
2HO |
IHO |
mi |
|
|
Ind |
.18 |
UN) |
111 |
Iffl |
194 |
itrí |
m |
||
|
111 |
.25 |
1U0 |
100 |
100 |
140 |
140 |
ItíO |
m |
Wobum
Jewett City NewCa-itle. New Cumberland Wheeling
Cincinnati. . . .
Zanesville
Evnnsville. . .. Jeffersonvilie
[.jiur'-iii'fl'iiTi; New Albany..
|
0.13 |
ion |
115 |
154 |
|
.125 |
KK» |
1(111 |
11'/ |
|
.125 |
11» |
100 |
144 |
|
.09 |
MI) |
m |
".- |
|
.125 |
1INI |
1») |
:i>\ |
|
.125 |
UNÍ |
Hll |
ni |
|
.125 |
huí |
HO |
¡tu |
|
.125 |
uní |
m |
ii' |
|
.10 |
uní |
100 |
I.HI |
|
.125 |
1111 |
iti) |
Kil |
|
.125 |
lili |
11X1 |
11») |
|
.10 |
111) |
iu> |
H») |
|
.125 |
100 |
100 |
auo |
|
Conn |
Jewett Citv |
1 75 |
100 |
ion |
1.33 |
166 177 177 173 |
|
NewCastle |
U) |
138 150 140 150 |
||||
|
D.ll |
r/.i |
:*M |
455 545 545 273 |
|||
|
Wheeling |
UjU |
133 |
lt>7 |
167 i 200 200 ¡ 167 |
||
|
100 100 |
10, |
113' 120 133! 133 |
||||
|
411 |
100 100 |
1.--) |
250 213 163 , 150 |
|||
|
UO 133 |
133 |
133 |
133 133; 133 |
|||
|
Lawrenceburj; . . |
71) |
100. 107 |
17» |
17» |
214 1431 143 |
|
|
New Alban.v |
.025 |
172 144 . 144 |
||||
|
ni |
Bloomington. . |
.13 |
Appkndix B
TABLE *— Continua!
|
Sute |
Towi. |
per Yd |
íau |
tM |
un |
1HM |
1M |
UBI |
|
|
Mass |
|||||||||
|
Pa |
.17 |
"100 |
Hft |
iflñ |
*M |
353 |
368 |
324 |
|
|
W.Va... |
New Cumberland |
.10 |
IIK> |
non |
:hw» |
4hll |
Mil |
A» |
MKI |
|
W.Va... |
.15 |
111) |
107 |
¡HS |
sss |
633 |
4<K) |
:«xi |
|
|
.16 .36 |
100 ion |
lili 110 |
260 1») |
1«> |
467 1711 |
||||
|
Ohio.... |
im |
||||||||
|
Ohio .... |
Zanesville |
.13 |
IIH) |
1HH |
16» |
XII |
fi77 |
346 |
son |
|
Ind |
Lawrencehurg. . . |
.30 |
ion |
M¡ |
«17 |
SI 7 |
X& |
WCi |
301) |
|
Ind |
.086 |
ion |
111 |
242 |
4rt> |
r,7si |
474 |
4» |
|
|
11L |
BloomingtoD |
.16 |
100 |
íaa |
m¡\ 300 |
400 |
433 300 |
: BBOWH. 8 X S.
|
MaHB |
0.13 .125 |
100 100 |
115 190 |
308 200 |
34S ano |
308 440 |
346 400 |
||
|
Pa |
NewCaetle |
240 |
|||||||
|
W.Va... |
.08 |
li») |
Ifflft |
375 |
Ano |
ffilfi |
<MR |
MV> |
|
|
W.Va... |
Wbeeling |
.125 |
[(NI |
1») |
240 |
:«K) |
»» |
400 |
32» |
|
.125 .20 |
100 100 |
98 I-':. |
UNO 150 |
BJU ll.i |
b2U |
||||
|
Ohio .... |
im |
||||||||
|
Ohio .... |
.13 |
I(K) |
I3H |
MR |
H |
M |
MM |
WD |
|
|
Ind |
li-l'.-i - ■ ■ ! ■ "i. ¡He |
.16 |
u>> |
187 |
107 |
187 |
167 |
1IV7 |
187 |
|
Ind |
Lawrenceburg. . . |
.28 |
1(11 |
107 |
Mil |
XII |
367 |
304 |
321 |
|
Ind |
New Albany |
.U7Tf |
KK1 |
i:* |
232 |
«44 |
656 |
||
|
IU. |
Bluomiiigton |
.16 |
100 |
133 |
233 |
333 |
433 |
600 |
:ísí |
|
0.125 |
ion |
|
.16 |
II M |
|
.15 |
101) |
|
.08 |
u» |
|
.10 |
1IO |
|
.125 |
ii» |
|
.15 |
n» |
|
.10 |
ion |
|
.10 |
n» |
|
.125 |
100 |
|
.126 |
UN) |
|
.085 |
1KI |
|
.125 |
100 |
W.Va W.Va Ohio
Woburn .... Jewett City. New Caatle. New Cumberland
Wheeling
Cantón
Cincinnati
Zanesville
Evansville
Jelferwinville ., La w re nce b u rg . New Albany. ..
101 320 300 280
81 10U 234 375
120 167 300 373
225 ::::, HV 625
150 300 400 800
120 240 400 600
83 DO 133 267
150 200 ,100 650
100 125 350 600
120 160 280 440
120 176 360 600
112 235 412 588
120 200 320 440
HlSTORY OF THE (jEEENBACKS
TABLE 4 — Continuo!
3D» AT BETAtL — Bf
|
State |
T„„ |
lllitllll Prl™ [wrYd |
1860 |
«81 |
1892 |
1863 |
18H |
US |
i«« |
|
Masa |
Q.1I .135 .10 .06 .10 .09 .10 .10 .085 .10 .08 .0675 .125 |
100 100 100 H jíj 100 110 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
100 88 130 250 125 111 150 150 100 150 113 111 1S» |
318 US 220 417 seo 222 500 300 118 300 232 240 |
409 280 400 500 ■f'KJ 556 600 .'¡r-i 588 300 563 tu 380 |
227 400 500 667 750 SH 750 700 ,--■1 813 963 480 |
227 440 150 mi ÓOÜ 750 350 8S4 Tr-j 500 741 560 |
||
|
Jewett City New C u m be ría no |
.'«n |
||||||||
|
W. Va W.Va |
-.i) tea |
||||||||
|
< >hio . Ohio. |
Cindnnati Zaneaville Kv.iiii-.viUi- Jeffersonville. . . . Lawrenceburg. .. I 1] ■ H -i . ■ 1 ¡i U t' ¡1 .... |
||||||||
|
Ind Ind |
500 B3 |
||||||||
Pa ... W.Va W.Va Ohio Ohio Ohio Ind . Ind .
Woburn
Jewett City. . New Cas t h; . . New Cumberland
Wbeeiing
Cantón
Cincinnati
Zaneaville
Jeffereonville.. La w re nce bu rg . New Albany . . . Bloomíngton . .
I'hilad.-ll.hiíi ....
Baltimore
New Cuwberiand
Cantón
Ki.rinurteld
Zunesvillo
Lnwrentehurg. Cedar Rápida
|
Appendix |
B |
455 |
|||||||
|
«LA |
I'ABLE i-Contiuaed IVE FRICM OV OKOÍ'KBIKS AT BBTAIL — MOLASHi: HIT OBI.EAH1 |
||||||||
|
State |
B». |
Imtml Pric» |
1*90 |
wei |
lttt |
L8C.1 |
1M |
18» |
m |
|
Pa W. Va. . . |
Philadelphia New Curo bedano |
0.40 .40 .40 .60 .60 .60 |
100 100 100 |
100 125 100 100 100 100 |
136 188 lfj.) 100 ioo |
225 376 150 133 190 |
175 250 316 300 367 160 |
200 225 313 300 250 22 ' |
276 225 |
|
Ind |
Latvrenceburg. . , Cedar Rápida . . . |
167 240 |
Pa..„ Md... W. Va.
Ohio.. Ühio.. (>hk>.. Ind. .. Iowa..
Boston
Philadelphia. Bal ti more. .. New Cumberland
Cantón
Springfleld .... Zanes ville ..... Lawrenceburg. Cedar Rápida.
W.Va
Obio....
Ohio
| Philadelphia Baltimore . . . New Cumberland
Bpringflt'ld
Zanesvílle ,
Lawrenceburg, Cedar Rápida,
|
60 |
|
|
60 |
1INI |
|
40 |
100 |
|
tí) |
1¡.) |
|
IU |
1(11 |
|
m |
II. 1 |
|
50 |
|
Conn. . . Pa W Va... |
JewettCity Philadelphia New Cumberland |
<To5 .04 .08 .10 .05 .10 .08 |
100 too 100 ion 100 |
80 l(jt) 133 100 loo 100 100 |
100 Mi li;7 100 100 too 117 |
130 125 187 100 140 100 133 |
]U) 160 167 100 160 130 17.-. |
160 175 HIT 100 300 190 n |
ii»i 335 187 |
|
Ohio .... Ind, Iowa — |
Zanosvillo Lawrenceburg, . . Cedar Ra pide |
100 in |
HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS
TABLE t- Continuo*
|
State |
»*. |
\'r, '■'•'. |
1M0 |
UBI |
1SB |
BM |
UM |
isas |
„ |
|
Pa . W.Va. . . |
Philadelphia New Cumberland |
3.07 .07 .10 .10 .10 .13 .07 |
ióó 100 UN) 100 100 |
100 171 80 100 100 100 100 |
114 200 125 100 150 100 128 |
143 2UU 150 150 200 ](«■ 129 |
171 200 aso 150 200 117 157 |
214 2a ) 300 200 250 117 157 |
171 |
|
Oliio .... Ohio .... Ind |
8 ) 1 1- j Fl g 1 i > ■ i ll Zanesville Lawrenceburg . . . Cedar Rápida |
200 200 117 300 |
W.Va
Ohio. Ohio .
Philadelphif New Cumberland
Cantón
Zanesville
I ..■>■■'■ i ■ ri'-rl'li I ■: . .
Cedar Rápida
|
0.08 |
ico |
na |
1ÍW |
im |
son |
|
|
.08 |
10) |
1B7 |
;■.„ |
Vi «i |
UN) |
200 |
|
.11 |
|i.i |
78 |
114 |
145 |
1H7 |
isa |
|
.11 |
ion |
1(» |
1«4 |
HXI |
•un |
-.■;, |
|
.11 |
|<(! |
100 |
l<» |
nm |
1<» |
1(K) |
|
.OB |
100 |
12B |
12b |
iw |
lUi |
Pa . . . .
W.Va
Ohio
Ohio .
Ohio
Ind...
Boston
Jewett Citv. . Philadelphia New Cumberland
Cantón
Spnngneld .... Zanesville. — Lawrenceburg Cedar Rapidh .
Philadelphi
V' ■ ■.'.■ Cumberland
Cantón
Sprinfriield —
Zanesville .
Lawrenceburg Cedar Rápida.
|
O.06 |
ino |
117 |
isa |
150 |
1B7 |
||
|
OH |
HX> |
117 |
i:n |
m |
133 |
117 |
|
|
OH |
1(X) |
•¡h |
7!i |
i-.-. |
IhO |
1-.-- |
|
|
0f> |
100 |
1«l |
1«l |
«ti> |
Iffll |
Iffl |
|
|
tt> |
lili |
IIO |
11Í0 |
«10 |
wn |
•xm |
|
|
12 |
loo |
117 |
a<t |
tffi |
i** |
v:> |
|
|
01 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
150 |
uso |
Appendix B
TABLK i-ctmtintmd
imw ísfii iw: iSh i«t mij ¡«se
Pa..
Md.
W. Va.
Ohio.
Ohio.
Ohio.
Ind..
Jersey City.. Norrietown . . Philadelphia Baltimnre . .. New Cumberland
Cantan
Springfield
Zanesville
Lawrenceburg. . Cedar Rápida . . .
OOTWKX: KIO, ItOAHTX»
|
Pa |
Philadelphia .... |
0.18 |
tífí |
11.1 |
1.18 |
Vfi |
mi |
"SI |
|
|
Md |
Bal ti more |
.20 |
100 |
100 |
ISO |
«m |
sw> |
XIII |
l«l |
|
W. Va... |
New Cumberland |
.14 |
1(10 |
un |
m |
17» |
114 |
«14 |
LTU |
|
Ohio .... |
.18 |
un |
ii» |
IIMI |
lili |
187 |
flfiO |
MH |
|
|
Ohio .... |
Zanesville |
.18 |
1(10 |
M |
m |
na |
1"... |
1» |
1B6 |
|
Ind |
.30 |
im |
i:« |
INI |
133 |
i:-> |
|||
|
low*.... |
Cedar Rápida |
.10 |
Hli |
íau |
US |
450 |
460 |
aw |
W.Va. Ohio..
Ohio .. Ohio . .
Philadelphii Bal tí more . . New Cumberland
Cantón
Springñeld
Zanesville
Lawrenceburg Cedar Rapids ,
|
0.50 |
100 100 |
110 |
ISO |
■?rt) |
|
|
.60 |
ion |
135 ii'.7 |
1H7 |
m |
V.HI |
|
.50 |
100 |
uo un |
Ir» |
IDO |
\m |
|
1.00 |
un |
tOO UB |
IM) |
WXr |
•i»p |
|
O.fiÜ |
100 , ioü |
IWi |
•>:*> |
:ití |
|
|
.S4Í |
100 |
97 07 |
,..., |
m |
14!' |
|
1.00 |
100 |
90. 1Ú0 |
r'.-> |
180 |
I. SI |
|
0.30 |
100 333 |
407 |
533 |
667 |
|
Pa W. Va ... |
New Cumberlanc |
0.O7 .07 .10 .06 .08 .10 .06 |
100 i 00 1 100 11JÍI 100 ... |
100 111 100 100 US 80 100 |
114 1*3 136 100 135 100 100 |
143 143 [00 íeo US 1» UU |
171 200 143 1U lnú lüñ UQl MO 188; 188 lili I**) «0|3r» |
900 111 |
|
Uhio .... Ohio .... Ind. Iowft — |
Springfield Zanesville Lawrenceburg . .. Cedar Rapids |
300 188 |
ELut-iíT o? ts> Gbkksbacks
Con. Jnc: - .-- .« I01> 100 88
(¡M WlaU :•> M> 110 110
5.Í « «r-*— ---- * WO WOi 100
Pa. nii i tu1- o» 1'» 100
W.V». -v _ --x- ÚB WO L£l 1S5
OfeMí C«nai -OS ... 100 133
Otan Snñmhtf OBS loo 93 93
(.««, Z^Mrife <* 100 100 100
Im. Ew»n»<-Jfc 10 ... 100 100
|
. |
UM |
UK |
|
133 |
164 1 900 |
|
|
HM |
1561 150 |
|
|
140 |
1*0 ! 110 |
|
|
ltt> |
175 |
•.i* |
|
11] |
133 |
l:*i |
|
1* |
1* |
ltt |
|
im |
VIH |
VID |
|
W |
1XÍ |
l-« |
|
i*» |
!"!> |
l?f> |
|
100 |
125 |
12b |
Sm, f> ,mm o.ll»
Ccea. - Sr» Ixm&jm ... .13
S.J. ... Canica 11
FV : F^l^Wpia . .10
ÍVv.1 S*wC«k«rt*»d 06
t*» Oa«« I -08
04» ... '■ Sí*ia^fielJ 085
Ohw . . . iMatiirúle 09
lr¡ ET»a¡íTÜk 075
|
ion |
inri |
130 |
IfW |
WÍI |
|
las |
llB |
13H |
154 |
ira |
|
n» |
inn |
114 |
17» |
v:- ' |
|
.... |
iim |
M |
141) |
1») |
|
u> |
i.-.i |
151) |
IM) |
I MI |
|
100 |
1» |
1.W |
188 |
15*1 |
|
l'l |
M |
M |
147 |
147 |
|
h!¡ |
un |
111 |
111 |
111 |
|
lm |
100 |
187 |
9U0 |
MH> |
W. V*
Ohw..
Ohk>
lod.
. Jevt-tt Citj
PhiUdelphL
! Csntoa
i Sprinutfifki . ■ -
ZídfSí ille
L»wrenceburg Od»rR*pid8.
|
0.23J |
im |
Rfl |
un |
ion |
15» |
181 |
|
.23 |
1IKI |
m |
til |
nm |
I-/ |
14.1 |
|
.20 |
• |
mi |
i yo |
IVñ |
15» |
|
|
.16 |
11» |
i* |
l«fi |
VXi |
l'A> |
125 |
|
.12 |
• ■ |
m |
kí |
150 |
:«* |
W> |
|
.10 |
lili |
w> |
Hll |
11)1 |
ihi |
WHI |
|
.13 |
ir ki |
m |
115 |
US |
mi |
254 |
|
.30 |
U» |
K3 |
Km |
83 |
117 |
151) |
|
.06 |
luo |
SJ0 |
250 |
33») |
417 |
Appbndix B
TiBLE 4 - Continued
|
SUte |
Towd |
v ,■■'■■<■ |.,T II. |
ato |
UD |
18B |
i«*' mi |
MU |
vm |
|
|
New London — |
3.11 .13 .14 .10 .10 .10 .11 .076 |
100 100 ióó 1Ú0 nx> 100 |
100 lttí 100 i in lió 100 91 lúo |
100 1M H'T UD i¿". 100 91 100 |
127 133 114 140 150 100 109 167 |
ur, 208 143 140 1S0 150 109 400 |
164 •£*) 179 lio 160 [-» 109 aju |
164 |
|
|
Pa W. Va. . . |
Philadelphia . . . New Cumberlanc |
17B 140 |
|||||||
|
Ohio .... Ohio .... Ind |
Springfield ZaneBville Evansvüle |
109 aoo |
W. Va..
Ohio... Ohio . . . Ohio . . .
New London
Philadelphia New Cumberland
Cantan
SpritiRtield.. Zantwvüle . . . Evansville...
|
y;;;':1. |
ino |
||||||||
|
Jewett City |
100 |
un n |
75 |
150 |
150 |
ir-i |
|||
|
Pa |
Philadelphia .... |
ino |
1H) |
\m |
WD |
ÍM> |
2») |
||
|
Md. |
1 1X1 |
«h |
100 |
lili |
■ano |
m |
12H |
||
|
W. Va. . . |
New Cuín be ría nd |
i:« |
147 |
147 |
ii. |
IW |
|||
|
Ohio .... |
100 |
vm |
114 |
114 |
■i«i |
•/:.-, |
•/m |
||
|
Ohio .... |
Zaneaville |
100 |
(H |
'.'1 |
141 |
1flfi |
176 |
||
|
la. |
Cedar Rápida . . . |
2.00 |
100 |
125 |
350 |
sao |
375 |
375 |
P*. "'.
Md. W.Va Ohio. Ohio . Ohio , la
J.'W.-r.lCin PhiladelpbJ Bahimore . New Cumoerlacd Cantón
SpririLTli'lil -- - -
ZaneflVÜle
Cedar Rápida . . .
|
100 |
91 |
«4 |
ion |
124 |
139 |
|
|
111» |
ii.; |
l.SO |
IHH |
«10 |
||
|
100 |
un |
lis |
i-i |
1H1 |
mi |
|
|
1») |
i:« |
14? |
141 |
|||
|
100 |
100 |
n« |
lil- |
167 |
IK7 |
|
|
l«l |
122 |
ni |
ilí |
im |
244 |
|
|
1011 |
179 |
Iffl |
-«m |
|||
|
2.50 |
100 120 |
300 |
300 |
sao |
HlSTOBT OP THE GlftSBlCIS
t»ri
100' 100 « 75 láú 130 . 100 100 108 ~~~ " 1001 133 150 UT- ICO' 100 117 160: 100 15S 156 158! 1001 133 133 17SI 100 114 1»< 1*3, ...I 100; 133 SO :
133, SOi JOO
I X» 300 1 IDO , 15o! 157. 113 »0. 133! 233
|
Mra . |
|
|
P*. ... |
|
|
W. Va. |
|
|
Ohio .. |
|
|
Uhio.. |
|
|
Ohio.. |
| |
|
Ind.... |
|
Jewett < "itv Philadelphia New Cumberland
Cantón
Sfinnetipld . .
Zanesvüle
lia «ren ce bn rg Cedar Rápida
ATS
100 100 100
ie< a»
136 13G
S50 350
125 130
1M- lAj
111 ISO
íño aoo
|
B«toB |
.17 .18 .10 .10 .07 .1.'. .20 .05 |
lii) 100 1U) 100 !,<> 100 100 |
87 82 IDO íaj 60 143 40 too 100 |
144 135 m 110 un 186 100 75 na |
185 176 UB 140 l'V •JU un 150 |
||||
|
Conn Pa. W.Va... Ohio.... ohio Ohio . - - . Ind. la. |
Jewett City PhiUdf-lphia . . . New Cumberland |
— 100 100 111 líll 140 |
114 uo |
||||||
|
Sprinpfield ...... Zaneaville Lawrenceburg. . i "t i) .i r Rápida . . . |
143 «7 100 100 |
171 67 no |
100 tu aoo |
TABLB t-Coniintáed
|
Stata |
.. |
Inítial Prioe per Ib. |
un |
Wl |
un |
M |
- |
im |
IMS |
|
Mam |
Boetoc |
0.121 .14 .13 .10 .10 .00 .07 .10 .15 |
100 100 100 ioo 100 100 100 100 |
86 ea 117 100 1S0 67 114 100 100 |
77 S9 117 105 140 89 114 190 UQ |
M 80 117 105 140 133 114 190 100 |
110 157 117 140 140 200 143 200 |
100 400 117 180 un 222 14.1 220 |
|
|
Conn. |
Jewett City NewLondon Phíladelpbia..... New Cuniberlanc |
170 133 |
|||||||
|
W. Va |
l.-KI |
||||||||
|
Ohio. Ohio . |
'/■■<. 1 1 1 ■ • 1 1 1 !■ ■ Lawreoceburg. . . |
143 220 |
|||||||
N.J. W.Vi Ohio
New London. . . Phíladelpbia....
Camden
Nen Cumberland ZanesviUe
|
ü.](l |
ion |
100 |
im |
ion |
ion |
113 |
|
.10 |
111) |
110 |
1V«I |
140 |
im |
|
|
.12 |
1IK) |
117 |
117 |
1tt> |
1ñ0 |
MH |
|
.08 |
1(1) |
lfi» |
IM) |
1») |
i:-i |
Iflíl |
|
.10 |
100 |
70 |
;o |
BU |
tw |
00 |
Jewett City.. Philadelphia.
Baltimore .
New Cuuiberland
Cantón
Springfield . .
ZanesVille
Cedar Rápida
W.Vn Obio. Ohio. Obio-
Philadelphi New Cumberland
Cantón
Springfield . . . Zunesvillü .... La wrence.hu re Cedar Rápida.
8"Ó8q'
|
lm |
100 |
117 |
117 |
|
Vi. 1 |
WX) |
201» |
201) |
|
i:« |
Iffí |
•ni |
wrr |
|
1») |
1») |
1IUI |
lflO |
|
mi |
IIX) |
133 |
|
|
K.i |
114 |
1 1'. |
143 |
|
100 |
12.". |
12b |
10(1 |
HlSTOBT ÚF THE GbGBNBACKS
TaBLE 1-OmUimat
|
State |
Towo |
Frica |
HH |
1BBL |
Wl |
IS'.'i |
UN |
M |
IW |
|
Pa W. Va. „ |
Philadelphia New Cumberland |
0.00 .08 (tí .08 .10 .0B .07 |
100 ÜQ 100 no 100 |
78 100 150 75 SO 100 100 |
89 US 200 100 «0 100 1U |
80 US auo 125 70 125 143 |
ra US aoo 125 80 isa 179 |
111 200 21*1 |
111 w aoo |
|
Ohio .... lnd la |
Zanesville Lawrenceburg . .. Cedar Rápida |
lili 125 178 |
no 125 17» |
-. rOKBjDAKTDU
|
Bo*tor |
.-r 11. S:ioa .10 .07 .05 .06 .05 .075 |
100 100 100 loó 100 |
95 130 114 100 110 100 100 |
61 íau ni 120 un 100 IDO |
88 130 113 120 140 120 167 |
117 130 157 160 140 120 200 |
||
|
Conn.... |
New London |
140 140 |
||||||
|
Pa W. Va... Ohio .... Ind |
Philadelphia New Cumberland Zanesville Evansville |
240 24U 1411 1« 140 ¡ 140 200 200 |
New London. Philadelphia. New Cumberland
Cantón
Springfield
Zanesville
Lawrenceburg.
100 17 117 117 117 117
... 100 100 111 133 200
100 125 150 13) 175 175
... 100 133 450 333 250
100 106 109 100 218 218
100 100 120 140 ISO 200
100
97 83
Jewett City.. New London. Philadelphia. New Cumberland Zanesville
|
per Ib. |
ion |
05 |
89 |
93 |
1.39 |
|
III) |
lili |
m |
HH |
178 |
|
|
.11 |
no |
II H |
un |
IIM |
109 |
|
.00 |
lim |
Mil |
III |
Ktt |
|
|
.08 |
100 |
117 |
i:« |
133 |
i:« |
|
.055 |
100 |
161 |
182 |
218 |
291 |
212 183 200' 192 lOit1 127 200¡ 200
13) 13)
|
Appbndiz |
B |
463 |
|||||||
|
KLATIT. FBKTO |
TABLB i-Contítaua |
||||||||
|
Sute |
Town |
pcílb. |
1800 |
IM |
UU |
UB |
1H1 |
„., |
1*1 i |
|
New London |
0.16 .06 .10 .0» |
100 1 100 100i 111 ... 100 U» SEO |
100 133 110 leo 96 |
100 133 120 ir-) lüu |
100 178 1» lf¡*> 100 |
113 214 180 160 111 |
118 |
||
|
Pl W. Vo. . . |
Philudelfihia. .... New Cumberlanii |
180 uso |
|||||||
New London, Philadelphin. New Cumberland Cantón...
Z;iru>sville
|
".kc |
100 |
«7 |
85 |
02 128 |
lx-, |
|
.u |
100 |
1(» |
1(1» |
10* UB |
|.M |
|
.10 |
1IH) |
101) |
120 Un |
■>i.i |
|
|
.01 |
100 |
mk |
IhO |
l;-)' m\ |
«10 |
|
.015 |
UN |
iwi |
i:n |
na ara |
VTJH |
|
.1» |
100 |
mu |
150 |
167 :mo |
300 |
|
Jewett City |
|
|
New London |
|
|
Pa |
Poiladel jiliia |
|
W.Va.. |
New Cuml>erlan< |
|
Ohio .... |
Bj i]- i •! i ■ Re] 1 1 |
|
Ohio ... |
|
|
Ind |
Lawreneeburg. |
|
,■ ii, |
100 |
«1 SI |
07 |
1» |
|
tti 77 |
tm |
l.-l |
||
|
ii |
100 |
HK) 1(» |
100 |
II.! |
|
10 |
1IJU KM |
1*1 |
I!>ll |
|
|
n |
100 |
ii: Lm |
lífl |
i;;i |
|
<» |
lili |
j:ai UB |
1H7 |
í-< |
|
irif» |
111) |
11.17 101 |
im |
:ti, |
|
ii |
100 |
KM i:»i |
IM |
1Ȓ |
|
20 |
100 |
75 1 86 |
UU |
% |
W.Va.
Ohio
Ohio..
Boston 0
New London
Philü.lelph......
New Cumlwrland
Sprin^field
Zun.wille
HlSTOBÍ OF THE Gbebnbacks
TABLE 1 — Continua!
|
SistB |
Towd |
Inltlal per Ib. |
1HB |
US |
um |
m |
» |
jo.-. |
]-•- |
|
Conn .... Pa W.Va... |
New London Philadeiphia .... New Cumberlanc |
0.08 .07 .07 .06 .05 .08 .13 |
100 loó 100 100 100 100 |
150 100 US 133 100 167 100 |
150 100 171 133 100 200 115 |
150 111 171 167 100 850 116 |
150 143 171 %'*\ 100 300 123 |
150 214 200 avi 160 333 123 |
175 233 ■3) |
|
Ohio .... Ohio .... Ind |
Spríngfield Lawrenceburg.. . |
101» 333 81 |
New London
Camden
Philadi'lphia NewCumberland Zanesville . Kv;tn.-vill<-
|
0.16 |
iro |
113 |
113 |
113 |
113 |
1-'-, |
|
.14 |
100 |
1(1) |
id) |
1(10 |
(,!> |
179 |
|
.15 |
|<il |
IIK) |
IW |
12(1 |
m |
|
|
.10 |
100 |
1%) |
tan |
120 |
|-ii |
1*41 |
|
.10 |
11X1 |
HTI |
m |
Wl |
im |
ino |
|
.20 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
Boston
New London
Pbiladelpbia ... NewCumberland
Cantón
Zanesville
Evansville. . .
|
0.09/. |
100 |
08 |
63 |
77 |
iafi |
|
UK> |
1») |
130 |
140 |
140 |
|
|
.06 |
111) |
luí |
117 |
150 |
|
|
.04 |
Id) |
151) |
151) |
150 |
150 |
|
.03 |
1(1) |
lili |
m |
SKM) |
:e« |
|
.05 |
UNÍ |
11») |
Kli |
Mi) |
140 |
|
.075 |
100 |
100 |
167 |
200 |
New London
Camden
Philadeiphia
NewCumberland
Cantón
Zanesville
Evaneville
|
100 107 107 |
114 |
114 |
129 |
|
loo mi íuu |
Id) |
14() |
140 |
|
... 100 loo |
11») |
w |
150 |
|
100 lfttt 160 |
l(Ki |
i«) |
160 |
|
100 1U) 125 |
WXI |
¡n» |
sen |
|
100 10» 100 |
117 |
133 |
IR» |
|
100 lüU 100 |
166 |
188 |
188 |
Appemdix B
TABLE 1 — Conimutd
|
Conn |
Jewett City |
|
Pa. |
Philadelphia .... |
|
W.Va... |
New Cumberland |
|
Ohio .... |
|
|
Ohio .... |
ZaDeevüie |
|
Jnd |
Lawrenceburg .. . |
|
la |
CedarBapids |
|
1K1 |
TR7 |
|
lia |
I* |
|
1N) |
HIT |
|
114 |
|
|
1ÍB |
m |
|
llfi |
i:';, |
|
im |
','|i i |
|
ISO |
sno |
|
aw |
¡S4U |
Jewett City
Philadelphia New Cu m berland
Springflcld
Zanesville
Lawrenceburg . , . Cedar Rápida
|
fil |
M |
«3 |
r,:t |
|
w> |
luí |
1*1 |
|
|
in» |
!:■> |
imñ |
l.'ll |
|
14.1 |
''11 |
Vil |
■'II |
|
1 ti |
1H7 |
'/.*> |
|
|
*:; |
HH |
Kll |
i:« |
|
■M |
l"-> |
1»> |
M |
|
100 |
175 |
aou |
auu |
|
Stats |
Town |
pnOal |
|||||||
|
C.IH) |
Jewett City |
1.00 |
ion |
-.:> |
IR |
7f¡ |
ffi |
ion |
no |
|
1 IK> |
th |
«¡i |
Ib |
i») |
M) |
||||
|
N. Y |
Watertown |
1.12 |
101) |
4f> |
M |
73 |
1(17 |
«7 |
|
|
Pa. |
0.70 |
lili |
lili |
luí |
im |
1,1 |
171 |
14» |
|
|
Pa. |
Philadelphia .... |
.25 |
100 |
un |
400 |
400 |
400 |
aso |
|
|
W.Va . . . |
New Cu m berland |
.30 |
HU |
Kll) |
i:h |
1«7 |
lffl |
1K» |
|
|
MI |
1110 |
1») |
Un |
m |
|||||
|
Ohio .... |
.60 |
100 |
100 |
1<- ' |
UN) |
111) |
Kll |
117 |
|
|
I1L |
Rock Island |
.36 |
VM |
171 |
HU |
1.1 |
3:.*t ni o? ira "gimn^i
"■^iT^itMnn j 1
22. irr :3 xs>'X» ¡isa
a* sx a> od i» HD
:•» ^s i» ni ! sa . US
i* j.i a> m » si
a» in ac kt wi i«
|
N--» Cuawiflaaii I Ü |
vi) |
:tt |
17» |
314 |
94 |
19ft |
19(1 |
||
|
..i * |
L-A' |
*• |
!■*, |
I.TlI |
1N |
||||
|
1 50 |
!■•■ |
M.' |
Kl> |
liU |
«U |
||||
|
I 50 |
!■»■ |
Mr |
m> |
■su |
|||||
|
.1 50 |
[.*} |
« |
i:t |
114 |
1» |
114 |
107 |
||
|
IUíww |
;«•■ |
1T1 |
171 |
[71 |
|||||
|
Illinijtí. |
vote |
l'Ai |
*.• |
W |
KH |
lo* |
llM |
||
|
P-rf-í |
|||||||||
|
í >» |
lf |
150 |
lfl» |
111 |
*m |
-ííl |
|||
|
b»^c ; ... |
. ■? -ij |
Mi |
i Ti |
Kl |
1*4 |
Itfi |
1WS |
KM |
|
|
. . 1 JO |
|.t. |
|>li |
!'•' |
luí |
Mil |
I3H |
I* |
||
|
J*«-« C.ty |
. 3.50 |
I>» |
[•>! |
111' |
114 |
114 |
l.i, |
Itt |
|
|
1.(0 |
¡•m |
!■»■ |
1* |
11» |
1,-KI |
im |
|||
|
Xew CñmberUcd 1 .-> |
!■*• |
Un» |
114 |
143 |
143 |
143 |
1411 |
||
|
Casteo |
|m |
m |
mi |
1 11 |
I-.1» |
mi |
i*i |
||
|
Sprineficld - |
. . 3 iJU |
l'M |
« |
W2 |
1U) |
133 |
1K7 |
1B7 |
|
|
. . 1.50 |
lili |
133 |
133 |
15» |
IH3 |
VIII |
*» |
||
|
1 «JO |
l'll |
luu |
lis |
l.m |
I.tO |
i:« |
1» |
||
|
Roe* libad . |
. 4.50 |
lili |
133 |
144 |
144 |
i:tt |
133 |
||
|
Odn Bvfdi. |
2.50 |
]ll> |
lm |
íai |
l'JO |
a» |
auo |
||
|
Mi-s-ouri |
Pikit Knob |
. . 2.3) |
1UJ |
IM |
IM |
100 |
160 |
|
4 50 1«)| ... |
153 178 833 |
?11 |
2fi7 |
|||
|
Bortón (2i . |
4.50 |
M) 133 |
l'.l 1-.'., J» |
SU7 |
||
|
3 SO |
1<" 100 |
100 1 100 121 |
i4;i |
|||
|
New Ouiiil»' rlsnii |
1 .Vi |
lijo' 117 |
133 150 150 |
Ihll |
150 |
|
|
í.ou |
100 175 |
175 SO 2S5 |
K)0 |
|||
|
Illinois.. |
Rock Islantl |
1.00 ... j 100 |
150 200 300 |
TABLE 4 — ConJinacd
|
aun- |
Town |
a: |
un |
un |
un |
IMS |
UH |
isa |
IMS |
|
a: |
J«*ettCily |
1.50 8 00 8.S i H I. so I H S.M 4.00 3 00 ■!oo 8 50 í m S.00 s.u I.O0 ■ 3g 4.00 |
i oó ióó IOS loo 100 100 100 loo IÓÓ 100 100 ióó 100 iou |
100 u 1(0 100 110 US m u un 100 ino 100 i.-ji 100 110 ISO |
120 M 100 US 100 100 117 114 190 130 i» 157 1» |
S IOS 1» 138 HO lint KJi ni 109 1» M ISO 100 |
ISO lll 1» li:i ■/,', 111 130 an ¡H 183 ni uo 1S0 1» 1J.-, 181 180 BIT US HO |
160 US 12* m 100 1T1 1M uo aoo 117 1SS 113 ion m ISO Inu 1S1 •m m im 200 i» |
uo 111 |
|
Homer |
l." |
||||||||
|
W V, . |
r" |
||||||||
|
Oh», ni .. IH.... ln<l |
BaieDOa ... 2ww*t1Ub |
117 WS 171 100 US |
|||||||
|
lod. |
%>■ ílhno, ll ■ N.» i! L.'.i :.- ■1 ■ II ...:- |
US m |
|||||||
|
111 111 |
H.II...II.-.I I.-.I. ..II. . |
1 1 |
so so so so |
ni 157 |
|||||
|
Jo»* |
|-«IuRii«U |
100 |
|||||||
g
-i • ■ ti Citj . ..
- " ' ■• - i-
i ......
^pflnrf«-l'l /..... i. , ,. LouU.llle
IwlliBiiwHl
. LiKii'ii'
I,»wr«ni>*tmr»i
Tpcío ll«uv
lll«»imh«t»h
R.«fcUUiHJ
l'xlit Kn|-»l<
Pllot K. ■■'
Si. Ludii
HlSTOBT OF THE GbBEKB&CKS
b« , R«t I.
M (tu M ■
ad — ' Ittdiasapplu
kI | L.F.r —
ai -..: Lawra
TI M 13
kw m m
i.. 11. ir
ir i.
i- v.
. Bork l.l.n.I . CedaiBapid* . . Pifan Konb .
Appendix B
oheetinss: brown, (-4, Atlantic A.. Sh'wtiuiw: bre-wn, t-t. Atlantic A.. . Shirtiiup: bl1Brbed,t-4.N.Y. Milla. Sbirtinifs: bleachod. H, N. V. Mills..
Tlnünjn Amoekcaí, A.CJL
Tickiní»:AmoskeaB, A.C.A
FlonriRm
Flour:Ryc
M«l: corn, jellow, Viliwiried.
M<!*1: eoru. »rllnw, kilo-driod
Bean»
Hícp: Carolina prime
Riw: Carolina prime
Sn«r: Hi .huí,-, brown
Suyar: eood brown-.-
ílutasscí : N. O. prima
llolaiaes: N. O. primo
Molasscs: Porto Rica, boai
Mnli-iats: Porto Rico, beat
Ktarch: ordiuary laundrjr
Stnrrb: onlúiarj Unndry
Üultír
Cbee»
Choe-
Ero
Brea
Mafkerel: «alt, nhare, No. 1
Mackrrcl: piekled, No. 1
B«r
Bee(
Motton
Pork: hann, nugar-cured
P..rk: hams, cmoked
Pork: bocoo, olear.
Pork: barón, olear.
Pork: aaltmeu
Pork: eornod or aalted
Lard
Lard
Coaltantbracite.ttOffl
Cual :aDtbraclto, atore ... -
C.ml: bilumlooua
i '.!.■. h fiii.ijiiiinonj
Aicrageof rvlatiT* priora
ATcranoof relatiie prieta
Wll.ilni.il.
Retnil . .
Wlml.'sa!. Retaü... Wh..|.-M. Retail... IVliolfíiil. Ept.il... lVbi.b'sal. Retail... »"!„,[, -:,l, Retail...
WlK.lr-j,!. I¡. I.iil ..
vvr.r.i .-• ;.j.
Retail..
\W„, I, ■■-;,!■
Wlmlesal.-
ReUil
Wl,..li. .i.- Retail . .
l!"tr,il
Rítail..
Wl,,.lr-.,
Rctotl .
Rotnil Wh.úVsalr Retail .. .
Whol-ílll,
Retail... Wb.ile=al. Retail .. .
Ul.,.1. ■■;,!,
j RaUll...
II» I II ÍÜ
lili) /..."■
<r,2 4G!) 4n:. ÍL's'
" " :wi :tri ate
'U7 386
APPENDIX C
Relative Waqes
TABLE 1
WAGE-8BRIEB FBOM TABLE in OF THE ALDEICH AGRICULTURAS IMPLEMENTO
1. Massachusetts
1 —
|
FOREMEN Woodwork's |
Tfc-= Laborees |
Machinists |
Painters |
Woodwoer's |
||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
|||||
|
Initial wage per day |
$1.64 |
$1.00 |
$1.665 |
$1.25 |
$1.333 |
|||||
|
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 2 2 2 2 2 1 3 5 2 3 3 7 6 5 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 • • • • • • 3 2 2 2 3 1 |
ReL Wages |
No. |
ReL Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan... July . . 1861, Jan... July . . 1862, Jan... July . . 1863, Jan . . . July . . 1864, Jan . . . July . . 1865, Jan . . . July . . 1866, Jan . . . July . . |
100 100 100 99 99 98 108 112 122 152 152 175 175 183 |
100 100 100 100 88 100 90 112 117 142 150 161 163 169 |
2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 6 5 |
100 100 108 108 100 84 113 101 108 123 125 138 131 134 |
100 100 100 100 100 • • • • • • • • • 89 106 113 127 124 120 |
3 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 4 3 4 4 5 5 |
100 103 103 94 113 113 113 119 124 161 169 189 191 179 |
i la the following tables the series of relativo wages from the "exhibits" of tbe Aldrich Reporta used in chap. v of Part II, are reproduced in full. As in the exhibits, the series are classified by establishments, and the' establishments by industries. To facilítate references, the samo order of arrangement is followed and the number assigned to each establishment in the exhibits and thestate in which it is located are given. A chango has boen made, however, in the arrangement of tho series by groap* ing the foremen, overseers, etc., in any establishment at the beginning and the f órnalos at the end. The initial wage from which varia tions are compoted and the nnmber of employees are given becanse they were made use of in preparing oertain of the tables in the text.
470
Appbndix O
471
TABLB l — Oontínued
WAQB-8BBXBS PBOM TABLB XII OF THB ALDBIGH RBPOBT — ALB, BBBB, ABD FOBTBB
2 New York
|
FORBMBH Laborees |
Brewbbs |
COOPERS |
Laboreas |
Teamstbrs |
||||||
|
8ex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
|||||
|
Initial wage per day |
$1.34 |
$6.39 |
$1.505 |
$0.85 |
$1.44 |
|||||
|
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 8 8 8 10 7 6 7 8 6 7 5 4 5 5 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 26 28 32 30 26 33 26 27 29 28 23 18 30 21 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan... July. . 1861, Jan... July . . 1862, Jan . . . July . . 1863, Jan... July.. 1864, Jan... July . . 1865, Jan... July . . 1866, Jan... July . . |
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 |
100 100 120 120 120 120 120 115 124 129 136 130 132 132 |
100 100 100 100 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 250 250 |
100 101 101 100 101 101 101 103 125 131 127 148 146 143 |
100 99 99 100 99 101 102 114 134 147 151 149 154 152 |
4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 |
100 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 |
4Md.
BOOKS AND NEW8PAPER8
5 N. Y. 5 N. Y. 5 N. Y.
5N. Y.
5N. Y.
|
Pbintbbs : Bk. and Job |
FORBMBN COBPS. |
FORBMBN Pbessmen |
Carpent's |
Composi- tor* |
COMPS. Learners |
|||||||
|
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
|||||||
|
Init. wage per day .. |
$1.665 |
$2.00 |
$2.00 |
$1315 |
$1.665 |
$0.695 |
||||||
|
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 • • * • 1 1 1 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 2 2 1 • • 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 « • |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. 10 7 8 6 5 7 5 • * • • 4 4 4 5 3 |
Reí. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
• • • • 8 8 6 6 6 8 6 9 12 12 12 12 |
• • • • • • 100 100 100 100 100 100 120 150 180 180 180 180 |
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 • • 2 2 2 2 2 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 • • • ■ • • 138 150 150 150 150 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 • • • • • • 133 133 142 150 150 |
100 100 95 • • • 95 95 102 102 102 127 127 127 140 • • • |
17 11 20 17 16 18 21 • • 23 27 25 23 26 |
100 100 99 99 99 99 99 • • • • • • 150 150 150 150 150 |
100 81 76 72 81 88 94 • • • • ■ • 99 108 105 120 132 |
472
HlSTOBY OF THE GBEENBACKS
TABLE 1 — Continuad
WAOB-SBRIBS FEOM TABLE XII OF THE ALDRICH RRPORT — BOOKB AND MSXWSP
5 New York
|
Machin'ts |
PRESSMEN |
Pbessboom Hands |
Portees |
FOLDERS |
Press roosi Haxds |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
F. |
F. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day . . |
$1.705 |
$1.665 |
$0.612 |
$0.915 |
$0.47 |
$0.465 |
||||||
|
No. 2 3 3 4 3 1 2 3 2 3 2 • • |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 • • 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 3 3 3 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 3 1 3 4 5 3 2 4 5 4 5 5 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 4 5 3 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 16 7 16 15 11 12 11 26 41 30 30 22 |
Bel. Wages |
No. |
BeL Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 95 95 95 94 88 92 137 161 156 153 • • • |
100 • • • 100 100 100 100 100 150 150 133 130 130 |
100 41 105 104 113 95 126 119 139 133 134 115 |
100 109 115 103 103 109 119 138 144 146 144 140 |
100 99 91 94 100 105 104 119 110 117 119 134 |
6 5 8 10 7 9 9 14 14 13 12 13 |
100 104 97 96 84 95 108 137 133 140 140 145 |
6 New York
|
FO REMEN COMPO8ITOR8 |
Compositora |
CoifPosiTOEs APPRBNTICES |
Peesshkn |
PERDÉIS |
||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
F. |
|||||
|
Initial wage per day |
$2.50 |
$1.835 |
$0.755 |
$2.335 |
$0.33 |
|||||
|
No. 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 2 2 3 4 6 6 6 6 9 8 11 8 10 10 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 9 9 8 7 7 8 6 6 2 3 4 3 4 3 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 • • • • • • • • |
BeL Wages |
No. |
BeL Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan . . July. 1861, Jan.. July. 1862, Jan . July. 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan . July 1865, Jan . July 1866, Jan. July |
• • • • |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 110 117 129 129 129 129 |
100 104 108 104 106 104 107 111 114 117 138 136 134 134 |
100 101 88 83 93 91 89 89 121 99 98 121 97 103 |
100 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 • • • • ■ • • • • • • • |
• • • • • • 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 4 4 |
• • • • • • • * • 100 152 152 152 152 152 164 174 189 SOS SOS |
Appendix C
473
TABLE 1- Continuad
W AGE-SERIES FBOM TABLE in OF THE ALDRICH REPORT— BUILDINQ TRADB8
7 Conn. 8 Conn. 8 Conn. 9 Conn. 9 Conn. 10 Md.
|
Carpent's |
Carpent's |
Carpent's HsiiPERS |
Hod Carrirrs |
Masons |
Paintbrs |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage perday .. |
$1.50 |
$1.715 |
$1.00 |
$0.80 |
$1.765 |
$1.75 |
||||||
|
No. 4 6 3 4 3 3 2 3 3 • • 3 4 4 4 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. 8 17 12 40 15 9 10 7 • • 17 • • 5 13 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
|
|
1800, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 117 89 100 89 100 100 117 117 • • • 150 183 171 188 |
9 10 9 6 1 7 • • 20 19 23 10 • • • • |
100 99 91 87 87 89 • • • 112 111 131 127 • • • • • • |
1 • • 1 2 • • 1 • • 2 6 9 6 • • • • |
100 • • • 138 132 • • • 134 • • • 125 125 157 146 • • • • • • |
100 137 125 125 125 125 188 202 • • • 199 • • • 208 206 |
6 11 12 1 9 9 7 4 • • 21 • • 7 10 |
100 116 105 113 113 113 158 131 • • • 140 • ■ • 160 170 |
2 4 2 1 1 6 1 8 2 9 5 9 5 11 |
100 100 86 86 86 86 86 100 114 143 143 143 143 143 |
12 Massachnsetts
|
FORBMXN Brickl'rs |
FOREMEN Masón a |
Brickl'rs |
Brickl'rs Helpebs |
Masons |
Masons' Helpers |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day .. |
$2.50 |
$2.50 |
$1.765 |
$1.12 |
$1.875 |
$1.065 |
||||||
|
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 • • • • • • 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 9 12 12 28 10 11 4 17 15 19 9 20 15 13 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 5 6 12 35 13 14 14 11 13 9 18 11 11 |
ReL Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. 9 15 9 15 20 17 6 16 11 8 9 8 13 21 |
Reí. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1806, Jan. July |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 110 120 • ■ • • • ■ • • • 160 160 |
100 100 100 120 100 100 100 100 100 120 120 160 160 160 |
100 86 107 101 106 105 110 106 120 131 139 146 147 167 |
100 91 100 100 101 110 109 108 122 134 134 134 156 156 |
5 11 11 13 10 13 4 9 7 19 7 8 13 15 |
100 85 101 96 84 105 93 102 114 102 116 137 143 167 |
100 100 85 92 97 110 118 114 130 142 142 142 160 166 |
474
HlSTORT OF THE GBEENBACKS
TABLE 1— Continuad
WAOB-8KBZX8 FROM TABLB XH OF THB ALDRICH RZPORT— BUTLDIXO
13 Mass. 13 Mass. 13 Mass. 13 Mass. 13
14
|
FOBKMKN C ARPEN TV |
FOREXKN Painters |
Ca&pknt'b |
CarprhtV Hklpkkb |
PaTNTKRS |
Stm. *Gas Fittxrs |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day.. |
$1.67 |
$1.50 |
$1.425 |
$0.83 |
$1.165 |
$1.875 |
||||||
|
No. |
Bel. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 • • • • 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
ReL Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
ReL Wages |
No. |
ReL Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 100 100 100 120 105 120 120 135 135 135 150 165 195 |
100 100 100 100 100 • • • • • • 111 111 117 133 150 167 183 |
7 17 14 21 18 18 20 23 15 20 17 19 30 24 |
100 93 93 83 90 95 99 106 110 119 126 147 152 167 |
1 4 3 3 • • 3 3 5 4 6 3 3 5 6 |
100 100 100 100 • • • 90 120 120 120 120 151 151 181 211 |
6 6 6 4 4 4 6 6 7 20 3 5 15 4 |
100 102 101 99 107 103 119 107 110 130 150 172 152 182 |
4 5 4 • • 4 ■ • 3 2 3 6 4 4 6 5 |
100 90 105 • m • 93 * • • 111 110 115 106 123 120 113 120 |
14 Mass.
15 Mass. 16 N. J.
16 N. J.
16 N. J.
17 N. Y.
Sex.
Init. wage per day. ■
1859, July
1860, Jan. July
1861, Jan. July
1862, Jan. July
1863, Jan. July
1864, Jan. July
1865, Jan. July
1866, Jan. July
St'm * Gas Fitters' Helperh
M.
$1.195
No.
1
• •
2
• •
1 1 1 3 3 4 2 3
Reí. Wages
100
84
• • •
110
• • •
105 42
112 77 63 79 84 73
Painters Hocse
M.
$1.10
No.
5
10
5
17
3
6
5
1
2
7
5»
9
4
10
Pldmbebs
$2.00
Reí. v Wages i ^°-
100 101 103 101 114 102 116 102 136 175 164 195 227 198
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 4
Reí. Wages
100
100
100
100
81
84
94
100
113
125
125
150
150
139
Laborees
M.
$1.18
No.
3 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 4 3 5 2
Reí. Wages
Tinsmiths
M.
$1.52
No
100
100
85
85
92
85
95
97
97
117
123
153
151
155
8 8 6 5 3 3 3 2 4 4 3 3 5 5
Reí. Wages
CARFzsrr'i
M.
$1.185
No.
100 104 108 110 113 113 115 107 132 122 128 148 148 155
2
5
5
5
3
6
5
10
9
14
12
12
10
10
ReL
100 110 112 122 127 127 133 152 152 169 183 174 186 196
i Honra redneed January, 1865, from 13 to 10.
Appendix C
475
TABLE 1-Continued
WAOB-SBBX» FIOM TABLB XII OF THB AX.DRICH SBPOBT— BUTLDDrO TBADBfl
17 N. Y. 17 N. Y. 17 N. Y. 17 N. Y. 18 N. Y. 19 N. Y.
|
Cabpknt's |
CarpentV |
T . m. |
Paj |
| |
f* . -m |
|||||||
|
Appren. |
Helpers |
IjA&ukkks |
TeAmbtkkb |
DITOS |
CAftrarT-B |
|||||||
|
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
|||||||
|
Init. wage perday.. |
$.375 |
$1.00 |
$0.88 |
90.75 |
$2.00 |
$2.00 |
||||||
|
No. • • 4 5 4 1 1 1 3 4 4 2 • • • • 1 • • |
Bel. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. • • 1 1 3 3 1 2 • • 2 1 • • • • • • 1 2 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 1 • • • ■ • • 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Bel. Wagea |
No. |
BeL Wagea |
No. |
Bel. Wages |
|
|
1859, Jan. 1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
• • • 100 123 147 88 112 100 96 133 139 183 • • • • • • 267 ■ • * |
• ■ 1 3 3 4 5 8 5 2 2 • • 1 1 • • 1 |
• • • 100 79 79 92 100 111 113 125 125 • • • 150 150 • • • 150 |
• • • 100 100 99 109 142 142 ■ • • 114 114 ■ • ■ • • • • • • 142 156 |
100 • • • • • • • • • 100 100 100 133 167 167 233 233 233 233 233 |
• • 15 60 8 40 8 45 10 40 7 45 12 45 10 45 |
• • • 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 113 113 150 150 175 175 175 |
• • 30 65 30 70 15 40 12 60 20 65 25 50 40 80 |
... 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 113 150 150 163 175 175 |
20N.Y.
21 N. Y.
22 N. Y.
22 N. Y.
22 N. Y. 23 N. Y.
|
Plumbebs |
Booms Sl.AMVl |
Brickl'bs |
Bricki/m' Helpers |
PlastVs |
PAIHTERS |
|||||||
|
8ex |
M. |
M. |
M. $2.00 |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day . . |
$1.875 |
$1.25 |
$1.25 |
$2.00 |
$1.915 |
|||||||
|
No. |
Bel. Wages |
No. |
BeL Wages |
No. 8 8 7 7 5 5 4 5 9 9 5 5 5 5 |
BeL Wages |
No. |
Bel. Wages |
No. |
BeL Wages |
No. |
BeL Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
4 4 4 4 5 5 10 12 4 4 4 4 6 6 |
100 100 100 100 101 107 107 133 160 187 187 187 195 195 |
2 6 3 4 2 3 3 6 5 8 2 5 2 6 |
100 125 120 120 160 160 240 240 280 280 320 320 280 280 |
100 100 100 100 113 113 125 125 125 150 150 150 175 200 |
12 10 10 10 8 8 6 6 10 10 3 4 10 10 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 130 130 180 180 180 180 180 200 |
8 8 7 7 5 5 4 5 9 9 5 5 5 5 |
100 100 100 100 100 113 125 125 125 150 150 150 175 200 |
• • 3 • • 5 • • 2 • • 3 • • 4 • • 2 ■ • 4 |
1ÓÓ • • • 93 • • • 91 • • • 113 • • • 150 • • • 185 Í83 |
476
HlSTOBY OF THE GBEENBACK8
TABLB l-Continmed fbom tabla xn of thb aldbich ekpokt 24 N. Y. 2*Pa. 2*Pa. 27 Pa.
|
Booms |
BmiCKLAY*S |
Bucklay's Hklpkbs |
CAmrar*a |
CAzrar*s |
PLASTA* |
|||||||
|
8ex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
perday.. |
$1.835 |
$2.00 |
$1.12 |
$1.75 |
$1.75 |
$1.065 |
||||||
|
BeL |
BeL |
BeL |
BeL |
BeL |
BeL |
|||||||
|
><x |
Wa*es |
No. |
Wages |
Na. |
Wages |
No. |
Wa«es |
No. |
Wt«» |
No» 9 |
Wt|w |
|
|
1900. Jan. 2 |
100 |
6 |
100 |
3 |
100 |
3 |
100 |
6 |
100 |
100 |
||
|
July |
2 |
91 |
20 |
100 |
10 |
100 |
8 |
100 |
10 |
100 |
13 |
108 |
|
1861, Jan. |
3 |
82 |
, , |
* • • |
. . |
• • • |
4 |
100 |
5 |
100 |
9 |
98 |
|
Juiy |
2 |
82 |
20 |
100 |
10 |
112 |
10 |
100 |
12 |
114 |
16 |
99 |
|
1862, Jan. |
4 |
78 |
6 |
113 |
3 |
112 |
4 |
114 |
7 |
114 |
10 |
99 |
|
Julir |
4 |
82 |
20 |
113 |
10 |
112 |
10 |
114 |
16 |
143 |
12 |
100 |
|
1863; Jan. |
5 |
84 |
m m |
• • • |
w m |
... |
4 |
114 |
5 |
143 |
8 |
116 |
|
July |
4 |
105 |
m # |
• • • |
m . |
• • . |
10 |
114 |
10 |
171 |
12 |
115 |
|
1864. Jan. |
4 |
113 |
10 |
125 |
10 |
134 |
10 |
129 |
6 |
171 |
10 |
114 |
|
July |
5 |
131 |
35 |
125 |
18 |
134 |
14 |
129 |
8 |
171 |
14 |
116 |
|
1865» Jan. |
4 |
150 |
10 |
150 |
5 |
179 |
20 |
136 |
7 |
171 |
10 |
114 |
|
July |
4 |
150 |
30 |
150 |
15 |
179 |
21 |
133 |
12 |
143 |
14 |
137 |
|
1866, Jan. |
4 |
163 |
12 |
150 |
12 |
179 |
15 |
151 |
8 |
143 |
8 |
139 |
|
July |
4 |
163 |
40 |
150 |
20 |
179 |
19 |
151 |
20 |
143 |
10 |
156 |
CAUIAGES AXD WAGOXS
33 New York
luitial w*í* per day.
BLACKSMIT8 BLACK8MTT,8
$1.50
No.
UHVJanuary 3
July 3
IfcU.January 3
July 3
Ifcfci.January 3
July 3
U*ft*January 3
July 3
l*U,Januarr 3
July
MR* January 3
July
lftMk Januai?
July
BeL
100 100 100 100 200 200 200 200 200
$0¿35
No.
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 .
|
3 |
200 |
3 |
|
3 |
200 |
3 |
|
3 |
200 |
3 |
|
5 |
200 |
5 |
|
5 |
200 |
5 |
|
BeL |
|
|
Wages |
No. |
|
100 |
2 |
|
100 |
2 |
|
100 |
2 |
|
100 |
2 |
|
190 |
2 |
|
190 |
|
|
190 |
3 |
|
190 |
3 |
|
180 |
3 |
|
190 |
2 |
|
190 |
2 |
|
190 |
2 |
|
190 |
4 |
|
180 |
1* |
BeL
100 100 100 100 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140
fll'l
No.
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
100 100 100 100 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160
Appendix O
477
TABLK 1— Continuad
WAOB-SBBIM FBOM TABLB XH OF TH1 ALDRICH BJCPOBT— OTPT PÜBLZO WOSK8
84 Mass. 84 Mass. 35 N. Y. 85 N. Y 85 N. Y. 85 N. Y.
|
FOREMEN Laborees |
Laboreas |
FOBBHElf Laborera |
Blacksm's |
BlacksmV Helpebs |
Blastebs |
|||||||
|
OvX •••• •••• |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day.. |
$1.25 |
$1.02 |
$2.00 |
$1.82 |
$1.25 |
$1.25 |
||||||
|
No. 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 6 3 5 4 |
ReL Wages |
No. 7 24 18 16 21 27 7 12 29 14 75 19 12 32 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. 16 23 17 25 9 7 4 7 8 7 7 5 2 2 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 15 12 19 8 4 5 4 5 5 7 5 5 1 1 |
Rol. Wages |
No. |
ReL Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 140 140 170 100 160 160 170 147 220 193 167 180 180 |
100 99 99 99 99 100 107 146 119 131 120 153 147 157 |
42 30 25 28 20 22 19 20 17 16 12 11 12 8 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 110 125 150 150 150 150 150 |
100 99 99 96 97 99 106 110 137 151 176 179 179 192 |
100 100 92 84 92 91 100 108 128 152 160 160 160 160 |
6 10 15 • • • • • • 2 • • • • 1 1 1 1 • • |
100 100 100 • • • • • • • • • 128 • • • • • • 152 160 160 160 • ■ • |
85 New York
|
Bbicbxay's |
Cabpent's |
Qardkn'rs |
Labobbbs |
Masons |
Stonbcut's |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day . . |
$2.00 |
$1.72 |
$1.40 |
$1.00 |
$2.00 |
$2.00 |
||||||
|
No. 25 45 25 35 7 8 7 12 5 8 5 3 2 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 36 18 28 38 14 13 19 8 8 10 9 10 8 11 |
ReL Wages |
No. 20 40 14 30 10 15 15 16 16 30 20 22 12 12 |
Rcl. Wages |
No. 1225 1500 1200 1100 800 900 800 800 700 650 500 450 420 500 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 150 165 58 55 8 8 7 12 6 8 5 3 3 2 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 100 100 90 88 88 100 110 125 150 160 150 175 175 |
100 100 101 97 100 99 114 116 145 158 174 187 189 203 |
100 93 93 82 79 79 93 100 114 136 143 143 143 143 |
100 100 100 90 100 100 125 125 150 180 190 190 190 190 |
100 100 100 90 88 88 100 110 125 150 160 150 175 175 |
240 185 290 20 • • 16 15 5 5 20 10 1 11 2 |
100 100 100 113 • • • 88 100 113 125 150 160 150 175 175 |
478
HlSTOBY OF THE GrEENBACKS
TABLE 1 — Continuad
WAQK-8BRIRS FROM TABLB XH OF THB ALDRICH RRPORT— CITT PUBLIC WORKS
35 N. Y. 36 Pa. 36 Pa. 36 Pa. 36 Pa. 36 Pa.
|
Qüarrym'n |
Carpknt'b |
Enoineers |
Enoineer assistant |
FlBEMEN |
Laborees |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day.. |
$1.10 |
$2.00 |
$2.125 |
$1.25 |
$1.25 |
$1.335 |
||||||
|
No. 110 340 280 45 70 50 30 • • |
Bel. Wages |
No. • ■ 1 1 2 2 2 2 *> í |
Reí. Wages |
No. 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 4 4 4 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 6 7 6 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 3 3 6 7 7 7 6 5 10 10 8 8 8 8 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 23 30 30 34 34 34 8 8 36 36 21 26 15 13 |
Reí. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 100 100 145 173 182 182 182 • • • |
• • • 100 100 100 100 100 Í38 138 138 |
100 100 99 99 99 99 94 94 96 96 119 119 119 119 |
100 100 88 88 88 88 92 92 92 92 132 132 132 132 |
100 100 100 103 103 103 102 99 99 99 132 132 132 132 |
100 97 97 96 96 96 96 96 112 112 131 131 131 131 |
36 Pa.
36 Pa.
36 Pa.
37 Pa.
Sex.
Initial wage per day.
1860, January July....
1861, January July....
1862, January July....
1863, January July....
1864, January July....
1865, January July....
1866, January July....
Machinists
M.
$1.50
No.
6
8
12
12
Reí. Wages
100 100 121 121 121 121 100 100 146 133 175 183
las
178
Pattern Makers
M.
$1.50
No.
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
Reí. Wages
100 100 100 100
150 150 150 150
Watchmxn
M.
$1.50
No.
2 2 4 4 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Reí. Wages
100
100
89
89
89
94
73
73
73
73
100
100
100
100
Laborera
M.
$1.25
No.
28 30 33 37 16 29 20 34 19 38 24 37 15 23
Reí. Wages
100 100 100 100 100 100 120 120 140 140 140 140 140 140
Appendix C
479
TABLE 1- Continuad
WAOB-AKKIS8 nOM TABLE in OF TH1 ALDRICH BBPOET — OOTTOH OOODS
88 Massachusetts
|
M'ST'B Ma CHINI8TS |
OVERSEERS C ARDÍ NO Dep't |
overseers Cloth Room |
overseers Dresbino Dkp't |
overseers Spinnino Dep't |
ovbbsebrs Weavino Dep't |
|||||||
|
UvA • • • • |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wa«e per day.. |
$3.33 |
$3.00 |
*2.00 |
$3.00 |
$3.00 |
$2.065 |
||||||
|
No. |
Reí. |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 100 100 100 100 100 106 106 120 120 120 120 150 150 |
100 100 83 83 83 83 100 100 117 117 117 117 133 133 |
100 100 84 84 84 84 100 100 125 125 113 113 138 138 |
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
100 100 83 83 83 83 100 100 117 117 117 117 133 133 |
100 100 83 83 83 83 100 100 113 113 117 117 133 133 |
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 |
100 100 85 85 85 85 103 103 129 129 121 121 157 157 |
|
Secón d Hands |
Thtrd Hands |
Backbots |
Balees |
Bbam- Carriers |
Beltmen |
|||||||
|
8ex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day.. |
$1.365 |
$0.97 |
$0.265 |
$1.00 |
$0.835 |
$1.50 |
||||||
|
No. 13 13 13 13 13 13 10 10 12 12 11 11 12 12 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 17 17 18 18 12 12 9 9 4 4 6 6 13 13 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 13 13 12 12 13 13 14 14 14 14 13 13 13 13 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864,Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 100 77 77 78 78 101 101 113 113 139 139 157 157 |
100 100 71 71 80 80 103 103 155 155 159 159 175 175 |
100 100 87 87 74 106 136 158 177 177 172 172 187 187 |
100 100 83 83 &3 &3 108 108 133 133 133 133 167 167 |
100 100 83 83 &3 83 129 129 150 150 159 162 175 175 |
100 100 100 100 111 111 111 111 117 117 122 122 150 150 |
480
HlSTOBT OF THE GBEENBACK8
TABLE Í-Oontinued
FKOlf TABLB in OF THB ALDRICH
98 Massachnsetts
UPOBT — OOTTOV OOODS
|
Black- SMITHS |
BOBBIH Mkv |
BOTLKRXSH |
BVbm'kV Hklpkeb |
Cabfent'b |
Cakd OiDrom |
|||||||
|
8ex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
*L |
||||||
|
Init. wago per day . . |
$1.79 |
$1.415 |
$1.75 |
$1.06 |
$1.52 |
$1.025 |
||||||
|
No. 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 |
Reí. Wages |
No. • • • • 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
ReL Wagss |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 100 97 97 106 106 106 106 116 116 151 151 158 158 |
• • • • • • 100 100 106 106 124 124 159 159 153 153 144 144 |
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 |
100 100 86 86 95 95 100 100 98 98 107 107 114 114 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 116 116 116 116 130 130 139 139 |
5 5 6 6 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 |
100 100 102 102 113 113 113 113 132 132 168 168 164 164 |
7 7 7 7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 |
100 100 90 90 111 111 111 111 120 120 140 140 141 141 |
|
DOFFKRS |
DOUBLE TENDEES |
Entrtmkn |
FlLLIWG Cauri ees |
Lap Carriera |
M'cHmsTs |
|||||||
|
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
|||||||
|
Init. wage por day.. |
$0.315 |
$0.64 |
$0.92 |
$0.83 |
$0.71 |
$1.565 |
||||||
|
No. 33 33 33 33 33 .33 27 27 26 26 26 26 27 25 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 6 6 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
ReL Wagss |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 100 92 92 97 97 124 124 139 139 186 186 183 187 |
100 100 88 88 110 110 117 117 113 113 198 198 198 198 |
100 100 82 82 82 82 109 109 136 136 136 136 163 163 |
100 100 81 81 81 81 111 111 141 141 155 155 155 155 |
100 100 92 92 126 126 118 118 146 146 144 144 192 192 |
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 9 9 8 8 |
100 100 97 97 105 105 109 109 128 128 144 144 166 166 |
Appendix C
481
TABLE l-Coniinucd
TABLB in OF THB ALDBICH MPOBT— COTTON OOOIM
88 Massachosetts
|
Mabons |
OlLBBfl |
Paiwtkm |
Piensa |
BOLLRB OOVEBKBS |
Waste Hamds |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day.. |
$1.48 |
10.42 |
$1.36 |
$0.71 |
$1.50 |
$1.10 |
||||||
|
No. 5 5 6 6 7 7 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 |
Bal. Wages |
No. |
Bel. Wages |
No. 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 |
Bel. Wages |
No. |
BeL Wages |
No. |
Bel. Wages |
No. 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 |
Bel. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 100 99 99 98 98 115 115 151 151 192 192 225 225 |
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 |
100 100 107 107 107 107 107 107 112 112 131 131 242 242 |
100 100 104 104 107 107 107 107 113 113 135 135 156 156 |
12 12 9 9 9 9 9 9 7 7 9 9 9 9 |
100 100 111 111 109 109 146 146 181 181 193 193 200 200 |
2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 |
100 100 100 100 111 111 111 111 122 122 142 142 151 151 |
100 100 91 91 86 86 121 121 136 136 132 132 114 114 |
|
Watchmvn |
Whkblpzt Mkn |
Tard Hands |
Yarn Carribss |
Cakd Stbippkes |
SCKUBBEBS |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
p. |
F. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day.. |
$1.33 |
$2.00 |
$1.10 |
$0.68 |
$0.71 |
$0.45 |
||||||
|
No. 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 5 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 |
Bel. Wages |
No. |
Bel. Wages |
No. |
Bel. Wages |
No. |
Bel. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 100 81 81 81 81 107 107 113 113 132 132 150 150 |
100 100 113 113 113 113 113 113 125 125 133 133 150 150 |
100 100 91 91 82 82 110 110 127 127 114 114 127 127 |
3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 4 4 1 1 4 4 |
100 100 74 74 74 74 74 74 92 92 178 178 145 145 |
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 |
100 100 96 96 113 113 141 141 162 162 190 190 190 190 |
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 7 7 |
100 100 83 83 83 83 111 111 129 129 149 149 164 164 |
HlSTOBÍ OF THE Q-BBENBACKS
TABLE 1— Oontinued
|
38 Mam. |
SSMhu. |
39 Mass. |
39 lian. |
KMam. |
sen™. |
|||||||
|
Fonxra |
JÍSR. |
|||||||||||
|
el™™ |
||||||||||||
|
Sex |
P. |
F. |
11. |
H. |
K. |
11. |
||||||
|
Init. wnK" pardal.. |
toso |
(0.71 |
91.75 |
»1.75 |
tt.00 |
•too |
||||||
|
No. |
Reí. W«gB3 |
No |
Reí. |
No |
Reí. Wagn |
No |
Eel. WagM |
No. |
Rol. WagM |
Na |
B*L |
|
|
1860, Jan. |
47 |
100 |
2 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
|
Jub |
47 |
V. |
100 |
1 |
107 |
1 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
] |
100 |
|
|
1861, J«n. |
4.'. |
84 |
1 |
70 |
1 |
107 |
1 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
|
July |
4¡> |
S4 |
1 |
70 |
1 |
107 |
1 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
|
1862,Jan, |
4h |
80 |
1 |
85 |
1 |
107 |
1 |
94 |
1 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
|
July |
V, |
80 |
1 |
85 |
1 |
114 |
1 |
64 |
100 |
1 |
75 |
|
|
1863, Jan. |
45 |
105 |
3 |
97 |
1 |
114 |
1 |
114 |
1 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
|
July |
4.S |
105 |
3 |
97 |
1 |
114 |
1 |
114 |
] |
100 |
1 |
100 |
|
1864,Jan. |
44 |
95 |
S |
102 |
1 |
114 |
1 |
119 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
|
|
July |
44 |
95 |
■A |
102 |
1 |
129 |
8 |
129 |
1 |
100 |
1 |
113 |
|
1865, Jan. |
» |
102 |
1 |
143 |
] |
143 |
1 |
100 |
1 |
113 |
||
|
July |
» |
102 |
1 |
143 |
3 |
143 |
1 |
113 |
1 |
113 |
||
|
1966, Jan. |
:« |
200 |
14 |
104 |
1 |
171 |
1 |
171 |
1 |
125 |
1 |
125 |
|
July |
37 |
200 |
14 |
104 |
1 |
171 |
i |
186 |
1 |
12S |
1 |
125 |
39 Maaaaebosetts
|
Otaasox |
SECOM |
c™»-. |
||||||||||
|
«■lothK'k |
HANOa |
|||||||||||
|
Box |
M |
11. |
M. |
H. |
M. |
11. |
||||||
|
Inít.wsuo |
¡125 |
81.75 |
82.00 |
82.00 |
81.175 |
81.42 |
||||||
|
\v.,„-.- |
•" |
Wagcs |
Uu, |
\Y.,o- |
..... |
Rui |
Wa«v, |
■•" |
■han |
|||
|
1080, Jan |
1 |
100 |
1 |
HX) |
1 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
n |
100 |
11 |
100 |
|
July |
1 |
100 |
I |
100 |
100 |
1 |
loo |
1 |
103 |
11 |
n |
|
|
]k«;i,.1uii |
1 |
100 |
1 |
too |
I |
100 |
1 |
100 |
n |
103 |
« |
as |
|
1 |
100 |
1 |
]<<l |
1 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
« |
103 |
11 |
se |
|
|
1 |
100 |
1 |
too |
1 |
100 |
1 |
11JO |
3 |
101 |
10 |
n |
|
|
1 |
7B |
1 |
86 |
1 |
75 |
1 |
75 |
4 |
se |
1" |
«5 |
|
|
IMKUjiii |
1 |
78 |
1 |
114 |
1 |
100 |
1 |
lio |
1 |
9» |
¡M |
90 |
|
1 |
7B |
1 |
114 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
1 |
0» |
« |
92 |
||
|
1 |
78 |
1 |
114 |
1 |
H» |
1 |
100 |
2 |
128 |
H |
108 |
|
|
1 |
92 |
1 |
114 |
1 |
88 |
1 |
113 |
» |
toa |
K |
128 |
|
|
100 |
129 |
1 |
88 |
1 |
113 |
ti |
108 |
H |
141 |
|||
|
1 |
100 |
1 |
120 |
a |
113 |
1 |
113 |
t> |
130 |
14 |
148 |
|
|
1 |
111 |
1 |
143 |
i |
125 |
1 |
iaa |
5 |
148 |
11 |
14T |
|
|
July |
1 |
111 |
1 |
143 |
i |
130 |
1 |
138 |
4 |
154 |
u |
m |
Appendix C
483
TABLE 1— Continuad
WAOB-6EEXES FBOM TABLE XII OF THB ALDBICH RJCPOET — OOTTOW GOOD6
39 Massachusetts
|
Caed Orindebs |
Card Strippbrs |
Machtn'ts |
■ Paintsbs |
PlCEEBS |
Section Hamos |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day... |
$0.83 |
$0.625 |
$1.38 |
$1.14 |
$0.735 |
$0.76 |
||||||
|
No. 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 6 6 3 4 4 2 1 1 5 2 2 4 4 4 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 24 24 14 13 14 17 7 10 11 10 10 12 16 15 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 7 7 7 5 4 6 4 6 8 6 6 6 6 5 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 5 6 6 6 6 4 3 3 2 3 2 5 7 7 |
Reí. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 110 110 110 114 104 110 110 151 160 160 201 202 192 |
100 103 111 112 112 104 96 96 120 179 179 179 179 179 |
100 101 104 106 97 99 109 102 112 126* 145 136 146 149 |
100 104 111 111 111 100 95 97 97 119 130 133 132 136 |
100 102 102 102 102 102 113 113 136 170 204 181 171 165 |
100 110 106 107 109 103 113 113 109 123 109 147 185 185 |
|
Slabheb Tendees |
Watchmbn |
Tabd Hands |
Drawees- IN |
Drawiho Hands |
Speedees |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
p. |
P. |
P. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day... |
$1.06 |
$0.86 |
$0.855 |
$0.475 |
$0.42 |
$0.52 |
||||||
|
No. 3 4 2 2 1 2 2 5 3 2 2 6 4 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 14 14 14 14 14 13 13 13 15 14 15 14 16 15 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 17 12 12 14 10 18 14 13 8 9 5 10 14 13 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 5 3 4 5 4 3 2 2 5 2 2 7 6 5 |
ReL Wages |
No. 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 4 4 5 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 92 83 83 84 • • • 97 97 111 131 127 139 148 155 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 116 145 145 145 174 174 |
100 101 101 102 92 101 104 105 119 150 148 152 154 168 |
100 112 84 113 114 117 114 114 123 143 141 133 189 171 |
100 119 119 119 119 95 95 95 119 119 119 129 160 160 |
4 4 4 4 4 2 1 1 2 3 2 5 4 5 |
100 106 104 101 104 96 92 92 106 110 110 121 161 161 |
484
HlSTOEY OF THE GbEENBACKS
TABLE 1 — Continued
WAOB-BBRISS FROM TABLB XH OF THB ALDRICH REPOBT — COTTOK GOODS
99 Mass. 99 Mass. 99 Mass. 40 Mass. 40 Mass. 40
|
Sptnnkbs Frakb |
Warperb |
Weavers |
M áster Machín 'ts |
FOREMKN Yard |
OVKRflEKRS Card. Dkp. |
|||||||
|
8ex |
F. |
F. |
F. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day... |
$0.475 |
$0.595 |
$0.46 |
$2.00 |
$1.50 |
$2£0 |
||||||
|
No. 28 21 26 29 30 25 23 25 24 25 28 34 34 31 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 6 6 7 6 7 5 1 1 2 1 1 2 4 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 19 15 25 16 18 19 21 23 20 22 24 25 24 22 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 92 97 95 102 102 97 99 114 121 118 131 191 189 |
100 115 108 105 79 84 67 67 94 109 97 141 132 161 |
100 103 110 102 112 102 117 118 128 149 140 132 186 198 |
100 100 113 113 113 113 113 125 150 150 150 150 163 163 |
100 100 117 117 117 117 117 117 150 167 167 167 157 167 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 110 110 110 120 120 120 |
40 Massachusetts
|
ovbrseers Cloth R'm |
overseers Dbess.Dep. |
Oyerseers Spin. Dep. |
OVER8EER8 Weav. Dep. |
Second Hands |
Third Hands |
|||||||
|
M. |
i |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day... |
$1.42 |
51.83 |
$2.50 |
$2.25 |
$1.485 |
$1.265 |
||||||
|
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 1 1 1 1 |
Rol. Wages |
No. 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 6 6 7 7 6 5 6 3 13 13 14 14 15 11 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 5 5 5 5 4 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 5 2 |
Reí. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 100 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 123 123 123 123 123 |
100 100 100 100 137 137 137 137 150 150 164 164 164 164 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Í2Ó 120 110 110 120 120 |
100 100 111 111 111 111 111 111 98 102 102 111 111 111 |
100 100 97 97 97 97 97 96 109 112 114 118 119 121 |
100 100 100 100 100 96 82 82 112 132 122 125 132 128 |
Appendix C
485
TABLE l-Continued
WAOB-8KBZX8 FROM TABLR XH OF THE ALDRICH RRPORT— COTTOM OOOD8
40 Massachosetts
|
1 |
Band Bots |
Carpent'b |
Card Qrinders |
Card Stripprrs |
Cloth-R'm Hands |
Drawing Hands |
||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init.wage per day .. |
10.79 |
$1.49 |
$0.83 |
$0.755 |
$0.50 |
$0.662 |
||||||
|
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Rol. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
2 4 4 1 1 1 • • • . 1 4 1 • • |
100 89 93 106 127 127 • • • • • • • • • • • • 63 111 127 • • • |
8 8 7 7 7 9 9 9 13 9 11 11 14 8 |
100 100 104 104 106 106 103 107 128 139 128 140 141 159 |
11 11 8 8 8 2 1 • • 6 7 5 6 6 6 |
100 100 106 106 106 96 106 • • • 181 178 179 189 189 189 |
11 11 11 11 14 4 3 • • 9 12 10 9 9 9 |
100 100 99 99 99 99 100 • • • 166 175 180 179 180 181 |
2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 • • • • • • • • 2 2 |
100 100 106 106 116 116 116 116 • • • • • • • • • • • • 169 169 |
5 4 5 5 4 2 • • • • 2 3 3 3 5 6 |
100 100 95 95 79 94 • • • • • • 106 113 121 129 157 176 |
|
Drkssrrs |
Domas |
£noinrkr8 |
FXBHMBN |
Harnbss Hands |
Laborees |
|||||||
|
8ex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init.wage per day .. |
$0.98 |
$0.303 |
$3.00 |
$1.415 |
$0.38 |
$0.995 |
||||||
|
No. 2 2 3 3 2 2 1 1 2 2 3 4 5 7 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 2 2 2 2 2 1 • • • • 1 1 • • • • 2 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 100 101 102 88 90 88 92 94 100 73 88 111 117 |
27 28 25 15 14 5 9 • • 15 15 15 14 10 9 |
100 100 102 107 105 114 94 • • • 124 124 132 132 165 165 |
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 92 92 96 96 96 100 |
100 102 98 99 100 105 106 99 104 106 107 108 112 118 |
100 97 121 121 126 132 • • • • • • 197 197 • « • • • • 216 234 |
16 16 11 11 9 6 5 4 11 14 8 13 13 8 |
100 100 103 103 100 106 107 124 147 173 164 174 176 177 |
486
HlSTORY OF THE GREENBACKS
TABLE 1— Continuad
WAOK-SKBZX8 FROM TABLE XH OF THB AXDRICH BEFOBT— COTTOX OOODS
40 Massachusetts
|
Machin'ts |
Machin'ts' Apprent's |
PlCKINO Room H'DS |
Rovino Hands |
Sbctioh Hands |
Spoolkbs |
|||||||
|
CK>X . • . • ... |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day .. |
$1.765 |
$0.875 |
$0.85 |
$0.38 |
$1.25 |
$0.448 |
||||||
|
No. 14 13 10 10 10 10 9 10 14 13 14 15 16 17 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. 4 4 6 6 7 7 2 2 3 5 2 4 7 8 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 4 5 4 4 • • 1 • • • • 7 3 2 2 4 4 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 102 106 106 106 105 103 102 125 127 126 134 132 142 |
2 2 3 3 3 2 2 3 4 4 2 • • 1 1 |
100 100 114 114 114 114 124 137 119 126 129 • • • 77 114 |
100 100 98 98 98 98 106 106 123 165 162 162 181 187 |
100 101 101 104 m • • 132 • • • • • • 106 132 145 151 153 168 |
4 4 4 4 1 1 • • • • 7 7 5 3 4 5 |
100 102 107 108 106 106 • • • • • • 106 106 137 131 122 115 |
4 5 2 2 3 3 1 2 3 3 7 6 8 5 |
100 101 84 96 119 128 62 61 92 96 107 114 144 183 |
|
Tbakbters |
Watchmbn |
CiíOTh-R'm Hands |
DOPTKRS |
Drawino Hands |
Dbebskrs |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
F. |
F. |
F. |
F. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day . |
$1.50 |
$1.06 |
$0.61 |
$0.315 |
$0.455 |
$1.069 |
||||||
|
No. 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 |
Rol. Wages |
No. 2 2 4 4 • • • • 8 8 4 4 4 5 5 3 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 6 6 5 5 • • • • 1 1 3 3 3 3 8 8 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 2 5 5 3 2 1 4 • ■ • • • • • • 6 6 8 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
ReL Wages |
No |
ReL Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 18G5, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 100 92 92 92 92 89 83 94 94 91 91 117 117 |
100 100 94 94 • • • • • • 94 94 134 158 158 158 165 165 |
100 100 87 87 82 82 • • • • • • 99 99 130 130 136 136 |
100 103 103 112 106 106 98 • • • • • • • • • • • • 127 159 159 |
22 23 9 9 8 5 3 1 13 18 20 20 21 19 |
100 105 130 134 114 122 101 114 127 125 117 127 139 134 |
9 10 8 7 6 6 3 3 5 5 10 11 11 7 |
100 106 107 106 69 71 54 55 105 105 92 96 117 138 |
Appendix C
487
TABLE 1—Cantinued
WAQE-8EEIE8 FBOM TABLE XII OF THE ALDRICH REPOBT— COTTON OOOD8
40 Massachusetts
|
Harneas Handb |
Room Hands |
Speeders |
Spoolebb |
Stretch- KE8 |
SWKSPEBS |
|||||||
|
F. |
F. |
F. |
F. |
F. |
F. |
|||||||
|
Init.wage per day.. |
10.464 |
$0.67 |
$0.503 |
90.404 |
90.533' |
90.39 |
||||||
|
No. 5 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 3 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 8 2 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 8 8 6 6 6 1 1 • • 10 8 8 8 8 8 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 9 11 15 20 12 12 7 7 10 11 15 17 19 24 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 3 3 6 6 8 3 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 2 2 1 1 • • • • • • • • 3 2 2 5 6 7 |
Bel. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 103 125 125 140 140 151 151 162 162 162 162 185 192 |
100 100 112 112 112 112 112 112 93 106 106 149 152 153 |
100 100 104 105 105 99 99 • • • 144 154 152 156 155 159 |
100 95 86 90 98 101 88 103 120 127 118 125 173 200 |
100 100 110 114 113 118 119 116 117 120 122 124 134 143 |
100 100 103 103 • • • • • • • • • • • • 128 147 154 156 182 187 |
8ex
Initial wage per day
1860, January July
1861, January July
1862, January July....
1863, January July
1864, January July
1865, January July...,
1866, January July . . .
W arpees
F.
90.059
No.
7 9 11 12 6 5 1 1 3 3 2 3 6 3
Bel. Wages
100 100 99 103 100 103 102 102 137 148 127 126 162 202
Wbavbbs
F.
90.321
No.
12
14
14
15
10
10
3
9
8
6
16
10
45
52
BeL Wages
100 100 106 106 106 106 109 116 116 116 125 125 125 125
Wbavkbs
F.
90.42»
No.
8 7 6 9 5 6 8 9
10 8
10 8 9 6
Bel. Wages
100 100 100 100 102 102 107 107 107 107 107 119 119 119
i Per cut for sheetings 46 taches wide, 48 yards per cut. > Per cut for sheetings 72 taches wide, 40 yards per cut.
488
HlSTOBT OF THE GREENBACK8
TABLE 1-Coníimmcd
FSOM TABLE U OF THB AXDRICH SKPOXT
42 New Hampshire
— DKY OOODS
Sex.
PORTEES
Initial wage per day.
$1.00
1860, 1861, 1862, 1863, 1864, 1865, 1866,
January
July
January
July
January
July
January.
July
January
July
January
July
January
July
No.
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ReL
100
100 100 100 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
Salesmkn
$1.125
No.
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Reí. Wages
100
100 100 100 156 156 156 156 178 178 178 178
10.80
No.
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4
ReL
100
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 104 104 104 104
OIXOHAMS
43 Massachosetts
|
OVERSEERS |
O-m. |
\_ |
||||||||||
|
Carding Dep't |
Dressing Dep't |
Spinning Dep't |
Weaying Dep't |
OlVUND Hakda |
bAn Roys |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day.. |
$3.00 |
$3.00 |
$2.50 |
$3.00 |
$1.55 |
$0.30 |
||||||
|
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 2 2 o 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No, |
Reí. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861,Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865,Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 106 106 106 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 106 117 117 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 110 110 120 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 106 133 133 |
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 103 116 124 132 148 152 |
16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 117 117 123 133 150 |
Appendix C
489
TABLE 1—Continued
WAOE-SEEIBS FROM TABLB XII OF THE ALDRICH RBPORT— QINQHAMS
43 Massachusetts
Sex
Init. wage perday..
1860, Jan. July
1861, Jan. July
1862, Jan. July
1863, Jan. July
1864, Jan. July
1865, Jan. July
1866, Jan. July
Boíles Tendees
$1.165
No.
2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 4
Reí. Wages
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 129 129 140 140 140
Carpen- tees
M.
$1.75
No.
4 4 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 5 6
Bel. Wages
100
100
100
86
86
86
86
100
100
114
114
129
129
134
Caed Geindbes
$1.25
No.
2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4
Reí. Wages
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 107 120 120 140 140 140
Caed Stbippess
$0.83
No.
4
4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 5
Reí. Wages
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 114 114 135 135 169 181 181
Caed Tendees
$0.75
No.
7 7 7 7 6 6 3 3 6 6 6 6 5 5
Reí. Wages
100 100 100 100 100 100 111 111 111 133 149 167 187 187
Desmees
$1.64
No.
14 14 14
9 10 10 10 11 11
9 10 11 14 14
Reí. Wages
100 112 110 112 114 120 117 107 110 112 118 131 137 138
43 Massachusetts
|
t1 |
Loom |
Machín- |
Pa |
TV. |
Smash |
|||||||
|
Dtkbb |
FlXBES |
ists |
1NTEE8 |
PlCUEKS |
Mendees |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage perday. |
$1.00 |
$1.58 |
$1.55 |
$1.75 |
$1.00 |
$1.30 |
||||||
|
No. 24 24 24 22 22 22 12 12 16 23 24 33 35 35 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 13 13 13 13 13 13 12 12 13 13 14 17 18 17 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 6 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 6 7 7 7 7 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 4 4 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 |
Reí. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 125 150 150 175 175 175 |
100 99 97 103 94 84 107 96 97 99 128 136 146 147 |
100 90 90 99 97 92 97 100 100 107 110 128 145 152 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 103 103 114 120 120 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 112 112 125 125 150 165 165 |
100 100 100 100 87 87 87 87 87 90 S6 106 115 115 |
490
HlSTOBT OF THE GBEENBACK8
TABLE 1—Continucd
WAOB-8ERIE8 FROM TABLE XII OF THE ALDRICH RKFOBT — OnTOHAMS
43 Massachusetts
|
Watchmek |
Wbavkrs |
Taro Hands |
Drawkrs- IN |
Drawiho- Fraks Tendees |
QUILLKBS |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
F. |
F. |
F. |
||||||
|
Init. wage perday.. |
$1.165 |
90.93 |
$1.00 |
$0.80 |
$0.49 |
$0.57 |
||||||
|
No. |
Bel. Wages |
No. 85 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 10 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 5 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 10 |
Bel. Wages |
No. |
BeL Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. |
2 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
36 |
100 |
||||
|
July |
2 |
100 |
93 |
98 |
10 |
100 |
5 |
100 |
10 |
102 |
35 |
100 |
|
1861, Jan. |
2 |
100 |
108 |
100 |
10 |
100 |
4 |
100 |
10 |
102 |
37 |
100 |
|
July |
2 |
100 |
100 |
104 |
8 |
100 |
4 |
115 |
9 |
102 |
36 |
96 |
|
1862, Jan. |
2 |
100 |
82 |
97 |
6 |
100 |
4 |
118 |
10 |
102 |
34 |
96 |
|
July |
2 |
100 |
65 |
104 |
6 |
100 |
4 |
111 |
10 |
102 |
29 |
104 |
|
1863, Jan. |
2 |
100 |
23 |
97 |
6 |
100 |
5 |
106 |
8 |
102 |
23 |
101 |
|
July |
2 |
100 |
11 |
104 |
6 |
100 |
5 |
104 |
8 |
102 |
20 |
100 |
|
1864, Jan. |
2 |
100 |
35 |
99 |
8 |
100 |
5 |
103 |
11 |
112 |
25 |
100 |
|
July |
3 |
115 |
40 |
105 |
8 |
125 |
5 |
103 |
14 |
122 |
29 |
128 |
|
1865, Jan. |
3 |
115 |
40 |
129 |
10 |
150 |
5 |
103 |
12 |
133 |
29 |
128 |
|
July |
4 |
129 |
34 |
135 |
10 |
163 |
6 |
100 |
15 |
163 |
39 |
131 |
|
1866, Jan. |
2 |
129 |
85 |
167 |
12 |
163 |
6 |
125 |
10 |
163 |
45 |
153 |
|
July |
2 |
129 |
98 |
185 |
12 |
163 |
6 |
150 |
12 |
173 |
45 |
160 |
43 Massachasetts
|
i Sptwciui |
||||||||||||
|
Reelers |
Speeders F. |
i Framb |
Waepers |
Wbavkrs |
WnrDKss |
|||||||
|
Sex |
F. |
F. |
F. |
F. |
F. |
|||||||
|
Init. wage perday.. |
$0.66 |
$0.60 |
$0.56 |
$0.73 |
$0.72 |
$0.56 |
||||||
|
Bel. |
Bel. |
Bel. |
VT 1 Bel. |
Bel. |
BeL |
|||||||
|
No. 34 |
Wages |
No. 12 |
Wages |
No. |
Wages |
No. |
Wages |
No. |
Wages |
No. |
Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. |
100 |
100 |
19 |
100 |
26 |
100 |
115 |
100 |
103 |
100 |
||
|
July |
38 |
100 |
12 |
100 117 |
105 |
26 |
100 |
103 |
97 |
101 |
105 |
|
|
1861, Jan. |
33 |
120 |
10 |
100 |
10 |
105 |
27 |
100 |
98 |
99 |
99 |
107 |
|
July |
28 |
120 |
13 |
100 |
10 |
105 |
20 |
134 |
97 |
111 |
70 |
121 |
|
1862, Jan. |
26 |
120 |
12 |
100 |
10 |
105 |
20 |
133 |
120 |
101 |
61 |
121 |
|
July |
19 |
145 |
12 |
100 |
10 |
105 |
19 |
130 |
89 |
114 |
54 |
121 |
|
1863, Jan. |
14 |
145 |
6 |
100 |
6 |
105 |
11 |
123 |
88 |
107 |
43 |
121 |
|
July |
14 |
132 |
6 |
100 |
8 |
107 |
13 |
108 |
90 |
106 |
37 |
121 |
|
1864, Jan. |
21 |
132 |
12 |
108 |
16 |
116 |
18 |
104 |
115 |
101 |
44 |
121 |
|
July |
25 |
130 |
11 |
117 |
18 |
125 |
25 |
101 |
160 |
100 |
25 |
141 |
|
1865, Jan. |
26 |
130 |
11 |
133 |
20 |
143 |
20 |
110 |
140 |
134 |
49 |
143 |
|
July |
39 |
129 |
13 |
158 |
29 |
170 |
28 |
142 |
188 |
151 |
70 |
168 |
|
1866, Jan. |
45 |
144 |
17 |
158 |
26 |
170 |
35 |
144 |
196 |
1654 |
82 |
175 |
|
July |
43 |
148 |
17 |
167 |
25 |
170 |
34 |
144 |
172 |
178 |
85 |
186 |
Appendix C
491
TABLE 1 — ConUnued
WAGB-8EBXE8 FSOM TABLK XH OF THE ALDRIOH EEPORT— GBOCEBXSS
44 New Hampshire
|
Sales men |
TBAM8TBB8 |
|||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
||
|
Initial wage por day. . . |
90.875 |
$1.50 |
||
|
No. 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
|
|
1860, January July |
100 100 100 129 157 157 186 186 186 186 186 186 186 186 |
100 100 |
||
|
July 1862, January July 1863, January July July 1865, January July 1866, January July |
100 100 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 |
ILLCMIN ATINO GAS
45 Mass. 46 Mass. 46 Mass. 46 Mass.
47 N. Y.
47 N. Y.
|
Rxtortm'n |
Gool Handlmb |
FlSBMEN |
Labobkrs : Street |
Black- BMITH8 |
Blackbm's HBLPKRS |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day.. |
90.955 |
$1.00 |
$1.00 |
$1.00 |
$1.965 |
$1.125 |
||||||
|
No. 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 3 • • 4 1 2 1 2 • • 5 1 1 • • 2 • • |
Reí. Wages |
No. 7 6 7 6 12 10 14 9 14 10 15 8 11 9 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 3 12 • • 8 2 6 • • 5 • • 6 2 4 • • 4 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 7 8 10 10 10 9 6 6 7 6 6 6 6 6 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 4 3 3 6 5 6 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 |
Reí. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 116 136 138 146 138 160 |
100 ióó 100 100 100 100 • • • 143 150 150 • • • 150 • • • |
100 100 100 100 100 113 113 137 137 175 175 175 175 200 ■ |
100 100 • • • 100 109 100 • • • 110 • • • 125 125 125 • • • 150 |
100 98 97 97 97 97 104 140 124 140 151 151 151 153 |
100 111 111 100 100 100 111 156 133 156 178 178 178 178 |
492
HlSTOBY OF THE GBEENBACKS
TABLE 1 — Continued
WAOB-8BRISS FROM TABLE III OF THE ALDRICH RZPORT — ILLUXIX ATDTO OAft
47 New Tork
|
Bricklat- KR8 |
Brickl'rs* Hblpers |
Cabpkn- TBR8 |
Enoixrxrs |
FULKMXX |
LdLBOMMMM |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
11. |
||||||
|
Init. wage perday. . |
$2.105 |
$1335 |
$1.75 |
$2.165 |
$L34 |
$1.065 |
||||||
|
No. 7 26 11 15 11 4 2 2 4 1 3 7 3 9 |
Reí. Y! ages |
No. 3 4 4 5 5 4 3 4 2 2 2 6 3 5 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 6 6 10 9 9 6 4 4 3 4 5 5 6 8 |
Bel. Wages |
No. |
Bel. Wages |
No. |
BeL Wages |
No. |
BeL Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 97 97 97 97 101 107 131 119 119 127 143 143 160 |
100 103 103 101 101 103 119 131 131 131 150 150 150 150 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 143 133 143 171 171 171 182 |
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 6 3 3 3 2 2 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 112 123 112 123 135 139 139 162 |
80 80 90 90 90 60 60 60 80 80 70 80 80 60 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 131 168 149 168 187 187 187 187 |
219 208 240 210 220 190 100 75 43 65 55 |
100 98 •W 96 99 97 142 142 142 142 186 188 188 173 |
47 N. Y.
47 N. Y. 47 N. Y.
48 0hio
48 Ohio 48 Ohio
Sex
Init. wage p«rday ..
1800, Jan.
July 1861, Jan.
July 1802, Jan.
July
1863, Jan. July
1864, Jan. July
1865, Jan. July
1866, Jan. July
|
Painters |
Pavesa |
Stable- |
Black- |
BlacksmV |
Brickxat- |
||||||
|
MEN |
8MITH8 |
HXLPKBS |
KRS |
||||||||
|
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
$1.50 |
$1.25 |
$1.25 |
$1.50 |
$1.00 |
$225 |
||||||
|
Rol. |
Bel. |
Bel. |
Bel. |
Bel. |
BeL |
||||||
|
No. |
Wages |
No. 3 |
Wages |
No. 3 |
Wages |
No. 1 |
Wages |
No. |
Wages |
No. |
Wage* |
|
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
2 |
100 |
||||
|
100 |
6 |
100 |
3 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
2 |
100 |
|
|
100 |
6 |
100 |
3 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
2 |
100 |
|
|
117 |
4 |
100 |
3 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
2 |
111 |
|
|
117 |
3 |
100 |
3 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
2 |
111 |
|
|
117 |
4 |
100 |
3 |
100 |
3 |
111 |
1 |
115 |
2 |
111 |
|
|
117 |
4 |
100 |
3 |
104 |
3 |
128 |
1 |
115 |
2 |
122 |
|
|
167 |
4 |
140 |
2 |
1(50 |
3 |
139 |
1 |
125 |
2 |
lim |
|
|
150 |
1 |
120 |
3 |
140 |
3 |
172 |
1 |
175 |
2 |
133 |
|
|
167 |
3 |
140 |
1 |
160 |
3 |
178 |
1 |
200 |
2 |
178 |
|
|
183 |
4 |
160 |
2 |
160 |
3 |
189 |
1 |
200 |
2 |
178 |
|
|
2 |
200 |
3 |
160 |
2 |
160 |
3 |
189 |
1 |
200 |
2 |
178 |
|
2 |
200 |
2 |
160 |
2 |
160 |
3 |
217 |
1 |
200 |
2 |
178 |
|
1 |
217 2 |
160 |
2 |
160 |
3 |
217 |
1 |
200 |
2 |
900 |
Appendix C
493
TABLE 1 — Continucd
WAQB-8ERIES FROM TABLE XH OF THB ALDRICH REPOBT — ILLUMIN ATINO OAS
48 0hio
Sex
Initial wage per day.
1860, January July . . .
1861, January July . . .
1862, January July . . .
1863, January July . . .
1864, January July . . .
1865, January July . . .
1866, January July . . .
Carpen tees
M.
$1.525
No.
5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Reí. Wages
100 103 103 103 103 107 115 131 148 164 164 197 197 180
FlREMEX
Jrf
$1.225
No.
58
58
58
75
75
75
75
75
90
123
123
123
123
133
Reí. Wages
100 100 100 100 100 113 116 141 204 169 169 169 184 184
Laborera
M.
$1.00
No.
40
40
40
40
40
65
65
65
111
46
10
10
10
10
Rol. Wages
100 100 100 100 100 113 115 125 150 175 175 175 190 190
Watchmen
$1.10
No.
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Reí. Wages
100 100 100 102 102 114 114 136 159 159 159 159 159 159
LEATHKR
SO Massachusetts
|
Blackxrs |
Cellar Hands |
Finishers |
Flatten- ERS |
Olosskrb |
Setters- oüt |
|||||||
|
OvX • • • • ■ . - • |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day.. |
$1.00 |
$1.00 |
$1.195 |
$1.165 |
$1.165 |
$1.165 |
||||||
|
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 9 9 10 10 7 7 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 100 100 100 117 117 117 134 134 134 134 134 159 159 |
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 |
100 100 117 117 125 125 142 150 175 184 200 200 200 192 |
100 100 109 118 128 137 144 146 141 143 157 160 144 146 |
100 100 115 129 129 143 158 158 172 172 186 186 162 158 |
100 100 115 115 129 129 143 143 143 143 143 150 150 158 |
100 100 115 115 T29 143 158 172 186 186 186 186 172 172 |
494
HlSTOKY OF THE GbEENBACKS
TABLE 1-Continued
WAGB-8BBIE8 FBOM TABLB XH OF THS ALDRICH BKFOBT— LKATHBB
50 Mass. 50 Mass. 50 Mass. 50 Mass. 51
51
|
Spltttbbs |
Stuffbbs |
Tablb Hands |
WrTTBN'BS |
Bark GR1NDKK8 |
BKAJfSTXB |
|||||||
|
8ex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage perday.. |
$1.50 |
$1.085 |
$1.055 |
$1.035 |
$1.50 |
$1.50 |
||||||
|
No. |
Bel. Wages |
No. 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
I R?l. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 100 122 122 133 133 144 144 156 156 156 156 156 156 |
100 100 107 107 123 123 143 148 150 153 179 179 174 174 |
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 2 2 |
100 100 105 105 127 132 142 147 147 147 158 160 158 158 |
5 5 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 |
100 100 113 116 133 141 150 161 185 201 188 188 177 169 |
100 100 111 111 111 111 133 133 144 144 144 144 144 144 |
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 |
100 100 111 111 129 129 140 140 144 144 144 144 144 144 |
51 Massacbusetts
Sex.
Iuitial wago per day.
1860, January July. . . .
1861, January July....
1862, January July....
1863, January July....
1864, January July. . . .
1865, January July....
1866, January July....
Lbach Tendera
No
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
$1.50
Reí. Wages
100 100 100 100 122 122 133 133 144 144 144 144 139 133
LlMBBS
$1.50
No.
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Reí. Wages
100 100 111 111 111 111 133 133 144 144 144 144 144 144
Shaybbs
No.
2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
M.
$2¿0
Reí. Wages
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 120 120 120 120 120 120
Yabd Haxds
$L165
No.
13 13 13 13
9 9 9 9 8 8 8 8 7 7
ReL Wages
100 100 120 129 130 130 133 133 173 173 182 182 186 186
Appendix C
TABt.E 1-OmJÍHttaf
52 New Hampebire
|
Labouhu |
Luwirai |
|||
|
Sex |
u. |
H |
||
|
•0.385' |
•0.505' |
|||
|
No. |
Reí. Wxaa |
No. |
Reí. Wl|M |
|
|
October October 1865, January October 1866,January October |
4 4 3 .t 2 3 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 3 |
100 100 100 100 119 119 160 160 179 179 179 179 179 179 |
19 16 23 24 17 16 12 11 14 16 15 23 21 19 |
100 101 09 100 130 126 182 186 189 194 202 201 202 208 |
|
TmtMmnma |
||||||
|
8e |
H. |
u. |
M |
|||
|
ln¡t.,agep,,d.r.. |
11.50 |
•1.125 |
«1.04 |
|||
|
No. |
Reí. Wegw |
No. |
ReL Vi ama |
No. |
Wagés |
|
|
1860, January . . . July 1861, January . . . July 1862, January . . . July 1863, January . . . 1864, January .. . July 1865, January . . . July 1886, January . . . July |
1 1 1 2 2 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 |
100 100 100 92 92 100 11* 101 115 120 139 139 139 139 |
2 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 |
100 100 115 99 94 9t 98 98 117 111 111 111 122 122 |
9 11 11 14 12 11 11 10 11 11 15 14 13 12 |
100 104 104 106 101 106 105 119 123 131 135 135 129 1.10 |
49(>
HlSTOBY OF THE GrEENBACKS
TABLE l—Continued
WAGE-8BBIE8 FBOM TABLE XII OF THE ALDBICH BEPOBT— METALS AMD MBTAJLLIC
OOOD8
54 Connecticut
|
FOEEMAN BOILEB-M'S |
FOREMAN MACHTNI8T |
FOREMAN Moldees |
Black- 8MITH8 |
Blacksm 'a' HSLPEBS |
BOILEB-M* |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day.. |
$3.00 |
$3.835 |
$2.875 |
$2.25 |
$1.375 |
$1.77 |
||||||
|
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Bel. Wages |
No. |
Bel. Wages |
No. 3 3 1 7 6 1 1 3 4 2 1 1 1 • • |
Bel. Wages |
No. |
Bel. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 117 133 183 200 200 133 133 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 125 167 167 167 98 98 |
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
100 104 104 104 104 104 104 122 122 157 157 157 139 139 |
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 3 |
100 100 100 100 94 100 100 94 111 133 156 130 156 148 |
100 100 100 101 96 100 100 103 100 121 133 121 121 • • • |
4 5 3 4 1 1 2 3 3 5 3 10 3 9 |
100 99 101 101 99 99 120 141 127 144 141 138 136 149 |
54 Connecticut
|
boileb-m's Helpebs |
Enoineebs |
Machtn'ts |
M achín 'ts' Helpebs |
Moldees |
Moldees* Helpebs |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day.. |
$1.15 |
$1.50 |
$1.765 |
$1.16 |
$1.625 |
$1.215 |
||||||
|
No. 5 5 3 7 3 3 6 8 9 12 8 6 5 6 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 1 1 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 12 15 9 6 18 14 6 12 14 21 16 14 20 23 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 6 4 7 16 26 13 4 1 7 4 5 o 7 7 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 5 3 4 4 4 10 15 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 7 10 9 8 7 7 6 5 11 ^ i 9 7 10 8 |
Reí. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 102 109 101 109 109 100 106 121 143 145 145 152 150 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Ü7 150 167 167 167 167 |
100 100 102 106 97 98 96 103 111 129 149 144 145 154 |
100 104 126 110 109 110 125 97 129 130 134 122 123 137 |
100 112 123 112 123 123 119 126 126 152 152 152 147 168 |
100 100 100 102 109 112 108 103 109 1.31 142 123 120 130 |
Appknois C
TABLE 1 — Cantinaat
|
MConn. |
MC™». |
SJConn. |
K |
Con». |
MCoiin. |
KConn. |
||||||
|
Buoa |
R |
ir e n- |
11: .11.1 ll-M'- |
Machdí't* |
||||||||
|
MQTOB |
llELPEKa |
** |
ÜÍLPIH |
|||||||||
|
11. |
u. |
M. |
H. |
M. |
II. |
|||||||
|
Init.i.»(M |
11.75 |
«1.895 |
«1.00 |
«1.555 |
«1.005 |
tl.645 |
||||||
|
Wo. |
■""■ |
Wigw |
... |
Waucí |
...:. |
Wagw |
lío. |
V.-.IU-- |
'" |
Was» |
||
|
íi |
K«> |
111 |
11 |
|||||||||
|
lW*U¡m |
100 |
|||||||||||
|
July |
1 |
un |
||||||||||
|
18Gl,Jan. |
86 |
|||||||||||
|
Julj |
a |
|||||||||||
|
1962, Jan. |
i |
100 |
H |
93 |
9 |
109 |
31 |
108 |
6 |
114 |
fifi |
ION |
|
July |
i |
100 |
H |
96 |
« |
111 |
19 |
106 |
115 |
n |
109 |
|
|
ISiV!. Tim |
4 |
89 |
10 |
96 |
11 |
11S |
15 |
121 |
10 |
117 |
W |
122 |
|
July |
9 |
102 |
H |
KM |
9» |
11» |
an |
129 |
¡» |
126 |
HH |
126 |
|
ÍStJJ..fiin |
111 |
7 |
118 |
15 |
LSg |
42 |
138 |
(K |
121 |
m |
141 |
|
|
July |
136 |
7 |
i:¡2 |
13 |
1-17 |
4? |
163 |
IV) |
141 |
Hh |
158 |
|
|
ISi-H-,..!;»,, |
4 |
138 |
H |
136 |
11 |
148 |
45 |
172 |
M |
111 |
MI |
171 |
|
July |
8 |
150 |
H |
136 |
1» |
146 |
45 |
17D |
M |
1)7 |
hl |
168 |
|
186fí.Jan. |
171 |
e |
132 |
10 |
147 |
9A |
173 |
M |
159 |
4» |
173 |
|
|
July |
4 |
158 |
7 |
145 |
11 |
üíl |
;t( |
178 |
pa |
147 |
n |
176 |
|
sacona. |
taCona. |
K> c™. |
MCODD. |
59 Codo. |
SsConu. |
|||||||
|
Machín 'tu |
Pattibn- |
Fo«i«AM |
Fubjman |
Blacb- |
||||||||
|
Hblpbm |
HBLFUB |
Machis "tu |
H oí, de as |
BIUTBB |
||||||||
|
Sel |
H. |
U. |
H. |
U. |
M. |
H. |
||||||
|
per dar |
*U35 |
11.675 |
•1.00 |
$4.79 |
92.49 |
$1.75 |
||||||
|
""■ |
iJu |
WlíM |
llu. |
W.Bt» |
llu |
Wbbbí |
Mu. |
WaKBS |
l.u. |
Wners |
||
|
1859 |
•n |
100 |
10 |
100 |
2 |
100 |
||||||
|
1860, Jan |
1 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
||||||
|
July |
1 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
||||||
|
1861, Jan |
1 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
||||||
|
July |
1 |
100 |
1 |
120 |
1 |
100 |
||||||
|
1862, Jan |
¿ó |
99 |
1 |
100 |
1 |
120 |
1 |
114 |
||||
|
Jul) |
22 |
101 |
14 |
no |
1 |
100 |
1 |
120 |
1 |
114 |
||
|
1863, Jan |
2» |
110 |
14 |
110 |
1 |
120 |
1 |
114 |
||||
|
July |
37 |
111 |
IR |
117 |
75 |
1 |
128 |
1 |
114 |
|||
|
1864, Jan |
31 |
115 |
IH |
129 |
2 |
75 |
1 |
128 |
1 |
129 |
||
|
41 |
121 |
IV |
140 |
11») |
1 |
68 |
1 |
192 |
||||
|
1865, Jan |
31 |
127 |
II |
147 |
2 |
150 |
1 |
192 |
||||
|
July |
:« |
126 |
H |
150 |
1 |
150 |
1 |
67 |
1 |
192 |
||
|
1866, Jan |
21 |
130 |
10 |
161 |
2 |
150 |
2 |
101 |
1 |
192 |
||
|
July |
29 |
136 |
9 |
173 |
165 |
2 |
100 |
1 |
257 |
498
HlSTORY OF THE GrEENBACKS
TABLE 1 — Continuad
W AGE-SERIES FBOM TABLE XH OF TOTE ALDUCH REPORT —
GOODS
56Conn.
METALA AJTD MBTAL11C
|
Emc |
•»«• . |
• |
Machín 'ts' |
Machix'tb' |
Molde**' |
|||||||
|
frIXEERS |
Machín tb |
Apprknt's |
Helpers |
MOLDKBS |
APPlBTT'l |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init.wage per day.. |
$1.165 |
$1.715 |
$0.615 |
$1.04 |
$1.53 |
*055 |
||||||
|
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. 12 12 8 10 19 14 9 5 7 12 12 12 27 23 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 5 5 7 8 9 9 6 4 4 3 11 12 13 12 |
Bel. Wages |
No. |
ReL Wages |
No. |
ReL Wages |
No. |
ReL Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 100 100 107 107 • • • 129 129 143 158 172 172 172 186 |
100 102 98 99 99 105 106 110 119 119 127 137 143 149 |
100 102 101 109 107 109 96 102 103 106 129 140 145 154 |
4 4 4 6 11 9 9 5 5 6 6 10 8 12 |
100 106 105 104 106 109 109 117 127 135 141 150 142 149 |
12 9 11 15 12 12 9 12 18 25 14 18 17 23 |
100 101 102 101 104 104 105 112 113 126 145 149 . 141 146 |
2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 • • 1 1 |
100 109 115 119 119 125 121 182 205 145 155 • • • 182 182 |
56 Coqd. 56 Conn.
57 Md.
57 Md.
57 Md.
57 Md.
|
Moldees' Helpers |
Pattern- Makers |
Black- smiths |
BlacksmV Helpers |
BOILER- Makkrs |
Laborees |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage por day.. |
$1.075 |
$1.875 |
$1.565 |
$1.00 |
$2.065 |
$0.92 |
||||||
|
No. 14 13 11 13 16 13 11 13 18 21 17 13 14 12 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 8 8 3 2 4 4 6 6 7 8 7 6 6 8 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 8 10 3 6 5 8 6 6 10 13 13 8 8 7 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 2 4 1 1 2 2 6 8 13 8 15 11 12 7 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
ReL Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July ] 865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 100 97 95 95 95 98 110 110 125 132 130 132 138 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 109 120 140 140 142 142 |
100 103 99 96 95 95 109 117 135 170 176 173 184 178 |
100 100 100 96 97 92 100 125 135 147 159 165 173 172 |
100 86 120 72 88 94 87 92 107 106 136 138 139 120 |
4 4 4 5 4 4 8 8 10 8 14 16 14 12 |
100 100 100 82 82 90 109 125 134 156 162 172 176 174 |
Appendix C
499
TABLE 1 — ConUnued
WAOE-8EKIE8 FBOM TABLK XII OF TOTE ALDRICH RKPORT — METALS AND MRTALLIC
OOOD8
57 Md.
57 Md.
57 Md.
57 Md.
57 Md. 58 Mass.
|
Machín 'ts |
MOLDKRS |
Paintxrs |
Pattern- Makers |
TBAM8TEB8 |
FO REMAN F'bn'ckm'n |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day.. |
$1.645 |
$1.87 |
$1.56 |
$1.62 |
$0.97 |
$3.00 |
||||||
|
No. 16 20 12 8 9 12 22 27 24 20 28 22 47 28 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 5 5 4 2 1 5 4 6 6 18 9 5 15 10 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 8 3 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 • • 1 1 1 3 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Bel. Wages |
No. 4 3 4 4 2 2 2 3 3 2 4 4 4 4 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 100 103 94 98 102 112 116 125 157 164 167 169 169 |
100 100 103 94 107 98 103 103 114 120 135 136 141 141 |
100 99 107 75 75 75 107 109 96 • • • 144 160 160 170 |
17 11 7 4 3 6 11 11 17 15 12 12 10 9 |
100 102 106 89 «9 98 104 116 119 139 153 161 177 181 |
100 102 100 87 84 94 116 122 131 155 159 169 169 169 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 , 100 100 100 117 117 100 100 100 |
58 Mass.
|
forjbman Machín 'tb |
FüRNACE- MKN |
Laborers |
Machin'ts |
Machin'ts' Hklpkrs |
MOLDBBS |
|||||||
|
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
|||||||
|
Init. wage per day. . |
$2.68 |
$1.445 |
$0.89 |
$1.72 |
$1.28 |
$156 |
||||||
|
No. 7 8 6 7 9 11 10 14 6 7 12 12 10 5 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 2 1 1 3 4 3 1 6 4 18 6 2 2 2 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 30 38 40 88 60 36 42 27 30 9 14 22 28 40 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 42 74 81 114 110 81 78 70 112 106 78 77 86 98 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Bel. Wages |
No. 19 25 23 58 38 27 15 24 21 20 24 22 25 26 |
Bel. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 101 104 105 106 102 97 101 117 117 127 128 127 147 |
100 100 100 91 90 94 100 110 97 94 92 99 102 121 |
100 102 101 98 99 103 104 105 110 122 143 153 153 152 |
100 98 100 97 100 102 103 103 120 125 136 137 141 146 |
9 14 21 33 18 14 10 32 53 42 30 20 26 24 |
100 97 100 98 100 98 100 93 99 109 112 117 121 121 |
100 102 102 100 101 102 105 110 120 120 141 147 153 155 |
500
HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS
TABLE 1— Continued
W AGE-SERIES FROM TABLE XIX OF THB ALDRICH REFOBT — MBT ALA AMD MSTALUT
OOOD8
58 Mass. 58 Mass. 59 Mass.
59 Mass. 50 Mass. 60 M
|
Tbamsters |
Tbamsters with Tbam |
Laborbbs |
M'CHIXISTB |
Pattbrn- Maksbs |
L.ABORKBS |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day . ■ |
$0.94 |
$2.50 |
$0.90 |
$1.50 |
$1.75 |
$1.25 |
||||||
|
No. 5 8 5 10 8 10 9 12 7 8 8 10 5 9 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 • • 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 17 17 17 17 17 17 22 22 25 25 25 25 26 26 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
ReL Wages |
No. |
ReL Wajns |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 109 106 104 108 109 112 121 124 139 146 158 160 156 |
100 100 100 • • • 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 144 144 144 167 167 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 113 120 153 150 150 157 167 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 114 137 137 137 143 143 |
9 13 12 10 16 16 18 14 14 12 12 10 14 15 |
100 100 120 120 120 120 140 140 140 140 128 140 160 160 |
60 Mass. 60 Mass. 60 Mass. 61 Mass. 61 Mass.
61
|
M'CHINIBTS |
Pattbbn- Makbbs |
Watchmen |
Black- 8MITH8 |
Laborkbs |
M'CHxsnsTt |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day.. |
$1.665 |
$2.00 |
$1.50 |
$2.00 |
$1.125 |
$1.635 |
||||||
|
No. 75 73 72 72 65 75 65 60 54 52 62 59 91 82 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
ReL Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
ReL Wages |
No. |
ReL Wages |
No. |
ReL Wagei |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan July 1866, Jan. July |
100 100 108 120 132 132 180 180 165 165 180 180 180 180 |
100 100 105 105 113 113 125 150 150 150 175 175 175 175 |
100 100 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 140 140 160 160 160 |
100 88 88 88 88 88 100 100 100 119 119 119 119 119 |
4 4 2 2 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 2 2 |
100 100 111 111 111 118 118 133 133 133 133 133 122 122 |
11 11 12 12 12 11 11 11 11 11 16 16 17 17 |
100 100 104 107 108 109 108 112 117 133 130 137 143 145 |
Appendix C
501
TABLE 1 — Continuad
WAGK-8BBIX8 FBOM TABLR XII OF THB ALDRICH BXPOBT — MBTAL8 AWD MSTALLIO
OOOD8
61 Mass. 62N.H. 62 N. H. 62N. H. 62N. H. 62 N. H.
|
WOOD- WoRKERS |
Black- SMITH8 |
ENQINRBRS |
Laborxrs |
M'CHOTBTS |
M,CHVST•, Afpbbnt's |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day . |
$1.665 |
$1.50 |
$1.17 |
$1.14 |
$1.48 |
$0.485 |
||||||
|
No. 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 3 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 • • 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 3 5 1 1 1 3 3 4 2 1 1 1 5 4 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 19 23 10 6 13 16 12 12 12 11 11 12 10 12 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 100 110 110 113 116 115 115 125 130 135 150 155 155 |
100 100 95 95 106 100 106 111 114 150 167 150 167 159 |
100 100 100 • • • 100 100 100 107 107 128 128 128 150 150 |
100 104 88 88 88 97 100 102 117 110 81 81 121 130 |
100 103 102 104 106 104 110 116 117 125 134 122 144 136 |
5 5 8 5 5 3 5 3 5 5 3 4 10 9 |
100 106 99 124 134 92 113 108 114 138 166 170 156 160 |
62N.H. 62N.H. 65N.J. 65 N. J.
66 N. Y. 66 N. Y.
|
Pattkbn- |
WOOD- |
FORXMBN |
M YiimrTfiTfi |
CORB- |
CüPOLA |
|||||||
|
Makj&rs |
WOBKKRS |
M'CHINISTS |
Makbbs |
Mbn |
||||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day.. |
$1.67 |
$1.375 |
$3.00 |
$2.00 |
$1.25 |
$1.055 |
||||||
|
Bel. |
Reí. |
Reí. |
Reí. |
Reí. |
Reí. |
|||||||
|
No. |
Wages |
No. |
Wages |
No. |
Wages |
No. 3 |
Wages |
No. |
Wages |
No. |
Wages |
|
|
1859,July |
• • |
• • • |
• • |
• • • |
1 |
100 |
100 |
• • |
• • • |
• • |
• • • |
|
|
1860, Jan. |
1 |
100 |
2 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
3 |
100 |
||||
|
July |
1 |
100 |
1 |
109 |
1 |
100 |
3 |
100 |
||||
|
1861, Jan. |
1 |
96 |
• • |
• • • |
1 |
100 |
3 |
100 |
||||
|
July |
1 |
96 |
• • |
• • • |
1 |
100 |
2 |
103 |
||||
|
1862, Jan. |
• • |
... |
1 |
91 |
1 |
100 |
2 |
103 |
||||
|
July |
1 |
90 |
1 |
91 |
1 |
100 |
2 |
103 |
||||
|
1863, Jan. |
• • |
• • • |
1 |
121 |
i |
ióó |
9 |
86 |
1 |
100 |
2 |
110 |
|
July |
1 |
90 |
1 |
133 |
1 |
100 |
7 |
91 |
1 |
100 |
2 |
110 |
|
1864, Jan. |
1 |
120 |
1 |
109 |
1 |
100 |
12 |
94 |
1 |
100 |
2 |
114 |
|
July |
1 |
120 |
1 |
133 |
1 |
111 |
17 |
110 |
1 |
120 |
3 |
127 |
|
1865, Jan. |
• • |
• • • |
1 |
164 |
1 |
139 |
15 |
110 |
1 |
120 |
2 |
136 |
|
July |
1 |
120 |
• • |
• • • |
1 |
139 |
17 |
113 |
1 |
120 |
2 |
136 |
|
1866,Jan. |
1 |
150 |
1 |
158 |
1 |
139 |
17 |
120 |
1 |
120 |
3 |
134 |
|
July |
1 |
180 |
• • |
• • • |
1 |
139 |
19 |
121 |
1 |
120 |
3 |
134 |
502
HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAOKS
TABLE l-Continued
WAOE-8BRIB8 FSOM TABLE XII OF THS ALDRICH REPOET —
GOODS
eeN.Y.
66N. Y.
66 N. Y.
66 N. Y.
66 N. Y.
rAixac 67 N. Y.
|
Engibe ees |
Laborees |
M'CHINISTS |
Tbamsters |
Watchmxv |
Black- emites |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
K. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day.. |
$1.00 |
10.835 |
$1.125 |
$1.00 |
$0.855 |
$1.75 |
||||||
|
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. 6 6 5 • • 7 13 11 11 12 13 10 8 6 7 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
BeL Wages |
No. |
BeL Waiseí |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 117 150 150 150 150 150 |
100 100 100 • • • 97 98 101 122 125 160 166 166 167 167 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 137 119 133 163 163 163 163 163 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 117 142 142 142 142 142 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 117 100 117 117 117 117 117 |
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 • • 1 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 105 105 114 157 157 150 • • • 157 |
67 New York
|
Bl'ks'ths' Helpebs |
Laborees |
Machín 'ts |
Machin'ts' Hbxpebs |
Moldee* |
Moldees* Appbex. |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
eL |
||||||
|
Init. wago por day... |
$0.875 |
$0.89 |
$1.59 |
$1.005 |
$1.66 |
$0.675 |
||||||
|
No. 2 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 8 10 9 7 7 8 7 10 9 12 12 11 12 15 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. 7 7 7 5 4 4 2 2 2 5 5 4 5 5 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 7 7 6 6 4 7 6 6 7 8 9 8 9 10 |
Bel. Wages |
No. |
BeL Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863,Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865,Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 107 107 100 100 100 86 143 143 186 186 186 179 186 |
100 99 99 97 97 97 103 133 134 177 174 169 170 166 |
7 8 8 6 6 9 8 12 13 13 12 12 14 13 |
100 101 102 100 96 100 101 106 115 151 153 153 153 152 |
100 100 100 91 95 95 94 105 126 146 146 148 139 144 |
100 100 102 100 100 97 103 111 119 138 141 145 148 143 |
4 3 3 1 1 1 • • • • • * 1 2 1 1 2 |
100 105 103 93 111 111 * • • • • • 111 98 86 111 106 |
Appendix C
503
TABLE 1—Continued
WAGE-SERIES FSOM TABLB XH OF THE ALDRICH REPORT — METALS AMD METALUC
OOOD8
67 N. Y
67 N. Y.
67 N. Y.
67 N. Y.
68 N. Y. 68 N. Y.
|
MOLDEES' |
Pattebn- |
Pattebn- MAEER8* |
WAT^iraN |
FOREMEN |
FOREMEN |
|||||||
|
Helpebs |
MAKER8 |
Appren. |
Bl |
'KSM'S |
Boilbrm's |
|||||||
|
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
|||||||
|
Init. wage per day... |
$1.125 |
$1.50 |
$0.33 |
$0.81 |
$2.00 |
$2.00 |
||||||
|
Bel. |
Reí. |
Reí. |
Reí. |
Reí. |
Reí |
|||||||
|
No. 3 |
Wages |
No. 3 |
Wages |
No. • • |
Wages |
No. |
Wages |
No. |
Wages |
No. |
Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. |
100 |
100 |
• • • |
1 |
100 |
• • |
• • • |
• • |
• • • |
|||
|
July |
4 |
97 |
3 |
100 |
• • |
• • • |
1 |
100 |
• • |
• • • |
• • |
• • • |
|
1861, Jan. |
4 |
97 |
3 |
100 |
■ • |
• • • |
1 |
103 |
• • |
... |
• • |
• • • |
|
July |
3 |
101 |
3 |
94 |
1 |
100 |
• • |
• • • |
1 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
|
1862, Jan. |
4 |
98 |
3 |
94 |
1 |
100 |
• • |
• • • |
1 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
|
July |
3 |
96 |
3 |
94 |
1 |
152 |
1 |
102 |
1 |
100 |
1 |
100 |
|
1863, Jan. |
4 |
95 |
3 |
94 |
1 |
152 |
1 |
115 |
1 |
100 |
1 |
125 |
|
July |
4 |
108 |
3 |
103 |
• • |
• • • |
1 |
115 |
1 |
rj5 |
1 |
125 |
|
1864, Jan. |
3 |
106 |
3 |
106 |
• • |
• • • |
1 |
115 |
1 |
175 |
1 |
125 |
|
July |
3 |
126 |
3 |
136 |
1 |
152 |
1 |
132 |
1 |
175 |
1 |
163 |
|
1865, Jan. |
3 |
126 |
3 |
136 |
1 |
189 |
1 |
123 |
1 |
225 |
1 |
163 |
|
July |
3 |
130 |
3 |
136 |
1 |
189 |
1 |
123 |
1 |
225 |
1 |
163 |
|
1866, Jan. |
3 |
144 |
4 |
135 |
1 |
227 |
1 |
132 |
• • |
• • • |
1 |
167 |
|
July |
3 |
144 |
4 |
135 |
1 |
227 |
1 |
132 |
1 |
150 |
1 |
167 |
68 New York
|
Black- 8MITH8 |
BOILER- MAKER8 |
Boilebm's' Appren. |
Boilbrm's' Helpebs |
Macein'ts |
Machtn'ts' Appren. |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day. . |
$1.25 |
$1.21 |
$0.375 |
$0.84 |
$1.375 |
$0.545 |
||||||
|
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. 3 2 5 7 6 5 14 17 30 27 21 18 5 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 2 2 3 3 1 2 1 4 4 3 • • • • |
Reí. Wages |
No. 12 8 4 9 5 3 5 10 9 5 3 4 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 8 4 3 9 12 13 12 14 11 12 9 11 13 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 4 2 5 6 7 8 4 7 10 11 11 10 7 |
Reí. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
1 1 • • 1 • • 3 5 5 5 5 5 6 5 |
100 110 • • • 100 • • • 103 114 120 140 164 164 155 158 |
100 98 132 127 131 116 137 152 162 173 174 174 149 |
100 116 133 133 111 100 105 112 123 151 156 • • • • • • |
100 90 119 109 110 114 89 98 98 107 124 108 119 |
100 100 119 107 115 117 128 131 162 158 144 156 169 |
100 115 89 89 108 102 69 90 100 116 118 122 122 |
HlSTOBY OF THE GKEENBACK8
TABLE 1-Coníimitrf
|
•8N.Y. |
MK.Y. |
«N. Y. |
M |
N. Y. |
SSN.Y. |
WK.Y. |
||||||
|
«„,„.. |
Pattt.-.. |
«r |
||||||||||
|
\itki.nt * |
Hhl.i'EBB |
Arrux t\ |
||||||||||
|
Sai |
K. |
M, |
SI. |
M. |
K. |
M. |
||||||
|
lniL.nrure |
«.315 |
60.50 |
$0.72 |
ei.29 |
«1.49 |
«0.855 |
||||||
|
■'" |
Uw. |
'" |
Uu. |
\\„x- N" |
||||||||
|
lSUÜ.Jao |
H |
100 |
2 |
100 |
12 |
100 |
3 |
100 |
■:.-, |
100 |
7 |
100 |
|
11 |
116 |
125 |
N |
128 |
2 |
107 |
17 |
96 |
» |
74 |
||
|
LHi.il, Jüi) |
1 |
122 |
126 |
18 |
99 |
13 |
88 |
|||||
|
July |
11 |
117 |
2 |
84 |
H |
130 |
1 |
136 |
21) |
102 |
« |
n |
|
11 |
117 |
1 |
84 |
10 |
120 |
X |
U8 |
3b |
103 |
7 |
!'.' |
|
|
July |
Ifl |
115 |
117 |
14 |
131 |
3 |
lie |
22 |
115 |
4 |
95 |
|
|
lHlV!, .];,,, |
1» |
117 |
1 |
117 |
16 |
135 |
7 |
116 |
15 |
115 |
f» |
69 |
|
.,., |
122 |
4 |
113 |
11) |
162 |
H |
133 |
91 |
109 |
|||
|
lH*ll,.l!in |
23 |
123 |
6 |
106 |
1'! |
162 |
8 |
143 |
1 |
235 |
||
|
July |
39 |
137 |
6 |
129 |
H |
158 |
fH |
154 |
12 |
83 |
||
|
41 |
118 |
4 |
148 |
Í3Ó |
5 |
169 |
fifi |
157 |
1" |
85 |
||
|
K» |
117 |
2 |
157 |
2 |
191 |
4 |
179 |
«1 |
159 |
9 |
77 |
|
|
149 |
1 |
84 |
153 |
h |
180 |
43 |
168 |
3 |
94 |
|||
|
July |
26 |
152 |
3 |
97 |
2 |
174 |
5 |
186 |
54 |
172 |
8 |
81 |
|
NN.I. |
TON. Y. |
TIN. Y. |
TIN. Y. |
71 N. Y. |
71 N. Y. |
|||||||
|
U-CB"M'8TB' HeLFEBH |
M'einsíiHTs |
FflUEMEX |
«IIM |
<*»«, |
||||||||
|
Box |
11. |
H. |
U. |
M. |
bt |
n |
||||||
|
peí 'lay - |
«.25 |
«90 |
«3.00 |
«2.075 |
«1.15 |
11.915 |
||||||
|
Ka. |
W¡iii-'- |
No. 7 |
Bel. Whm |
1 |
Bel WeJM |
No. |
BoL |
lío. |
Eel. u.,t... |
Ko. |
bl |
|
|
:i |
100 |
100 |
100 |
12 |
100 |
11 |
HO |
í< |
l'Xi |
|||
|
4 |
92 |
8 |
98 |
1 |
100 |
IV, |
100 |
11 |
100 |
0 |
100 |
|
|
98 |
4 |
99 |
1 |
100 |
II) |
100 |
13 |
100 |
H |
101 |
||
|
8 |
95 |
2 |
103 |
1 |
100 |
'.i |
101 |
II |
100 |
H |
101 |
|
|
7 |
102 |
6 |
97 |
1 |
100 |
9 |
103 |
A |
100 |
K |
im |
|
|
92 |
102 |
100 |
U |
104 |
13 |
104 |
H |
mí |
||||
|
« |
BO |
4 |
104 |
1 |
111 |
9 |
113 |
5 |
190 |
M |
108 |
|
|
107 |
1 |
111 |
10 |
117 |
12 |
121 |
9 |
121 |
||||
|
4 |
US |
1 |
133 |
11 |
132 |
15 |
141 |
K |
180 |
|||
|
IlÚj |
98 |
4 |
1 |
167 |
11 |
l* > |
n |
171 |
fl |
135 |
||
|
7 |
98 |
155 |
1 |
167 |
n |
155 |
IK |
172 |
6 |
[3fl |
||
|
July lH»U*n July |
H |
101 |
159 |
1 |
167 |
1H |
164 |
13 |
177 |
■i |
tSfl |
|
|
110 |
5 |
162 |
1 |
167 |
14 |
161 |
15 |
176 |
6 |
M |
||
|
:i |
110 |
5 |
W.< |
1 |
167 |
1» |
167 |
16 |
170 |
6 |
145 |
Appendix C
505
TABLE 1 — Continued
WAOB-SBKIKS FROM TABLK XH OF THB ALDRICH RKPOKT — MKTALS AND MKTALUO
GOODS
71 N. Y. 71 N. Y. 71 N. Y. 71 N. Y. 72 N. Y. 72 N. Y.
|
Drauohts- MBN |
Laboríos |
MOLDKBS |
Pattkbn- Makkrs |
Black* smiths |
Bl*ks'ths* Hklpkrb |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. $1.96 |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day.. |
$2.165 |
$1.00 |
$1.885 |
$1.515 |
$0.875 |
|||||||
|
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. 7 10 6 5 9 5 6 7 10 7 8 12 11 9 |
Reí. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
3 3 4 4 3 3 4 5 7 7 7 8 6 9 |
100 100 98 98 100 100 106 115 127 137 155 154 171 183 |
12 12 10 10 10 10 11 11 13 19 10 15 19 18 |
100 100 100 100 102 103 111 121 130 152 150 152 152 152 |
14 14 13 13 11 12 11 12 15 16 10 15 17 15 |
100 100 102 102 104 102 107 115 132 158 164 160 170 171 |
3 3 4 4 5 5 5 5 7 8 6 7 5 5 |
100 100 97 97 94 94 99 111 125 146 145 144 147 148 |
9 8 5 4 5 4 5 4 3 5 3 5 4 3 |
100 97 92 93 96 109 102 122 121 144 149 152 165 165 |
100 105 100 103 103 111 114 118 129 165 171 170 177 176 |
72 New York
|
Carp*nt*rs |
Carpkwt's Hklpbrs |
COAL Whkklkrs |
M'OHIMTSTS |
Masons |
Masoms' Hklpbrs |
|||||||
|
K. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
|||||||
|
Init. wage per day.. |
$1.625 |
$0.815 |
$0.896 |
$1.375 |
$2.50 |
$0.965 |
||||||
|
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
ReL Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 2 6 8 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 |
ReL Wages |
No. |
Rol. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
• • 2 1 1 • • • • • • 1 1 5 5 4 7 7 |
• • • 100 92 92 • • • • • • • • ■ 123 135 126 135 134 134 130 |
• • 1 • • • • • • 3 6 9 6 2 3 4 4 3 |
... 100 • • • • • • • • • 148 161 171 202 107 210 215 211 204 |
11 6 9 5 10 9 6 10 16 13 15 • • 15 14 |
100 102 103 109 104 131 126 148 164 170 198 • • • 197 197 |
3 6 9 7 6 4 • • • • • • 5 8 4 6 8 |
100 101 102 108 103 104 • • • • • • • • • 160 181 166 174 176 |
100 100 100 100 87 83 82 87 92 104 104 96 109 109 |
5 4 5 5 4 7 7 5 7 6 10 5 4 7 |
100 104 100 100 89 107 109 114 121 138 148 149 149 149 |
506
HlSTORY OF THE GbBBNBAOKS
TABLE l — Continued
WAGE-SEBIB8 FBOM TABLE XII OF THE ALDRICH RXPOBT —
GOODS
73 Pennsylvania
|
Black* bmithb |
Bi/ks'ths' Helperb |
< M |
}ORB- AKJSR8 |
Laborees |
M'cmxiBTB |
MOLDUf |
||||||
|
00 JE • • • • |
M. |
M. $1.00 |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day |
$1.89 |
$1.335 |
$1.00 |
$1.705 |
$1.635 |
|||||||
|
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. 2 4 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 3 4 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 2 2 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 4 5 5 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Bel. Wages |
No. |
BeL WlfM |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
3 3 4 3 2 3 3 2 2 5 3 3 4 5 |
100 103 100 103 108 106 112 126 139 139 159 153 152 148 |
100 100 100 100 100 113 113 121 125 150 167 167 167 167 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 112 125 137 150 150 150 150 |
13 16 16 17 20 22 18 21 20 22 20 24 18 23 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 106 114 123 148 159 159 159 159 |
12 9 9 8 11 13 13 13 13 13 14 8 8 16 |
100 102 102 108 108 108 103 112 116 144 162 150 173 165 |
5 8 8 9 9 8 8 7 5 4 3 4 4 8 |
100 94 97 96 96 94 8? 101 112 122 132 132 153 153 |
|
73 Pa. |
74 Pa. |
74 Pa. |
74 Pa. |
74 Pa. |
i |
4Pa. |
||||||
|
Pattern- Makebs |
Black- 8MITHH |
Bi/kVths' H EL PER 8 |
Core- Marees |
D&AUGHTS- MKN |
Ekoixezbs |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day.. |
$1.585 |
$2.20 |
$1.40 |
$1.20 |
$2.50 |
$2.40 |
||||||
|
No. 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 5 5 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 8 8 10 10 9 8 10 12 7 7 7 7 10 8 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Bel. Wages |
No, |
BeL Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 110 112 112 112 112 119 126 152 174 175 175 173 173 |
100 100 100 91 91 100 100 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 |
100 107 107 107 107 107 114 114 114 121 121 121 121 121 |
100 100 100 100 117 117 117 117 117 125 142 142 167 167 |
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 |
• • • 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 108 108 108 108 106 106 |
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 110 110 125 125 125 125 125 |
Appendix C
507
TABLB 1 — Continued
WAGE-BEBIXS FROM TABLB XH OF THB ALDRICH KKPORT — MSTAL8 AMD MKTALLIC
OOOD8
74 Pennsylvania
|
Laborees |
M*CHINI8T8 |
MlLL- WRIGHT8 |
MOLDEES |
Pattbrn- Makers |
P'T^N-M'K'B Hrlpers |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day.. |
$1.00 |
$1.65 |
$2.00 |
$1.70 |
$1.535 |
$1.30 |
||||||
|
No. 15 15 15 12 14 13 14 12 13 15 17 18 18 18 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 16 17 15 14 14 16 16 15 16 16 16 16 15 14 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. 12 12 10 8 10 10 10 6 6 10 8 8 10 10 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 4 |
Reí. jWages |
No. 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 |
Reí. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 110 110 110 110 120 140 140 140 140 150 150 150 150 |
100 101 101 100 112 112 112 112 124 124 138 138 156 157 |
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 115 125 150 150 185 185 |
100 100 118 118 118 129 129 147 147 176 176 176 176 176 |
100 101 101 101 107 114 121 127 130 143 159 159 176 176 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 115 115 115 115 154 154 123 123 |
PAPEB
75 Massachusetts
Sex
Initial wage per day
1860, January July....
1861, January July....
1862, January July....
1863, January July...
1864, January July....
1865, January July....
1866, January July....
Enoineers
M.
$1.165
No.
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Reí. Wages
100 100 100 100 100 100 115 115 115 129 143 143 143 143
$1.25
No.
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bel. Wages
100 100 100 100 87 87 107 107 107 140 160 160 200 200
Laborees
$1.00
No.
22
20 17 16 15 15 12 12 12 12 12 12 10 9
Reí. Wages
100 100 100 100 80 80 100 100 100 134 150 167 150 150
Machine Hands
$1.335
No.
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Reí. Wages
100 100 100 100 100 112 112 112 125 150 169 169 187 187
508
HlSTORY OF THE GbEENBAOKS
TABLE 1 — Continued
WAOE-SERIBS FBOM TABLE XII OF THB ALDRICH RBFÓBT — PAPKR
75 Massachusetts
Sex.
Initial wage per day
1860, January July . . .
1861, January July . . .
1862, January July . . .
1863, January July . . .
1864, January July . . .
1865, January July . . .
1866, January July . . .
M'h'nbH's Helpers
M.
$1.00
No.
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Bel. Wages
100 100 100 100 100 117 117 117 117 150 150 150 150 150
Paper
CUTTEES
F.
$0.50
No.
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 4
Bel. Wages
100 100
100 100 80 80 100 100 100 117 117 130 130 150
RaoSobtkbs
$0.50
No.
6
8
9
10
10
10
12
12
9
10
10
10
14
14
Bel. Wages
100 100 100 100 80 80 100 100 100 117 117 117 117 130
RAILWATB
76 Massachusetts
|
Bago ade- men |
bra remen Pass'q'r |
Brakemen Freioht |
Conduct'b Pass'q'r |
Condüct's Freioht |
EXGINEEBS LOCOMO'VB |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day... |
$1.915 |
$1.25 |
$1.165 |
$3.195 |
$1.61 |
$2.30 |
||||||
|
No. 6 6 6 6 8 10 4 10 6 10 10 10 10 3 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 10 12 18 18 18 18 12 9 17 6 12 18 32 18 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 22 6 14 10 12 12 13 13 16 9 10 10 10 16 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 16 12 12 12 10 12 12 22 22 16 10 13 12 12 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 20 19 23 22 23 16 17 17 30 22 26 17 21 23 |
Bel. Wages |
No. |
B*l. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 110 110 110 110 |
100 ioo 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 153 140 153 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 120 120 120 120 120 146 146 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 120 120 120 120 |
100 102 109 108 111 110 111 113 , 110 ¡ 110 163 165 172 159 |
56 41 33 46 46 40 43 47 43 46 50 56 46 48 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 105 105 106 106 125 130 130 131 |
Appenüix O
509
TABLE 1—ConUnued
WAGE-8EKIB8 FBOM TABLB XH OF THS ALDUOH BKFOBT — BAXLWATB
76 Massachosetts
|
FlREMEN Locomotive |
FORBKEN Masón 8 |
Carpentebs |
Masons |
Paintebs |
||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M |
M. |
M. |
|||||
|
Initial wage per day... |
$1.145 |
$2.50 |
$1.30 |
$2.00 |
$1.425 |
|||||
|
No. 42 24 38 22 22 50 38 56 36 36 36 42 40 42 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Bel. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. • • 4 • • 7 • • • • ■ • 8 3 6 3 5 16 19 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 11 1 1 • • • • 4 • • 8 • • 9 8 6 6 11 |
Reí. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan... July . . 1861, Jan... July . . 1862, Jan... July . . 1863, Jan... July . . 1864, Jan... July . . 1865, Jan . . . July . . 1866, Jan . . . July . . |
100 114 114 114 114 114 117 117 117 117 153 153 153 153 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 140 140 160 100 |
79 • • • • 49 65 24 29 68 49 27 58 61 50 54 |
100 • • • • ■ • 111 107 87 98 108 131 118 170 165 135 156 |
• • • 100 • • • 91 • • • • • • • • • 113 125 125 125 140 105 147 |
100 117 140 • • • • • • 96 • • • 105 • • • 140 145 142 160 177 |
8IDEWALK8
77 New York
Sex
Initial wage per day
1860, January July ...
1861, January July . . .
1862, January July . . .
1863, January July . . .
1864, January July . . .
1865, January July . . .
1866, January July . . .
SlDEWALK LATKR8
M.
$2.00
No.
12
15 10 12 8 9 6 6 8 8 7 8 8 8
Reí. Wages
100 100 100 100 100 100 113 113 138 138 175 175 175 188
SlDEWALK
Latees1 Helpbks
M.
$1.00
No.
6 7 5 6 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 4 3 4
Reí. Wages
100 100 100
100 100 100 125 125 175 175 250 250 275 275
Stone
CUTTE&S
$2.00
No.
12
15
10
12
8
8
6
6
8
8
7
7
8
8
Reí. Wages
100 100 100 100 100 100 113 113 138 138 175 175 175 188
Tbamster»
M.
$2.00
No.
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Reí. Wages
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Í:íio*t op t»« Giiesmcu
JxÍt
1
J^y
J*It
Ü5S. Juaary-. JoJt
JdJj
"^ST^
|
1 |
va » |
1W |
3 100 |
«t<- >'" tw- |
||||||
|
96 100 1 |
100 • 2 100 |
|||||||||
|
JuIt 2 |
:- J.T |
Mi |
i loo |
117¡ 100 |
1 |
100 2 111» |
||||
|
1961. Jan. 2 |
113 50 |
113 |
1 126 |
10» 119 |
100 1 10) |
|||||
|
Julr 6 |
126 I > |
«7 |
1 U |
83Í 80 |
||||||
|
... 37 |
11» |
|||||||||
|
Julr 3 |
120 UlO |
VI |
2 , 79 |
si 110 |
||||||
|
13T ¡ as |
Kl> |
1 |
121 |
|||||||
|
Julr .í |
137 3» |
111 |
3 |
KA |
136; Ul |
1 |
121 |
1 |
100 |
|
|
H |
se |i62 |
i:« |
■■: |
ian |
130 165 |
121 |
■x- |
|||
|
. |
1*0 [213 |
135 |
7 |
111 |
162 130 |
* |
115 |
1 |
m |
|
|
.^ |
112 1131 |
i» |
n |
133 |
, 81 153 |
1 |
121 |
X |
ii' |
|
|
i» pk |
155 |
i:w |
1«2 1(! |
121 2 1 130 |
||||||
|
1886, Jan |
:, |
167 5¡jl |
177 |
tt |
116 |
148 171 |
1 |
121 |
* |
110 |
13» 1%: 156
1 BecaOM <J diflerenoe between tbe sooofr and winter ngei of quan-jiM*. ÜM MlatiTe *uea tat Janoarr of racb yr>r ara omnpntnd a* paneataaiB i.f Uta m«i> ¡« Wn«rI,lW0(la»l. and tliiweforJolias perneo ta««i)f tbe wamia JbIj.IS» (W.l'l- iSwiiotecociwiriiinaqnanTmcn.StoooT»; wm*™ J.n-.lwrTíl.»»!; JoÍt.IWO.»-» t Srri ootenoDcenihxB qairrjnM, Bino» 79 ; waf JaiL,lWn,iaj|; Jnly.lMMI V
Appendix O
511
TABLE \ — Continued
WAOB-SBRIES FROM TABLB XH OP THE ALDRICH RKPORT — STONB
81 Maryland
|
Enginebrs |
Laborees |
Marblb CUTTERS |
Marblb Polishbrs |
Marblb Rubbbrs |
TSAMSTBRS |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day. |
$1.50 |
$1.125 |
$2.00 |
$1.15 |
$1.085 |
$1.125 |
||||||
|
No. 1 1 • • • • 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 2 2 2 • • 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 |
Reí. Wa«fes |
No. 7 7 6 4 * • 7 6 8 9 9 8 8 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 5 5 4 1 2 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 6 4 4 3 2 1 5 5 5 10 9 11 9 9 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 2 2 • • • ■ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 |
Rol. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 100 • • • • • • 89 111 111 145 145 145 145 145 |
100 100 100 • • • 89 111 111 141 148 148 158 158 |
100 113 104 100 • • • 113 113 145 163 163 las 163 |
100 100 98 87 87 109 120 140 149 149 155 155 |
100 101 101 100 104 92 92 115 118 151 154 153 149 150 |
100 100 • • ■ • ■ • 100 89 89 100 111 133 148 148 163 163 |
81 Md. 82 N. Y.
82 N. Y.
82 N. Y.
83 N. Y.
84 Pa.
|
Watchm'n |
Marblb Cuttbrs |
Marblb Polishbrs |
Marblb Rubbbrs |
Oranttb CUTTBRS |
Laborbrs |
|||||||
|
M. |
m. |
m. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
|||||||
|
Init. wage per day. |
$1.00 |
$2.00 |
$1.315 |
$1.155 |
$2.25 |
$1.25 |
||||||
|
No. 1 1 1 1 • • • • 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 4 6 6 8 7 7 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 100 100 72 • • • ■ • • 100 100 100 125 125 125 125 125 |
o 8 6 8 5 6 4 9 9 9 9 11 13 ,21 |
100 102 87 78 74 86 88 98 108 131 136 %149 146 148 |
2 2 3 3 2 3 3 5 4 5 7 15 12 9 |
100 100 92 79 81 as 89 106 112 156 156 166 157 153 |
8 14 12 12 6 9 10 10 7 11 7 6 5 7 |
100 99 95 88 88 88 98 133 119 160 166 181 195 200 |
100 100 as 89 89 as 89 94 97 133 133 133 133 157 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 |
512
HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS
TABLE 1 — Continued
WAQE-OERIES FBOM TABLE XH OF THE AiDRICH REPORT — STOITB
84 Pennsylvania.
|
Stone Cüt- TERfl |
8TOSTE CüT- TIU |
||||
|
M. |
Sex |
M. |
|||
|
Initial wage per day |
$1.50 |
$1.50 |
|||
|
No. 1 3 2 4 2 6 2 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 5 4 8 3 5 4 7 |
Bel. Wages |
||
|
1860, January |
100 117 100 117 100 117 133 |
1863, July |
133 |
||
|
July |
1864. January |
158 |
|||
|
1861, January |
July |
179 |
|||
|
July |
1865. January |
206 |
|||
|
1862, January |
July |
203 |
|||
|
July |
1866. January |
217 |
|||
|
1863, January |
July |
217 |
|||
WHTTB LBAD
85 Pennsylvania
Sex
Initial wago per day.
1860, January July
1861, January July . . .
1862, January July . . .
1863, January July . . .
1864, January July . . .
1865, January July . . . January July . . .
Engineers
No.
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
M.
$1.50
Bel. Wages
100 100 100 100 111 111 111 111 133 133 117 117 117 117
Laborees
M.
$1.12
No.
13
15
16
15
15
14
9
8
6
4
1
5
8
6
Bel. Wages
100 100 101 102 104 104 112 112 110 143 150 156 156 156
Laborees, Boy s
$0.635
No.
5 5 3 2 1 1 1 3 2 1 2 4 4 3
Bel. Wages
100 105 105
92 106 105
92 101 118 105
98 105 105
96
Watcbkex
$1.145
No.
I 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
* •
1 1 l 1 1
BeL Wages
100 100 100 100 100 100 125 125
• • •
150 150 150 150 150
Appendix C
513
TABLE 1 — Coniinued
FBOM TABLB XU OF THB ALDRICH EBPORT — WOOLBN OOOD8
86 Connecticut
|
ovbbsbbbs Cabd. Dbp. |
OVBBSBBBS Dyr Housb |
ovbbsbbbs Finish.Dbp |
OVBBSBBBS FULLINO & Oioo. Dbp. |
ovbbsbbbb Wbav.Dbp. |
Caed Clbanebs |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
1 |
M. |
|||||
|
Init. wage perday.. |
$2.00 |
$1.80 |
$1.375 |
$1.375 |
$1.50 |
0.69 |
||||||
|
No. |
Bel. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Bel. Wages |
No. |
Bel. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 1 2 1 1 1 1 4 5 4 5 2 3 3 6 |
Bel. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 100 125 125 88 125 150 150 150 150 180 190 190 190 |
100 100 100 100 83 83 83 83 125 128 167 167 167 167 |
100 100 100 100 100 109 218 218 218 218 262 262 262 262 |
100 109 109 109 109 109 109 95 84 98 145 120 120 120 |
100 100 100 117 117 117 117 117 133 173 177 175 200 200 |
100 100 112 112 138 100 103 104 109 112 154 115 138 121 |
86 Connecticut
|
Cabo Tendera |
Cabpbnt's |
FüLLERS A Gigorrs |
Loom FlXERS |
Sboond- Hands |
Sbbabbbs |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day . . |
$0.60 |
$1.50 |
$0.84 |
$1.25 |
$0.90 |
$0.75 |
||||||
|
No. 6 4 5 5 8 8 4 7 6 6 7 7 9 6 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 1 1 ■ • • • • • • • 1 • • i 2 1 1 1 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 4 8 3 6 10 8 3 12 9 3 6 6 9 10 |
Bel. Wages |
No. • • • • • • 1 1 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 |
Bel. Wages |
No. |
Bel. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 104 107 105 106 101 108 106 113 99 143 137 123 130 |
100 100 • • • • • • • • • • • • 108 • • • • • • 108 108 108 150 150 |
100 88 107 93 94 95 107 86 87 149 168 151 152 154 |
• • • • • • • • • 100 100 93 110 113 125 176 192 160 160 150 |
100 100 98 98 106 100 119 98 107 111 144 158 150 189 |
• • • • 1 • • 1 4 4 2 2 3 2 3 4 5 |
• • • ióó • • • 100 117 107 103 133 149 187 193 183 160 |
514
HlSTORY OF THE GrEENBACKS
TABLE 1 - Cantinued
WAGE-6EB1E8 FBOM TABLB XH OF THS ALDRICH REPORT — WOOLBI OOODt)
86 Connecticut
|
Spinnkbs Jack and MCLK |
Sortera |
Watchmsn |
Weavkbs |
Yark Carrierb |
Drawkbs- IN |
|||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
1 |
M. |
M. |
M. |
F. |
|||||
|
Init. wage perday.. |
$1.05 |
$1.50 |
1.00 |
$0.925 |
$0.69 |
$0.62 |
||||||
|
No. 12 10 9 7 10 13 11 12 15 14 11 15 13 12 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Bel. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. |
Reí. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 101 100 110 95 106 124 117 129 129 160 170 171 184 |
100 100 100 100 100 122 120 142 150 150 157 160 167 160 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 125 140 150 175 175 175 |
13 16 15 16 16 22 23 26 25 24 27 22 27 37 |
100 104 125 119 121 119 146 120 133 145 173 151 159 175 |
1 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 2 2 1 2 |
100 Í2Ó 133 133 181 172 |
1 2 • • 1 1 1 1 2 • • 1 1 1 1 • • |
100 89 • • • 100 119 119 119 119 • • • 134 202 202 • • • |
|
86 Conn. |
86 Conn. |
86 Conn. |
86 Conn. |
87 Mass. |
87 Mass. |
|||||||
|
Handers- |
Speckers |
Spoolers |
Weaters |
Overa EER8 |
OVRRAEERS |
|||||||
|
1n |
Card. Dbp. |
Dte Hocsb |
||||||||||
|
Sox |
F. |
F. |
F. |
F. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day.. |
$0.50 |
$0.50 |
$0.65 |
$0.81 |
$2.00 |
$2.50 |
||||||
|
No. 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 2 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 4 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 |
Reí. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
||||||
|
July |
• • |
• • • |
2 |
100 |
3 |
92 |
5 |
119 |
1 |
100 |
1 |
75 |
|
1861, Jan. |
. . |
• • • |
• • |
• • • |
2 |
114 |
4 |
136 |
1 |
115 |
1 |
75 |
|
July |
1 |
60 |
4 |
100 |
2 |
114 |
4 |
131 |
1 |
115 |
1 |
75 |
|
1862, Jan. |
1 |
60 |
2 |
100 |
4 |
102 |
4 |
132 .. |
• • • |
1 |
113 |
|
|
July |
1 |
60 |
• • |
• • ■ |
2 |
114 |
5 |
130 1 |
115 |
1 |
113 |
|
|
1863, Jan. |
1 |
60 |
2 |
108 |
3 |
128 |
4 |
100 |
1 |
115 |
2 |
119 |
|
July |
2 |
60 |
6 |
108 |
4 |
103 |
6 |
117 |
1 |
115 |
1 |
125 |
|
1864, Jan. |
• • |
... |
• • |
• • • |
7 |
102 |
7 |
141 |
• • |
• • • |
2 |
138 |
|
July |
1 |
90 |
4 |
132 |
8 |
106 |
5 |
148 |
2 |
138 |
1 |
150 |
|
1865, Jan. |
1 |
96 |
2 |
140 |
6 |
82 |
5 |
180 |
2 |
138 |
1 |
150 |
|
July |
1 |
120 |
# . |
• • • |
5 |
128 |
7 |
152 |
1 |
125 |
1 |
150 |
|
1866, Jan. |
1 |
90 |
1 |
126 |
6 |
117 |
4 |
151 |
1 |
150 |
1 |
175 |
|
July . . |
• • • |
2 |
166 |
3 |
123 |
4 |
184 |
1 |
150 |
1 |
175 |
Appendix C
515
TABLE 1 — Continued
WAGE-SEEIES FBOM TABLE XII OF THE AX.DEICH EEPORT — WOOLEW OOOD8
87 Massachnsetts
|
ovebsbebs Weav.Dep. |
Ca |
RDSBS |
Cabo Tendees |
Dye-Hoube Hands |
LiOOM- FlXEBS |
Caed Tendees |
||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
F. |
||||||
|
Init. wage pcrday.. |
$1.75 |
$0.795 |
$0.378 |
$0.65 |
$1.25 |
$0.418 |
||||||
|
No. 2 • • |
Bel. Wages |
No. 8 6 9 4 3 7 8 5 5 12 8 6 7 8 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 6 14 7 14 19 22 30 12 13 5 7 4 6 5 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 22 16 16 23 29 29 .9 22 24 18 12 15 16 15 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 • • 1 1 3 • • 6 5 13 9 7 7 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 4 2 • • • • 5 13 8 20 14 15 16 15 18 17 |
Bel. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 100 100 107 114 114 114 171 • • • 171 171 229 229 229 |
100 120 108 95 103 109 109 123 122 113 116 135 148 147 |
100 137 135 143 136 148 146 152 155 144 160 173 179 179 |
100 94 101 99 98 102 119 119 119 132 155 156 195 195 |
100 100 100 • • • 140 140 122 • • • 127 148 164 184 192 192 |
100 115 • • • • • • 128 120 123 130 128 136 146 147 165 165 |
88 Bhode Island
|
ovbbhbbbh oveesbees Caed. Dep.'Dyb House |
OYBB8EBB8 Finís h.Dep |
OVBBSEBBS Spinn. Dbp. |
ovebsbbbs Weav.Dep. |
Sboond- Hamds |
||||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day.. |
$1.75 |
$1.67 |
$1.50 |
$1.33 |
$1.33 |
$1.145 |
||||||
|
No. |
Bel. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Bel. Wages |
No. |
Bel. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
BeL Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Bel. Wages |
No. 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 |
Bel. Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 100 100 100 100 100 143 143 157 157 200 200 200 229 |
100 100 105 105 105 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 111 111 111 111 111 136 |
100 110 110 113 113 113 126 126 150 150 150 150 150 201 |
100 107 107 107 107 107 113 113 126 126 138 138 150 150 |
100 102 102 103 101 104 119 119 132 132 132 132 132 128 |
516
HlSTORY OF THE GfiEENBACKS
TABLE 1 — CorUinued
WAQE-SRRIE8 FROM TABLK XII OF THB ALDRICH REPORT — WOOLKM OOOM
88 Bhode Island
|
Allby BOT8 |
Card FbKDERS |
Clkanbbs |
DRX88KR8 |
Dtxbs |
Fnxnro Caiihu |
||||||
|
Sex |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
|||||
|
Init. wage per day.. |
$0.63 |
$0.58 |
$0.83 |
$1.00 |
$1.10 $1.12 í |
||||||
|
No. 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 2 2 3 3 4 5 5 5 4 4 2 2 2 3 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
ReL Wages |
No| Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1864, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 100 100 100 100 79 79 79 92 92 100 100 100 113 |
100 100 100 100 100 86 86 86 122 122 143 143 152 159 |
100 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 100 100 86 86 88 80 |
100 100 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 100 117 125 150 |
100 100 109 114 114 114 109 114 114 114 114 114 114 118 |
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l 1 1 1 |
100 100 100 100 112 112 112 112 112 119 119 127 127 127 |
88 Rhode Island
|
FlLLINQ Sortees |
FlNISHERfl |
Fullera |
GlGGERS |
LiABOBKBS, Dtb House |
PlCKKXS |
|||||||
|
Scx |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
M. |
||||||
|
Init. wage per day.. |
$1.21 |
$0.79 |
$1.17 |
$0.79 |
$0.96 |
$1.21 |
||||||
|
No. |
Reí. Wages |
No. 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Reí. Wages |
No. 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 |
ReL Wages |
No. |
ReL Wages |
No. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 |
ReL Wages |
|
|
1860, Jan. July 1861, Jan. July 1862, Jan. July 1863, Jan. July 1SM, Jan. July 1865, Jan. July 1866, Jan. July |
100 100 100 100 103 103 110 110 110 110 110 110 114 117 |
100 100 100 100 100 95 95 95 116 116 127 127 127 137 |
100 100 100 100 100 103 103 107 107 107 107 114 114 114 |
100 100 100 95 95 105 105 105 127 127 127 127 142 148 |
2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 96 96 100 104 104 104 104 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 110 110 117 117 121 124 121 131 |
TABLB 1 — Continua!
88 Rhode IaUad
|
Pkbbb- |
sy;:.- |
*¡¡;:;: |
„.„.. |
SPINNKKS |
Wabtb |
|||||||||
|
Su |
M. |
*t. |
fe |
M. |
fe |
u |
U. |
|||||||
|
per ú*j.. |
ti oo |
10.88 |
81 00 |
» ,00 |
10.95 |
»92 |
80.8! |
|||||||
|
¿ |
k i* |
J |
|| £* 100 lili 109 111 111 US |
3 a i t 1 í |
ll Sí |
6 |
fl 100 IDO l.ti 10) 117 111 117 |
f i' V 18 ILI |
d |
í 15 |
i |
2Í |
||
|
1860. Jan.. Jal». ¡"1. J.in Jol». ív;¿, ,i.Mi July, 1SÜJ, hl, Jnly. l¡yit, .r.ir, July. ISlL-,. .!.,,,.. Joly. lgflO, Jan Jnlj. |
100 100 100 IX 100 104 10* IOS 111 18 |
ilí! |.N| 113 100 ia ia i» i» ita |
túO un HB 118 18) isa lia US |
t 6 a |
loa ín lat 1M |
loa ]f.J Lili K.IU MI 10» toa tn oa gj H UB |
|
"ís- |
mu™. |
lililí MI |
££• |
BUblM |
rrw,.™. |
w«™ |
||||||||
|
Sol |
H. |
U. |
F. |
p. |
P. |
F. |
F. |
|||||||
|
'stxr. |
81 .06 |
«0.91 |
K.M |
n.oo |
».« |
S9.67 |
■D.70 |
|||||||
|
£ |
¡f |
^ |
i¿ |
d |
) |
| |
ll |
ó |
^5 |
<j |
II |
|||
|
1WQ, Jan. Jcil/ 18fll. Jan Jul» 1802, Jan. Jul». 1803, Jan.. July 1961. Jan.. July. 1805. Jbq.. ■». £1': Jnlr. |
|l*í lid ín > 100 100 MS ir r, lia |
11 10 10 10 1 10 |
B H.rj 100 US 11*} 119 118 iia |
s 3 a 3 10 |
lili lili II.) 107 117 181 131 |
mi 1"! |
i ■: i i |
kVi ll» mil 9 |
«0 100 loo 100 Da 100 too IOS 114 lüi 1T, |
U 11 11 10 a n |
ion toa ¡M 107 117 110 11S 117 UO 143 8 m mi |
518
HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAOKS
WAGB-SUBS
TABLK21
FBOM VOL. XX OF THB TBHTH CKMBUS AOBZOÜLTÜBAL IMPLBMBNT8
Massillon, O., 9
|
Occnpation |
Initial Wage p'r Day |
1860 |
1861 |
1862 |
186S |
1864 |
1805 |
1886 |
|
Pinisher Molder |
í.lo 1.62 0.90 1.50 1.50 |
• • ■ • • • • « • • • • • • • |
100 100 100 100 100 |
100' 100 111 117 100 |
117 115 122 133 117 |
133 123 133 150 133 |
140 123 139 150 133 |
150 154 167 150 |
|
Painter |
133 |
|||||||
BOOT8 AVD 8HOS8 Lafayette, Ind., 16, 17
Overeeer
Cutter, Solé . . . Cutter, Upper . . Pitter
|
66.661* |
100 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
150 |
150 |
|
aoo |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
4.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
2.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 100 100
Baltimore, Md., 19
Overseer
Buttoner or lacer
Cutter
Fitter
Packer
Treer
|
60.00* |
100 |
100 |
107 |
107 |
120 |
120 |
|
0.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
133 |
133 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
133 100 150 150 100 140
i Id this Appendix the series of relativo wages computed f rom the material in Mr. Wbekb'8 "Report on the Statistics of Wages in M anuí actu ring Industries M (Tenth Censtu of the United State», Yol. XX) are giren at length. The order of arrangement under industries and establishments is that of the souree, and the nunv ber following the ñame of the town and state in which each establishment is located shows the page of the u Report " on which the original data may be fonnd. As in the preceding Appendix, the initial wage is recorded, but the sex and nnmber of employees are not, because they are not stated by Mr. Weeks.
2 Per month.
Appendix O
619
WAOS-ftKRIBS
TABLB l-Contin%eA
FBOM YOL. XX OF THB BOOT8 AMD SHOKS
Mass., 20, 21
|
Ooenpation' |
Initial Wage p'r Day |
1*80 |
1861 |
1882 |
1888 |
1884 |
1865 |
1886 |
|
Cutter |
$ 1.33 2.00 0.50 1.16} 1.50 1.50 2.00 |
100 • • • 100 • • • 100 100 • • • |
100 100 100 100 133 100 100 |
132 130 200 143 133 117 130 |
132 125 200 143 167 133 125 |
150 138 250 172 167 133 138 |
150 163 250 172 183 167 163 |
201 |
|
Pitter |
163 400 |
|||||||
|
Treer |
243 183 |
|||||||
|
Packer |
167 |
|||||||
|
163 |
Columbro, O., 25
Cellarman Laborera . Maltster . . Teams ter.
|
$ 1.15 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
133 |
167 |
200 |
|
0.76 |
100 |
100 |
126 |
151 |
201 |
228 |
|
1.15 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
133 |
167 |
200 |
|
0.96 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
140 |
159 |
180 |
200 228 200 180
BKICK
Si. Lonis, lío., 81
Boy
Engineer
Laborera (lst)... Laborera (2d) . . . Molder
|
0.7825 |
100 |
• • • |
80 |
111 |
105 |
168 |
|
1.66 |
100 |
100 |
• • • |
120 |
196 |
211 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
88 |
113 |
138 |
175 |
200 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
60 |
60 |
80 |
120 |
120 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
75 |
133 |
117 |
199 |
212 |
207 301 200 140 218
Trenton, N. J., 83
Burner
Carrier
Molder
Pit-filler
Presser
Off-bearer
Setter
Sorter
Teamster
Wheeler
WhTr and tosser
|
$ 1.62 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
154 |
|
0.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
133 |
|
1.375 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
127 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
|
0.60 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
142 |
|
1.62 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
154 |
|
1.10 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
118 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
|
1.10 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
|
1.10 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
136 |
154 133 164 160 140 167 170 136 150 136 159
520
HlSTOBY OF THE GbBBNBAOKS
WAflA-UBIBS
TABLB Z-ConUnued
FBOM YOL. XX OF THB BBIOX
Phüadelphia, Pa., S4
|
Occnpation |
Initial Wajre p rDay |
1860 |
1861 |
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
1865 |
1886 |
|
Burner |
$ 1.92 2.00 0.62 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 1.00 1.375 0.75 1.50 1.50 1.75 1.00 1.20 1.12 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
* 117 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 91 100 100 100 86 100 100 100 |
117 100 100 100 100 100 117 100 91 100 83 100 86 112 104 112 |
149 125 121 112 100 112 133 112 118 133 93 133 114 112 104 112 |
156 138 121 125 124 125 150 125 136 133 100 133 129 125 104 112 |
156 175 161 150 124 150 167 150 182 167 108 150 171 150 125 134 |
167 200 |
|
Carrier off Cárter |
161 150 |
|||||||
|
Driver |
124 150 |
|||||||
|
Engineer Molder |
167 150 200 |
|||||||
|
Presser |
167 150 |
|||||||
|
Press-sorter Setter |
200 186 |
|||||||
|
WhTr and toeser |
150 167 156 |
Cigarmaker
CIGABS AND TOBACCO
Washington, D. C, 41
|
0.83>á |
100 |
125 |
142 |
186 |
196 |
299 |
289
St. Louis, Mo., 44
Caser
Cutter... Laborera Packer . Sorter . . , Stripper
|
$ 2.66 |
100 |
100 |
150 |
162 |
188 |
188 |
|
1.85 |
100 |
100 |
127 |
162 |
178 |
178 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
130 |
166 |
185 |
185 |
|
1.30 |
100 |
100 |
142 |
181 |
192 |
192 |
|
2.66 |
100 |
100 |
150 |
162 |
188 |
188 |
|
0.70 |
100 |
100 |
143 |
186 |
186 |
186 |
216 178 185 192 216 186
New Jersey, 45
Caser. . . Cutter . . Laborer Packer . Sorter . . Stripper
|
$ 1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
0.70 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
129 |
129 |
|
1.37 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 100 160 100 150 100
Appendix O
521
TABLK Z-ConUnued
WAQB-8UM FBOM VOL. XX OF THB TMHTH CIQAU ÁHD TOBAOOO
Wisconain, 50
|
Occnpation |
Initial Wa*e p'rDay |
1800 |
1881 |
1882 |
1868 |
1864 |
1866 |
1886 |
|
Maker |
1.331 1.75 0.25 |
100 100 100 |
100 100 100 |
125 114 120 |
150 126 133 |
175 143 133 |
175 171 133 |
162 |
|
Packer |
152 |
|||||||
|
StriDDer. |
133 |
|||||||
CLOTHIMO
Kentacky, 51
Cutter.... Salesman . Tailor .... TailoresseB
|
$ 3.84 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
|
2.56 |
100 |
150 |
150 |
150 |
150 |
150 |
|
1.75 |
100 |
129 |
129 |
171 |
171 |
171 |
|
1.16} |
100 |
129 |
129 |
172 |
172 |
172 |
125 150 157 158
Nowark, N. J., 51
|
Cutter |
$ 2.00 1.25 1.25 0.375 0.375 |
100 100 100 100 100 |
125 100 100 100 100 |
117 100 100 100 100 |
138 100 100 100 100 |
142 120 120 133 133 |
167 |
|
|
Man |
130 |
|||||||
|
Tailor |
130 |
|||||||
|
Woman |
167 167 |
|||||||
Syracnse, N. Y., 52
Foreman
Apprentice
Cutter
Machine woman
Preeser
Tailor
Tailorees
Trímmer
|
80.001 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
150 |
150 |
|
0.331 |
100 |
122 |
122 |
122 |
149 |
149 |
|
1.83 |
100 |
123 |
146 |
146 |
160 |
160 |
|
0.66| |
100 |
113 |
126 |
126 |
126 |
126 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
116 |
133 |
150 |
150 |
150 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
111 |
122 |
122 |
122 |
|
0.66| |
100 |
100 |
126 |
126 |
126 |
126 |
|
0.66} |
100 |
126 |
126 |
126 |
150 |
150 |
150 149 160 126 133 122 126 150
|
FLOUB MILLS Stanton, Del., 58 |
||||||||
|
Amistant miller . Miller |
$ 1.73 2.50 1.73 |
• • • • • • • • • |
100 100 100 |
100 100 100 |
100 100 100 |
100 100 100 |
100 100 100 |
100 100 |
|
Packer |
100 |
|||||||
i Per month.
522
HlSTOBY OF THE GbBBNBAOKS
TABLE l-Continued
WAGB4ZRIB8 FBOM YOL. XX OF THB TMHTH
FLOÜB MILLS
Beilerille, 111., 50
|
Occnpation |
Initial Wage p'r Day |
1800 |
1881 |
1882 |
1863 |
1884 |
1865 |
1886 |
|
Assistant miller.. Miller |
1.^73 1.54 1.00 1.00 1.92 1.00 1.00 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
89 75 75 75 90 100 75 |
100 100 100 100 100 125 100 |
133 125 125 125 160 125 125 |
166 162 175 150 200 200 150 |
178 186 175 150 250 200 150 |
200 249 200 150 300 |
|
Packer |
200 |
|||||||
|
175 |
Fort Wayne. Ind., 80, 61
Assistant miller.
Laborar
Miller
Millwright
Packer
Stone dresser. . . . Teamster
|
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
114 |
114 |
114 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
150 |
150 |
150 |
|
2.50 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
140 |
140 |
140 |
|
3.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
117 |
117 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
104 |
108 |
116 |
120 |
|
1.75 |
100 |
114 |
114 |
129 |
129 |
129 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
140 |
140 |
140 |
114 125 120 100 88 129 140
Lafayette, Ind., 62
Assistant miller.
Laborera
Miller
Millwrights
Stone dressers. . . Teamster
|
$ 1.15 |
100 |
117 |
117 |
152 |
217 |
217 |
|
0.875 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
129 |
153 |
153 |
|
1.44 |
100 |
116 |
116 |
139 |
174 |
174 |
|
3.00 |
• • • |
100 |
117 |
117 |
117 |
117 |
|
2.00 |
• • • |
100 |
100 |
113 |
113 |
125 |
|
1.15 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
130 |
174 |
174 |
181 181 174 117 125 174
De Soto, la., 64
Assistant miller.
Laborar
Miller
Millwright
Teamster
|
$ 0.60 |
• • • |
100 |
167 |
167 |
208 |
200 |
|
0.55 |
• • • |
100 |
150 |
178 |
201 |
218 |
|
1.15 |
• • • |
100 |
150 |
250 |
250 |
235 |
|
1.50 |
• • • |
100 |
117 |
133 |
167 |
167 |
|
0.60 |
• • • |
100 |
167 |
167 |
206 |
200 |
250 160 200 150 167
Appendix O
IndiauapollB, Iiid., IB
|
Ooon palian |
lDiti.ll Wa*e p'tDiJ |
1M0 |
1881 |
185! |
188S |
UM |
1MB |
■» |
|
i'oo 1.00 |
100 100 |
100 100 |
100 100 |
150 150 |
150 150 |
175 200 |
176 |
|
Ka.it Boaton, Ha»., T7
|
16*00" 14. 00" |
100 100 |
100 100 |
100 100 |
100 100 |
100 100 |
100 100 |
100 |
|
Cambridg*. Mass., SI
|
Manoger |
UMW |
100 |
100 |
100 |
im |
120 |
120 |
120 |
|
Carrying-in boy . |
0.62 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
161 |
161 |
161 |
|
Clay-tramper . . . |
ir-i |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
Clearing-off boy. |
0.62 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
m |
161 |
161 |
|
LOO uso 2.00 |
100 100 100 |
100 100 100 |
100 100 |
100 100 100 |
117 125 |
138 117 125 |
||
|
125 |
||||||||
|
Finisher |
2XD |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
139 |
138 |
tae |
|
Í52 |
100 |
00 |
ge |
98 |
119 |
118 |
119 |
|
|
un |
100 |
loo |
100 |
100 |
200 |
200 |
200 |
|
|
Laborera |
USO |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
117 |
117 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
mi |
100 |
100 |
138 |
138 |
138 |
|
|
oes |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
161 |
161 |
161 |
|
|
XuWmaker — |
1X0 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
138 |
138 |
138 |
|
LfiO |
100 1«1 |
11» loa |
100 100 |
100 100 |
117 133 |
117 133 |
||
|
JbáJOUr |
133 |
|||||||
|
100 |
li«.l |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|||
|
[<V |
10» |
10" |
isa |
133 |
133 |
|||
|
100 |
100 |
100 |
H ¡7 |
167 |
167 |
|||
|
100 |
100 |
100 |
133 |
133 |
133 |
524
HlSTOBY OF THB GbEENBAOKS
TABLE Z-Cantinued
WAtiA-SUBS FBOM YOL. XX OF THB TMBTTH OKVSUS
FLIKT OLA88
Pittsbarg, PaM 84, 85
Oocnpation
Foreman cutter . Carrying-in boy . Clay-tramper . . . Cutter, j'yman . .
Driver
Finisher
Gatherer
Laborar
Mixer
Mold-m'k'r, ass't
Packer
Pot-maker
Presser
Sticker-up
Teaser
|
Initial |
||||||
|
Wage |
1860 |
1861 |
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
1865 |
|
p'r Day |
||||||
|
21. 001 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
o.eo |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
6.501 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
108 |
106 |
106 |
|
7.371 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
106 |
105 |
105 |
|
7.001 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
2.58 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
131 |
131 |
131 |
|
1.12 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
136 |
136 |
136 |
|
5.001 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
|
6.501 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
123 |
123 |
123 |
|
11. 701 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
114 |
114 |
|
6.251 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
|
13.00» |
100 |
100 |
100 |
131 |
131 |
131 |
|
2.62 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
126 |
126 |
126 |
|
0.90 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
6.501 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
115 |
115 |
115 |
143 133 169 170 186 196 176 200 215 194
146 193 178 262
Pennsylvania, 86, 87
Blower
|
$ 2.00 |
• • • |
100 |
109 |
113 |
175 |
245 |
245
Pennsylvania, 87, 88
Manager
Cutter
Driver
Engineer . . . Furnaceman
Laborer
Mixer
Mold cleaner Mold-maker
Packer
Top filler . . .
Leerman
Teaser
|
76.00a |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
2.50 |
100 |
80 |
80 |
80 |
80 |
100 |
|
1.00 |
• • • |
100 |
133 |
167 |
200 |
200 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
111 |
133 |
133 |
167 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
117 |
117 |
133 |
|
1.33* |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
|
1.66* |
100 |
70 |
70 |
70 |
70 |
80 |
|
0.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
|
3.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
111 |
|
1.16} |
100 |
94 |
94 |
100 |
100 |
129 |
|
1.66| |
100 |
70 |
70 |
70 |
70 |
80 |
|
1.10 |
100 |
136 |
155 |
155 |
159 |
182 |
|
1.42£ |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
158 100 200 178 150 125
80 120 111 129
80 182 120
1 Per week.
2 Per month.
Appendix O
525
TABLB 2—OonUnued
FBOM YOL. XX OF THB TBVTR CKMMüB FLIKT OLAB8
Wheeling, W. Va., 80
|
Occupation |
Initial Wase perDay |
1880 |
1861 |
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
1866 |
1866 |
|
Clay-tramper . . . Driver |
120.00» 0.833Í 1.16 1.75 0.83 M 0.91| 2.08 1.125 0.83 Jí 1.50 1.00 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
100 99 100 100 100 127 90 100 100 100 100 |
100 89 86 76 90 109 96 89 90 83 100 |
100 119 115 133 120 127 108 119 120 83 100 |
100 159 158 152 160 145 163 148 160 122 200 |
100 159 158 171 160 145 132 160 160 133 200 |
100 159 158 |
|
Eng'r and blksm. |
171 160 154 |
|||||||
|
Moldm'kr, j ' vman Packer |
130 148 |
|||||||
|
Pot-filler Teaser |
169 • 144 200 |
|||||||
icm Peoría, III., 106
Carpenter .... Hook-carrier . .
Laborar
Packer
Peddler
Plower
Sawyer
Spudder
Teamster
|
$ 1.50 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
133 |
200 |
167 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
150 |
150 |
|
0.75 |
100 |
133 |
133 |
133 |
167 |
133 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
150 |
150 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
150 |
150 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
150 |
125 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
|
0.60 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
167 |
167 |
167 |
183 175 167 150 140 175 150 150 208
IBÓN BLA8T FUBNACE8— ANTHBAdTB
New York, 115
Manager
Blacksmith
Brksmith'shelp'r Bottom-filler ....
Carpenter
Cinderman
Engineer
Founder
Keeper
Keeper's helper . Laborar
|
$ |
||
|
125.001 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.375 |
100 |
91 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
85 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
88 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.125 |
100 |
89 |
|
15.00a |
100 |
96 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
89 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
90 |
|
1.125 |
100 |
89 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
88 |
|
100 |
100 |
100 |
140 |
|
100 |
119 |
145 |
164 |
|
90 |
100 |
130 |
120 |
|
94 |
125 |
175 |
164 |
|
100 |
140 |
160 |
170 |
|
95 |
122 |
167 |
156 |
|
100 |
117 |
167 |
167 |
|
94 |
118 |
142 |
142 |
|
95 |
120 |
160 |
150 |
|
95 |
122 |
167 |
156 |
|
94 |
125 |
163 |
150 |
140 182 140 164 200 156 125 144 150 156 150
i Per month.
s Per week.
526
HlSTOBT OF THE GbBENBAOKS
TABLB Z-Continued
WAOB-BBBIB8 FBOM YOL. XX OF THB TBKTH CBH8US ptON BLAST FUKNACBB — AKTH&lCm
Catasauqaa, PaM 116
|
Initial |
||||||||
|
Occupation |
Wa«e p r Day |
1860 |
1861 |
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
1865 |
1866 |
|
Foreman, |
$ |
|||||||
|
machine shops |
2.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
130 |
130 |
127 |
|
Blacksmith, boss |
1.55 |
100 |
100 |
97 |
113 |
145 |
145 |
145 |
|
Carpenter, boss . |
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
106 |
114 |
129 |
135 |
143 |
|
Boss laborer .... |
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
113 |
125 |
125 |
138 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
97 |
97 |
125 |
172 |
156 |
172 |
|
|
Brksmith helper |
0.80 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
144 |
200 |
200 |
200 |
|
Brksmith j'yman Bottom- and |
1.35 |
100 |
100 |
93 |
111 |
130 |
130 |
137 |
|
top-filler |
1.43 |
100 |
100 |
104 |
108 |
154 |
149 |
148 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
90 |
100 |
120 |
160 |
175 |
185 |
|
|
Carpenter j'vman |
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
108 |
120 |
160 |
160 |
168 |
|
7.911 |
100 |
93 |
106 |
124 |
164 |
159 |
177 |
|
|
Engineers, 1 o c o- |
||||||||
|
1.65 |
100 |
97 |
106 |
106 |
121 |
141 |
145 |
|
|
1.12 |
100 |
94 |
98 |
121 |
156 |
161 |
170 |
|
|
2.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
133 |
133 |
133 |
|
|
Keeper |
2.01 1.69 |
100 100 |
95 101 |
102 103 |
107 100 |
135 137 |
130 136 |
129 |
|
Keeper's helper. . |
135 |
|||||||
|
0.80 |
100 |
100 |
113 |
141 |
181 |
178 |
191 |
|
|
1.40 |
100 |
100 |
104 |
118 |
150 |
161 |
143 |
|
|
Masón |
1.40 |
100 |
96 |
96 |
125 |
161 |
161 |
161 |
Pennsylvania, 119
Blacksmith
Brksmith helper Engineer, j'yman.
Bottom-filler
Cinderman
Pounder
Keeper
Keeper's helper .
Laborer
Metal -weighman. Top-filler
|
$ 1.25 |
100 |
86 |
100 |
146 |
186 |
203 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
88 |
100 |
114 |
200 |
200 |
|
8.041 |
100 |
100 |
110 |
139 |
160 |
187 |
|
0.90 |
100 |
111 |
125 |
151 |
222 |
222 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
117 |
75 |
86 |
133 |
133 |
|
1.30 |
100 |
103 |
103 |
175 |
219 |
296 |
|
1.15 |
100 |
100 |
116 |
150 |
198 |
192 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
113 |
143 |
200 |
207 |
|
0 875 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
130 |
229 |
171 |
|
0.90 |
100 |
100 |
111 |
127 |
190 |
199 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
113 |
113 |
143 |
214 |
207 |
200 200 149 222 133 296 192 207 171 199 200
i Per week.
Appbndix C
527
TABLB 2r-C<mHnued
WAOB-8BBIB8 FBOM YOL. XX OF THB TSNTH CKMBU8 IBÓN BLAST FUBN ACB8 — BITUMUIOÜB
Youngstown, O., 122
Occnpation
nager
cksmith
tom-fíller and >p-filler
Sen te r erman
pneer
inder
>per
>per's helper.
K>rer
;al-carrier
|
Initial |
||||||
|
Wage p'r Day |
1860 |
1861 |
1862 |
1868 |
1864 |
1865 |
|
100.00» |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
110 |
167 |
292 |
|
1.125 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
122 |
222 |
200 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
118 |
175 |
150 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
138 |
238 |
225 |
|
1.12 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
210 |
210 |
|
4.81 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
127 |
192 |
175 |
|
1.125 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
133 |
222 |
200 |
|
0.875 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
143 |
229 |
200 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
140 |
250 |
225 |
1866
100 292
188 167 212 220 100 167 188 200 225
IBÓN BLAST FUBNACE8 — CHASCO AL
Baltimore, Md., 128
nager
i-raker
lier
pneer
er
>per
tper's helper,
|
32.001 |
100 |
113 |
139 |
175 |
|||
|
0.85 |
100 |
134 |
156 |
218 |
|||
|
0.95 |
100 |
116 |
133 |
165 |
|||
|
6.00 |
100 |
121 |
150 |
192 |
|||
|
0.96 |
100 |
111 |
131 |
164 |
|||
|
0.85 |
100 |
126 |
146 |
193 |
|||
|
0.78 |
100 |
128 |
146 |
182 |
Boiling Springs, Pa., 132
cksmith
penter
tman
1-raker
lier
er
mder
;terman
>per
>per's helper
K>rer
miner
mster
|
$ 1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.10 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.10 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.10 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.30 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.10 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
iper month.
528
HI8TOBY OF THE GrBBBNBA0K8
TABhEZ-Oontínued
WAGB-SBBIBS
FBOM VOL. XX OF THB TMBTTH IBÓN BLA8T FUKNAGSS— CHABOOAL
Pilot Knob, Mo., 129
|
Oooupation |
Initial Wage p'rDay |
1859 |
1980 |
1881 |
1882 |
1888 |
1864 |
1885 |
1886 |
|
FUler, . Keeper. . . . Laborar . . |
$ 1.00 1.35 1.00 |
100 100 100 |
• • • • • • • • • |
• • • • • • • • • |
• • • • • • • • • |
110 85 100 |
120 83 115 |
150 111 140 |
140 148 140 |
Ámenla, N.T., 180
Filler
0.$875
100
86
129
137
171
IBÓN ÁVD 8TBBL FOUNDRXBB — 8TOVM
Quincy, 111., 141
Foreman
Blacksmith
Carpenter
Cleaner
Cupola man
Engineers
Filer
Finisher
Grinder
Laborar
Melter
Melter's helper. .
Molder
Molder's ap'rant.
Mounter
Pattern-dresser . . Pattern-maker . . Teamster
|
80.00» |
100 |
113 |
113 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
117 |
117 |
133 |
133 |
133 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
117 |
133 |
133 |
150 |
167 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
140 |
140 |
|
2.25 |
100 |
100 |
111 |
111 |
111 |
111 |
|
1.75 |
100 |
114 |
114 |
114 |
129 |
129 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
120 |
140 |
160 |
180 |
180 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
140 |
140 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
113 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
|
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
114 |
114 |
114 |
|
3.00 |
100 |
117 |
150 |
158 |
167 |
167 |
|
0.50 |
100 |
200 |
200 |
200 |
200 |
200 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
117 |
117 |
133 |
133 |
150 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
117 |
117 |
117 |
117 |
100 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
113 |
125 |
138 |
150 |
150 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
140 |
125 133 167 140 111 129 180 140 100 120 125 114 167 200 150 100 150 140
Philadelphia, Pa., 148
Engineer
Finisher
Laborera
Molder
Molder's helper.
|
$ 1.50 |
100 |
133 |
133 |
133 |
133 |
139 |
|
1.15* |
100 |
80 |
101 |
94 |
207 |
170 |
|
1.08 |
100 |
84 |
81 |
100 |
121 |
132 |
|
1.545 |
100 |
93 |
128 |
71 |
128 |
218 |
|
1.24| |
100 |
81 |
81 |
52 |
90 |
78 |
156 188 136
184 85
1 Per month.
Appbndiz C
TABLB í— Ctoníinvtrf
Taontou, Hm, 112, U
|
OoeapntloD |
Inltial |
uto |
ira |
ira |
ira |
UM |
„ |
un |
|
C»rpetiter |
60.661' 1.75 1.50 1.75 1.50 1.75 1.50 125 1.50 2.50 2.00 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
100 86 83 86 83 86 83 60 67 83 60 75 |
100 un 83 86 as 91 93 '.h; 75 93 90 96 |
113 114 100 isa 100 114 100 120 92 100 110 113 |
m 143 |
|
|
157 |
||||||||
|
Laborer Melter's helpore. |
143 117 140 83 117 |
|||||||
|
138 |
|
St.Lt |
ni*, Mo |
,1*1,1* |
||||||
|
Cu pola moa |
150.001 2.30| 1.50 1.54 2.885 2.00 1.50 1.54 2.00 2.00 2.50 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
133 100 100 110 100 100 133 110 100 100 100 |
133 160 100 1S0 120 150 133 180 100 100 100 |
133 160 100 leo 120 150 150 190 250 100 100 |
133 160 100 180 120 200 150 180 250 100 100 |
133 147 100 180 120 200 147 180 250 111 100 |
167 147 100 165 107 |
|
Hounter |
113 77 |
Coanestlcat, 159
|
65. 001 |
100 |
100 |
ion |
ion |
100 |
100 |
108 |
|
|
1.50 |
100 |
107 |
107 |
107 |
107 |
110 |
110 |
|
|
1.25 |
100 |
112 |
112 |
112 |
112 |
112 |
120 |
|
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
110 |
110 |
|
|
2.00 |
100 |
113 |
113 |
113 |
113 |
125 |
||
530
HlSTOKY OF i i^ < i¿ - . iCKS
TABLE 2 — Continuad
WAOB-SERIBS FROM YOL. XX OF THB TBNTH 0BN8U8
HA&DWARK
Connecticut, 157
|
Occapation |
Initial Wage p'rDay |
1800 |
1861 |
1882 |
186S |
1864 |
1866 |
1886 |
|
Fonrer |
60.00» 2.00 2.00 2.125 1.75 1.50 1.50 1.00 2.00 1.75 1.50 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
125 113 113 118 114 117 117 125 113 114 117 |
125 125 113 129 129 117 117 125 113 114 117 |
125 138 113 141 143 133 133 125 113 129 133 |
125 138 125 141 143 133 133 125 125 129 133 |
125 150 125 153 |
|
Grinder Helper |
157 150 |
|||||||
|
Packer |
133 |
|||||||
|
150 125 129 150 |
Chicopee, Mass., 150
Foreman .. Blacksmith
Forger
Grinder ... Helper .... Laborer ... Machinist . Polisher . . . Temperer .
|
71. 501 |
100 |
109 |
109 |
109 |
127 |
145 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
113 |
125 |
138 |
|
í.eo |
100 |
100 |
100 |
109 |
125 |
141 |
|
1.90 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
105 |
145 |
158 |
|
0.90 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
111 |
139 |
167 |
|
0.90 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
111 |
139 |
167 |
|
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
129 |
143 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
140 |
160 |
|
2.15 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
116 |
140 |
163 |
145 138 141 158 167 167 143 160 163
Massachusetts, 161
Foreman . . Blacksmith
Forger
Grinder . . . Laborer . . . Machinist .
Packer
Polisher . . . Temperer . .
|
52.001 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
113 |
125 |
125 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
150 |
150 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
120 |
140 |
140 |
180 |
180 |
|
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
114 |
114 |
114 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
|
2.17 |
100 |
104 |
104 |
104 |
115 |
127 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
117 |
133 |
167 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
117 |
117 |
117 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
150 |
167 |
138 175 180 114 140 138 200 117 167
i Per Month.
Appendix O
531
TABLE 2-Ccniinued
FBOM YOL. XX OF THB TENTE OMNSUS HAKDWASB
Massachusetts, 100, 161
|
Fonrer |
3.00 1.00 1.75 1.25 1.50 2.50 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 |
117 100 114 100 117 110 |
117 100 114 100 117 110 |
117 100 114 100 117 110 |
125 |
|
Packer |
125 129 100 |
|||||||
|
117 110 |
Fisherrüle, N. H., 182
|
Occnpation |
Initial Wage p'r Day |
1*80 |
1861 |
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
186S |
1886 |
|
52.?» > 3.84} 1.125 |
100 100 100 |
100 100 100 |
100 100 100 |
100 100 100 |
125 75 111 |
125 75 111 |
150 75 |
|
|
133 |
New York, 164
Forger
Grinder
Helper, flrst .... fielper, second..
|
3.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
2.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 100 100 100
MACHINKBT
Lafayette, Ind., 171
|
Bl'ksmith helper Molder ......... |
$ 2.00 1.25 1.00 1.75 1.75 1.75 |
888888 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 |
125 120 125 129 143 129 |
138 120 125 157 157 143 |
150 160 150 171 171 143 |
150 160 150 171 171 |
|
Pattern-maker . . |
143 |
Patereon, N. J., 173
Blacksmith Laborer ... Machinist . Molder ....
|
1.075 |
100 |
108 |
108 |
140 |
131 |
180 |
|
0.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
131 |
131 |
179 |
|
1.3125 |
100 |
100 |
84 |
132 |
124 |
171 |
|
1.3125 |
100 |
100 |
95 |
114 |
124 |
222 |
186 186 193 209
iPer Month.
532
HlSTOBY OF THE GbBBNBACKS
TABLB 2-Conünued
WAOS-8ESIB8 ROM VOL. XX OP THB TMHTH CZXSUS
Si. Louis, MoM 172
|
Initial |
||||||||
|
Occnpatioo |
Wue p'r Day |
1M0 |
1861 |
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
1*65 |
1881 |
|
Apprentice Blacksmith |
0.525 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
124 |
121 |
|
1.60 |
100 |
83 |
100 |
125 |
179 |
188 |
219 |
|
|
Bl'ksmith helper |
1.00 |
100 |
90 |
125 |
133 |
166 |
200 |
200 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
140 |
|
|
Draughtsman . . . |
1.60 |
100 |
83 |
94 |
125 |
172 |
188 |
219 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
90 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
160 |
160 |
|
|
1.60 |
100 |
83 |
100 |
125 |
172 |
188 |
219 |
|
|
Machinist helper |
1.00 |
100 |
90 |
100 |
120 |
133 |
167 |
200 |
|
Melter |
1.00 1.60 1.00 |
100 100 100 |
90 94 90 |
100 100 100 |
125 125 120 |
150 168 133 |
200 188 167 |
200 |
|
Molder |
219 |
|||||||
|
Molder'8 helper. |
180 |
|||||||
|
Patternmaker . « . |
1.60 |
100 |
83 |
94 |
125 |
172 |
188 |
219 |
Albany, N. Y., 173, 174
|
Machinist Molder |
$ 134| 1.16| 1.00 1.3125 1.625 1.50 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 |
98 100 97 95 98 142 |
98 100 97 100 98 142 |
115 100 125 114 93 146 |
163 139 175 162 131 158 |
163 139 156 162 135 158 |
172 150 163 167 138 |
|
Patternmaker. . . |
156 |
Alerón, O., 175, 176
Apprentice
Blacksmith
Brksmith helper Draughtsman . .
Engineer
Machinist
Machinist helper
Melter
Molder
Molder's helper. Patternmaker. . .
|
$ 0.48 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.75 |
100 |
114 |
129 |
143 |
143 |
143 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
|
1.75 |
100 |
114 |
129 |
143 |
143 |
143 |
|
0.64 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.75 |
100 |
114 |
129 |
143 |
143 |
143 |
|
1.125 |
100 |
111 |
111 |
111 |
111 |
111 |
|
1.20 |
100 |
108 |
108 |
113 |
113 |
113 |
|
1.75 |
100 |
114 |
129 |
143 |
143 |
143 |
|
1.125 |
100 |
111 |
111 |
111 |
111 |
111 |
|
1.75 |
100 |
114 |
129 |
143 |
143 |
143 |
100 143 120 143 100 143 111 113 143 111 143
Appendix O
538
TABLE Z-ConUnued
WAOS-8KKTBS FKOM YOL. XX OP THB TBHTH CBM8U8
MACHI1CKBT
Detroit, Mich., 177, 178
|
Initial |
||||||||
|
Oocopation |
Wase p'rDay |
1M0 |
1861 |
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
1865 |
1866 |
|
$ 1.50 |
100 |
100 |
107 |
117 |
157 |
167 |
183 |
|
|
Boiler-fitter |
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
108 |
200 |
200 |
183 |
|
Boiler-helper.... Boiler-maker |
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
175 |
175 |
180 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
108 |
200 |
200 |
183 |
|
|
Boiler riveter.. . . |
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
108 |
200 |
200 |
183 |
|
1.375 |
100 |
109 |
109 |
127 |
127 |
127 |
127 |
|
|
Laborer |
0.875 1.50 |
100 100 |
100 100 |
100 107 |
114 127 |
171 167 |
200 175 |
186 |
|
183 |
||||||||
|
Machin't's helper |
0.875 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
171 |
186 |
186 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
130 |
130 |
140 |
240 |
200 |
220 |
|
|
Molder's helper.. |
0.875 |
100 |
109 |
109 |
120 |
171 |
200 |
186 |
New York, 182
Apprentice .... Blacksmith .... Boiler-maker...
Riveter
Engineer
Machinist
Melter
Molder
Patternmaker..
|
0.60 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
167 |
167 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
167 |
167 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
180 |
180 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
167 |
167 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
133 |
133 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
150 |
100 167 167 200 100 167 120 133 150
New Albany, Ind., 185
Blacksmith
Blacks'th helper.
Cleaner
Coremaker
Laborer
Machinist
Molder
Molder's helper . . Patternmaker. . . Teamster
|
$ 2.00 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
138 |
138 |
138 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
117 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
138 |
138 |
138 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
113 |
113 |
138 |
138 |
138 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
150 |
150 |
150 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
150 |
150 |
150 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
138 125 125 117 125 138 138 150 150 120
534
HlSTOBY O* THE (¿BEENBAOKS
TABLE 2—Continued
WAOB-8B&IS8 FROM YOL. XX OP THB TKTÍTH CKN8T78
MACHINEBT
Buffalo, N. Y., 179, 180
|
1 |
Initial |
|||||||
|
Oecupation |
Wage |
1860 |
1861 |
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
18» |
uss |
|
• |
p'r Day |
• |
||||||
|
* 1.50 |
100 |
117 |
117 |
117 |
117 |
117 |
133 |
|
|
Blacks'th helper |
0.75 |
100 |
133 |
133 |
133 |
133 |
133 |
167 |
|
Boüer-fitter |
1.25 |
100 |
120 |
140 |
160 |
180 |
180 |
180 |
|
Boiler-flanger . . . |
1.50 |
100 |
117 |
133 |
150 |
167 |
167 |
167 |
|
Boiler-helper Boiler holder-on . |
0.50 |
100 |
150 |
150 |
200 |
200 |
200 |
200 |
|
0.75 |
100 |
133 |
167 |
167 |
167 |
167 |
167 |
|
|
Boiler-maker |
1.25 |
100 |
120 |
140 |
160 |
180 |
180 |
180 |
|
Boiler-ríveter . . . |
1.25 |
100 |
120 |
140 |
160 |
180 |
180 |
180 |
|
1.12 |
100 |
179 |
179 |
179 |
179 |
179 |
179 |
|
|
1.12 |
100 |
134 |
156 |
156 |
179 |
179 |
201 |
|
|
Melter |
1.10 1.50 0.85 |
100 100 100 |
100 109 102 |
100 109 102 |
100 109 102 |
114 117 129 |
136 133 147 |
114 |
|
Molder |
183 |
|||||||
|
Molder's helpers |
176 |
|||||||
|
Machin't's help.. |
0.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
117 |
133 |
|
Patternmaker. . . |
1.60 |
100 |
156 |
156 |
156 |
156 |
156 |
172 |
|
Joiner |
1.50 1.00 |
100 100 |
100 100 |
100 100 |
100 100 |
100 100 |
100 100 |
117 |
|
Joiner's helper. . |
100 |
Worcester, Mass., 187
|
Girl |
$ 0.80 1.50 2.10 1.10 |
100 100 100 100 |
100 93 95 91 |
100 93 95 91 |
113 143 143 136 |
125 150 155 159 |
150 217 238 227 |
188 |
|
Skillfd workman Unskilled work.. |
267 333 273 |
Evansrille, Ind., 191
HUoksmith
Ñottarmaker . . . .
Kntfinwr
L*t>or*r
Machintat
lViintor
tVtttarnmaker. . . Timwr
|
1.^5 |
• • • |
100 |
114 |
124 |
176 |
181 |
|
1.575 |
• • • |
100 |
127 |
149 |
214 |
222 |
|
2.025 |
• • • |
100 |
118 |
123 |
146 |
146 |
|
1.025 |
• • • |
100 |
112 |
132 |
183 |
183 |
|
1.55 |
• • ■ |
100 |
126 |
135 |
176 |
194 |
|
1.625 |
• • • |
100 |
129 |
138 |
200 |
169 |
|
1.50 |
• • • |
100 |
133 |
183 |
244 |
250 |
|
1.50 |
• • • |
100 |
150 |
160 |
227 |
233 |
133
146 185 194 192 250 210
Appendix C
535
TABLE 2—Continucd
WAGB-flKRIES FBOM YOL. XX OP THB TBMTH CT5N8ÜS
NAIL FACTORIE8
Pittsborg, PaM 231
|
Oocapation • |
Initial Wage p r Day |
1800 |
1861 |
1802 |
1803 |
1864 |
1865 |
1806 |
|
$ 1.125 1.25 1.00 0.835 1.375 1.16| |
100 100 100 100 100 100 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 |
100 100 100 110 127 100 |
156 200 113 135 164 115 |
211 200 194 155 182 115 |
233 •250 225 202 227 158 |
272 250 225 225 245 200 |
TIN AND 8HBBT IBÓN WORKS
Newark, N. J., 234
Coppersmith
Gasfitter
Helper
Laborer
Plumber
Pump-maker.... Tinsmith
|
$ 1.75 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
157 |
171 |
200 |
|
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
157 |
171 |
200 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
133 |
133 |
150 |
167 |
200 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
140 |
140 |
160 |
160 |
200 |
|
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
157 |
171 |
200 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
138 |
138 |
150 |
175 |
175 |
|
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
157 |
171 |
200 |
200 200 200 200 200 175 200
MARBLB WORKS
Lafayette, Ind., 235
|
Carver |
2.1o 1.50 2.50 1.50 |
100 100 100 100 |
• • • • • • • • • • • • |
• • a • • • • • • • • • |
160 167 160 133 |
160 167 160 133 |
160 167 160 133 |
160 |
|
Cutter |
167 |
|||||||
|
Rubber |
160 133 |
|||||||
Troy, N. Y., 236
Cutter... Canrer . . Engineer Letterer . Polisher . Rubber . . Teamster
|
$ 2.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
113 |
113 |
113 |
|
2.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
111 |
111 |
111 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
111 |
133 |
150 |
150 |
133 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
113 |
113 |
|
1.331 |
100 |
112 |
112 |
112 |
125 |
131 |
|
1.33| |
100 |
112 |
112 |
112 |
112 |
125 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
107 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
125 133 133 125 125 125 120
536
HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS
TABLE 2—Continued
WAGB-SEBIE8 FBOM YOL. XX OF THE TENTH CEN8T78
IBON-MININO
Amenia, N. Y., 253
Occnpation
Laborer
|
Initial Wage p'r Day |
1860 |
1861 |
1862 |
1868 |
1864 |
1865 |
|
$ 0.96 |
100 |
96 |
96 |
98 |
120 |
159 |
161
Hokendaaqaa, PaM 254
Engineer Miner . . .
$
1.00
0.80
100 100
115 125
115 125
175 200
166 188
166 188
PAPER
Union ville, Conn., 266, 267
Foreman
Overseer
in rag-room . . .
Back-tender
Bleacher
Box-maker
Calenderer, girl.
Carpenter
Counter, girl
Cutter, girl
Engineer's helper
Finisher
Finisher's helper
Fireman
Folder, girl
Machinist
Machine-ténder . Machine-
tender's help . .
Millwright
Laborer
Loftman
Rag engineer . . . Rag-sorter, girl . . Sealer
|
$ 4.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
167 |
167 |
|
1.47 |
100 |
90 |
90 |
114 |
136 |
136 |
|
0.92 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
109 |
163 |
163 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
150 |
150 |
|
1.17 |
100 |
171 |
171 |
171 |
171 |
171 |
|
0.58 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
116 |
129 |
|
1.17 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
143 |
143 |
|
0.67 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
124 |
|
0.58 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
116 |
155 |
|
0.92 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
109 |
163 |
163 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
111 |
167 |
167 |
|
1.33 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
113 |
169 |
169 |
|
0.92 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
109 |
163 |
163 |
|
0.67 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
134 |
124 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
167 |
200 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
111 |
111 |
133 |
|
0.92 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
109 |
163 |
163 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
167 |
200 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
150 |
150 |
|
1.42 |
100 |
118 |
118 |
118 |
158 |
158 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
111 |
133 |
|
«0.58 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
108 |
129 |
|
1.33 |
100 |
107 |
126 |
126 |
126 |
126 |
167
170 163 167 171 159 171 149 155 182 167 169 217 149 200 150
163 200 150 211 150 155 150
Appendix C
|
New Jersey, 170 |
||||||||
|
Occupation |
¿X |
""' |
||||||
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
200 |
ass |
||
|
í.as |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
||
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
||
|
1.60 |
100 |
un |
IDO |
loo |
100 |
íao |
||
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
||
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
||
|
Cutter, girl |
0.75 |
100 |
100 |
IDO |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
||
|
1 00 |
100 |
UN) |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
||
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
11» |
100 |
100 |
100 |
||
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
||
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
||
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
10» |
101) |
100 |
||
|
tender'» helper |
1.50 |
100 |
UN) |
100 |
100 |
ion |
100 |
|
|
Mülwrijtht |
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
|
Rag engineer . . . |
1.661 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
loo |
100 |
100 |
|
|
Rae i-niíi rip'ii a |
||||||||
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
||||||
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
IQO |
|
Macan Fallí. N. Y., I» |
||||||||
|
5.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
ion |
100 |
10O |
100 |
|
|
in rag-room... |
1.76 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
114 |
114 |
114 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
ion |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
|
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
|
0.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
||
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
117 |
117 |
117 |
|
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
ion |
117 |
117 |
117 |
117 |
|
|
0.75 1.00 |
10O 100 |
100 100 |
100 100 |
100 100 |
100 |
125 |
||
|
125 |
||||||||
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
113 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
|
|
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
114 |
114 |
114 |
114 |
|
|
1.50 |
100 |
117 |
117 |
133 |
133 |
133 |
133 |
|
|
1 00 |
100 |
113 |
113 |
126 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
|
|
Millwright |
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
11* |
114 |
114 |
114 |
114 |
|
Rag engineer . . . |
1.25 |
IDO |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
|
Rag engineer's |
||||||||
|
0.87: |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|||||
|
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
538
HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS
TABLE 1-Continued
WAGB-8ERIES FEOM YOL. XX OF TBM TBHTH
PAPER
Evans ville, IndM 272
CKH8U8
|
Initial |
||||||||
|
Occupation |
Wage p'r Day |
1860 |
1861 |
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
1865 |
1881 |
|
$ 1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
111 |
|
|
1.16} |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
115 |
|
|
Laborer |
1.00 |
100 |
117 |
117 |
117 |
117 |
117 |
117 |
|
Machine -tender . |
1.66} |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
1» |
|
Rag engineer . . . |
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
111 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
Watertown, N. Y., 281, 282
Overseer
in rag-room . . .
Calenderer
Finisher, female Finisher, male . .
Fireman
Folder
Laborer
Lof tman
Machine-ténder . Rag engineer . . . Rag engineer's
helper
Rag-sorter
|
$ 1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
113 |
125 |
150 |
|
0.50 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
130 |
140 |
140 |
|
0.50 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
130 |
140 |
140 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
106 |
120 |
140 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
113 |
125 |
150 |
|
0.50 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
130 |
140 |
140 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
113 |
125 |
150 |
|
1.13 |
100 |
89 |
100 |
111 |
133 |
177 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
83 |
100 |
100 |
133 |
167 |
|
1.13 |
100 |
89 |
111 |
118 |
133 |
106 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
113 |
125 |
150 |
|
0.40 |
100 |
125 |
150 |
163 |
175 |
175 |
150 160 160 140 150 160 150 155 167 155
150 175
•Pennsylvania, 287
Overseer
in rag-room . . Asst. bleacher . Back-tender ...
Bleacher
Calenderer ....
Cutter, girl
Finisher
Fireman
Laborer
Machine-ténder Rag engineer . . Rag-sorter
|
$ 1.16} |
100 |
100 |
100 |
115 |
172 |
172 |
|
0.91} |
100 |
100 |
109 |
137 |
182 |
201 |
|
0.83| |
100 |
110 |
100 |
140 |
180 |
200 |
|
1.16} |
100 |
100 |
100 |
143 |
172 |
186 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
93 |
133 |
160 |
173 |
|
0.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
133 |
167 |
|
1.33| |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
150 |
162 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
167 |
183 |
|
0.83* |
100 |
100 |
100 |
80 |
130 |
130 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
144 |
167 |
183 |
|
1.33* |
100 |
100 |
100 |
131 |
150 |
175 |
|
0.66} |
100 |
100 |
100 |
126 |
126 |
126 |
172 201 220 172 160 167 150 167 180 167 159 125
Appendix O
539
TABLE 2 — Continued
WAQS-8KKTBS FKOM VOL. XX OP THS TBHTH CKXBÜ1
PAPES
Wisoonsin, 288
|
Initial |
||||||||
|
Oocapation |
Wage p'r Day |
1800 |
1861 |
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
1866 |
1866 |
|
5.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
150 |
150 |
175 |
175 |
|
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
140 |
|
|
0.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
|
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
133 |
133 |
133 |
|
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
150 |
150 |
175 |
|
|
Folder |
0.75 1.00 1.75 |
100 100 100 |
100 100 100 |
100 100 100 |
100 150 100 |
1,33 150 100 |
133 Sí |
133 |
|
Laborar |
175 |
|||||||
|
Machine-ténder. . |
114 |
|||||||
|
Ragengineer |
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
140 |
140 |
140 |
140 |
|
Rag engineer's |
||||||||
|
helper. |
1.00 0.50 |
100 100 |
100 100 |
100 100 |
150 100 |
150 100 |
175 125 |
175 |
|
125 |
||||||||
|
« |
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
150 |
150 |
150 |
175 |
PIAMOS AMD omoAxs Westfleld, Mass., 280, 290
Action-maker. . . . Mise (all others)
Tañer.
Voicer
|
$ 2.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
|
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
129 |
|
3.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
|
3.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
125 129 114 114
New York, N. YM 292
Foreman
Action-maker . . . Actkm-ragolator.
Carver
Caae-maker
derk
Finisher
Fly finisher
Kermaker
Laborar
8akwmaker.
8ound-board
maker.
Tone regolstor. .
Top-maker
Tañer
|
3.66| |
100 |
100 |
109 |
|
2.16} |
100 |
92 |
100 |
|
2.16| |
100 |
92 |
100 |
|
1.83* |
100 |
91 |
100 |
|
1.83| |
100 |
91 |
100 |
|
3.33| |
100 |
100 |
110 |
|
2 16f |
100 |
92 |
100 |
|
2 16f |
100 |
92 |
100 |
|
2 00 |
100 |
92 |
100 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
89 |
100 |
|
3 33* |
lí*> |
110 |
1150 |
|
2 16f |
\<f) |
92 |
Vf) |
|
2.50 |
100 |
93 |
100 |
|
2.50 |
100 |
93 |
1(0 |
|
2.33| |
Vf) |
Itf |
VJ0 |
|
1.88} |
100 |
91 |
í 100 1 |
114 108 108 118 11* 125 108 108 108 111 200
115
un un un uu
136 115 115 127 127 125 115 115 117 111 200
123
l Vi
na
114 127 3
284 115 115 127 127 125 115 115 117 122 910 !
123 ! 113 ; 113 114 127
284 123 115 127 127 150 115 115 117 122
123 113 113 114 127
540
HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAOKS
TABLE 2— Contínued
WAQB-SKRTBS FBOM YOL. XX OP THE TXNTH CEK8U8 PIANOS AND OBOA.NS
Concord, N. HM 291
|
Occupation |
Initial Wasre p'r Day |
1860 |
1861 |
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
1865 |
18G6 |
|
Action-maker . . . Case-maker Millhand Tuner |
l.?5 1.75 1.75 1.65 2.00 1.75 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 |
114 100 100 106 113 100 |
114 100 100 106 113 100 |
114 100 100 106 113 100 |
143 114 114 121 138 114 |
143 114 114 121 138 114 |
143 114 114 121 138 |
|
114 |
PDf8
Waterbnry, Conn., 283
Girl
Laborer . Mechanic
|
0.58} |
100 |
100 |
100 |
143 |
143 |
156 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
150 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
133 |
133 |
150 |
156 150 150
POTTEBT
East Liverpool, O., 900
Boy
Clay-maker . .
Dipper
Dish-maker . .
Fireman
Girl
Jiggerman . . .
Kilnman
Laborer
Mold-maker . .
Packer
Presser
Sagger-maker Woman
|
$ 0.30 |
100 |
100 |
167 |
||
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
133 |
||
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
133 |
||
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
150 |
||
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
167 |
||
|
0.30 |
100 |
100 |
167 |
||
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
||
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
160 |
||
|
0.75 |
100 |
100 |
250 |
||
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
150 |
||
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
167 |
||
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
133 |
||
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
167 |
||
|
0.40 |
100 |
100 |
• |
163 |
Liverpool Township, O., 903
Poreman
Brick-molder Carpenter . . . Engineer
Laborer
Miner ,
|
52.00' |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
113 |
|
|
1.50 |
• • |
100 |
100 |
100 |
113 |
117 |
|
1.25 |
• • • |
100 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
140 |
|
1.10 |
• • • |
100 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
114 |
|
1.00 |
• • • |
100 |
100 |
120 |
125 |
140 |
|
1.00 |
• • • |
100 |
100 |
110 |
125 |
135 |
113 117 140 114 150 135
1 Per raonth.
Appendix O
541
TABLE 2 — Continued
WAQB-SKRIE8 FBOM VOL. XX OF THB TKMTH CBM8U8
POTTKBT
East Liverpool, O., 301, 802
|
Oocnpation |
Initial Waw p'r Bay |
1860 |
1861 |
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
1865 |
1866 |
|
Boy |
$ 0.33 1.50 1.50 200 1.50 0.33 2.00 1.25 1.00 2.00 1.50 1.50 1.50 3.00 2.00 1.25 0.50 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
152 133 150 113 167 121 113 160 150 125 150 133 167 117 113 160 150 |
152 133 150 113 167 121 113 160 150 125 150 133 167 117 113 160 150 |
182 167 167 125 200 152 125 180 175 175 167 150 183 133 125 160 160 |
182 |
|
|
Dipper |
167 167 |
|||||||
|
Girl |
125 200 152 |
|||||||
|
Handler |
125 |
|||||||
|
Laborer |
180 175 |
|||||||
|
Mold-maker Packer |
175 167 |
|||||||
|
Presser |
150 |
|||||||
|
Sagger-maker. . . Turner |
183 133 125 |
|||||||
|
Warehouseman. . Woman |
160 160 |
|||||||
Newark, N. J., 302
Laborer,
$
1.00
100
100
150
150
150
150
TANKRIE8
Binghamton, N. Y., 312
Beam hand. .
Currier
Finiflher
Handlerman
Shaver
Striker
Teamster
Yard hand . .
|
1.&) |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
150 |
165 |
|
1.70 |
100 |
118 |
129 |
141 |
153 |
153 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
120 |
128 |
140 |
160 |
140 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
112 |
150 |
160 |
160 |
|
1.70 |
100 |
118 |
129 |
141 |
153 |
153 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
120 |
128 |
140 |
160 |
140 |
|
0.88 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
127 |
148 |
142 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
112 |
150 |
160 |
160 |
175 153 140 160 153 140 142 160
|
New York, N. Y., 313 |
||||||||
|
Laborer |
125.00» 1.375 |
100 100 |
100 100 |
100 100 |
100 100 |
100 100 |
100 100 |
100 100 |
i Per monta.
542
HlSTOBY OF THE GbBBHBACKS
TABLE Z-Ctmiinmcd rwou TOL.XX or
Laaeastor, N. Y., 214
Oeeopfttíoo
Bark-grínder Beam hand . Engineer . . . Handlerman
Laborer
Roiler
Teamster . . . Watchman . . Yard hand . .
|
InitUl |
||||
|
Wa«e |
1880 |
un |
1M2 |
1*0 |
|
p'rDty |
||||
|
$ 0.75 |
100 |
100 |
167 |
183 |
|
0.875 |
100 |
100 |
171 |
186 |
|
0.875 |
100 |
100 |
171 |
186 |
|
0.81 |
100 |
100 |
169 |
185 |
|
0.75 |
100 |
100 |
167 |
183 |
|
0.81 |
100 |
100 |
185 |
901 |
|
0.875 |
100 |
100 |
171 |
186 |
|
0.875 |
100 |
100 |
171 |
186 |
|
0.81 |
100 |
100 |
154 |
170 |
|
183 |
900 ; |
|
186 |
900 |
|
186 |
»> |
|
185 |
901 |
|
183 |
900 |
|
201 |
216 |
|
186 |
900 |
|
186 |
900 |
|
170 |
185 |
201
216
200 185
Sanford, N. Y., 316
Foreman
Bark-grínder . . .
Beam hand
Currier
Engineer
Handlerman. . . .
Laborer
Roiler
Teams ter
Watchman
Yard hand
|
$ 2.24 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
107 |
107 |
107 |
|
0.75 |
100 |
100 |
107 |
133 |
133 |
133 |
|
0.77 |
100 |
104 |
104 |
149 |
164 |
175 |
|
0.72 |
100 |
100 |
104 |
132 |
139 |
139 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
108 |
135 |
142 |
154 |
|
0.76 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
132 |
132 |
164 |
|
0.73 |
100 |
100 |
105 |
158 |
169 |
173 |
|
0.88 |
100 |
102 |
108 |
125 |
142 |
159 |
|
0.70 |
100 |
100 |
107 |
107 |
121 |
136 |
|
0.90 |
100 |
100 |
111 |
139 |
139 |
167 |
|
0.76 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
132 |
132 |
164 |
121 133
153 157 164 185 159 136 194 164
Pike Pond, N. Y., 316
Foreman
Beam hand
Handlerman
Laborer
Roiler
Teamster
Watchman
Yard hand
|
25. 001 |
• • • |
100 |
100 |
100 |
160 |
180 |
|
0.77 |
100 |
• • • |
100 |
• • • |
130 |
149 |
|
0.73 |
100 |
• • ■ |
105 |
• • • |
137 |
158 |
|
0.69 |
• • • |
100 |
100 |
100 |
145 |
167 |
|
0.85 |
100 |
• • • |
113 |
• • * |
118 |
135 |
|
0.73 |
100 |
• • • |
105 |
• • • |
137 |
158 |
|
0.65 |
100 |
• • a |
• • • |
• • • |
154 |
177 |
|
0.69 |
100 |
• • • |
112 |
• ■ • |
145 |
167 |
180
167
i Per mooth.
Appendix C
543
TABLE 2—Coniinued
WAGB-8BUB8 FROM YOL. XX OP THB TBNTH CENSUS
TANNEBIKS
WellsviUe, N. Y., 318
Occupation
Foreman
Bark-grinder
Beam hand
Engineer
Handlerman
Laborar
RoUer
Teamster
Watchman
Yard hand
50.00» 0.75 1.00 1.25 0.75 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.25 1.00
|
1860 |
1861 |
1862 |
1868 |
1864 |
1865 |
|
100 |
100 |
150 |
150 |
150 |
•200 |
|
100 |
100 |
133 |
133 |
167 |
167 |
|
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
|
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
|
100 |
100 |
100 |
133 |
167 |
167 |
|
100 |
100 |
133 |
167 |
167 |
200 |
|
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
|
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
150 |
|
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
|
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
1866
200 200 150 120 200 200 150 150 120 150
Oneida, N. Y., SIS
Foreman
Bark-grinder.. Beam hands . .
Engineer
Laborer
Yard hand
|
40.00» |
100 |
100 |
100 |
113 |
113 |
105 |
|
0.92} |
100 |
100 |
100 |
124 |
124 |
124 |
|
1.15 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
117 |
107 |
|
1.15 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
117 |
107 |
|
0.92} |
100 |
100 |
100 |
124 |
124 |
124 |
|
0.92} |
100 |
100 |
100 |
124 |
124 |
124 |
113 145 117 117 124 124
Cincinnati, O., 318, 310
Bark-grinders. .
Beam hand
Currier
Finisher
Handlerman . . .
Engineer
Laborer
Sha ver
Watchman
Yard hand
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
83 |
116 |
133 |
183 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
93 |
120 |
160 |
166 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
111 |
100 |
117 |
133 |
144 |
|
1.33 |
100 |
113 |
106 |
113 |
162 |
150 |
|
1.08 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
116 |
185 |
185 |
|
1.58 |
100 |
105 |
116 |
137 |
147 |
158 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
83 |
100 |
166 |
166 |
|
1.66 |
100 |
110 |
100 |
110 |
140 |
151 |
|
1.16 |
100 |
100 |
72 |
115 |
158 |
172 |
|
1.08 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
116 |
185 |
185 |
183 173 155 162 216 168 166 160 172 185
i Per month.
544
HlSTOBY OF THE GfiEENBAOKS
TABLE 2— Continué*
WAQE-SEEEBS FBOM VOL. XX OP THB TKNTH CXN8UB
CARPETS
M assachusetts, 324
Occupation
Carder
Carpenter
Dyer
Finisher (earn- ings for Dea). •
Laborer
Loom-fixer
Machinist
Pickerman
Reeler
Spinner
Spinner jack ....
Spooler
Teamster
Twister
Warper
Weaver
Winder
Wool sorter (wages for Dec.)
|
Initial |
||||||
|
Wage |
1860 |
1861 |
1862 |
186S |
1864 |
1865 |
|
p'r Day |
||||||
|
0.39 |
• • • |
100 |
103 |
105 |
133 |
177 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
89 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
133 |
|
1.38 |
100 |
100 |
87 |
109 |
115 |
127 |
|
0.57 |
• • • |
100 |
100 |
102 |
123 |
191 |
|
0.83 |
100 |
100 |
90 |
111 |
171 |
181 |
|
1.38 |
100 |
100 |
91 |
100 |
127 |
139 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
89 |
100 |
109 |
133 |
150 |
|
0.83 |
100 |
100 |
90 |
100 |
161 |
171 |
|
0.45 |
• • • |
100 |
98 |
109 |
156 |
202 |
|
0.49 |
• • • |
100 |
100 |
98 |
127 |
198 |
|
0.73 |
• • • |
100 |
100 |
110 |
144 |
160 |
|
0.43 |
• • • |
100 |
88 |
102 |
140 |
237 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
106 |
120 |
134 |
|
0.46 |
• • • |
100 |
109 |
107 |
135 |
196 |
|
0.51 |
• • • |
100 |
127 |
122 |
163 |
241 |
|
0.52 |
• • • |
100 |
115 |
125 |
165 |
229 |
|
0.37 |
• • • |
100 |
100 |
103 |
132 |
224 |
|
1.10 |
100 |
105 |
114 |
127 |
168 |
182 |
1866
187 133 127
181 181 163 150 181 216 204 159 226 134 207 249 229 230
182
COTTON MANUFACTURE
Willimantic, Conn., 333
Carding overseer Spinn'g overseer.
Back boy
Card-stripper . . .
Carpenter
Drawer
Grinder
Laborer
Machinist
Mule-spinner.. . .
Painter
Picker
Second hand
Speeder
Yard hand
|
50. 001 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
130 |
266 |
|
50. 001 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
110 |
130 |
156 |
|
0.33* |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
175 |
175 |
|
0.83* |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
150 |
150 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
133 |
167 |
|
0.58* |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
123 |
143 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
113 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
150 |
150 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
133 |
150 |
167 |
|
0.83* |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
150 |
150 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
|
0.83* |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
140 |
140 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
107 |
120 |
140 |
140 |
147 |
|
0.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
133 |
144 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
150 |
150 |
266 182 175 150 167 143 120 150 183 160 133 150 147 178 150
1 Per month.
Appendix O
545
TABLE 2—CkmUnued
FROM YOL. XX OP THB TBNTH CBM8U1 OOTTON MANUFACTUBB
Connocticut, 336
|
Occnpation |
Initial Wam p*r Bay |
1M0 |
1861 |
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
1865 |
1866 |
|
Overseers, card'g, spinn'g, weav% Baler |
54.001 0.25 0.83¡ 0.75 1.50 0.41| 0.475 0.41} 1.29 0.875 0.33| 1.16} 1.00 1.50 1.05 1.331 0.75 1.00 0.50 1.081 0.45 0.54 0.77 1.33} 0.80 0.83* |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 84 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 94 94 100 |
100 100 100 100 83 100 112 108 100 100 104 100 100 100 84 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 97 87 88 100 |
106 108 120 100 83 108 123 120 87 133 133 100 83 94 89 100 89 100 100 115 100 108 91 87 83 100 |
106 108 120 100 100 120 123 120 116 133 133 100 100 117 110 100 89 100 120 138 100 108 119 112 94 120 |
111 108 120 100 117 133 123 120 136 153 133 100 125 150 127 106 89 125 150 161 100 108 130 131 115 150 |
128 133 140 |
|
Card-stripper . . . Cloth trimmer . . Doffer |
155 150 151 149 |
|||||||
|
Drawer |
160 |
|||||||
|
Dresser |
174 |
|||||||
|
Folder |
171 |
|||||||
|
Frame spinner . . Mule-spinner . . . Picker |
179 136 133 167 167 125 155 |
|||||||
|
Second hand Speeder |
150 200 |
|||||||
|
Spin'g section h'd Spooler |
184 122 |
|||||||
|
Warper |
139 |
|||||||
|
Weaver |
162 |
|||||||
|
WVg section h'd Web-drawer |
150 130 160 |
Evansville, Ind., 341
In cloth r'm, fem. In el. room, male
Repairer
Weaver, female .
|
1.00 |
• • • ■ |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.50 |
• • • • |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100. |
|
1.75 |
• • • • |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.05 |
• • • • |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
143 |
100 100 100 143
iPer month.
546
HíSTOBT OF THE GfiEENBAOK8
TABLE 2 — Continued
WAGB-8EKTE8 FBOM YOL. XX OF THB TMHTH CMISÜ» OOTTOM MANUFACTURE
Connecticot, 338
Occupation
Overseers, card'g, spinn'g, weav'g
Back boj
Baler
Card-stripper . . .
Carpenter
Cloth-trimmer . .
Doffer
Drawer
Folder
Laborer
Machinist
Patatera
Picker
Speeder
Spinner
Spin'g section h'd
Spooler
Warper
Weaver
WVg section h'd Web-drawer
Initial
Wa*e
p'r Day
41.00» 0.25 1.06| 0.83| 1.16| 0.46 0.37 0.41} 1.06} 1.00 1.66| 1.161 0.83| 0.66} 0.70| 0.66} 0.45 0.75 0.91} 1.16} 0.83}
|
1800 |
1861 |
1882 |
1883 |
1864 |
|
100 |
100 |
104 |
99 |
102 |
|
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
100 |
100 |
100 |
107 |
107 |
|
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
130 |
|
100 |
100 |
115 |
115 |
121 |
|
100 |
100 |
109 |
109 |
109 |
|
100 |
100 |
101 |
101 |
107 |
|
100 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
141 |
|
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
106 |
|
100 |
100 |
95 |
95 |
95 |
|
100 |
100 |
107 |
107 |
107 |
|
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
|
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
113 |
|
100 |
100 |
106 |
111 |
123 |
|
100 |
100 |
113 |
126 |
150 |
|
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
111 |
|
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
122 |
|
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
100 |
100 |
143 |
107 |
107 |
|
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
Overseers, card'g.
spinn'g, weav'g
Card-stnpper . . .
Drawer
Grinder
Picker
Slasher
Spinner, female . Spin'g section h'd
Warper, girl
Weaver, girl
124 112 115 130 172 127 124 160 115 125 125 121 130 113 148 188 148 133 109 115 120
|
42.81 * |
» • • |
100 |
100 |
103 |
117 |
126 |
||
|
0.64 |
» • • |
100 |
100 |
117 |
176 |
179 |
||
|
0.41 |
• • • |
100 |
98 |
121 |
121 |
129 |
||
|
0.97 |
* • • |
100 |
99 |
114 |
136 |
148 |
||
|
0.72 |
» • • |
100 |
90 |
104 |
144 |
175 |
||
|
1.08 |
» • • |
100 |
96 |
127 |
144 |
156 |
||
|
0.51* |
» • • |
100 |
100 |
115 |
126 |
135 |
||
|
0.82 |
» • • |
100 |
121 |
141 |
178 |
188 |
||
|
0.52 |
i • • |
100 |
103 |
114 |
126 |
135 |
||
|
0.565 |
» • • |
100 |
86 |
104 |
136 |
155 |
131 116 123 140 186 183 146 181 115 125 125 136 140 138 153
148 167 119 143 140
|
Christiana Hnndred, Del., 340 |
||||||||
|
$ 1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
123 |
167 |
167 |
|
|
Chico pee Falls, Mass., 347 |
145 195 178 169 175 181 195 212 178 219
1 Por month.
Appendix C
547
TABLE 2—Oontinued
WAOR-SK&IB8 FBOM VOL. XX OF THB TENTH CBM8Ü8 OOTTON MANÜFACTÜU
Maine, 343
Ooenpation
Overseers, card'g, spinn'g, weav'g
Back boy
Card-stnpper . . .
Carpenter
Dresser
Frame-spinner . .
Grinder
Machinist
Mule-spinner . . .
Painter
Picker
Second hand . . .
Spooler
Weaver
Web-drawer
Warper
Yara hand
|
Initial |
||||||
|
p'rlMy |
1860 |
1861 |
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
1865 |
|
65.001 |
100 |
100 |
102 |
102 |
110 |
120 |
|
0.30 |
100 |
83 |
83 |
83 |
110 |
110 |
|
0.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
133 |
167 |
|
1.33 |
100 |
125 |
102 |
102 |
119 |
159 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
83 |
83 |
88 |
115 |
|
0.54 |
100 |
107 |
96 |
96 |
107 |
135 |
|
1.08 |
100 |
100 |
93 |
93 |
106 |
146 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
90 |
90 |
110 |
155 |
|
1.22 |
100 |
99 |
82 |
82 |
119 |
116 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
• • • |
58 |
58 |
• • • |
139 |
|
0.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
133 |
167 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
77 |
77 |
112 |
133 |
|
0.54 |
100 |
96 |
100 |
100 |
109 |
143 |
|
0.75 |
100 |
80 |
84 |
84 |
107 |
120 |
|
0.63 |
• • • |
100 |
102 |
102 |
121 |
106 |
|
0.65 |
100 |
106 |
92 |
92 |
98 |
106 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
80 |
80 |
106 |
140 |
1866
120 110 167 159 115 135 146 155 116 139 167 133 143 120 106 108 140
Concord, N. H., 355, 356
Carding overeeer Spinning overee1 r Weaving overee'r
Back boy
Card-strípper . . . Cloth-trimmer . . Day watchman. .
Doffer
Drawer
Dresser
Frame-spinner . .
Grinder
Laborer
Loom-ftxer
Machinist
Machinist (wood)
|
32.001 |
100 |
100 |
94 |
94 |
113 |
150 |
|
34. 001 |
100 |
94 |
88 |
88 |
124 |
147 |
|
38.001 |
100 |
95 |
84 |
84 |
116 |
126 |
|
0.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
|
0.70 |
100 |
100 |
95 |
95 |
119 |
179 |
|
0.46 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
109 |
136 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
92 |
92 |
116 |
133 |
|
0.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
|
0.45 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
111 |
148 |
|
1.331 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
106 |
125 |
|
0.46 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
109 |
117 |
|
0.95 |
100 |
100 |
96 |
96 |
123 |
158 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
92 |
92 |
100 |
100 |
|
0.96 |
100 |
100 |
86 |
86 |
130 |
156 |
|
1.581 |
100 |
105 |
105 |
105 |
116 |
142 |
|
1.33| |
100 |
112 |
112 |
112 |
119 |
131 |
225 176 158 120 179 163 150 120 148 150 182 175 125 182 158 187
i Per month.
548
HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAOKS
TABLE Z—C<mtinued
WAOB4BBDSS FBOM YOL. XX OF THB TBNTH CKN8US COTTON MANUFACTURE
Massachosetts, 850-52
Occnpation
Carding overseer Spin'ing overseer W eav'ng overseer
Back boy
Card-strípper . . .
Carpenter
Cloth-trimmer . .
Doffer
Drawer
Drawer-in
Dresser
Dyer
Frame-spinner . .
Grinder
Laborer
Lap-head tender
Machinist
Mule-spinner . . .
Painters
Picker
Quiller
Ruler
R.W. head tender
Second hand
Scrubber
Speeder
Sweeper
Warper
Watchman
Weaver
W'v'e sect'n hand
Winder
Yard hand
Yardman
|
Inital |
|||||
|
Wage |
1880 |
1861 |
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
|
p'r Day |
|||||
|
$ 3.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
3.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
3.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
0.29 |
100 |
109 |
109 |
109 |
112 |
|
0.83 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
135 |
|
1.75 |
100 |
86 |
86 |
100 |
114 |
|
0.47 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
0.475 |
100 |
100 |
84 |
87 |
105 |
|
0.53 |
100 |
96 |
96 |
96 |
113 |
|
0.80 |
100 |
115 |
111 |
104 |
103 |
|
1.74 |
100 |
106 |
113 |
101 |
105 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
132 |
|
0.53 |
100 |
106 |
104 |
109 |
111 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
112 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
|
0.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
133 |
|
1.40 |
100 |
110 |
102 |
111 |
119 |
|
0.40 |
100 |
125 |
130 |
118 |
145 |
|
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
103 |
|
1.085 |
100 |
88 |
88 |
98 |
122 |
|
0.57 |
100 |
96 |
104 |
100 |
128 |
|
0.66 |
100 |
120 |
145 |
132 |
130 |
|
0.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
|
1.625 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
92 |
115 |
|
0.55 |
100 |
100 |
105 |
105 |
115 |
|
0.60 |
100 |
98 |
98 |
98 |
113 |
|
0.55 |
100 |
100 |
105 |
105 |
115 |
|
0.73 |
100 |
134 |
130 |
108 |
101 |
|
1.16| |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
107 |
|
0.94 |
100 |
106 |
96 |
72 |
97 |
|
1.52 |
100 |
109 |
95 |
96 |
111 |
|
0.59 |
100 |
115 |
136 |
115 |
134 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
1865
104
104 104 136 163 129 100 132 127 225 124 160 130 128 150 167 142 153 114 134 131 129 167 138 109 129 109 142 115 118 116 159 150 150
1866
117 106 133 147 187 134 100 158 156 150 130 175 168 140 163 200 168 203 120 152 160 149 187 162 152 154 152 144 134 153 126 176 163 163
Appendix O
549
TABLE Z-Continued
WAOB-BEBIB8 FBOM VOL. XX OF THE TBNTH COTTON MANUFACTUK*
Concord, N. H., 355, 356
Occnpation
Mule-spinner . . . Night watchman
Picker
Seoond hand
Speeder
Spin. section h'd
Spooler
Warper
Weaver
WVg section h'd Web-drawer .... Yard hand
|
Initial |
||||||
|
Wage |
1860 |
1861 |
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
1865 |
|
pf r Day |
||||||
|
1.06| |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
115 |
153 |
|
1.161 |
100 |
100 |
93 |
115 |
115 |
129 |
|
0.83| |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
140 |
160 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
92 |
92 |
100 |
125 |
|
0.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
142 |
|
0.92 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
109 |
136 |
|
0.41| |
100 |
111 |
111 |
111 |
120 |
141 |
|
0.50 |
100 |
117 |
133 |
133 |
150 |
167 |
|
0.625 |
100 |
106 |
106 |
106 |
120 |
134 |
|
0.92 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
109 |
136 |
|
0.62| |
100 |
100 |
94 |
94 |
120 |
146 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
92 |
92 |
100 |
100 |
1866
184
143 160 125 167 136 160 200 174 136 154 125
Dover, N. H., 956, 857
Carding overseer Spin'ing overseer Weavi'g overseer
Back boy
Card-strípper . . .
Carpenter
Doffer
Drawer
Dresser
Frame-spinner . .
Grinder
Machinist
Mule-spinner . . .
Painters
Picker
Seoond hand
Speeder
Spooler
Warper
Weaver
Web-drawer
Yard hand
|
66.001 |
100 |
89 |
73 |
• • • |
91 |
109 |
|
66.001 |
100 |
73 |
73 |
• • • |
91 |
109 |
|
48.00» |
100 |
88 |
100 |
• • • |
125 |
150 |
|
0.26 |
100 |
104 |
104 |
• • • |
115 |
146 |
|
0.83 |
100 |
81 |
90 |
• • • |
151 |
151 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
89 |
93 |
117 |
133 |
133 |
|
0.32 |
100 |
84 |
78 |
• • • |
103 |
94 |
|
0.24 |
100 |
88 |
88 |
• • • |
104 |
96 |
|
0.56 |
100 |
89 |
80 |
• • • |
95 |
104 |
|
0.35 |
100 |
89 |
71 |
• • • |
94 |
94 |
|
1.08 |
100 |
82 |
93 |
• • • |
139 |
139 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
89 |
93 |
117 |
133 |
133 |
|
0.85 |
100 |
100 |
87 |
• • • |
101 |
124 |
|
1.42 |
100 |
94 |
94 |
94 |
141 |
141 |
|
0 75 |
100 |
89 |
100 |
• • • |
167 |
167 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
90 |
100 |
• • • |
120 |
120 |
|
0.39 |
100 |
95 |
85 |
• • • |
103 |
100 |
|
0.19 |
100 |
121 |
84 |
• • • |
137 |
253 |
|
0.42 |
100 |
95 |
69 |
• • • |
81 |
107 |
|
0.36 |
100 |
86 |
75 |
• • • |
94 |
100 |
|
0.39 |
100 |
92 |
87 |
• • • |
87 |
113 |
|
0.83 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
151 |
151 |
127 127 163 192 160 158 172 125 179 160 155 158 176 141 177 160 131 247 138 258 164 181
i Per month.
-1EENBACKR
i-a-iQ. EL K3
|
, :« |
INI» |
,«. |
_ 1 |
» |
|
i. 100 |
100 |
100 |
!*> |
l*j |
|
4 UH |
104 |
un |
133 |
T-Tí |
|
>. 100 |
100 |
100 |
1:9 |
I-' |
|
• 100 |
100 |
100 |
1(« |
HH |
|
110 |
110 |
110 |
117 |
|
|
110 |
110 |
110 |
li- |
111 |
|
L 100 |
100 |
100 |
nio |
1U) |
|
'. ■> 11» |
100 |
100 |
130 |
IW> |
|
:.o , loo |
1110 |
11» |
117 |
117 |
|
:v : loo |
100 |
117 |
i:« |
i:;,' |
|
>! ' 96 |
yo |
100 |
1QJ |
lt» |
|
: .o . íuo |
100 |
100 |
m |
111 |
|
'. 0 100 |
100 |
120 |
131 |
lll |
|
;.».' no |
1(0 |
130 |
17n |
•jo |
|
: i- íoo |
110 |
HW |
1W |
m |
|
: » loo |
no |
131 . |
121 |
iki |
|
: v ion |
loo |
117 |
12.-. |
i « |
|
: \> loo |
lttl |
litó |
\<> |
w. |
|
•. •■ n» |
no |
un |
i:*i |
|
|
:.•' íuo |
100 |
HU . |
1H1 ' |
llfl |
|
:»> ii» |
100 |
1U> |
f'.i i |
-íi |
|
:•> u» i |
loo |
no |
143 1 |
112 |
llfl 139 1.Y1
lili : ll«l I 111 ,
Appbndix O
Coho«s,N. Y., m, M2
|
Occapatlou |
Initi«l Vtai 11'rD.J |
USO |
Un |
un |
un |
UN |
isas |
UM |
|
Ove rsec r, cardi ng Oversoer, cluth- |
58. 501 1.125 ».ÜQ» 0.30 o.eo 0.70 1.63 0.50 0.825 0.50 2.00 0.50 0.56 0.875 0.75 0.33 0.70 2.00 1.50 1.00 1.00 .787,' 1.00 i.:¡ii' .65 .50 .65 1.50 .62 ,a;í7ij .70 1.375 .75 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 too 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 un 100 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 11*1 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 II») 100 11» 11») 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
100 100 100 100 10a 100 101 100 100 10* 119 100 100 111 100 133 115 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 me 115 1*5 115 100 110 112 se 10a 133 |
122 100 112 110 150 110 IOS IOS IOS IOS 112 113 108 111 1U 150 1-27 107 113 117 113 156 111 155 139 115 140 115 117 110 123 107 118 150 |
133 133 112 120 167 118 125 123 11a 108 111 125 118 111 135 187 138 143 125 133 125 170 142 170 133 115 150 115 133 110 145 114 127 167 |
178 |
|
Orerseer, Bpin'g. Overseer, weav'g. Back boy |
129 140 183 |
|||||||
|
Card-atripper... . Cloth-tritnmer... |
125 13» UB |
|||||||
|
Frame-apinner... |
195 |
|||||||
|
Machi nist |
138 150 138 180 |
|||||||
|
Mule-spinner . . . Second hand Slubber 8peeder SpinDingsection |
180 157 154 MO 173 |
|||||||
|
164 |
||||||||
|
WenvinK KlíCtlon |
||||||||
|
Yard hand |
167 |
552
HlSTOBY OP THE ObBENBAOKS
TABLE 2— Continuad
WAOB-8BBDSS FBOM VOL. XX OF THB TBWTH CKMIUS COTTON MANUFACTUtt
Philadelphia, P»., 964, 865
|
Occnpation |
Initial Wa*e p'r Day |
1860 |
1861 |
1862 |
1868 |
1864 |
1865 |
1886 |
|
Overseer, carding Overseer, spinn'g. Overseer, weavi^ Folder |
80.00» 60.00» 60.00» 1.50 1.50 1.50 2.50 2.50 1.50 1.50 1.66} 1.50 1.50 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
100 100 100 100 |
|
G rinde r |
100 |
|||||||
|
I>aborer ......... |
100 |
|||||||
|
Mule-spinner Picker |
100 100 100 |
|||||||
|
Second hand Spinning section- hand |
100 100 |
|||||||
|
Weaver |
100 |
|||||||
|
Web-drawer .... |
100 |
WOOLKH IHDÜBT»T
Indianapolis, Ind., 385,
Overoeers, differ- ent departm'ts
Carder
Carder, boy
Dyer
Dyer's helper
Engineer
Finisher
Fuller
Gigger
Laborer
Loom-fixer
Picker, boy
Scourer
Shearer
Spinner
Warper
Weaver, girl
Wool-sorter
|
$ 39.00» |
100 |
111 |
133 |
133 |
167 |
200 |
|
1.75 |
100 |
114 |
114 |
129 |
143 |
143 |
|
.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
133 |
133 |
200 |
200 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
150 |
150 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
133 |
133 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
106 |
106 |
106 |
167 |
200 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
111 |
133 |
133 |
150 |
150 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
150 |
200 |
|
1.66 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
151 |
|
.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
111 |
133 |
133 |
150 |
150 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
120 |
160 |
160 |
160 |
200 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
.66| |
100 |
100 |
100 |
150 |
150 |
150 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
133 |
133 |
200 143 100 200 150 167 200 150 120 200 151 100 120 150 200 100 150 133
iPer month.
Appendix C
553
|
TABLE Z-Continued |
||||||||
|
WAQK-8BUB8 FBOM VOL. XX OF TffB TBNTH CENSÜB — WOOLKN DfDUSTRT |
||||||||
|
Massachusetts, 992, 908 |
• |
|||||||
|
Initial |
||||||||
|
Occupation |
Wa*e p'r Day |
1880 |
1861 |
1882 |
1868 |
1864 |
1865 |
1866 |
|
Overseer, carding |
$ |
|||||||
|
No. 1 |
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
71 |
143 |
200 |
180 |
|
Overseer, carding |
^»*^^^ |
|||||||
|
No. 2 |
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
143 |
114 |
157 |
142 |
|
Overseer, carding |
||||||||
|
No. 3 |
3.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
133 |
133 |
133 |
133 |
|
Orerseer, dress- |
||||||||
|
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
157 |
214 |
•214 |
|
|
Overseer, dress- |
||||||||
|
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
157 |
214 |
214 |
|
|
Overseer, dyeing. Overseer, finislrg |
1200.001 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
150 |
150 |
150 |
150 |
|
3.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
106 |
117 |
133 |
133 |
|
|
Overseer, fulling. |
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
150 |
150 |
150 |
|
Overseer, gigging |
3.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
106 |
117 |
133 |
150 |
|
Overseer, repairs |
||||||||
|
No. 1 |
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
138 |
175 |
175 |
200 |
|
Overseer, repairs |
||||||||
|
No. 2 |
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
150 |
150 |
175 |
|
Orerseer, spin- ning No. 1 . . . . |
||||||||
|
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
157 |
157 |
157 |
|
|
Overseer, spin- ning No. 2 |
||||||||
|
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
129 |
171 |
171 |
|
|
Overseer, spin- |
||||||||
|
ning No. 3 . . . . |
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
129 |
in |
171 |
200 |
|
Overseer, waste |
||||||||
|
sorting No. 1 . . |
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
150 |
150 |
150 |
|
Overseer weaving |
||||||||
|
No.l |
2.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
111 |
133 |
167 |
167 |
|
Overseer weaving |
||||||||
|
No. 2 |
2.25 2.50 |
100 100 |
100 100 |
100 120 |
111 65 |
133 80 |
167 90 |
167 |
|
Overseer, yard... |
100 |
|||||||
|
Carder |
1.75 0.68 |
100 100 |
100 79 |
100 81 |
71 96 |
114 113 |
143 132 |
157 |
|
138 |
||||||||
|
Dyer |
0.91 0.48} |
100 100 |
100 106 |
100 115 |
106 113 |
145 123 |
164 124 |
165 |
|
Finisher, female. |
180 |
|||||||
|
Finisher, male. . . |
0.88 |
100 |
103 |
102 |
105 |
135 |
153 |
161 |
|
Puller |
0.81 0.84 1.75 |
100 100 100 |
98 100 100 |
99 102 114 |
107 110 77 |
152 151 95 |
154 164 109 |
157 |
|
Gigger |
168 |
|||||||
|
Laborer |
115 |
|||||||
|
Picker |
0.81 1.38 |
100 100 |
91 98 |
100 101 |
105 116 |
142 138 |
164 159 |
168 |
|
159 |
||||||||
|
0.78 |
100 |
109 |
121 |
122 |
154 |
199 |
221 |
|
|
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
77 |
95 |
108 |
115 |
|
|
Warper |
.8025 |
100 |
119 |
114 |
117 |
118 |
143 |
214 |
|
Waste-sorter |
0.34 |
100 |
100 |
103 |
126 |
156 |
144 |
159 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
106 |
132 |
154 |
154 |
|
|
Weaver, female.. |
0.69} |
100 |
109 |
103 |
100 |
102 |
133 |
179 |
|
Wool-sorter |
1.17 |
100 |
99 |
101 |
113 |
138 |
157 |
171 |
»Peryear.
554
HlSTOBY OF THE ObEBNBAOKS
TABLE 2-Continued
WAOB-8K&IBS FBOM VOL. XX OF THS TKKTH CKM8UB
WOOLKN INDÜBTRT
Dorer, Me., 889
Oocupttioa
Foreman
Orerseers, differ- ent departm'ts.
Carder, boy
Carpenter
Dyer
Dyer's helper . . .
Fuller
Laborar
Loom-fixer
Machinist
Picker
Soourer
Spinner
Spooler
Teamster
Warper, female.. Weaver, témale.. Wool-sorter
Initial
Wage
p'rDay
1860
39.001
|
39.00» |
100 |
|
0.50 |
100 |
|
1.33 |
100 |
|
1.33 |
100 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
|
1 00 |
100 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
|
1.33 |
100 |
|
0.86 |
100 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
|
1.30 |
100 |
|
0.46 |
100 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
|
0.67 |
100 |
|
0.70 |
100 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
1861
100
100
100 100 100 100 100 105 100 110 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 107 100
1862
100
100 110 113 113 110 110 100 133 113 105 110 100 100 100 100 107 100
115
100 120 113 113 115 135 110 133 113 116 115 115 109 110 100 114 125
1864
141
141 150 150 132 125 150 133 133 150 116 125 135 163 133 137 136 140
154
150 180 169 141 150 175 150 150 169 116 150 140 174 150 149 143 155
151
150 180 169 141 150 175 150 150 169 116 150 138 163 150 149 143 160
Fitchbarg, Mass., 390
9uperintendent .. Orerseers of dif- ieren t dep'tm'ts.
Carder
Carder, boy
Pver's helper
Fúller
Ctig^er
Looiu firers
Picker, boy
Spinner
Syooler, girl
\N arper
Weaver, female. . Wool ííorter
83.33'
|
42. 251 |
100 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
|
0.60 |
100 |
|
0.75 |
100 |
|
0.92 |
100 |
|
0.75 |
100 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
|
0.60 |
100 |
|
0.85 |
100 |
|
0.58 |
100 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
|
0.75 |
100 |
|
1.80 |
100 |
100
|
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
100 |
108 |
115 |
128 |
136 |
|
106 |
106 |
112 |
120 |
120 |
|
100 |
108 |
117 |
133 |
133 |
|
100 |
127 |
133 |
177 |
177 |
|
100 |
100 |
100 |
145 |
145 |
|
100 |
127 |
133 |
177 |
177 |
|
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
|
100 |
106 |
117 |
133 |
133 |
|
100 |
104 |
129 |
176 |
206 |
|
103 |
103 |
103 |
106 |
122 |
|
112 |
112 |
110 |
140 |
140 |
|
100 |
100 |
107 |
107 |
120 |
|
100 |
100 |
125 |
138 |
138 |
100
138 120 133 177 145 177 120 133 206 122 140 127 138
1 IVr nionth.
Appendix O
555
TABLB 2 — Continua*
FBOM YOL. XX OF THE TKNTH CKNBU8 WOOLKN IXDUBTRT
Illinois. 384
Oocupation
Superintendent
Foreman
Carder
Engineer
Spinner
Spooler
Weaver
Wool-sorter ....
|
Initial |
||||||
|
Wage p'r Day |
1860 |
1861 |
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
1865 |
|
65 $W |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
|
58. 501 |
100 |
100 |
111 |
111 |
111 |
111 |
|
0.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
|
2.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
0.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
|
0.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
1865
160 111 120 100 120 100 125 125
New York, 396. 399
Superintendent .
Foreman
Overseers, differ- ent departm'nts
Carder
Carder, girl
Carpen ter
Dyer
Dyer's helper. . ..
Engineer
Finisher
Fuller
Qigger
Laborer
Loom-fíxer
Machinist
Picker
Scourer
Shearer
Spinner
Spinner, boy or
girl
Spooler, girl
Teamster
Watchman
Warper
Weaver
Weaver, boy or
girl
Wool-sorter
|
160.00» |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
188 |
|
100.001 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
200 |
|
53.561 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
149 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
|
0.42 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
137 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
140 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
133 |
|
0.70 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
179 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
200 |
|
.5375 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
182 |
|
0.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
200 |
|
0.70 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
179 |
|
0.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
167 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
140 |
|
0.625 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
200 |
|
0.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
200 |
|
0.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.13 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
142 |
|
0.56 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
82 |
|
0.30 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
140 |
|
0.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
167 |
|
0.85 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
147 |
|
0.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
230 |
|
0.94 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
133 |
|
0.40 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
135 |
|
1.10 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
145 |
188 200
149 120 137 140 133 179 200 182 200 179 167 117 140 200 200 100 142
82 140 167 147 230 133
135 145
i Per month.
556
HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS
TABLE 2 -Continuad
WAOR-SKEIBS FBOM VOL. XX OF THB TKTTH CBT8US
WOOLXN ZNDU8TBT
Manchestar, N. H., 996
Occupation
Overseers, differ ent departm'nts
Carder
Carpenter
Laborer
Loom-fixer
Machinist
Picker
Shearer
Spinner
Spooler
Teamster
Warper
Weaver
Wool-sorter. . . .
|
Initial |
||||||
|
Wage |
1880 |
1861 |
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
1866 |
|
p'r Day |
||||||
|
66. 561 |
100 |
106 |
96 |
100 |
118 |
129 |
|
0.92 |
100 |
100 |
103 |
100 |
136 |
136 |
|
1.47 |
100 |
97 |
101 |
110 |
144 |
133 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
125 |
125 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
106 |
120 |
134 |
|
1.36 |
100 |
105 |
104 |
122 |
118 |
143 |
|
0.92 |
100 |
100 |
103 |
109 |
136 |
136 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
112 |
117 |
|
0.52 |
100 |
123 |
112 |
112 |
121 |
127 |
|
0.60 |
100 |
100 |
102 |
128 |
127 |
127 |
|
1.17 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
107 |
128 |
128 |
|
0.60 |
100 |
100 |
102 |
128 |
127 |
127 |
|
0.78 |
100 |
90 |
79 |
90 |
109 |
112 |
|
1.48 |
100 |
95 |
95 |
116 |
116 |
124 |
142 145 139 133 140 137 145 128 175 183 128 183 171 139
Dreaden, O., 400]
Overseers, differ- ent departm'nts
Carder
Carder, boy
Dyer
Dyer's helper . . .
Puller
Gigger
Loom-fixer
Picker, boy
Shearer
Scourer
Spinner
Teamster
Warper
Weaver
|
58.50» |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
2.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
0.60 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
160 |
160 |
160 |
160 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
0.60 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
160 |
160 |
160 |
160 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 100 125 160 120 120 120 100 125 100 160 1U0 100 125 100
1 Per month.
Appendix C
557
TABLE 1-Continued
WAOR-flKRIKS FROM VOL. XX OF THX TBXTH CKXBÜ8
WOOLKM INDUBTRT
Springfield, DI., 882, 383
Occupation
Overseers of dif ferent dep'ts .
Carder
Carder, boy
Dyer
Engineer
Finisher ,
Laborer ,
Picker
Spinner ,
Weaver
Wool-sorter
|
Initial |
||||||
|
Wa*e |
1860 |
1861 |
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
1865 |
|
p'r Day |
||||||
|
$ 36.251 |
100 |
122 |
122 |
126 |
152 |
197 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
87 |
87 |
100 |
167 |
183 |
|
0.75 |
100 |
80 |
80 |
100 |
107 |
107 |
|
2.00 |
• • » |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
150 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
128 |
128 |
140 |
160 |
200 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
150 |
133 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
|
0.75 |
100 |
133 |
133 |
133 |
167 |
200 |
|
1.40 |
100 |
93 |
93 |
100 |
143 |
179 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
120 |
100 |
120 |
140 |
200 |
|
1.25 |
• • • |
100 |
100 |
120 |
160 |
220 |
1866
206 183 107 150 200 150 150 200 179 160 220
New Hampshire, 306, 387
Overseers in dif- ferent dep'ts . .
Carder
Carpen ter
Dyer
Engineer
PuDer
Laborer
Machinist
Spinner
Spooler
Teamster
Weaver
|
$ |
||
|
42. 251 |
100 |
100 |
|
0.50 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.75 |
100 |
108 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.375 |
100 |
100 |
|
0.875 |
100 |
100 |
|
0.875 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.10 |
100 |
100 |
|
0.50 |
100 |
100 |
|
0.875 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.10 |
100 |
100 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
|
100 |
100 |
138 |
|
125 |
125 |
150 |
|
100 |
100 |
143 |
|
100 |
100 |
130 |
|
109 |
109 |
145 |
|
114 |
114 |
149 |
|
114 |
114 |
157 |
|
106 |
106 |
160 |
|
114 |
114 |
148 |
|
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
114 |
114 |
149 |
|
107 |
107 |
125 |
138 150 143 130 145 149 157 160 148 100 149 125
CARBIAQB AND WAGÓN WORKS
Belleville, DI., 413
Apprentice
BÍacksmith
Blksmith, helper
Bodymaker
Painters
Striper
Trimmer
Varnisher
Wood-worker . . .
|
0.331 |
100 |
100 |
149 |
149 |
149 |
149 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
150 |
150 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
150 |
150 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
150 |
150 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
150 |
150 |
|
1 75 |
100 |
114 |
143 |
143 |
171 |
171 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
150 |
150 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
150 |
150 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
150 |
150 |
149 150 150 150 150 171 150 150 150
i Per month.
558
HlSTOBY OF THE ObBENBAOKS
TABLE 2—Continued
WAOB-SEBIB8 FBOM YOL. XX OF THE TKNTH CXHBC8 CARRIAGB AND WAGÓN WORKS
Indianapolis, Ind., 414
Occupation
Apprentice
Blacksmith .... Bl'ksmith, helper
Body-maker
Laborer
Painters
Stitcher
Striper
Trimmer
Varnisher
Watchman .....
Wheelright
Wood-worker
|
Initial |
||||||
|
Waite |
1860 |
1861 |
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
1865 |
|
p'r Day |
1 |
|||||
|
$ 0.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
150 |
|
2.25 |
100 |
100 |
89 |
89 |
89 |
111 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
75 |
75 |
100 |
125 |
|
2.25 |
100 |
100 |
78 |
78 |
111 |
111 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
75 |
75 |
88 |
88 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
117 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
88 |
88 |
100 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
88 |
88 |
100 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
|
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
86 |
86 |
100 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
75 |
75 |
75 |
88 |
18»
150 111 125 111 125
88 125 117 100 100 125 100
88
Dubuque, la., 416
|
Painter |
$ 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 |
100 100 100 100 |
120 120 120 120 |
160 160 160 160 |
200 200 200 200 |
220 220 220 220 |
220 220 220 220 |
220 220 |
|
Trimmer Wood-worker |
220 220 |
Portland, Me., 417
|
$ 1.75 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
|
|
0.60 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
|
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
|
|
Brksmith, helper |
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
Body-maker |
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
140 |
120 |
|
|
Laborer ......... |
1.25 1.75 1.25 1.75 1.25 |
100 100 100 100 100 |
100 100 100 100 100 |
100 |
|
Painter |
114 |
|||
|
Stitcher |
120 |
|||
|
Striper |
114 |
|||
|
100 |
||||
|
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
|
|
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
|
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
|
Wheelwright |
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
|
Wood-worker |
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
|
143 |
171 |
171 |
171 |
|
108 |
108 |
108 |
108 |
|
143 |
171 |
171 |
171 |
|
100 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
|
143 |
171 |
171 |
171 |
|
120 |
140 |
140 |
140 |
|
120 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
|
143 |
171 |
171 |
171 |
|
160 |
160 |
160 |
160 |
|
143 |
171 |
171 |
171 |
|
100 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
|
143 |
171 |
171 |
171 |
|
143 |
171 |
171 |
171 |
|
125 |
150 |
150 |
150 |
|
150 |
183 |
200 |
200 |
|
167 |
200 |
200 |
200 |
Appendix C
559
TABLE Z—Continued
WAOB-flK&IBS FBOM YOL. XX OF THB TUTE CBMBÜ8 CA&BIAOB AND WAGÓN WORKS
Massachosetts, 420, 421
|
Initial |
||||||||
|
Occnpation |
Wage p'r Day |
1880 |
1861 |
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
1865 |
1886 |
|
2.875 |
100 |
109 |
109 |
109 |
109 |
109 |
109 |
|
|
Boay-maker |
0.75 |
100 |
117 |
117 |
117 |
117 |
117 |
117 |
|
1.33 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
132 |
132 |
132 |
188 |
|
|
2.50 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
|
|
Painter |
1.58 1.50 1.875 1.50 |
100 100 100 100 |
100 106 117 83 |
• • • 106 117 83 |
116 106 117 83 |
116 106 117 83 |
116 106 117 83 |
158 |
|
Stitcher |
106 |
|||||||
|
Striper |
117 |
|||||||
|
83 |
||||||||
|
Trímmer |
1.58 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
142 |
142 |
142 |
206 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
113 |
113 |
113 |
113 |
113 |
113 |
|
|
1.00 |
100 |
113 |
113 |
113 |
113 |
113 |
113 |
|
|
Wheelwright Wood-worker — |
1.33 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
132 |
132 |
132 |
188 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
160 |
160 |
160 |
160 |
160 |
160 |
New York, 423
|
Helpers |
0.875 1.365 |
100 100 |
115 111 |
121 111 |
116 111 |
116 115 |
129 140 |
146 |
|
149 |
Ravenna, O., 424
|
Bl'ksmith, helper Painter |
$ 1.50 1.00 1.50 1.375 1.375 1.50 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 |
117 125 126 127 127 133 |
167 150 167 164 164 133 |
183 150 183 164 182 167 |
200 150 183 164 182 167 |
200 150 183 164 |
|
Wheelwright — |
182 167 |
Whitewater, Wis., 426
Blacksmith
Bl'ksmith, helper
Engineer
Laborer
Machinist
Teamster
|
$ 1.25 |
100 |
110 |
120 |
120 |
140 |
150 |
|
0.80 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
156 |
188 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
113 |
113 |
125 |
138 |
150 |
|
0.75 |
100 |
107 |
133 |
133 |
167 |
183 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
160 |
|
0.76 |
100 |
132 |
132 |
132 |
164 |
197 |
180 188 175 200 180 197
560
HlSTOBY OF THE GbBENBAOKS
TABLE 2—OmUnued
WAOB-AULIS8 FBOM YOL. XX OF THX
CAKEIAOB AHD WAOOM WOBXB
Lonisrille, Ky„ 416
cnraus
|
Occupation |
Initial Wage p'r Day |
1880 |
1861 |
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
1885 |
188S |
|
Pa inter |
$ 2.33 2.00 2.00 1.66 |
100 100 100 • • • |
64 96 83 100 |
71 92 92 110 |
129 108 106 120 |
172 125 121 140 |
186 150 150 151 |
215 158 |
|
Wood-worker |
156 181 |
FURCTTUUE
New Haven, Conn., 435
Foreman
Cabinet-maker . .
Carver
Chair-maker
Engineer
Finisher
Laborer
Machine hand . .
Packer
Turner
Upholsterer
Varnisher
|
65.001 |
100 |
108 |
115 |
123 |
123 |
123 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
113 |
113 |
125 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
113 |
113 |
113 |
113 |
|
1.80 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
111 |
111 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
113 |
125 |
125 |
|
1.80 |
100 |
100 |
111 |
111 |
111 |
125 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
113 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
|
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
114 |
114 |
129 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
113 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
|
2 00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
113 |
113 |
125 |
131 125 125 111 138 125 120 125 129 125 125 125
Chicago, 111., 438
Cabinet-maker..! 1.10 ! 100 ! 100
114
148
205
227
250
Kentucky, 446
Foreman
Cabinet-maker
Carver
Engineer
Laborer
Machine hand
Packer
Turner
Upholsterer . . . Varnisher
|
75.00' |
100 |
100 |
113 |
113 |
113 |
113 |
|
1.40 |
100 |
107 |
125 |
179 |
179 |
196 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
133 |
133 |
133 |
200 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
1U0 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
150 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
120 |
140 |
160 |
100 |
200 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
167 |
167 |
183 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
120 |
140 |
200 |
200 |
200 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
140 |
140 |
160 |
133 196 200 100 150 200 160 183 220 160
i Per month.
|
OeeupatioQ |
Inillal |
1H0 |
ím |
IMS |
,„ |
UN |
IMS |
,»., |
|
10 Oo1 0.331 8.00 1.081 1.50 1.50 0.76 1.00 t.oo i . m 1.85 1.86 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 no 100 |
185 100 100 isa loo 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
125 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 ISO 100 180 100 |
138 100 113 100 117 117 100 100 150 100 ISO 180 |
160 100 113 100 117 117 100 100 150 100 140 180 |
163 100 113 180 117 117 101 100 150 100 140 180 |
175 |
|
|
Chair-maker Engineer Finisher Labore r Machine liunü . . |
120 117 117 111 100 |
|||||||
|
no |
|
LooIiTÜle, K»„ «1 |
|||||||||
|
Foreman Cabinet-maker. . |
150.001 ÍJO 1.90 2.00 1.75 1.50 1.80 1M 1.75 156 |
100 100 11») 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
too 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
100 100 loo 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
100 100 |
||
|
Machine hand... |
100 100 100 100 |
||||||||
|
Varnieher |
100 |
|
LonisTiUe, |
Kr.. 443 |
|||||||
|
Foreman |
1 80.001 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
|
8.50 8.00 |
100 100 |
100 100 |
100 100 |
100 100 |
100 loo |
100 100 |
||
|
100 |
||||||||
|
2.25 |
100 |
too |
100 |
100 |
10.1 |
100 |
100 |
|
|
2.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
|
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
loo |
100 |
loo |
114 |
111 |
|
|
1.50 2.00 |
100 100 |
100 100 |
100 100 |
100 100 |
100 113 |
113 |
||
|
Turner |
113 |
|||||||
|
2 tu |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
too |
loo |
100 |
|
New |
York. N |
.¥.. 450 |
||||||
|
Cabinpt maker . . |
48.00' l.lfl 1.33| 1.161 1.00 1.50 1.00 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
100 100 75 88 100 78 100 |
104 143 112 115 133 111 133 |
ue 172 137 129 187 133 167 |
187 228 u;-j 186 200 167 20U |
888 280 187 200 SU 180 333 |
22» 315 200 |
|
Finisher |
300 217 |
|||||||
|
Upholsterer Varnisher |
211 217 |
562
HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAGKS
TABLE 2—Continued
FBOM YOL. XX OF THB FUBNITUBS
Bochester, N. Y., 450
tbhtu cnrauB
Occupation
Cabinet-maker
Carver
Chair-maker . .
Finisher
Machine hand
Packer
Upholsterer . . . Varnisher
|
Initial |
||||||
|
Wage |
1860 |
1861 |
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
1865 |
|
p'r Day |
||||||
|
$ 1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
117 |
|
2.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
117 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
150 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
113 |
113 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
133 100 133
leo
100 150 113 160
New York, 452
Foreman
Cabinet-maker
Carver
Chair-maker . .
Engineer
Finisher
Laborer
Machine hand
Packer
Turner
Upholsterer. .. Varnisher
|
eo.oo1 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
167 |
167 |
|
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
143 |
143 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
150 |
150 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
150 |
150 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
150 |
150 |
|
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
150 |
150 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
175 |
175 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
150 |
150 |
|
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
143 |
143 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
150 |
150 |
120 167 143 150 150 150 120 150 175 150 143 150
Columbas, O., 454
Foreman
Carver
Cabinet-maker Chair-maker . .
Engineer
Finisher
Turner
Laborer
Machine hand
Packer
Upholsterer . . . Varnisher
|
100.001 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
3.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
2^0 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
2.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
aoo |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
2.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
aoo |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
2.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
2.40 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
i Per month.
Appbndix O
563
TABLE Z—Continued
WAOB-SEKUEfl FBOM YOL. XX OF THB TBNTH CKNBUB
FURNITUBB
New Hampshire, 448
|
Oocapation |
Initial Wag* p'r Day |
1860 |
1861 |
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
1865 |
1866 |
|
Cabinet-maker . . Machine hand . . Turner |
36.401 1.15 r.oo 1.25 |
100 100 100 100 |
100 109 110 100 |
100 117 125 100 |
125 117 125 120 |
125 130 140 120 |
125 139 150 140 |
125 139 150 140 |
Philadelphia, Pa., 456, 457
Foreman
Cabinet-maker .
Carver
Chair-maker . . .
Packer
Upholsterer
Varnisher
|
48. 001 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
|
1.67 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
120 |
120 |
120 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
113 |
113 |
113 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
117 |
117 |
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
117 |
117 |
117 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
|
1.32 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
126 |
126 |
126 |
125 120 113 117 117 125 126
Wisconsin, 459
|
Cabinet-maker. . Carver |
33.33*» 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.25 2.00 1 50 2.00 1.50 |
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • |
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
15 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • |
0 |
250 117 117 117 117 117 120 125 117 125 117 |
250 117 117 117 117 117 120 125 117 125 117 |
250 117 117 117 117 117 120 125 117 125 117 |
250 117 117 |
|
|
Chair-maker Machine hand . . Packer |
117 117 117 120 125 117 |
|||||||||
|
Turner |
125 |
|||||||||
|
117 |
8AW- AND PLANINO-MILLB
Carrollton, Mich., 473, 474
Engineer Fuer Laborer . Sawyer . . Teams ter
|
$ 2.37 |
100 |
100 |
74 |
84 |
148 |
148 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
119 |
103 |
175 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
150 |
200 |
175 |
|
1.345 |
100 |
102 |
114 |
139 |
180 |
182 |
|
1.00 |
100 |
94 |
100 |
150 |
225 |
200 |
148 175 188 202 200
iPer month.
564
HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAGKS
TABLE t — ConUnued
WAOB-8EKTB8 FBOM YOL. XX OF THE TKNTH CBXBUS BAW- AND PLAlíING-MLLLS
Kentacky, 468, 469
Ooeapation
Foreman, dress'g
department . . Foreman, sash
department . . Bench hand,sash
department . . .
Laborer
Machine hand,
sash departm't Matcher, dress'g
department . . . Molder, dressing
department . . . Planer, dressing
department . . . Sawyer, dressing
department.. . Surfacer, dress'g
department . . . Steamboat joiner Teamster
|
Initial Wago p'r Day |
1860 |
1861 |
1862 |
1863 |
1864 |
1865 |
|
$ |
||||||
|
80.00» |
100 |
63 |
81 |
100 |
156 |
208 |
|
70.00» |
100 |
71 |
86 |
143 |
•179 |
143 |
|
1.50 1.00 |
100 100 |
83 125 |
83 150 |
167 175 |
183 175 |
200 175 |
|
1.75 |
100 |
80 |
86 |
157 |
171 |
186 |
|
1.375 |
100 |
91 |
91 |
127 |
164 |
218 |
|
1.80 |
100 |
83 |
89 |
111 |
153 |
181 |
|
1.375 |
100 |
91 |
91 |
127 |
164 |
218 |
|
1.375 |
100 |
91 |
91 |
127 |
164 |
218 |
|
1.375 1.60 1.00 |
100 100 100 |
91 94 100 |
91 109 100 |
127 125 138 |
164 172 167 |
218 203 150 |
125
143
200 160
196
218
181
218
218
218 188 200
Trarerse City, Mich., 477
Foreman Engineer Fuer .... Laborer . Sawyer . . Setter . . . Teamster
|
153.83» |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
• • • |
|
5.81| |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
• • • |
|
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
150 |
173 |
261 |
• • • |
|
0.385 |
100 |
119 |
140 |
200 |
260 |
300 |
• • • |
|
0.77 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
130 |
175 |
200 |
• • • |
|
0.77 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
130 |
175 |
200 |
• • • |
|
0.385 |
100 |
119 |
140 |
200 |
260 |
300 |
• • • |
Wisoonsin, 496
Foreman, sawing department . . .
Engineer
Filer
Laborer
Sawyer, sawing department .
Setter
Teamster
» Par moaih.
|
52.00' |
100 |
100 |
100 |
125 |
150 |
200 |
|
1.50 1.50 1.00 1.50 |
100 100 100 100 |
100 100 100 100 |
100 100 100 100 |
117 133 113 133 |
150 150 150 150 |
167 200 150 183 |
|
1.25 1.00 |
100 100 |
100 100 |
100 100 |
120 113 |
120 150 |
160 150 |
200
167 200 175 200
160 175
Appkndix C
TABLB Z-Continwxt
|
oupation |
loltinl |
uto |
18*1 |
1NS |
un |
l*J |
IMS |
UN |
|
iiui, dress'g artment . . . tan, saffh srtment . . . |
* 83.331 ' 33.33;' 1.875 2.00 1.25 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.625 |
100 100 100 100 IDO 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 |
100 100 Iflj 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 lili too |
loo 100 un 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 un 100 |
100 100 100 100 100 1(11 100 100 80 88 100 100 |
100 100 100 100 90 88 100 88 B8 86 88 100 |
100 100 100 100 80 86 mi 86 86 86 86 100 |
100 100 100 100 80 B6 100 |
|
.«,..... |
100 |
|
Ohio.US |
1SS |
|||||||
|
o»ú, dress'g |
||||||||
|
artment . . , |
SS.OQi |
100 |
130 |
140 |
160 |
200 |
300 |
300 |
|
artment . . . |
65.001 |
100 |
120 |
140 |
160 |
200 |
300 |
|
|
srtment . . . |
S5.001 |
100 |
ino |
100 |
140 |
ISO |
200 |
no |
|
1.50 |
loo |
100 |
117 |
133 |
US |
833 |
||
|
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
143 |
171 |
||
|
ccr |
1.00 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
150 |
200 |
200 |
no |
|
ine hand . . |
1.75 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
143 |
no |
BB |
|
|
1.50 |
100 |
100 |
133 |
167 |
200 |
SS9 |
3BO |
|
|
1.76 |
100 |
114 |
])( |
143 |
171 |
300 |
||
|
er, dreasing |
||||||||
|
•artment . . . |
1.50 |
100 |
117 |
133 |
167 |
300 |
200 |
no |
|
-artment . . . |
1.76 |
100 |
100 |
114 |
143 |
900 |
228 |
BB |
|
* tar |
1.25 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
140 |
20) |
300 |
no |
Mfltiomooee, Wis.. i
|
rér |
s 1.06 ■2.00 1.50 1.30 |
10Ó 1Ó6 |
100 106 100 100 104 |
100 114 100 100 110 |
100 128 100 107 123 |
117 150 125 133 146 |
117 150 126 133 146 |
117 128 |
|
ister |
131 |
HlSTOBT OP THE GBBENBACKS
TABLE 1 -Cora ¡t.tiírf
5t. Louis. lio., 199
|
Ooenpstlon |
Ioitial Wsno |
1860 |
ísai |
1862 |
1863 |
IBM |
1SSS |
1M |
|
Calker Oarpenter Laborer |
■ 2.50 2,50 2.885 1.00 |
100 100 100 100 |
120 120 100 125 |
120 120 133 125 |
120 120 133 125 |
170 170 167 200 |
200 200 200 250 |
180 180 200 |
Carpenter . .
Laborer
Dockband.. Sawyer
|
1.75 |
100 |
143 |
113 |
143 |
200 |
200 |
|
1.125 |
100 |
111 |
11H |
111 |
140 |
1*0 |
|
2.00 |
100 |
125 |
125 |
125 |
188 |
188 |
|
2.25 |
100 |
111 |
111 |
111 |
156 |
156 |
|
Baltimor* |
Hd |
|||||||
|
Grado |
lull. pt.Yr |
Sel |
IMO |
un i'-', IX t'JU M0 100 ir» |
100 loo IDO US M |
iMtlMl 1O0I 1» 1(0 SO 100, IM II.) lili ico . ]¿: 1Q0 187 100 1". lúa { 3» |
1MB ts 1" iTi ir,: m iií ■1 |
EM |
|
Principáis high nonools boys |
1 I ¿00 1.100 ara ano a» |
U. u. H. F. P. F. F. F. T. |
v'.l 100 100 100 100 tu |
ír |
||||
|
Ihriii'-ii':il-. ¿rrunnuir schoofs, bojrs .. .. Vrinciimlí. Krn! .ir ..-1 1 ■. |
||||||||
|
Vir.-I Hi-.-i-r :inlü. ursmnwr-chcHil>,«irl> J'rl[jc¡|i¡iU. iiriiiinry -.'limilí, bojs |
||||||||
|
3 1 i l:í i .-- t cni.l". ¡■rimurj schools. |
-n |
|||||||
|
■ |
|
Boston, Uta. |
||||||||
|
He . , |
2,900 1.000 £,000 rao 3» |
k! F." F. |
100 100 100 100 íoo |
100 too too 100 íoo |
íoo 100 100 too 100 |
íoo 100 íoo íoo |
110 130 133 |
1= 13 |
|
First «ssistant», srammar schoóls Assistants, lowost. primar j HchooLi > .. |
1*0 , i« 150 1» |
1 From the Aldrich Rcpori, Part IV, Tabla XIV.
TABLE 3-Continitai
Ciacinnati, O.
Prinoip.lt, district aehuols
■-!-l-8t,Inleniiedíat0 6chn9 i*t, diatriot sr.hciolfi ..
indi. I.i.. hicíi. .-[..[
;t. district se bools ..
|
St. Loáis, lio. |
|||||||||
|
L» ísaa m 375 |
H. ?. |
100 100 un 100 |
M SE 73 |
H 87 |
1» 1U ISO |
US )■:■> 141 130 |
m |
||
|
Ttjir.i .1 --i- l.u.i -..iirflri,-!. -rliíuil-i, mi ni |
133 |
||||||||
Bsrnatoble Coon ty , Kass.
|
Franklln Conntj, Hora. |
||||||||
|
Twohera ol ooonlrj «ehoolí |
21.44» U.M* |
M. F. |
100 100 |
ice 90 |
100 IOS 100 103 |
134 130 |
||
' Altar tbrrm jrnum' Mirlos.
ar slx Trinen' «untan.
INDEX
Lrnry, 52 n., 74 n.
[. C : on flnancial consequences l-tender acts, 405; se© also 74 n.
r (Boston), 18, 19 n., 81.
rüBAL products: prices of, 29-84.
Beport: criticism of table of
> prices, 289-43; of table of rela- jes, 281, 282, 311-13 ; new ana ly sis wlata, 243-59, 386-8, 409.410: of kta, 283-321, 411, 412; cf. tablea ss, 429-51 ; of wages, 470-517 and
dhn B. : remarles on flrst legal- bilí, 61; resolution approving resumption of specie payments,
> also 55 n., 59 n.
esolution, 128, 238.
n Annual Cyclopjbdia : 11 n., n» 14 n., 20 n.. 21 n., 26 n., 29 n., ,, 39 n., 43 n., 84 n., 85 n., 87 n., 54 n., 159 n., 165 n.
, H. B., 77.
tes: gold valué of the papar y, 423-8 ; relativo prices of oom- «, 429-69; relativo wages, 470-
ior: in arreara, winter of 1862-
oongressional inquirios, 105-9,
■©ara snmmer of 1864. 125; how
i 1865, 127 ; inerease ín rate of ,
, capture of: effeot on valué «cy, 204.
Monthly, 19 n.
, 96n.
.. C, 78 n.
TEPHEN, 96 n.
>trs: circulation of, during ar, 145-8, 181.
18* CONVENTION " : OppOSÍtÍOn tO
lng*s legal-tender bul, 47, 48; il program proposed, 50.
Mctgaxine (New York), 20 n., : n., 23 n., 27 n., 28 n., 29 n., 84 n., • n., 88 n., 39 n., 40 n., 48 n., 86 n., 46 n., 147 n., 149 n., 150 n., 154 n., 160 n., 161 n., 162 n., 163, 164 n., 166 n.. 177 n., 186, 199 n., 218 n., 65, 366.
oondition of banks in snmmer , 20-23; agreement regarding ,000 loan, 23; effeot of Toan on 28-42; suspensión of specie its, 38-41, 144-8.
*, Don C, 74 n., 86 n.
Bates, Bdward: opinión on oonstitu- tionality of legal-tender clause, 52.
Bayard, J. A., 52 n., 63 n., 64 n.
Baylet, B. A., 9 n., 17 n.. 73 n., 86 n., 88 n., 89 n., 123 n., 124 n., 126 n., 164 n., 178 n., 174 n., 176 n., 177 n.
Bbrket, W. A., 43 n., 78 n.
Binoham, J. A. : remarks on flrst legal- tender bilí, 53; see also 151 n.
Blacksmiths: relativo wages of, 299, 331.
Blakb, H. O., 52 n., 65 n., 67 n.
Blainz, J. O., 10 n., 20 n., 37 n., 51 n., 215 n.
Blodoet, LoRnr: on proeperity during war, 392.
Boiler-maebrs: relativo wages of, 299.
Bolles, A. 8., 10 n., 23 n., 27 n., 43 n., 51 n.
Borrowers of capital (see also Be- aidaal claimants): effeot of groen- backs on interests of , 360-79.
Boston: relativo rents in, 357.
•* Boston Mbrchant": discusión of prosperíty during war, 393, 394.
Bowlet, A. L., 282 n.
Breckinridgb, R. M., 27 n., 195 n.
Brooks, James, 225 n.
Buildino trajdbs: relativo wages in, 295,344.
Bullock, C. J., 282 n., 325 n.
Business (see Proflts).
Butleb, Oso. B., 74 n.
Calhoun, J. C, 113 and note.
California: monetary circulation of, during Civil War, 142-4.
Call loanb: ratos of interest on, 367, 368.
Calvert, C. B., 78 n.
Campbell, J. H., 55 n., 61 n., 65 n.
Capttalists (see Lenders of capital. Residual claimants, Interest, Proflts).
Caret, H. C, 189 n., 271 n.
Carlilb, J. S., 78.
Caepbntbes: relativo wages of, 299, 331,345.
Cenbus (tenth federal) : data regard- ing retail prices, 259-64 ; data regarding wages, 324-33; data regarding rent, 354-7.
Ceetipicates op indebtednbss : flrst issuo authorised, 86, 87; issues Jan- nary to March, 1862, 88; issues April to June, 1862, 90; use as curreney, 1TJ.
669
570
HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS
Chamtlin, J. T., 188 n.
Chancellorsvtllb, battle of: effeot on valué of currency, 203, 218.
Chandler, Z. : on temporary Joan, 85 ; attempt to forestal 1 second legal-tender act, 93; see also 78 n., 86 n., 229 n.
Chase, S. P. : appointment as secretary of treasury, 3 ; administration of treas- ary, Marca to Jane, 1861, 10-15; issae of treasury notes, 15; financial pro- gram, July, 1861, 15, 16; attitude toward taxation, 18, 19; arrangement for $150,- 000,000 loan, 23; refosal to draw on banks, 25, 26; issne of demand notes, 26,27; report of December, 1861,37,44; responsibility for suspensión of speoie payments, 41-3; letter regarding first legal-tender bilí read in Congress, 62; attitnde toward bilí, 68-71; administra- tion of treasury, January to June, 1862, 82-91 ; request for second issne of groen- backs, 91-3 ; su^gests postage-currency act, 98, 99; administration of treasury, Julyto December, 1862,100-104; report of December, 1862, 102-4; answers to inquirios into arrears in pay of army, 105-8; ezplanation of premium upon gold in December, 1862, 112; regaras íssues of greenbacks neoessary to facilí- tate borrowing, 114 ; opposes additional issues in December, 1363, 121; admin- istration of treasury in 1864, 123, 124; resignation, 124, 202, 234 ; issue of one- and two-year treasury notes of 1863, 174-6: campaign against gold markets, 225-32; see also 4 n., 12 n., 26 n., 27 n., 34 n., 62 n., 70 n., 73 n., 82 n., 94 n., 123 n., 149 n.
Chattanooga, battle around: effect on valué of currency, 204, 221.
Chiceamauoa, battle of: effect on valué of currency, 203, 220.
Cincinnatt : relativo rents in, 357.
Circülatino médium: effect of legal- tender acts on, 135, 141-81.
Cisco, J. J.: secures bids for treasury notes of 1860. 7; suggests temporary loan. 85, 151, 152; senas in resignation, 124,202.
Clase, Daniel: reports bilí regarding bronze cents, 169 ; see also 229 n.
Clay, B. J. : bilí to regúlate contracta for gold, 225.
ClEARING-HODSE LOAN CESTTFICATE8,
20, 21, 21 n., 28, 32, 33 n.
Cobb, H.: administration of treasury, 5,6.
Coe. G. S., 8 n., 23 n., 26 n., 27 n., 29 n.,
43 n., 48 n.
Coin : withdrawal of gold from circula- tion after suspensión, 135, 142; con- tinued use of gold in California, 142-4, 180; disappea ranee of subsidiary silver, 156-9; circulation of minor coins, 165- 73, 180; amount of specie in circulation in 1861. 178, 180; premium upon gold coin, 182-238; tablas of valué of paper money in coin, by months, 423, 424; daily, 425-8.
Collamsb, Jacob: remarks on first legal-tender bilí, 53, 59; remarks on tae 44 gold bilí," 229,230; see also 52^53^ 54 n., 55 n., 56 n., 57 n., 58 n., 60 n-, O a-, 77, 95 n.
Commereial Advertiter ( New York), 19 a- 81, 153 n., 154 n., 159 n„ 166.
Commereial and Financial Chronicle. 186, 192 n., 197 n., 232 n., 271 n^ 366, 18, 389 n.
Comuoditt prices (aee Prioes).
Conant, C B., 389 n.
Conorsss (seo Debatea in Congress, Legal-tender acta, Alley resoluta»): financial legislation of extra tfwftm. July and Aognst, 1861, 16-18: subordina- tion of economic to financial considera- tions by, 403, 404 ; lavish appropriations by, 415, 416.
Conjugal cowditioh: and advance in
relativa wages, 806, 307, 323» 324. Consigno, P. A., 4 n., 26 n.
CoNKLiNG, Roscos: substitute proposed for first legal-tender act. 75; oppoaitiao to legal-tender clause, 76; see tuo lSn-, 52 n., 60 n., 63 n., 65 o.
Consumpttow OF wealth: changa in character of oonsumption of woraing- men's families, 349; effect of green- backs on consnroption, 398-402.
"Conversión "clause: parpóse, 89 ;slow- ness of conversions, 88-90, 92, 10Í, 101; repeal of the clause, 115, 116; effect apon valué of greenbacks, 195-7.
Cooke, Jat : sacceasfal oondoct of flve- tweaty loan of 1862, 121, 123, 202. 218, 219; of seven-thirty loan in 1865, 127, 238; see also 34 n.
CooPKS, Peter, 78 n.
Coenino, Erastus : member Committee of Ways and Means, 45 ; attitnde toward legal-tender bilí, 46.
Cornwallis, K., 182 n., 185 n., 227 n^ 235 a.
Cost of ltvtng : method of estimatinc changos in, 335-9; as a factor in ad* vancing money wages, 308, 306, 347.
Cost of the war : effect of greenbacks on, 403-20.
Coürtnkt, L. H.: estímate of effect of greenbacks on cost of war, 405.
Cowan, £. : remarks on first legal-tender bilí, 60, 66; remarks on the "gold bilí" 230: see also 52 n., 55 n., 56 n., 58 n., $4 n., 65 n., 69 n., 77.
Credit : contraction of, caused by green- backs, 375, 376, 390, 396.
CeisfielDj J. W. : remarks on first legal- tender bi 11, 53, 59; see also & n., 53 a.. 59 n., GOn., 66 n.
Curtís, Q. T., 8 n.
CUSTOMS-HOUSE CKRTXFICATE8 : Sales OÍ,
by treasury, 226.
Customs revenüe : act of March, 1887. 5: act of March, 1861, 9, 11 ; act of Augnst 5, 1861. 17, 18 ; receipts, January to Jone, 1862, 83 ; effect of greenbacks on, 413, 4*
Dato, G., «n.
Dea ATES IX Cohgusb: npon flrst legal-
toudcr act. ,11-68; upon secoud letral- tender act, 04-7; apon third legal- tender act, 110-15 ; npon Che "sold bul," mt-Xf- abaeoce of confusión between ic and fiscal oonaidera tiouu, 403,
401.
Debt. fbdehal; lncrease of.oaused br
«reonbacVs. 403-20. Da, Kxioht, W. F., 130 n., 118 D. Dilkai, A., 169 n. Df.uand noteh oí 1801: nuthoriaatii
of, dar
..f.íUI.
(U.l.ll-1 I<,.íi,,-J¡, -j;.U7n.: r<..li'm|.tiiii] i anthoriváT 64:
IVH. III: rcplnc-d liy itr.' .i,n: ,:.-..- -.h. i;.... .......
(.¡ir I.",-,,
■ncy. lltl i;.
, ■
mistión to «oíd, 1¡
tocomniodíties, 239-79; tablas of Talue
Of papar mcinol ¡n ooin bj rnontha, 421,
424 j daílr, 42S-B ; Ublaa of prices, 429-69.
Diíect tax: act of Angnst 5, 1861, 18;
DoDOK, J. B, : on iragN of farro laboren,
tender biÚ, Ü ; tea also 99 n. DOKE, C. P-, 74 d. Djutt miora: «Bact on Taina of e
rencj, 204, 220. Dunt, J. W,.212n. I»xw,J.G.,78n. Dcnbab, C. F„ 21 n
Elections- effaot of.on Taina of cor-
rcncy . 205. 21 3. 220, 222, 238 Elliott, E. B. : itatíaticsof intareat, SM. Bhebt, Mus. 8. K V., 78 n. ENQiNHKna : relativa wagea of, 99, SU. Enlibthenth ib abmy: eBect of, on
w»B!i, 289. 290, 305, 348, 349. Bvaetb, W. M ., < n. Etenino ElCHANOB, 184, 201. Etbbett, R, 19 n.
(sea also Finanoe», ei Ui Jane, 1882, 82. ■, 1882, 100, 101;
w.nr
.„ .».,.,« <,. (UW, 1
Breen bao ka on, 406-12. ElPOETS AND IMPORTA, 11, 22, 22 n. Expra* (New York), 206 n., 367 n. Eituavaoanck; effect of irreenbacks
opon, 398-402. Failükbs, bcbinkbs: caased bji cessa-
22; amallnumberdurinBwBr,389-9¡. Falknee. B. P.: criticism of table of
relatite prlces 238-43; of relati.e waire».
281, 282, 311-13, 828. 829; Falkner's
method of weighting prioe-tables, 330. Fahh laborees: rolatiTe van» of,
S2I-Í, Farm fhíidoctb: prices oí, 380-8,429-34, Fabm sentí, 358, 359. Faemkbb : proflta of, 386-6. Febkis, J. A., 144 n. Feshenorn, W. P.: nimarks on flrst
legal-tender bilí, 89-81, 68. 84 68-8; oa
isra^ño^ora^reenlmckTV 94° on Wdson's resolutiou to isstiegreen bacila
of third issue of greenbacks, 111; ap- pointed Becretary of the treasarr, 124, 202, 284; administra tion of the treas- ury.124-8; withdrawalof coapon treas-
"gold bilí," 229; seo abo 23 n.. 53 n„ 59 n.. 68 n., 73 a., 78 n., 77, 78, 79 n., 189 D..
... Nortl
Ei.Diut. Wihhk:
Br.Diut.Wi
a prosperity daring
. -. , e of credit.
375 ; stitistics of f a jlares , 389. Badie, John, 270 n.
ECONOHIC CONHEQOENCK» OF QKIBN-
BACES íseeCircnlating médium, Stand- ard of Talue, Prices, Wages, Rcat, rnterest,Proflts.Productiuu,lViUMum¡). tion. Credit, Coat of mr) : Economic r.. Hnancial effecta. 403, 404.
ffcononutH Loadon), ÍOn.,273n.
Econout: di. extravagante, 398-402.
Kdwabds. T. «.: remarks on aecond legal-tender bilí, 98; remarks on third
to June, 1861. 10-15: January to June. 1882, 82-01 ; Joly to December, 1882. 100- 104; improíement due to BUccess of rW twentv loan, 121; difflcnlti* of 1-fi), lffi-6jMcColIm;h's administra tion, 139- 8; effect of greenbacks on, 403-20.
ftEEMEN : relative wanes of. 299. 343.
Pibheb, Ibvino: statislics of interost.
rLB of: eflTact o
FlTIEIUOH. H. ti., 189 n. FOOT. 8., 77.
572
HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS
Foreion bxchanoe: low price of ster- ling, spring and summer of 1861,22; sales of, by treasury, 228.
Fobeion rklations : effect of, on valué of currency, 206, 20?, 214, 238.
FOBEMEN AND OVEB8KBBS: relativa
.wages of , 299.
Foster, L. S., 77.
Fbactional currkkot: issues of, 163.
Frebman, Pliny. 78 n.
Fdndino Provisión (see "Conversión" clause).
Gallaqheb's Evening Exchanob, 184, 206.
Oallattn, James: opposition to issne of demand treasury notes, 15.n. ; oppo- sition to Spaulding's legal-tender bilí, 48; see alsoji^. JÉLlL, 40 n.
Garfield, J. A., 225 n.
Gas industrt: reía tire wages in, 296, 344.
Getttsburo, battle of : effect on valué of currency, 204.
Gibbons, J. S., 26 n., 267 nM 271 n.
Glass blowebs : relativo wages of, 818, 319.
Gold (see Coin, Premium upon gold. Depreciation, Greenbacks): valué of gold and prices, 272-5; monthly highest, lowest, and average valué of paper money in gold, 423, 424; daily highest and lowest valué of paper money in gold, 425-8.
"Gold bill," 228-32.
Gold boom, 183, 184.
Government bmplotees: pay of, 333-5, 408,409.
Government purcbases: effect on prices, 256-9, 265, 266; cf. tables 449-51.
Greenbacks (see also Legal-tender acts, "Conversión" clause) : flrst issues, 88, 155; relief of treasury by, 90; Chase opposes further issues, December, 1862, 102. 103; as a flnancial resource, 128-31 ; gold valué of, 135, 136, 140 n., 182-238; circulation of, 173, 174, 180; effect of, on prices, 239-79; on wages, 280-351; on rent, 352-9; on interest, 360-79; on prof- its, 380-91; on production of wealth, 392-8; on consumption of wealth, 896- 402; on cost of war to government, 403-20; tables showing valué of green- backs in gold. by months, 423, 424; daily, 425-8; tables of prices in green- backs, 429-69; of wages in greenbacks, 470-567.
Gürley, J. A. : on Chase's failure to sell flve-twenty bonds, 108; see also 105 n., 110 n.
Hale, J. P.. 229 n.
Hardy, S. McLean, 248 n.
Harper, Jesse, 78 n.
Harpcr's Monthly Magazine, 212 n., 390.
Hart, A. B., 4 n., 70 n., 72 n., 74 n., 124 n., 149 n.
Henderson, J. B. : remarks on tfce "gold bilí," 229.
Hendricks, T. A., 225 n.
Herald (New York) 19 n.. 80 n., 48a., 81, 81 n., 145 n., 150 n., 151 n- 152 n.. 153 n~, 157, 184 n., 205 n., 208 n., 207 n., 231 n., 387 a.
Hickman, John: remar ks on flzst legal- tender bilí, 62.
Hoar, Geo. F., 364 n.
Hoce, C. yon, 10 n., 48 n., 74 n., 189 n.
Hooper, Samuel : work on Committee of Ways and Means, 45; attitude toward legal-tender bilí, 46; remarks on Sánate amendments, 77; remarles on second legal-tender bilí, 96; introduces post- age currency bilí, 99; remarks on third legal-tender bilí, 114; substitute pro- posed by third legal-tender bilí, 116,117; remarks on the gold bilí." 280 ¡opin- ión of effeets of greenbacks on trasi- ness, 392; see also 58 n., 59 n.,67 n.,97 n., 110 n., 114 n., 116 n., 225 n.
Horton, Y. B. : opposition to flrst legal- tender bilí in committee, 46; remarks upon it in Honse, 59,63; substitute pro- poned for flrst legal-tender act, 75; op- position to legal-tender clause, 76; amendment offered to second legal- tender bilí, 96; remarks on third lejnl- tender bilí, 111, 114; proposes repeal of 11 conversión " clause, lia ; see also 55 n., 58 n., 59 n., 60 n., 78.
Howard, J. M. : remarks on flrst legal- tender bilí, 53.
Howe, T. O. : remarks on flrst legal-ten- der bilí, 56, 64 ; see also 52 n-, 56 n-, 57 xu, 61 n.
Hdlbdrd, H. R. : estímate of effect of greenbacks on cost of war, 406.
Hunt's MerchanU' Maoaxine: comments on decline in consumption of staple commodities, 400, 401 ; see also 11 n.. 13 n., 14 n., 18 n.,21 n., 22 n., 24 n., 30, 87 il, 39 n., 43 n., 125 n., 145 n., 149 n., 150 n., 151 n., 152 n., 155 n., 159 n., 172 n., 175 n., 177 n., 184 n.. 186, 189 n., 191 n~ 192 n-, 193 n., 196 n., 202 n., 207 n., 965, 366, 375 n., 889 n.
Indbpendent subtreasurt : relatiocto $150,000,000 loan. 25; prevente bank loan, July, 1864, 125.
Index -numbbbs : for prices, 239-19; for wages, 280-351.
Intebbst on pvblic debt: effect of greenbacks on, 418, 419.
Interest. bate of: statistics of rate, 365-8: slicht increase in, 368; causes. 369-72; effect of government demand for loans. 373; of nigh proflts, 374; of contraction of credit, 375, 376 ; interest realizad on investments in government bonds, 377-9.
Intrrnal bevbnub duttes (see Taza- tion): increase in receipts from. duríng war, 120, 129; effect of greenbacks on receipts from, 413-16.
Ibón indüstbt : reUtive wages in, 315-13.
Jabo*. E. J., SM n. JOKMSON, A. R, 189 n.
JOBNBOH. RmiDI : ropeal Of t ho " Kold
bill,"2S2; aeeal»o225n.. 22» n. ■fbamnJ (Boston ), 19 n.. 81. Jtmrnot of Oommerce {New York), 81,
208 n. Kasson, J. A., 225 n. Kklixxhí. WrLLiAM: rnmnrks on firat
lagal-tecder bilí, 59,57;see al» 53 a.,
55 n., 58 r.., 57 □., 5» n., 05 n. Sido, H.. 8 n. Kjlho, Para-ron, TI. Khoi, J. J„ 8 c, 10 D., 51 n., 1*8 □., 159 n.,
lK!n.,168n„ m a. liABOUM: relativa wages of, 398, 39,
341. Lañe, J. B. : remarles on tho "(oíd bilí,"
Lauohlin, J. Laüíbmje, 52 n., 13B ».,
1. Act of Febraarv 25, 1882 : Spaolciintr'B bilis, M-5i : debate in Courau, SÍ*;
attitude of Chase, 68-"*: Tatherod bj Spanldins, 69-71 ; anbatltntea pro-
ChaSB,9|-í, -.un,
bilí iiiirmlucd i>v Spauliliiiu 94:
«i.- '. 'Jl ": i'>l"S '.'7: j.f.n-iní!-. of
act. ns: olí-crou u,« víiIu<- ol tho cur-
rei.oy, l!*J. 213, 214.
:í. J..¡nt r<-*.lati..n of Jíionury 11,
■BiDpi
. lili,
Wilwn's r
r ."■"..' . h i V ?- > i " " i >■- ' V ■ ': í.' .-■ 'i.ii'liiiT valué of
thr- .-urr.Tir-v. ::«i.
■i. .\ot -I M ,.'.'11 :t. is-üi; h,ir..,]i,.:ilon <>r Lili. 1(«: provisi.m, ,.f 1,111. 110; .l.l»:it-, II" i:,¡ iimrti.'iiiK-tMK. lir.-H;
...ir-, lili. 117; r,I,,,i..i.,l,- .,1 nrl. 117. 118; .«flVrt on tho - ■■-
-,. 1,1,1 ooo.ooo, iK.
LkOAL-TKNDSL*
0,819.
on vaina of cnrrency, EOS ¡ effect of assassination on valúa of onrrencj, 206; sea abo 21 n„ 68 n„ 78. 208 o.
Linukbman, H. B., 142 □., 159 n.
I.ippi-.uvtVt Slmith.it Mooosint, 23 n.
Loan oomnTn™ : of New York banlt*. report of, 1862, 28 n., 29 II., 32 d.. 33. n„ 34 n., 35 d., 30 n.. 40 o., 41 n., 43 n.
Loíss. riDBEAL: of 1858, 5; of 1890, 5, 6, 8,11. 14; ofPebrnary 8,18(1, 8,9,11,12; of March 2,1881. 11: tlW.OOO.OÚO loan of 18(1, 18. 17, 19-43, 83, 84. 88. 90; flva- twenty loan of 1882. 79, 88-90, 104, 107, 108, 121, 123; temperan loan, 85, 88, 88, 90, 91, 92, 151, 152, 154; ten-fortj ioao of 1894, 123, 128; flvo-twenty loan of 1891, 128; oftect of loana on vaina of currencv, 202. See siso Treasurv notas. Certifica tas of indebtedneas, Demand
Loa Na, prívate: loas and gain la par- chaaing powor of principal cauaed bv greenbacks, 381-1.
Loan», btate. 20 n.
Lodibvillb: relativa renta in, 357.
lf*al-tenderb¡ll.»4,95; amends ■eaolatiun of Janaarv 1T, 1883, i also 59 n., 58 n„ 94 n., 110 n. oca, Hugb: a upointed secretar»
treasurv, 129. 202; pa/ment of dj, 127; reoonmenda ipeedv rtion of spocie pavmenU. iT¡, ¡ president of Bank of Sute of •¡MU, H7; ™ Inorease of spocu-
Hachinibts: i 345.
9 n..91
re «asea of. 299, 331.
UcPBEBaCH,B.,8n.
Mamn, C. A.: aatimate of effect of a-faen-
backsoucostof war,406; ser al» 74 u.,
18» n., 270 n„ 398 n. Hauhali., A. : 352 n., 381. Mabslabd, G., 27 n. Masón*: relativa wagea of, 299, 345. ■■dbiiit, J. K., 18S □., 227 n„ 234 n..
Mrihuh or duriiid «lar
oopa, Jolj 1 — - third
5BUCt ,,
if aecond election
574
HlSTOBY OF THE GBEENBACKS
Moorb, 212 n.
Moran, Charles, 189 n.
Mosoan, E. D. : disagreement with Chase over Cisco's successor, 124.
Morrill, Jubtin 8.: work in Commit- tee of Ways and Means, 45; attitude toward legal-tender bilí, 46; remarles od flrst legal-tender bilí, 58; anticipa- tion of early end of war, 72; substituto proposed for flrst legal-tender act, 75; opposition to legal-tender clause, 76; prophecy of second issue. 82 ; remarles onseoond legal-tender bilí, 96; remarles on third legal-tender bilí, 111; opposi- tion to further issues of greenbacks, 122: see also 55 n., 56 n., 57 n., 58 n., 59 n., 60 n., 68 n., 78 n., 110 n.
Mosrb, Beenabd, 144 n.
Nation, 398 n.
National bankino system: proposed by Chase, December, 1861, 37, 44: Spaulding's banking bilí. 45, 46; arpea by Chase, December. 1862, 103; bilí reported by Stevens, January 8, 1863. 105; urged by Lincoln, 109; issue of national bank notes, 148.
National Intelligencer (Washington), 19 n.,81.
Necessity foe legal-tender acta: affirmed by Spaulding, 47; incon- sisteney of argument, 49; argument of necessity in Congress, 61-7; Chase's opinión in 1862 and 1870, 70, 71; opinión of flnancial critics, 72-4.
Nkvah, 78 n.
Newcomb, Simón: estímate of increase in cost of war caused by greenbacks, 405 ; seo also 74 n.
Newspapers: demand for heavier taza- tion. 18, 19 n.: attitude toward flrst legal-tender bilí, 80, 81 ; reports of gold markets, 185. 186, 190; reports of ínter- est ratos, 966, 367.
New York Chambee of Commerce: ad- vises adoption of legal-tender bilí, 80; see also 19 n., 186, 196 n., 227 n.
Nicolay and Hat, 3 n., 15 n., 21 n., 68 n., 74 n.. 100 n.
Opdyke, Oeorge C, 163 n.
Opequan Creek, battle of: effect on valuó of curreney, 204.
Painters: relativo wages of, 299, 331.
Parker, T. M., 401 n.
Pattern-makers : relativo wages of, 299.
Pearce, J. A., 52 n., 59 n.
Pendleton, G. H. : remarks on flrst legal-tender bilí, 53; see also 52 n., 58 n., 59 n., 225 n.
Philadelphia : relativo rents in, 357.
Pike, F. A. : remarks on second legal- tender bilí, 95; seo also 55 n., 56 n., 58 n., 64 n.,65 n., 95 n., 111 n.
Pollock, James : recommendations minor coins, 169, 170.
Pomerot, T. M.: remarks on flrst legal* tender bilí, 57, 77; on aeoood legal- tender bilí, 95; see also 56 n., 68 bu, n n., 89 n., 95 n., 96 n.
Poor, H. V., 26 n., 27 n.
Port Hüdson, capture of: effect on valué of curreney, 204.
P<*t (Chicago), 159 n., 100 n.
Po$t (Boston;, 19 n., 81.
Postaos currency : history of tan act of July 17, 1862, 98, 99; circulation, Ml- 5,180.
Postmaster general : repoit of, De- cember, 1862, 163. 165 n.
Potters : relativo wages of , 318.
Powell, L. W., 54 n., 229 n., 335 n.
Premtum upon oold, 182-238; cf. tables showing valué of paper curreney in gold, 423-8.
Prest (Philadelphia),81.
Prices: of commodities at Wholesale, 243-56: of government snpplies, 256-9, 406-12 ; of commodities at reteJL25B-64 : in England, Germany, and the United States, 272, 273; effect on prices of government parchases, 265; of ínter- ruption in supply of southern producto, 266; oftaxation, 267-70; of enlistmeots in the army, 270 :of specolation. 270. 271 ; of the quantity of mooey, 271 ; oí the decline m gold, 272-5; of the paper standard, 275-9; general character and consequenoes of fluctuations, 136-40; relativo retail prices in four tnwns, 340 ; in eastern and western states, 346, 347; cf. tables in Appendix; relative prices of farm prodnets, 429-34 : of va- rióos commodities at wholesale. 435- 48 ; relative prices paid by federal gov- ernment for suppfíes, 449-51 : relative Í trices of varióos commodities at re- ail, 451-68; comparison of relative prices of 23 commodities at wholesale and at retail, 469.
Printers : relative wages of , 299.
Production of wbalth : effect of green- backs on, 392-8.
Profbssional men : relative earnings of, 821. ^^
Profits: use of the term. 380, 381; in- crease of profits caused oy decline of wages, rent, and interest, 382-5 ; effect of differences in relative prices upon profits, 385-8; profits of f armera, S&K; statistics bearing upon profits, 389-91 ; effect of high profits on interest, 374; on production of wealth, 365-6.
Prosperitt : discussion of , by war-tiaw pamphleteers, 392-4.
Public debt: increase of March 7 to July 1, 1861, 14; effect of greenbacks oo amount of. 403-20.
Public works (municipal): relativa wages of employees, 295, 344; see also 297 n.
QuANTTTT theort : and the valué of the greenbacks. 207-9; and prices, 271, 2ZL
Index
575
Quarbym en : relativo wages of, 299, 345.
Railwat bmployees: relativo wages of,
295, SU. RECETPTfl and ex pendí tures : annnal
reporta apon, 407, 408.
ReCEIPTS OF THÍ TREA8ÜRY (see alsO
Finances, state of the): January to March, 1862, 88: April to Jane, 1802, 90; Jaly to Septemoer, 1862, 101 ; increase of receipts from tazation, 120; reca- pitularon, 128-30 ; effect of greenbacks on, 412-17.
Rent: in towns, data eollected by Young, 353, 354: data eollected by Weelcs, 355-7 ; difference between rents i a eastern and western states, 355, 356: in cities and towns, 356, 357; rent of farms, 358, 359; c/. tables, 467, 468.
Reporta of secreta rt of treasury: July, 1861, 15, 16; December, 1861, 87; December, 1862, 102-4 ; December, 1863, 121 ; December, 1864, 125, 126 ; Decem- ber, 1865, 127, 128 ; effect of reports on valué of the correney, 201.
Republican (St. Loáis), 168.
Republican (Springfleld, Mass.), 19 n., 81, 158, 160 n., 161 n., 163, 164, 166 n., 167, 348 n.
Retail pbicbs (see Prices).
Revbnue oommission, 1865-66: inquiry into consumption of wealth, 401.
Rhodes, J. F., 88 nM 51 n., 73 n., 74 n., 212 n.
Rice, H. M., 77.
Riddle, A. Q. : remarles on third legal- tender bilí, 114 ; see also 110 n., 114 n.
Bollins, E. H. : opposition to legal- tender clause, 76.
St. Louis : relativo rents in, 357.
Sales of oold bt the treasurt, 225-7.
Sauerbeck, A. : English index-numbers, 272,273.
Saulsburt, W., 54 n.
School-teachers : relativo salaries of, 319, 320.
Schuckbrs, J. W., 4 n., 29 n., 43 n., 85 n., 123 n., 124 n., 125 n., 152 n., 176 n., 186 n., 226 n., 227 n.
Schurz, Carl, 189 n.
Schwab, J. C, 21 n.
Second hands : relativo wages of, 299.
Sedowíck, C. B., 78.
Seward, W. H., 68 n.
Sheffield. W. P. : remarles on second legal-tender bilí, 96 ; see also 52 n., 55 n., 59n.,60n.,94n., 110 n.
Shellababoer, S.: opposes repeal of "conversión" clause, 116; see also 65 n., 113 n.
S Hermán, John: remarles on flrst legal- tender bilí, 53, 65 ; opposition to tem- porary loan, 85, 86; remarles on second logal-tendor bilí, 95 ; vote upon it, 97 : proposed amendment maleing demand notes legal tender, 152; introduces
"gold bilis," 225,228; RecollcctionM, 10 n. ; see also 53 n., 55 n., 59 n., 61 n., 67 n., 78, 89 n., 105 n., 111 n., 225 n., 229 n.
"Shinplastesb" : circulation of, 159-64, 180.
Shipping and Commercial List (New York), 151 n., 152 n., 153 n.
"Shoddy aribtocracy" : extra vagance of, 398.
Simmons, J. F. : remarles on second legal-tender bilí, 94; see also 55 n.,
66 n., 73 n., 80 n., 95 n., 151 n.
Soetbeer, A.: index-numbers for Ger- many, 272, 273.
Soldiers : pay of . 334, 335, 406.
Sound Currency^ ZJ n., 52 n., 195 n.
Southern debtb: treatment of, in 1861, 21 and 21 n.
Southern producto : relativo prices of , 252-4, 266.
Spahr, C. R., 282 n.
Spauldinq, E. G. : worle on Committee of Ways and Means, 45 ; flrst draft of legal- tender bilí, 46; reasons assigned for it, 47; reply to Gal latín. 48-50; second draft of legal-tender bilí, 51 ; remarles on bilí, 52, 61, 64. 65. 67, 77, 80; " Father of the Greenbacks, * 69-71, 94; remarks on second legal-tender bilí, 94, 95. 96; remarks on third legal-tender bilí, 108, 111, 114 ; opinión of effect of greenbacks on business, 392; History of Legal- Tender Paper Money* 4 n., 19 n., 23 n., 25 n., 26 n., 27 n., 29 n., 33 n., 43 n., 45 n., 46 n., 47 n., 48 n., 49 n., 51 n., 52 n., 62 n.,
67 n., 68 n., 70 n., 73 n., 75 n., 76 n., 105 n. ; see also 55 n., 56 n., 57 n., 58 n., 61 n., 65 n., 82 n., 87 n., 89 n., 97 n., 110 n.
Spear, S. T., 74 n.
Specib payhents, suspensión of: by banks, 38-41, 144-8; by treasury, 41 ; re- sponsibility for, 41-3.
Speculation: and the premium upon gold, 185, 187, 188, 190, 191, 193, 194, 20», 210, 224 ; attempts to crush gold specu- lation. 223-32 ; speculation and prices, 270. 271 : effect of greenbacks on specu- lation, 396-8.
Spinner, F. E. : on wages of government clerks, 334.
Stamp tax : on sales of gold, 223, 224.
Standard of valué: fluctuations in specie valué of greenbacks. 135, 136, 140 n., 182-238; in prices, 239-79; effect of changos in the standard, see Wages, Rent, Interest, Proftts, Production, Consumption, Cost of war, Credit; community's interest in standard v*. flnancial interest of government, 403, 404.
St anton, E. M., 68 n., 105.
Stevens, Thaddeüs: chairman Com mittee of Ways and Means, 45; atti tudo toward legal-tender bilí. 46; n* marks on flrst legal-tender bilí, 52, 57 64, 65, 67, 77, 80; explanation of " fund ing provisions," 89 ; remarks on socoud
HlSTOBY OF THE GREENBACKS
lega I- tender bilí, 97: reporta loan and Tíli,asiiiqhí«,C.L.:
52 □., 55 o., 58 a., 61 n.. 78, 78 □., 82 n.,
81 n., 87 n., 91o, Stosivcdttkbb : relativa mges of. 289.
«5. Stohk tkase: relatiTO nages ¡n. 293,
BH. Steihes, 348 n. StTMNKB, Charles: ramarka (iu flrat
leBal -tender bilí, 54, 79; sea abo 55 n.,
59n.,60n., fin.
Sümnee, W. G„ 21 □., 43 a., 74 n.
Suo(Baltimore), SI D.
Taohbio, F. W.. H n., 71 n.
Taxation; tnadequaer of taxea leried ¡a Aufrast. 1881,18. 19. 63. 72; inórense of Uisb, 120: effect Of, on prioes, 287- 70; effect of greenbacks on recoipta f rom tasas, 112-17.
Tkahsteib: relativo waues of, 299, XII.
294, 295, 302, 330, 344. Tbohab. 1). F.¡ remarks on first legal-
tender bilí, 57, 63: opposition to lecal- tonderelause, 76; see abo 52 n-, Mu., 56 n., 57 n., 59 n., 60 n.
Thohab. P. F. : administraron of traas- nry.6-8.
Thompson. R. E., 189 n.
rime» (New York),» n., 3Bn„ 73 n., 81, 152 n., 153 n., 151 n., 15», 161 n., 193 n., l«9n., 200 n-, 202 n.. 204 u., 207 n., 215 n., 220 a., 222 n„ 223 n„ 221 n., 225 n., 228 n.,
: offered socretaryship of
3. P., 188 n. Tbeasobt note*; onn-ycar notes of 1837, r>: tme-xear notes of 1860,6, 7. 8,
II; Uvi.-yoai-TiotísoriStil, 13.13, 14.3); sijty-day notas of 1861.20; 7:30 notes
<>f llifii, 17. 2»; (me- and two-ymii ■ notes
,.f is.a. i:«. m, r», ni tí: c.m.pound-
iTil.sn-t nutes, i:13. 121, 12.-.. 131. 178; ■( ; :ill m.t.'í of 1S64. 125, 126, I-'T.ITT. 17»' ko.. alüo Oreen baclis, Demnnil notes of isil, <Vrt i flotea of indebledness. Tiiest akiaih: flu social effect of, 37,
_. ___ 'adminutráttoD, Jolr, wTlSÍ nnbütitnte proposed for flrat local- tender act, 75: nominatioo for moni- ñor of Oblo, Ó»; isa «Iso 60 n.
Vicksbi'bo, captvkbj o»: offoctuc tb!o« of carreney, 201.
Waoks: connection between idns» ,„ ,:r¡,-,^ and ¡n «no-.. 27U. 306; ..fu-
lllta.of Alitrtcll díl-irí. 21.1
375. thei
. .r r.,rc,il:Lt«.r¡T-..V!.
I,j m.li'i-lri.'.-.l-H -. :ili-i;i; !.■■ ..-.■■, t ■,::■• "I. 319-11, SH-i, 330, 3H : bí
.. .:'.'i ■.:-■■;. .(■' ■■■■■■■• i i ■ i .
Swam-aninps, 3UO-7. rS. H3; nnn llnrrii.ii ¡un-, L»'I '.:'., '.:■. '■■' . tion with nctnal oarniajet befóte ana- pensión, 303-1, 332.333: acloa.1 a-'Wf wniri ■-. iiK'n-aMbí, 308,309,333; rriilire
328-31. 316. 317; relaliro r" - ■
with Kaltn-r
ilerof RaTirws».
a reprnaantea by
ffeport. 340-41 ¡ compártela '—-i, 342. 343; hy inuusiries, .íh; dv oor-upe.tions, 34.'-: by mire-Kroni«, 345; Id eotvrn «nd ,-..■■: i
renardinr. 847-61 i cf. tabla of reUtin waeei oooipulrd from Titblf MI "f ili" M,ln,-h l.'.rvfl-f. (ID -.17: 'rom T„U* M\.ii,j;/.. .vw, 587; from Yol. iXi.dL. TenUí Omu. 51S-4M.
Waitr,F, C, VZn.
Walkeh, Amasa: remarks on third legal-tenderbilJ.lll.llS; sMalaollOu.. llln.,113n.,U4n.,39Bn.
Walíf.b. F. A., 52 n., 32S n.
Walkke.B. J., 10ii.,SBSd.
Waltihi, C. W., 61 n.. Mu,
Wah nbwb: effect o a Talneof cnrrency,
4ln„ 43n„ 70n., 124 n.,
dactioa of, 392-8; on o
,.,234, 235 r.., 237 u
,.201.209
i.,i-il, ■'■
Tiomi
United States
botes: seo Oreen backs, i, Demand notes of 1861. J.K.,27n.,52n..74n.
of tables
; of Ubleaof wajt
01, 309-13. J27; of ta"
■aun, 287-9. 291-8.
bles ofeoslol lii-
ina. 336, 337 ; of tablee of prieea of iirrri culto ral prodncts. 387.
Index
577
Wklls, David A. : inquiry into oarnings of professtonal men, 821 ; into rent of workincmen's houses, 853, 954; into profiteum; on canse of price fluctua- iiona, 269; on prosperity during war, SB2; on increase of speoulation, 887, 898; sea abo 851 n., 898 n.
Weston; O. II ., 189 n.
Wh abton, Josbph : opposition to oessa- tion of coinage of nickel cents, 160.
Wsra, Horacz, 25 n., 182 n., 406 n.
Wbolmalb Pricks (sea Prices).
WxLDKnrssa, battles of: effeot on Taina of cnrrency, 222.
Wilkihson, II. 8.» 18 n.
Willkt, W. TM 60 nM 77.
Williams, J. E», 26 n., 27 n., 43 n.
Williams. C. P.: estímate of effect of greenbaclcson cost of war, 406.
Wilson, G. F., 78n.
Wilson, Hekbt : offers resolution for a third issne of greenbacks, 106; see also 65 n., 65 n., 80.
Wilson, R., 77.
Wombn : relativo wages of , as compared with men, 291, 293, SJO-SOa, 807.
World (New York), 81, 205, 209 n., 234, 867 n.
Wrioht, H. B., 52 n., 63 n.
Tazoo rtvkb expedition: effect on yalue of cnrrency, 203.
Youno, Bdwabd : inyestigation into rent of workingmen's houses, 353-5.
RREÜ IF THIS BOOK 1S
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